* Originally posted at unocha.org.
A ceasefire or a pause in hostilities in Gaza would create an opportunity for the scale up of humanitarian assistance. This is needed to meet the urgent lifesaving needs of the population across all of Gaza. However, the conditions on the ground in Gaza pose significant challenges to the implementation of any scaled-up aid delivery.
This document identifies current challenges to aid delivery, the proposed solutions that need to be implemented primarily by Israeli authorities and the planned response for and initial 30 days (extendable) if there is an enabling environment. The proposed solutions and the planned response both include measurable indicators for implementation.
Humanitarian aid delivery in Gaza is currently constrained by:
1. Threats to humanitarian workers and installations. Movement and delivery capacity is increasingly constrained. Humanitarian partners face escalating challenges, with intensified combat and bombing occurring near Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) - designated routes, convoy holding points and humanitarian facilities.
2. A breakdown in law and order. This is partly due to the collapse of the civilian police force, leading to insecurity at the crossings and for convoys moving within Gaza. It is further compounded by the increase in armed gangs.
3. Regular denials or delays by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for coordinated movements. This results in delays, lost time and difficulty planning. Moreover, the UN convoy movement delays related to IDF permissions increase the level of risk due to nearby kinetic activity. Resources are regularly wasted as convoys spend hours waiting for the green light to move only to be denied, tying up operational capacity that might have supported other parts of the response during this time. In the South, a typical round trip involving trucks—traveling from the office to the crossing point for loading and returning to the office after offloading—takes an average of 20 hours.
4. Poor telecommunications. Communications challenges in Gaza continue to cause planning delays and security risks. Local networks are often down near crossings, satellite phones are frequently jammed, and outdated VHF equipment hinders convoy coordination. Despite efforts, little progress has been made on alternative satellite internet or upgrading VHF systems.
5. Large gatherings of desperate people who take cargo directly from the truck. Large crowds of desperate people often prevent trucks from moving and take goods directly from the truck. This severely limits agencies’ ability to reach vulnerable communities, fueling frustration with the UN and increasing security risks.
6. Lack of route alternatives. When the UN determines one route to be insecure or at too high a risk of looting, there is a lack of alternatives approved by Israeli authorities. Most of the routes assigned by the CLA are unsuitable, either impassable for long truck convoys, passing through crowded markets, or controlled by dangerous gangs.
7. Insufficient logistical equipment. This includes armored vehicles (Avs), spare parts, and protective equipment (vests and helmets, EOD equipment), which are currently not allowed by Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). This limits the ability of the UN to move safely. There is also a shortage of warehouse space in Gaza due to multiple evacuation orders. Additionally, following a series of critical incidents on UN convoys and UN managed facilities, the truck capacity that was available during the January ceasefire has been depleted.
8. Poor road conditions. Approximately 68 per cent of roads in Gaza are damaged. Overcrowding of people in the Southern Governorates is also limiting the ability of humanitarian supplies to move within the strip.
9. Unpredictable and inefficient supply lines. Supplies currently come from Israel, West Bank and Egypt to Kerem Shalom, Jordan to Zikim and Ashdod/Israel to Zikim and Kerem Shalom. However, not all of these crossings are predictably open. This makes it difficult to plan and results in humanitarian operations that are opportunistically delivered based on the supplies at hand rather than based on a planned response to the identified needs. New requirements, e.g. of customs clearance, are particularly cumbersome for health given diversity of supplied medicines/items. The lack of a designated UN run platform at crossing points complicates supply management, causes delays, and increases the risk of looting. Large-scale fuel entry is limited to Kerem Shalom, making north Gaza dependent on unreliable south-to-north coordinated transfers. Additionally, COGAT is introducing a restrictive fuel dispatch system through a single private provider for all humanitarian actors in Gaza.
10. Complicated process for the entry of humanitarian staff. With Rafah closed, UN and NGO staff can only rotate in via Kerem Shalom and exit through Jordan, a limited and unsustainable option that requires international staff to drive armored vehicles to the crossing. These vehicles, used for rotations, are then unavailable for field operations. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities are increasingly denying entry to humanitarian staff to Gaza.
11. Limitation of humanitarian partners able to deliver/dispatch aid to Gaza. Since 19 May, most INGOs and NNGOs have been excluded from 2720 clearance and convoy manifesting. UN agencies are also facing growing operational restrictions due to Israeli legislation and related policies.
Many of the above challenges would need to be solved if a scale up of humanitarian operations were to be implemented during a pause / ceasefire.
The following solutions need to be implemented prior to and during a ceasefire in order to enable a meaningful humanitarian response.
1. UN and humanitarian partners must be able to safely deliver assistance and monitor its delivery. This means that humanitarian locations and movements must not be targeted, including when moving in close proximity to any agreed buffer zone. During a potential ceasefire, civilian police may resume operations in certain areas.
Measurable indicator of implementation
2. Logistical equipment must enter Gaza urgently. The Israeli government must allow the urgent dispatch, through the reduction of bureaucratic processes, of communications equipment (including VHF and satellite solutions), protective gear, armored vehicles, trucks, spare parts, prefabs for staff accommodation and generators.
Measurable indicator of implementation
3. The population inside Gaza must be allowed to move freely and safely. A reduction of the congestion inside Gaza must be enabled by allowing the population to move freely and without fear of harassment, detention and being taken into custody. This means the population must remain able to travel South to North and vice versa and return to their areas of origin.
Measurable indicator of implementation
4. Entry of aid into Gaza and efficiency gains at existing crossings. The scale up of the humanitarian operation must make use of all available crossing points. Opening hours need to be expanded to optimize daylight hours and the crossing also needs to operate fully on Friday and Saturday. More than one crossing point into both the north and the south would be needed to mitigate against the risks of looting. If required, to avoid delays and fulfill the required daily target, Egyptian or Jordanian trucks could cross directly into Gaza to offload cargo at UN distribution points. It is essential that the IDF at crossing points refrains from excessive involvement in determining the composition, size, and destination of convoys, to ensure more efficient and predictable humanitarian operations.
Measurable indicator of implementation
5. Improved ability to move along main supply routes within Gaza. Effective aid delivery requires both the coastal and Salah ad Deen roads to be open from first light, with unrestricted access for UN staff and cargo. Humanitarian workers must be able to move through any remaining checkpoints without harassment, and the IDF must repair or facilitate repairs of damaged roads.
Measurable indicators of implementation
6. The private sector needs to be revived to complement the humanitarian response. Basic commodities from the private sector need to enter at scale, humanitarian aid cannot sustain a population of over 2 million people. If the target is 600 trucks entering Gaza per day, then 350 would need to be with commercial goods, 150 with UN and INGO supplies, and 100 with items collected by the Red Crescent societies and/or bilateral member state donations. Private sector goods need to be dispatched throughout Gaza.
Measurable indicators of implementation
7. Assistance must reach all of Gaza. Humanitarian assistance, including fuel, must be facilitated to all parts of Gaza to address the most urgent needs and to restore the trust of the community. Our inability to deliver will erode community acceptance.
Measurable indicators of implementation
8. Entry of critical humanitarian items must be facilitated. Restrictions on assistive devices, spare parts for AVs, trucks, comms equipment and vehicles must be eased urgently. Israeli authorities should also lift bans on items essential for the restoration, maintenance and continued functionality of sanitation, medical equipment, solar systems, generators, UXO clearance materials, and agriculture production.
Measurable indicators of implementation
9. Fuel, electricity and cooking gas. Sufficient quantities of fuel will be needed for hospitals, water and sanitation infrastructure, communications and humanitarian operations including frontline protection organizations working with children, women, older persons and person with disabilities and should be delivered throughout Gaza (North and South).
Measurable indicators of implementation
10. Visas need to be issued. Dozens of UN INGO staffers have been waiting for months for their visas to support Gaza operations from Jerusalem. Additionally, an increasing amount of UN, INGO and medical staff are denied entry to Gaza. These visas need to be issued and approval to enter Gaza facilitated.
Measurable indicators of implementation
If the above measures are agreed to and implemented, the following response from the UN will be feasible.
1. Food assistance. Scale up provision of food assistance across the whole of Gaza through provision of food-in-kind/food vouchers distributed directly to individuals/families, support to re-establishment of bakeries and establishing of kitchens for hot meal preparation and distribution, livelihoods support, and cash – digital payments. Children, pregnant women and older persons will be targeted for high-energy, nutrient- dense food items.
Measurable indicators of implementation
2. Health services. Expand health service delivery while preparing for, increasing detection of, and res ponse to outbreak-prone communicable diseases, and strengthening health logistics. Generator spare parts and consumables have been overused for 18 months. Currently only 18 out of 36 hospitals are partially functioning in Gaza.
Measurable indicators of implementation
3. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. WASH services are currently reaching approximately 20 per cent of the population in need.
A one-month pause would allow for reach to expand to at least 80 per cent of the population by providing sufficient water for communities and 1.8 million IDPs; supplying WASH facilities with critical operations and maintenance materials, fuel, equipment and tools, chlorine and chemicals. Multisectoral response to hygiene, inclusive sanitation and solid waste management in IDP centers, institutions and communities, and public health and hygiene awareness.
Measurable indicators of implementation
4. Nutrition. Initial screening of children under five years old has identified rates of malnutrition not previously experienced in Gaza. A Gaza-specific emergency protocol is being developed for prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition through increased screening and provision of preventative and curative supplies for pregnant and lactating women and children under five years old. This will include the establishment of stabilization centers and training for partners in MUAC screening and preventative activities for early identification of acute malnutrition cases.
With predicable access and the ability to rapidly scale up partner capacity, nearly 98 per cent of the target population can be reached within the one-month period.
Measurable indicators of implementation
5. Shelter. Provide emergency shelter and basic household items to displaced populations, extending coverage into the north and middle areas. Assistance will consist of tents that meet specific quality standards; sealing off kits to consolidate or improve makeshift shelters or weatherproof homes, and NFIs - vital bedding, kitchen items and winter clothing. Pending requisite supplies, the aim is to reach 200,000 people, prioritizing those in self- settled areas.
Measurable indicators of implementation