THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT ON PALESTINIANS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE WEST BANK

July 2007

United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
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The settlement of Betar Illit in Bethlehem governorate (see map of Palestinian governorates p. 146), the most rapidly growing settlement in the West Bank (see inset p.29). Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
Introduction

This report examines the humanitarian impact on Palestinians from the ongoing construction of settlements in the West Bank and other Israeli infrastructure, such as the Barrier and the roads, that accompany them.

The analysis shows that almost 40% of the West Bank is now taken up by Israeli infrastructure. It also demonstrates how roads linking settlements to Israel, in conjunction with an extensive system of checkpoints and roadblocks, have fragmented Palestinian communities from each other.

The deterioration of socio-economic conditions in the West Bank has been detailed in regular OCHA and World Bank reports over the last several years. These have underlined the fact that freedom of movement for Palestinians is crucial to improving humanitarian conditions and reviving socio-economic life.
The findings are based on extensive fieldwork combined with spatial analysis derived from satellite imagery. As the maps illustrate, the consequences of settlements and related infrastructure on Palestinian life are severe, and if current trends continue, socioeconomic conditions in the West Bank are likely to worsen. Despite the transfer of Israeli civilians into occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) being illegal under international law, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank settlements has continued to grow steadily by around 5.5% each year. In 2007, approximately 450,000 settlers live in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, alongside 2.4 million Palestinians.

More than 38% of the West Bank now consists of settlements, outposts, military bases and closed military areas, Israeli declared nature reserves or other related infrastructure that are off-limits or tightly controlled to Palestinians. The settlements and other infrastructure are detailed in Chapter One. The settlements are linked to each other and to Israel by an extensive road network. Palestinians for the most part are either prevented from using these roads or have only restricted access onto them. The roads and their restrictions on Palestinian movement are outlined in Chapter Two.

The West Bank has been dissected into dozens of enclaves by the settlements and related infrastructure. This fragmentation has negatively affected social and economic life for the vast proportion of Palestinians. Chapters Three and Four examine the impact of these restrictions in both urban and rural settings. Palestinians compete with Israeli settlers for West Bank resources, notably limited land and water, while their freedom of access and movement is denied. These issues, which are directly related to Israeli settlements and infrastructure, are detailed in the concluding chapter.

The Israeli settlement of Pesagot is located in Ramallah governorate with a 2004 population of approximately 1,380. Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007
OCHA has created a geo-database of Israeli presence in the West Bank drawing together a variety of primary resources including satellite imagery, Israeli topographical maps (Survey of Israel), available Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics data (ICBS) and Palestinian Ministry of Planning data. For more details related to methodology please refer to Annex 2.

According to the Israeli movement Peace Now (http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=57). However, throughout this report OCHA cites 2004 population data for the number of Israeli settlers living in the West Bank as this is the most current available data at the time the research and writing of this present document were conducted. See Annex 2. for more details about demographic data contained in this report.
Introduction
This chapter examines the variety and extent of Israel's physical control over land and resources in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. It details the establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure, including closed military areas, nature reserves and the West Bank Barrier.
Settling an occupied territory is illegal under international law. By its very nature, military occupation is seen as temporary. The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits the transfer of the Occupying Power’s civilian population into the territory it occupies since such settlement makes terminating the occupation more difficult. The illegal status of Israeli settlements has been confirmed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (see Annex 1.)

Israeli settlements in the West Bank

Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank
What is a settlement?

Settlements are organised communities of Israeli civilians established on land in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with the approval and direct or indirect support of the Israeli government. Apart from a few exceptions in East Jerusalem, residence in these communities is not open to West Bank and East Jerusalem Palestinians but only to Israeli citizens and to persons of Jewish descent entitled to Israeli citizenship or residency under the Law of Return.

There are 149 settlements in the West Bank including East Jerusalem. In addition, there are nine industrial sites which are Israeli owned and operated and located near settlements, usually within their municipal boundaries. These are often managed from nearby settlements and include Israeli industrial companies.

The territory controlled by settlements can be divided into two:

• ‘built-up areas’:

consist of residential areas, shopping centres and schools that make up the urban fabric of settler communities. This urban area is served by roads and industrial infrastructure to provide power, water and other services.

• ‘outer limits perimeter’:

the area beyond the urban fabric. The large majority of settlements are surrounded by a track, a road and/or a fence that determines a settlement’s ‘outer limits’ or current physical boundaries.
The surrounding fence of the large Ariel settlement in the northern West Bank (Salfit governorate). Photo by OCHA / Nir Kafri, 2007.

The surrounding fence of the Efrata settlement in the central West Bank (Bethlehem governorate). Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005.
Where are settlements located?

In 2007, approximately 57% of the total settler population in the West Bank lived within a 10 kilometre radius of the Old City of Jerusalem, many of them inside the Israeli declared Jerusalem municipal boundary. The encircling settlements have increasingly isolated East Jerusalem, home to approximately 250,000 Palestinians, from the rest of the West Bank (see Chapter Three).

Eighty per cent of the settler population lives within a 25 kilometre radius of Jerusalem in the Ramallah and Bethlehem governorates.

Most of the settlements deeper into the central West Bank are located on hilltops affording them a commanding presence over surrounding Palestinian communities. Other settlements, such as those in the Jordan Valley, have large areas of agricultural land under their control (see Chapter Four).

Most populated Israeli settlements by governorate in 2004

Source: OCHA. *Israel presence in the West Bank geo-database.* For more details see Annex 2.
Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank

Settlements: territorial and population expansion

Early settlement development was concentrated in and around East Jerusalem, along the Jordan Valley and on the eastern and western slopes of the northern West Bank mountains. Settlements were also established in and around Hebron and later in the southern Hebron hills and near the 1949 Armistice Line, commonly known as the ‘Green Line’. The establishment of new settlements was particularly prolific in the decade between 1977 and 1987.

Since the beginning of the Oslo Accords period in 1993, which left the issue of settlements to final status negotiations, the total settler population has increased by 63% (an absolute increase of more than 163,000 settlers between 1993 and 2004). The settlement population growth rate far exceeds the growth rate inside Israel. Between 2003 and 2004, for example, the settler population expanded by 4.6% compared with 1.8% inside Israel.

While fewer settlements were established after 1987, overall the settler population increased by nearly 150% between 1987 and 2004 - an average annual growth rate of 5.5% per year.

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<td>4</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA Israel presence in the West Bank geo-database For more details see Annex 2. Compilation based on 139 of the 149 settlements existing in the West Bank.
Dolev settlement located on a hilltop in Ramallah governorate commands the surrounding area including the Palestinian village of Ein Qinya (foreground). Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
In 1987, the 128 existing settlements covered 4,127 hectares of land. By 2005, the number of settlements had grown to 149 but the amount of land they covered had increased by nearly 400% to 16,375 hectares.\textsuperscript{14}
Settlement outer limits in 2005

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank

Expansion of Israeli settler population in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem

Population

Year

Source: OCHA, Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.

Expansion of Betar Illit settlement (Bethlehem). Residents of the Palestinian village of Nahhalin, foreground, are surrounded by Israeli settlements and will be cut off from the rest of the West Bank by the construction of the Barrier around the Gush Etzion block of settlements. Photo: by J.C. Torda, 2007.
Examples of territorial and population expansion between 1987 and 2005

The four fastest growing settlements:

- Ariel
- Newe Ya’akov / Pisgat Ze’ev
- Ma’ale Adumim
- Betar Illit

The following pages graphically detail the expansion by area and population of the four fastest growing settlements in the West Bank between 1987 and 2004/5. These settlements are located in ‘settlement blocs’ in the northern West Bank (Ariel), and north (Pisgat Ze’ev/ Newe Ya’akov), east (Ma’ale Adumim) and south (Betar Illit) of Jerusalem.
Ariel settlement

Ariel settlement, established in 1978, is located deep inside Salfit governorate in the northern West Bank. Palestinian communities, such as Marda, that once relied on Salfit as a main service centre, are now separated from it by the expansion of Ariel (see map opposite). Ariel will be encircled by the Barrier which extends 22km into the West Bank at this point.

Ariel settlement growth: population and land area covered since 1987

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>2004/5</th>
<th>Absolute Increase</th>
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<td>Area covered (in ha)</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>701.2</td>
<td>+624.8</td>
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<td>Settler population</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>16,414</td>
<td>+11,114</td>
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Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Chapter One

Expansion: 1987 – 2005

Salfit, Qira, Marda

Settlement territorial expansion

1987
- Built-up
- Outer limits

2005
- Built-up
- Outer limits

Source: see Annex 2.
The four fastest growing settlements

Newe Ya’akov / Pisgat Ze’ev settlements

Newe Ya’akov and Pisgat Ze’ev settlements were established within the Israeli declared Jerusalem municipal boundaries in 1972 and 1985 respectively. These two settlements were built in the midst of Palestinian urban neighbourhoods. They are linked to the Old City and West Jerusalem, as well as the large settlement of Ma’ale Adumin to the east, by a series of highways and now form one contiguous bloc.

| Newe Ya’akov / Pisgat Ze’ev settlement growth: population and land area covered since 1987 |
|---------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|
| Area covered (in ha)            | 1987 | 2004/5 | Absolute Increase |
|                                 | 104.3 | 603    | +498.7 |
| Settler population              | 18,200 | 61,285 | +43,085 |

Source: OCHA. Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Expansion: 1987 – 2005

Source: see Annex 2.
Ma’ale Adumim settlement

Ma’ale Adumim settlement, located to the east of Jerusalem along Road 1 towards the Jordan Valley, was established in 1975. The location of this settlement, the nearby Mishor Adumim settlement industrial area and other settlements along this east-west axis constitutes a bloc which effectively divides the West Bank into north and south. The completion of the Barrier in the Jerusalem area will ensure this ‘settlement bloc’ remains adjacent to Israel. Jahalin Bedouin have been displaced due to the expansion of the settlement.

Ma’ale Adumim settlement growth:
population and land area covered since 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2004/5</th>
<th>Absolute Increase</th>
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<tr>
<td>Area covered (in ha)</td>
<td>155.1</td>
<td>700.9</td>
<td>+505.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Settler population</td>
<td>11,110</td>
<td>28,293</td>
<td>+17,823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Chapter One

Expansion: 1987 – 2005

"Arab al Jahalin

Settlement territorial expansion

1987
- Built-up
- Outer limits

2005
- Built-up
- Outer limits

"Arab al Jahalin Palestinian community
The four fastest growing settlements

Betar Illit settlement

Betar Illit settlement is located within the Gush ‘Etzion ‘settlement bloc’ and has been the fastest growing settlement since its establishment. The encirclement of this bloc by the Barrier will ensure that Betar Illit remains adjacent to Israel, at the same time cutting off six Palestinian villages from their centre of life in Bethlehem.

Betar Illit settlement growth: population and land area covered since 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1987</th>
<th>2004/5</th>
<th>Absolute Increase</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area covered (in ha)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>507.8</td>
<td>+507.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Settler population</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>24,895</td>
<td>+24,734</td>
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Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Chapter One

Expansion: 1987 – 2005

Battir
Husan
Wa’di Fukin
Nahhalin

Settlement territorial expansion

Source: see Annex 2.
The establishment and expansion of Har Homa settlement

Construction is ongoing in approximately 75 settlements in the West Bank, in particular around East Jerusalem, according to Peace Now, an Israeli movement which monitors settlement activity. Peace Now also notes that in 2006 a total of 952 tenders were published for construction contracts in the West Bank while 1,272 new construction “starts” were noted in the first three-quarters of 2006.15

As the satellite image on the page opposite shows, Har Homa is a significant example of this expansion trend. Located south of Jerusalem, this settlement was established in 1997 on Abu Ghnaim mountain, less than 2km from Bethlehem. This area had been previously declared a ‘Green Area’ by the Israeli authorities after it extended the Jerusalem municipal boundaries in 1967 to include this land (in total adding 64 sq. km of the West Bank to East Jerusalem).

Declaring Abu Ghnaim mountain a Green Area prevented Palestinian urban expansion, officially to preserve the ecological diversity of the area.16 However, in 1997, Har Homa was created. In 2004, it was home to more than 4,400 settlers and by 2005, covered an area of more than 229 hectares.17 Expansion continues in 2006/07 (see A Financial Incentive: Housing in settlements and in Israel on page 29 of this report). The Barrier, when completed, will separate Har Homa from Bethlehem, but will be connected to Jerusalem and to Israel.


Har Homa area of expansion - as of May 2006

Source: see Annex 2.
Who are the settlers?

Settlers can broadly be defined into two categories:  

- **‘ideological settlers’**: These settlers follow a religious conviction that the West Bank is part of the “Land of Israel” and that it is their religious duty to settle in the West Bank. They are the pioneers of the settlement movement and typically live in settlements in the northern and central West Bank, most notably in the Nablus area. Extremist ideological settlers are also now located in Hebron’s Old City and the southern Hebron hills (see Chapter Four). Some, called the ‘hilltop youth’, are a predominant force behind the establishment of outposts (see next section).

- **‘economic settlers’**: These settlers are more likely to be motivated to move into settlements by financial incentives. Within this category, are Ultra-Orthodox Jews coming from the poorest neighbourhoods of Jerusalem and secular lower-middle class families. Over the years, much of the attraction of residing in settlements has come from the range of financial incentives such as housing subsidies, preferential loans and lower taxes that settlers typically enjoy.

Housing in settlements is typically much cheaper than the equivalent in Israel (see opposite box, A Financial Incentive: Housing in settlements and in Israel). Many of these settlers commute daily to jobs inside Israel along roads reserved primarily for their use (see Chapter Two).
A Financial Incentives: Housing in settlements and in Israel

New apartments in settlements are much cheaper that the price of similar apartments in West Jerusalem. Lower prices are a strong incentive to move to settlements.

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+ parking + storage
NIS 1,615,000*

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Gorgeous, spacious + balcony
Beautiful view, + 2 parking spaces + storage
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Iton Yerushalayim newspaper, 13 April 2007

Exchange rate, 1 NIS = 0.25 USD
An outpost is a settlement which has been set up without the proper authorisation. Outposts are illegal under Israeli law because they have not been authorised or planned by the Israeli government. The decision to establish a settlement must be made by GoI resolution and approved and signed by the military commander of the area. A formal settlement structure must be established in the framework of a lawful building scheme and it has to be built on Israeli-declared “state land”.

Under International law, however, both settlements and outposts are illegal (see Annex 1).

In 2006, there were more than 100 outposts in the West Bank with a population of approximately 2,000 settlers according to Peace Now.20

The establishment of outposts started in 1995 and has continued for more than a decade since the Government of Israel (GoI), responding to international pressure, largely stopped approving new settlements. Creating outposts has enabled the settler movement to circumvent the freeze on the establishment of new settlements. The majority of outposts were established in the years before and immediately after the start of the second Intifada, between 1998 and 2002.

In 2005, Talia Sasson, the former head of the State Prosecution Criminal Department, conducted an inquiry at the request of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Bureau into the establishment of “unauthorized outposts” and the involvement of state and public authorities.21
Her investigations revealed that many public authorities had illegally supported outposts through funding, allotting land and issuing permits for connection to water and electricity networks. The main public authorities identified included the Ministry of Defense and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) including the Civil Administration; the ministries of Construction and Housing, Interior Affairs and Agriculture; and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization.\(^2\)

Like a settlement, an outpost is usually protected by a patrol road and/or a security fence, marking its outer limits. Residents of outposts are entitled to IDF protection.

The establishment of outposts in the West Bank

Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database For more details see Annex 2.
Compilation based on 94 of the 96 existing outposts in 2005.
Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank

Where are outposts located?

Most outposts are connected to a ‘mother’ settlement. Approximately 90% of all outposts are located within three kilometres of an established settlement and some of these are situated inside its outer limits. Their close proximity to settlements provides not only the benefit of settlement services, infrastructure and security but also enables residents to claim that the outpost is not a new settlement but rather a ‘neighbourhood’ of the nearby settlement. The remaining outposts located further away (between 3–6 km) are linked to their nearest settlement(s) by a road.

The creation of an outpost close to a settlement expands the amount of land under the mother settlement’s control. The settlement and outposts develop their infrastructure and in some cases eventually merge. Over time some outposts have received retroactive legal approval based on the claim that they serve the “natural growth” needs of a settlement.

The physical features that connect settlements to outposts such as roads and fences and other infrastructure divide Palestinian areas, restricting Palestinian movement and access to agricultural land.

The four settlements with the highest number of outposts located around them – Shilo, Eli, Itamar and Yitzhar – are south of Nablus. Shilo and Eli settlements, for example, have eleven outposts (see map p. 39) in close proximity, reinforcing the connection between the settlement of Ariel and the Jordan Valley and impeding Palestinian movement. These settlements and outposts also have the potential of becoming a new settlement bloc in time.

Source: OCHA Israel presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2. Compilation based on 94 of the 96 existing outposts in 2005.
Chapter One

Outpost outer limits in 2005

Israeli presence in the West Bank

- Settlement outer limits
- Settlement industrial areas outer limits
- Outpost outer limits

0.2% 3.1%

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
As the table below indicates, the presence of outposts significantly increases the amount of land falling under the control of 'mother settlements' in the area.

### The connection between settlements and outposts in the northern West Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Land covered by settlement</th>
<th>Land covered by outposts surrounding settlement</th>
<th>Total land covered</th>
<th>% increase of land covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bracha</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itamar</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>1,737</td>
<td>3,326</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eli</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,805</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilo</td>
<td>4,380</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>5,198</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yizhar</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,925</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,983</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,908</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
The connection between Shilo and Eli settlements and their outposts

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
In certain areas of the West Bank, particularly in the Jordan Valley, a number of settlements and outposts rely on agriculture. In many of these, land is cultivated outside the outer limits of the settlement. This additional land, also under settler control, covers a further 10,122 hectares of West Bank land.\(^{25}\)

Agricultural land outside of a settlement’s outer limits increases settler control over an area and prevents Palestinian access and use. Cultivation of this land by settlers in the Jordan Valley threatens the viability of the area for local Palestinian communities and farmers, especially when combined with the additional Israeli presence in the form of ‘closed military areas’ (see next section) along this eastern strip of the West Bank.

![Greenhouses and agricultural land farmed by settlers from Massu’a settlement (population 140 settlers in the Jordan Valley). Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.](image-url)
Israeli land cultivation in 2005

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Military infrastructure in the West Bank

The IDF operates 48 military bases in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, controlling approximately 1,919 hectares of land, where Palestinian access is prohibited. Fourteen bases are located in the Jordan Valley.26

However, the presence of these military bases does not convey the full extent of land controlled for military purposes. More than one-fifth of the West Bank is designated as closed military areas/fire zones, including an area fenced along the border with Jordan.27 These areas effectively limit access and use by Palestinians of 115,034 hectares of land unless they have prior permission from the IDF or settlement regional councils.28

The vast majority of these no-go areas are located in the eastern strip of the West Bank, including most of the Jordan Valley. While settlements are not located within these areas, they are located around and between them. The military areas act as a physical division between the settler population and local Palestinian communities.

Land that had earlier been declared closed for military purposes has, in some cases, been later requisitioned for settlements. Beqa’ot settlement in the northern Jordan Valley and Kiryat Arba near Hebron are such examples.29 Within the Jordan Valley are eight ‘Nahal’ or dual military/civilian settlements where no population data is available on the number of resident Israeli civilians.
Chapter One

Closed military areas

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.

[Map showing Israeli presence in the West Bank]

- Settlement outer limits
- Settlement industrial areas outer limits
- Outpost outer limits
- Land cultivated by Israelis
- Military bases and closed military areas

21%

5.1%
Nature reserves in the West Bank

Israel has declared 49,348 hectares of West Bank land as nature reserves. Under the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, a further 16,665 hectares of West Bank land was agreed by the GoI and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to be set aside as Green Area/Nature reserves.\textsuperscript{30}

With the exception of the Wye River Memorandum, all nature reserves in the West Bank are under Israeli civil and security control (within Area C under the Oslo Accords) and the majority are located along the eastern strip of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{31}

The declaration of land as a nature reserve severely restricts all other use and all development is forbidden. Palestinian shepherds and farmers caught crossing through nature reserves under Israeli control, risk fines for trespassing from the Israeli authorities.

As illustrated in the map opposite, more than 30\% of the area defined by Israel as nature reserves overlaps with closed military areas, in which Palestinian entry is forbidden.
Chapter One

Nature reserves

Israeli presence in the West Bank

- Settlement outer limits
- Settlement industrial areas outer limits
- Outpost outer limits
- Land cultivated by Israelis
- Military bases and closed military areas
- Israeli declared nature reserves*

* Includes land covered by Israeli designated nature reserves located inside the closed military areas

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
The Barrier

Israel began construction of a Barrier in the West Bank in June 2002. The GoI has stated that the Barrier was conceived to reduce the number of terrorist attacks. It maintains that “the sole purpose of the Security Fence, as stated in the Israeli Government decision of July 23rd 2001, is … security … [and] Israel’s response to suicide bombers who enter into Israel”.

However, GoI officials have since stated that the Barrier could also have political implications. On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, issued an opinion that Israel’s construction of the Barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and its associated gate and permit regime, violated international law. The ICJ called on Israel to:

- ‘cease construction of the Barrier ‘including in and around East Jerusalem’,
- dismantle the sections already completed,
- repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto.’

Although this is an advisory, non-binding legal opinion, on 20 July 2004, an overwhelming majority of UN member states voted for General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, which called on Israel to comply with the ICJ opinion. Israel has not complied with the ICJ opinion and Barrier construction continues.

On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, issued an opinion that Israel’s construction of the Barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and its associated gate and permit regime, violated international law. Although this is an advisory, non-binding legal opinion, on 20 July 2004, an overwhelming majority of UN member states voted for General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, which called on Israel to comply with the ICJ opinion. Israel has not complied with the ICJ opinion and Barrier construction continues.

The Court also concluded that Israel has an obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all persons affected and that Israel is under a responsibility to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized for purposes of construction of the Barrier in the oPt. UNROD, the UN Register of Damage, was established by a General Assembly resolution in December 2006, to compile damage claims for Palestinians affected by the Barrier.

On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, issued an opinion that Israel’s construction of the Barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and its associated gate and permit regime, violated international law. Although this is an advisory, non-binding legal opinion, on 20 July 2004, an overwhelming majority of UN member states voted for General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, which called on Israel to comply with the ICJ opinion. Israel has not complied with the ICJ opinion and Barrier construction continues.
The route of the Barrier

Percentage of Barrier constructed, under construction and projected - as of May 2007

- 33.5% Projected
- 9.9% Under construction
- 56.5% Constructed

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
The current route of the Barrier was approved by the Israeli cabinet in April 2006. As a result, nearly three-quarters of the total projected Barrier route (525 of the 721 km) runs inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and not along the Green Line. When complete, approximately 10.2 percent of West Bank territory, including East Jerusalem, will be isolated by the Barrier and physically connected to Israel. 37

The area affected includes some of the most agriculturally productive land and richest water resources in the West Bank:

• In the Salfit district, construction of the Ariel ‘Finger’ and a portion of the Qedumim ‘Finger’ will isolate almost 50% of the district’s land.
• Completion of the Barrier around the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc will separate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, restricting access to workplaces, health, education, and to places of worship.
• Further south, the route of the Barrier around the Gush Etzion settlement bloc will sever the last route between Bethlehem and Jerusalem and isolate the majority of Bethlehem’s agricultural hinterland.

In total, the Barrier encircles 69 Israeli settlements - comprising 83% of settlers 38 - and physically connects them to Israel. Conversely, in terms of Palestinians affected, it is estimated that at least half a million people live within one kilometre either side of the Barrier.

Concern is mounting that Palestinian farmers could risk dispossession of their land in the areas west of the Barrier if their access continues to be denied. 39 Through the application and reinterpretation of the Ottoman Land Code to the West Bank, Israel has previously expropriated large areas of land from their Palestinian owners since 1967. 40

The ICJ in its July 2004 Advisory Opinion concluded that “the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation”. 41

The Barrier along Road 60 from the Palestinian neighbourhood of Ar Ram to Qalandiya checkpoint. Watchtowers and other surveillance measures augment the nine-metre high concrete wall. Much of the Barrier in East Jerusalem is made up of such concrete features. Photo by OCHA Steve Sabella, 2005.
The Barrier runs through the middle of Abu Dis in East Jerusalem, fragmenting this once bustling urban centre and dividing Palestinian families from their traditional service providers. Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005.
The creation of ‘closed areas’ in the northern West Bank

In October 2003, the area between the Barrier and the Green Line in the northern West Bank was declared closed by military order. All Palestinians living there, or wanting to enter are now required to obtain permits from the Israeli authorities.

Fifteen Palestinian communities are enclosed in these areas, physically separated by the Barrier from the rest of the West Bank. The majority of the people affected require ‘long term’ or ‘permanent resident’ permits to continue to reside in their homes on their lands. If this gate and permit regime is extended to the completed barrier, approximately 60,000 West Bank Palestinians living in 42 villages will live between the Barrier and the Green Line in such closed areas.42

The Barrier also isolates the land and water resources of a far greater number of Palestinian farmers who now require ‘visitor permits’ to access their farmlands lying on the west of the Barrier. The humanitarian problems which the Barrier poses for Palestinians are detailed in Chapter 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of settlements</th>
<th>Total settler population</th>
<th>Total area of land covered (in hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>west of the Barrier*</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>365,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>east of the Barrier</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>421,669</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*actual / projected closed areas

Source: OCHA. Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Actual and projected areas west of the Barrier

**Israeli presence in the West Bank**

- Settlement outer limits
- Settlement industrial areas outer limits
- Outpost outer limits
- Land cultivated by Israelis
- Military bases and closed military areas
- Israeli declared nature reserves
- Actual / projected areas west of the Barrier*

* Includes land covered by Israeli designated nature reserves located inside the closed military areas

**Source:** see Annex 2 and 3.
The measures detailed in this chapter - Israeli settlements, outposts, cultivated areas, military infrastructure, nature reserves and 'closed areas' west of the Barrier - have effectively placed 38.3% of the West Bank beyond the reach of Palestinians.

As a result, the West Bank has been considerably narrowed for Palestinians, limiting their potential for growth and development (see map opposite). This is true both vertically - east and west - and horizontally - see the narrowing in the Jerusalem area and the two large incursions of the Barrier in the northern West Bank.

Moreover, in those areas remaining for Palestinians, a road system linking Israel with the settlements - and an accompanying system of closures - further fragments the West Bank and restricts Palestinian movement and activity. These additional issues are discussed in the following chapter.
The narrowing of the West Bank for Palestinian use

**Israeli presence in the West Bank**
- Settlement outer limits
- Settlement industrial areas outer limits
- Outpost outer limits
- Land cultivated by Israelis
- Military bases and closed military areas
- Israeli declared nature reserves
- Actual / projected areas west of the Barrier

![Map of Israeli presence in the West Bank](image)

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Endnotes

1. East Jerusalem is defined for the purpose of this report as the part of the city that is east of the 1949 Armistice Line (commonly referred to as the Green Line). There is no internationally recognised delineation of how far east the city extends as the municipal boundary drawn by Israel after the 1967 war is not recognised by the international community (UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 267), nor was the formal annexation of the city by Israel in 1980 (UN Security Council Resolution 476 and 478). For practical purposes, however, within this report, East Jerusalem refers to the part of the city between the Green Line and the Israeli declared municipal boundaries.

2. The former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, who is acknowledged as the ‘father of the settlements’, observed in his 2001 autobiography, Warrior: “Military units can be in one place today, while tomorrow they can be moved somewhere else. They are subject to the shifting policies of every new government. From our historical experience we knew that only settlements could secure a claim to land.” Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, Warrior – an Autobiography, Touchstone, 2001, p. 403.

For a detailed account of the various mechanisms used by the Government of Israel (GoI) to requisition land in the West Bank for settlement construction and expansion, see B'Tselem, Land Grab – Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002, particularly Chapter 3. Available at www.btselem.org.

3. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2. This figure includes all settlements established in the West Bank by 2005, including 12 settlements in East Jerusalem and eight ‘Nahal’ (dual civilian/military settlements) in the Jordan Valley and Hebron and Bethlehem governorates.

Included within this figure are also five settlements established in ‘no-man’s land’. During the negotiations for the 1949 Armistice Agreement, Israeli and Jordanian parties disagreed about the demarcation of the cease-fire line in some areas. As a result, two lines were drawn, such as in the Latrun corridor and around some parts of the west Jerusalem. The area lying between the two lines became known as no-man’s land and was subject to neither Israeli nor Jordanian control.

Not included within this figure is settlements inside the area known as Mount Scopus in East Jerusalem (which under the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan was recognised as having a special status) and the four northern West Bank settlements dismantled as part of Israel’s unilateral disengagement in September 2005.

According to Israeli Peace Now movement there are 121 official Israeli settlements in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem).


5. B’Tselem, Land Grab – Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002. Beyond the settlement outer limits lie two additional jurisdictional areas: the municipal boundaries and regional councils. According to B’Tselem: “The municipal boundary of each settlement is the area of authority of the local committee or council … [and] … constitutes the planning zone of the special planning committees” p. 92. The regional council area of jurisdiction “includes the areas of jurisdiction of the regional councils that lie beyond the municipal boundaries of a specific settlement. These areas include all the land Israel has seized control of during the years of occupation (with the exception of land included in Areas A and B) … This land is intended to serve as reserves for the future expansion of the settlements or to establish new industrial zones along the lines of those established in recent years” p. 92. These areas typically overlap with both nature reserves, closed military areas and other Israeli measures described throughout this chapter.

6. These industrial sites include the Barqan and Ariel industrial zones in the northern West Bank, Atarot and Mishor Adumim industrial zones around Jerusalem and Kiryat Arba and Shim’a industrial zones in the southern West Bank. The classification of these additional Israeli civilian areas as ‘settlement industrial areas’ is largely consistent with the characterisation used by groups such as Peace Now and the Foundation for Middle East Peace.

7. In 1967, Israel re-drew the Jerusalem municipal boundary and extended its civil control over 70 sq. km of newly occupied territory. Included within the expanded municipal boundary were not only parts of Jerusalem that had been under Jordanian rule but also an additional 64 sq. km of land, most of which had belonged to 23 villages in the West Bank. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.


9. Demographic information unavailable in the Statistical Abstracts of Israel (ICBS) for nine settlements. In addition, the population of Maccabim settlement is unavailable as it has been merged by ICBS with the population of a nearby city inside Israel. In September 2005, four settlements in the northern West Bank were dismantled by the Government of Israel as part of the Disengagement plan. The population figures of these four settlements are not included in the OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database.

10. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.


17. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.


21. According to Sasson, “A substantial number of outposts were built with the involvement of public authorities and State bodies, but with no authoritative decision by the Government of Israel … These authorities have legitimate powers regarding the Israelis in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, but they apparently use their powers unlawfully in connection with unauthorised outposts…” Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, Talia Sasson, Adv., 10 March 2005. Available at www.mfa.gov.il.

Under Phase 1 of the Roadmap, Israel was required to immediately dismantle all outposts created after March 2001. In her report, Talia Sasson identified that 24 outposts had been established since this time.

22. For an account of the complex role played by the Settlements Division of the World Zionist Organization in the initiating, planning and funding of settlements see B’Tselem, Land Grab, Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002.


26. The Jordan Valley is the stretch of land located at the base of a mountain ridge that runs adjacent to the Jordan Valley. The valley crosses Israel and the West Bank from the Sea of Galilee in the North to the Dead Sea in the South. For the purposes of this report, the Jordan Valley is defined as that part of this area within the West Bank. See, OCHA, Special Focus, The Jordan Valley, October 2005. Available at www.ochaopt.org.

27. This fenced-in area covers 15,789 hectares of land. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.


30. The Wye River Memorandum signed by the GoI and PLO on 23 October 1998 was a further agreement to implement the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C (see Conclusion). Part I of this memorandum under A: Phase One and Two Further Redeployments provided “1. Pursuant to the Interim Agreement and subsequent agreements, the Israeli side’s implementation of the first and second F.R.D will consist of the transfer to the Palestinian side of 13% from Area C as follows: 1% to Area (A) 12% to Area (B) … The Palestinian side has informed that it will allocate an area/areas amounting to 3% from the above Area (B) to be designated as Green Areas and/or Nature Reserves. The Palestinian side has further informed that they will act according to the established scientific standards … [and] … while these standards do not allow new construction in these areas, existing roads and buildings will be maintained”.
Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank

31. Responsibility for the nature reserves within Area C was never transferred to the Palestinian side.

32. Israel Seam Zone Authority (http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il).

33. On 4 July 2006, Israeli Minister of Justice Haim Ramon stated to Israeli radio, “that the separation fence is being built first and foremost for security reasons, but at the end of the day it has political implications.” The radio reported that, “in a tour of the fence route in the Macabim, Nahal Modiin, Mount of Olives and Beitar Elit, Minister Ramon said that the fence was built from the perspective that settlement blocs adjacent to the Green Line deserve protection but without unreasonably harming the Palestinian population.” IBA Radio Website summarizing an interview with Haim Ramon on the 5:00 pm News Magazine, 4 July 2006. In December 2005, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni announced while she was still Justice Minister that the fence would serve as “the future border of the State of Israel.” In fact, she said, “by means of its rulings on the separation fence the High Court was sketching the borders of the state.” Her statements, made in a public forum in the presence of High Court justices, aroused ire; they were said to contradict the position the State Prosecutor’s Office presented to the High Court. “One does not have to be a genius to see that the fence will impact the future border,” Livni also said at the time.” “State to Court: Fence route has ‘political implications.’” Haaretz, 14.6.2006, by Yuval Yoaz, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/726478. See OCHA, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of the April 2006 Barrier Projections, July 2006. Available at www.ochaopt.org.

34. ICJ, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004 (A/ES-10/723).

35. The UN General Assembly in resolution ES-10/15 demanded that Israel comply with its legal obligations outlined in the Advisory Opinion (A/RES/ES-10/15, 2 August 2004).

36. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para.152-153.

37. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2. Because of its meandering path deep into the West Bank, the Barrier’s length is more than twice that of the Green Line which lies adjacent to Israel at 315 km.

38. Op cit.


40. In the early 1980s, the Government of Israel reinterpreted the Ottoman Land Code, to allow the Commander of the IDF in the Region to declare as ‘State Land’ uncultivated miri land that had not been registered during the British Mandate or Jordanian rule. Between 1980 and 1984, Israeli authorities declared approximately 80,000 hectares of the West Bank as State Land, at times without the knowledge of Palestinian farmers who had possessed it for decades (see B’Tselem, Land Grab – Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002). Much of the land in the closed areas has already been declared State Land and Israeli settlements have been constructed in the closed areas (M. Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israeli’s Policies, American Enterprise Institute Studies in Foreign Policy (1984), p. 32). However, there remains declared State Land in the closed areas where no settlement construction has taken place and where Palestinian farmers before the construction of the Barrier continued to cultivate the land. There is also concern over the risk of dispossession regarding unregistered Palestinian land that has not been declared State Land.

41. ICJ, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,9 July 2004 (A/ES-10/723), para. 121

Chapter Two

Settlements, roads, closures - Palestinian enclaves

As shown in Chapter One, settlements and other Israeli infrastructure, including the Barrier, have significantly narrowed the amount of land that Palestinians can live in, use or access. More than 38% of West Bank territory is effectively off-limits or restricted to Palestinians.

There is an additional layer of restrictions placed on Palestinians. This chapter examines how Palestinian movement is inhibited by roads reserved primarily for Israeli use and the system of physical obstacles and permits that accompanies them.

These roads have two major impacts. First, Palestinians are restricted from using roads between their key towns and communities. Second, the roads have become barriers for Palestinians wishing to cross them. One community has been separated from another by roads reserved for Israeli use. They have, therefore, further fragmented the West Bank, creating isolated Palestinian enclaves.
Settlements, roads, closures - Palestinian enclaves

A road network primarily for Israeli use

Settlements depend on their connection to each other and to Israel; they cannot exist in isolation.

A network of 1,661 kms of roads, on which Israeli vehicles must travel by IDF order, links settlements, military areas and other infrastructure in the West Bank with Israel.¹

Some roads have been newly built, while others have resulted from upgrading pre-existing primary roads. Via these roads Israelis move freely between the West Bank settlements and Israel.

Palestinian access on to this network is restricted by a closure regime consisting of approximately 85 checkpoints, 460 roadblocks and a permit system for Palestinian vehicles (see pp.64-66).

The impact on Palestinian life has been profound. The key thoroughfares throughout the West Bank on which Palestinians have traditionally depended are closed or restricted, shutting routes traditionally used for trade, and normal movement to jobs, hospitals, schools, universities.

The World Bank notes that “in economic terms, the restrictions arising from the closure have not only increased the transaction costs but have also led to a level of uncertainty and inefficiency which has made the conduct of business difficult and therefore has stymied the growth and investment which is necessary to fuel economic revival”.²

The IDF states that the reason for the closure regime – which was mostly implemented in the course of the second Intifada – is to reduce attacks on Israelis by Palestinian militants by limiting their ability to move freely by vehicle.

In practice, these measures have enforced the status of certain West Bank roads as almost exclusively for Israeli / settler use, thereby, creating a ‘sterile’³ traffic flow for Israelis accessing settlements.

¹ Some roads have been newly built, while others have resulted from upgrading pre-existing primary roads. Via these roads Israelis move freely between the West Bank settlements and Israel.

² The impact on Palestinian life has been profound. The key thoroughfares throughout the West Bank on which Palestinians have traditionally depended are closed or restricted, shutting routes traditionally used for trade, and normal movement to jobs, hospitals, schools, universities.

³ The IDF states that the reason for the closure regime – which was mostly implemented in the course of the second Intifada – is to reduce attacks on Israelis by Palestinian militants by limiting their ability to move freely by vehicle.

In practice, these measures have enforced the status of certain West Bank roads as almost exclusively for Israeli / settler use, thereby, creating a ‘sterile’ traffic flow for Israelis accessing settlements.
Chapter Two

Roads primarily for Israeli use

**Type of roads primarily for Israeli use**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Length in km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpost roads</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military road</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,661</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA,Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Settlements, roads, closures - Palestinian enclaves

Major and regional road network

There are at least 20 major and regional roads primarily for Israeli use that specifically link West Bank settlements to each other and to Israel.4

There is no distinction in name or number between the sections of these regional roads, whether located in Israel or in the West Bank. Israeli traffic moves easily from one side of the Green Line to the other, passing through checkpoints with minimal delay.

The map opposite of the southern West Bank shows this interconnection. A settler from Kiryat Arba wishing to go to Be’er Sheva in southern Israel can travel seamlessly on Road 60. Road 35 provides similar direct access to another major Israeli city, Ashkelon to the west.

In Israel, Road 35 intersects with the new Road 6 highway, stretching from north to south, which when complete will provide easy access to all parts of Israel.

The main Road 443 from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv runs through the West Bank. It is completely blocked for West Bank Palestinians by a series of walls and fences on both sides of the road. Palestinians pass under this road through two narrow underpasses. Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
Connection of roads primarily for Israeli use in the southern West Bank to major roads in Israel

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Bypass road network

Many of the major roads that traditionally connected Palestinian urban centres are now reserved for Israeli use. Other sections of roads were specifically built to by-pass Palestinian localities.³

For example, segments of Road 60, the main north-south road that runs the length of the West Bank, were diverted after 1993 around the major Palestinian urban centres. The old Road 60 passed through the Palestinian cities of Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah and Nablus. The new Road 60 diverts traffic around all these centres (see map opposite for the southern section of Road 60).

Palestinians are generally restricted from travelling on the main routes taken over or purpose-built for Israelis by a range of physical obstacles (see page pp.64-66).

A bridge and a series of tunnels is used by Israeli settler traffic to bypass Bethlehem and its surrounding villages and to ensure easy access for the Hebron area settlements to Jerusalem. Photo: by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
Old versus new Road 60 – an example of bypassing Palestinian communities in the southern West Bank

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Physical components of the closure regime

A comprehensive system of 85 manned checkpoints and more than 460 physical obstacles regulates or prevents Palestinian vehicles from using those West Bank roads primarily reserved for Israeli use. The IDF states that closures are necessary to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian militant attacks since the start of the second Intifada. The number of physical obstacles in the West Bank has increased by more than 45% since August 2005.6

- **CHECKPOINT:**
  A barrier manned by the IDF, Border Police and/or private security companies with observation towers and other physical blocks used to control pedestrian and vehicular access.

- **PARTIAL CHECKPOINT:**
  An established checkpoint structure operating periodically.

- **ROADBARRIER:**
  A fence or other physical barrier of more than 100 metres in length, which runs alongside a road primarily reserved for Israelis. This obstructs the free passage of Palestinian people, vehicles and animals onto, off, or across the road.

- **EARTH WALL:**
  A series of earthmounds alongside a road used to prevent vehicles from crossing.
**- ROADGATE:**
A metal gate used by the IDF to control movement along roads.

**- EARTHMOND:**
A mound of rubble, dirt and/or rocks to obstruct vehicle access.

**- ROADBLOCK:**
A series of one metre concrete blocks to obstruct vehicle access.

**- TRENCH:**
A ditch dug across or alongside a road to prevent vehicles from crossing.
The number of obstacles in the West Bank since 2003

Source: OCHA. Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
Residents of Sa’ir once crossed Road 60 by vehicle to reach the city of Hebron.

Today, roadblocks and earthmounds stop vehicles crossing Road 60. The route that Sa’ir residents take is much longer and more circuitous. The example of Sa’ir village is typical of many throughout the West Bank.
West Bank closures: creating a two-tier road network

The closure regime blocks the Palestinian routes that once flowed onto the roads now used primarily by settlers and prevents Palestinian traffic from accessing them.

As the map opposite shows, nearly all of the physical obstacles and checkpoints that make up the closure regime are located along the primary and secondary roads for Israeli use.

In practice, Palestinians are compelled to use an alternative road network of secondary and more circuitous roads that run between the Israeli road network. In effect a two-tier road system – Israeli and Palestinian – operates side-by-side.

Limited Palestinian travel is still possible on the primary Israeli road system, but Palestinian drivers wanting to travel on these roads need permits. A different permit is generally required depending on whether the vehicle is commercial, public transport or private car. Few drivers of private cars are able to obtain these permits.

For those Palestinian drivers who succeed in obtaining permits, passage on the controlled road system is controlled by checkpoints. In addition to the 85 fixed and partially manned checkpoints, random – or flying checkpoints – are regularly set up by the IDF.

In July 2007, approximately 100 – 120 flying checkpoints were observed each week. Long delays are regularly reported at flying checkpoints and their unpredictable nature makes Palestinian travel plans difficult.

The closure regime that originated as a temporary security measure during the peak of terrorist attacks now appears institutionalised (see graph p. 66 for closure pattern).
Location of the closures

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.

Chapter Two
Fragmenting the West Bank into Palestinian enclaves

As the map opposite illustrates, the roadblocks and checkpoints not only stop Palestinians travelling on roads primarily for Israeli use, but also prevent Palestinian vehicles crossing these roads. The road system has fragmented the West Bank into a series of Palestinian enclaves.

Each Palestinian enclave is geographically separated from the other by some form of Israeli infrastructure including settlements, outposts, military areas, nature reserves and the Barrier. However, the Israeli road network is the key delineator in marking the boundaries of the enclaves. The road network functions to provide corridors for travel from Israel and between settlements in the West Bank, and barriers for Palestinian movement.

Palestinian communities on one side of a road can no longer travel by vehicle across the road to a neighbouring community on the other side because they cannot cross the Israeli road network. Instead, they are forced into longer, more circuitous roads to go distances that once took a few minutes.
Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank

Israeli presence in the West Bank

- Settlement outer limits
- Settlement industrial areas outer limits
- Outpost outer limits
- Land cultivated by Israelis
- Military bases and closed military areas
- Israeli declared nature reserves
- Actual / projected areas west of the Barrier
- Roads primarily for Israeli use

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Connecting enclaves

The map shows how checkpoints are strategically placed along the roads primarily for Israeli use network or at the entrance points to Palestinian enclaves. Flying or random checkpoints augment this system of control.

On these roads, all Palestinian vehicles – private, commercial and public transport – can be checked at these points to ensure they hold the correct permits to travel on these roads.

Unauthorized Palestinian vehicle access onto this road network is now almost impossible because of physical obstacles, in particular the trenches, road barriers and earth walls.

Excluded from travelling freely on these roads and with the West Bank fragmented, the question is how do Palestinians move from one enclave to another. In many places, the same checkpoints that regulate Palestinian traffic on the Israeli road network also check Palestinians moving between enclaves.

A growing trend is to funnel Palestinian traffic under the Israeli road network via tunnels and underpasses. Palestinian vehicles, therefore, remain on their inferior secondary road network, but pass under roads primarily for Israeli use to Palestinian communities in nearby enclaves. In effect, Israelis and Palestinians use a parallel road system.

To maintain this separation further, some Palestinian roads are being upgraded to allow for the increased Palestinian traffic flow.

In addition, the IDF are constructing what they term ‘fabric of life’ roads. Most of these purpose-built roads are located around Jerusalem where traditional links between communities have been severed by the Barrier and closures. They are designed to provide alternative connections to the traditional links Palestinians once used via specially created roads that avoid Israeli settlements and road network.

A sunken road (see photo below) is under construction to link the Biddu (pop. 35,000) with Bir Nabala (pop. 15,000) enclaves. The road will pass under Israeli settlement roads.

The pattern of checkpoints and tunnels are designed to limit and funnel Palestinian traffic while simultaneously permitting unimpeded movement for settlers. Where there are no settlements, as in the northern West Bank, for example, there is little fragmentation and Palestinians move more freely.

The fragmentation is at the root of the West Bank’s declining economy. The impact of this fragmentation on both urban and rural Palestinian communities is examined in the following chapters.
Palestinian movement between enclaves

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Endnotes

1. This prohibition by the IDF is largely to prevent Israelis from entering areas A and B under Palestinian control. Some of these roads are designated by military order for Israeli use only. Examples include: Road 1 linking Jerusalem to Ma’ale Adumim settlement; Roads 557, 5066, 4765 and a segment of Roads 60 and 5, which link settlements surrounding Qalqilya city to each other and to Israel; and, from Israel, Roads 5 and 505 feeding into the Jordan Valley settlements as well as the An’er, Shilo, Eli chain of settlements and associated outposts. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.


3. Phrase used by B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads, Israeli Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank, August 2004, p.13. Available at www.btselem.org. This is a phrase that B’Tselem frequently heard used by IDF soldiers and concluded is part of the IDF’s internal vocabulary (Communication, B’Tselem, 20 June 2006).


4. Source: OCHA Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.

5. The Israeli geographer Elisha Efrat states that the bypass road system was approved by the Israeli government and constructed with the intent to “… secure effective spatial control in territories which will remain under Israeli control in the final status agreements.” He characterises them as “… largely incompatible with the Palestinian road network, not compatible with the local topography and needs … built to serve exclusively Israeli needs … inflicting losses on Palestinian communities whose land was confiscated”. E. Efrat, The Geography of Occupation, Carmel edition, 2002, p. 148 – 150 (Hebrew).


7. Source: OCHA Protection of Civilians database. For more details see Annex 2.
This chapter examines the key cities of East Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron in light of the development of settlements and other Israeli infrastructure in the West Bank.

In addition to their cultural and historical significance, each city plays a central role as a regional market, manufacturing hub and a provider of jobs and services in the central, northern and southern West Bank. Almost a quarter of the Palestinian population in the West Bank resides in these cities and many more live in the villages and towns close by.
Settlements and Palestinian urban centres
East Jerusalem

In 1967, the GoI annexed East Jerusalem in addition to 64 square kilometres of surrounding West Bank land, unilaterally defining this area as the expanded Jerusalem municipal boundary. Construction of settlements in and around Jerusalem dates back to the period immediately after.1

In 1968, settlements were established surrounding the Old City in areas such as French Hill, Ramat Eshkol and Ma’alot Dafna as well as in the Old City itself. Further settlements were established within the expanded Jerusalem municipal boundary such as Ramot Allon (1973) in the northwest, Newe Ya’akov (1971) and Pisgat Ze’ev (1985) to the north, and Gilo (1971) and Har Homa (1998) in the south.

In addition, an outer ring of settlements (including Givat Ze’ev, Ma’ale Adumim and Betar Ilit) were established around Jerusalem as is visible on the maps opposite.

The construction of settler housing and infrastructure within East Jerusalem and surrounding areas created a new demographic reality on the ground.2

In 1980, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, passed legislation declaring that “Jerusalem complete and united, is the capital of Israel”3, reinforcing the position that the GoI had held since the 1967 War. This decree was declared to have “no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention”4 by the UN Security Council in 1980.5

Palestinians trying to enter East Jerusalem during Ramadan faced long queues and delays at checkpoints into the city. A permit issued by the Israeli authorities is required by West Bank Palestinians to enter Jerusalem. Photo by OCHA Mahfouz Abu Turk, 2006.

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
As the graphs show, the settler population inside East Jerusalem expanded by 65% from 111,300 to 184,034 between 1987 and 2004 while the area covered by settlements increased by 143% from 890 hectares to more than 2,170 hectares. Pisgat Ze’ev was the fastest-growing settlement in East Jerusalem between 1987 and 2004. Created in 1985, its population grew to 40,911 by 2004 and, the population increased annually on average by 11%, due in large part to the arrival of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, many of whom moved there in the early 1990s.

**Settlement expansion in East Jerusalem (1987 – 2004/5)**

**Expansion of Israeli settler population in Pisgat Ze’ev**

Source: OCHA. Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database. For more details see Annex 2.
The Barrier divides the Palestinian community of Hizma (foreground) from East Jerusalem. The settlement of Pisgat Ze’ev (background) lies in East Jerusalem and enjoys uninterrupted connection to West Jerusalem and to the rest of Israel. Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
Palestinian access to East Jerusalem

Palestinians who hold Jerusalem ID cards are permanent residents of Israel. They can live and enter Jerusalem without a permit, buy property and work in Israel, and receive Israeli taxpayer benefits.

By contrast, the introduction of a permit regime in 1993 restricted access for West Bank Palestinians to East Jerusalem. Restrictions were enhanced with the outbreak of the second Intifada, following a series of suicide attacks. According to the Israeli human rights organisation, B’Tselem, there have been 18 suicide bombings in Jerusalem since September 2000. Since then, a series of military checkpoints and obstacles has been set up to enforce the permit system.

Construction of the Barrier has made Palestinian access into East Jerusalem more difficult. The section of the Barrier within Jerusalem governorate measures 162 kilometres in length. Only five kilometres of its completed length runs along the Green Line. The remainder lies within the West Bank.

Whether the Barrier is viewed solely as a security measure or as a political step or a combination of both, its departure from the Green Line is plainly related to the existence of settlements.

The Barrier’s route winds around the Israeli settlements that surround East Jerusalem ensuring that the majority lie on the western side of the Barrier with easy access into Jerusalem and Israel. The route runs deep into the West Bank to encircle the large settlements of Giv’at Zeev (pop. 11,000) and Ma’ale Adummim (pop. 28,000). These settlements currently lie outside the municipal boundary but will be physically connected to Jerusalem by the Barrier (see map opposite).

The large terminal-like crossing point of Qalandiya is the main entry point for Palestinians to enter East Jerusalem from the north. Photo by Tom Kay, 2006.
Jerusalem settlements and the route of the Barrier

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
By contrast, densely populated Palestinian areas — Shu'fat Camp, Kafr ‘Aqab, and Samiramees with a total population of over 30,000 — which are currently inside the municipal boundary, are separated from East Jerusalem by the Barrier. Other villages to the north and east of the city, with populations of more than 84,000 are also excluded. In addition, the Barrier runs through the middle of Palestinian communities separating neighbours and families from one another — this occurs in Abu Dis, for example.

In other cases, West Bank villages that were once closely connected to East Jerusalem are now physically separated from the city. To the north, over 15,200 Palestinian residents of four villages in the Bir Nabala enclave are completely surrounded by the Barrier and related obstacles. As a result, these residents live in an enclave isolated from East Jerusalem, with their only access via ‘Fabric of Life’ roads (see previous chapter).

In total, approximately 25% of the 253,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the city by the Barrier. They can now only reach Jerusalem by crossing a checkpoint to access the services to which they are entitled as holders of Jerusalem ID cards.

For West Bank ID holders, only four of the 13 functioning checkpoints from the West Bank into Jerusalem are accessible for those who have been granted permits. These checkpoints, lying several kilometres inside the West Bank, are large terminal-like structures with elaborate security checks. Applications for permits are made through the Civil Affairs Units of the IDF. This is a time-consuming and bureaucratic process and there is no guarantee of a permit being given.

Seven of the nine remaining checkpoints are for Israeli citizens, including those living in settlements in the West Bank, persons of Jewish descent entitled to the Israeli Law of Return, other Israeli residents including East Jerusalem ID holders and non-Israelis with valid visas. The remaining two checkpoints are a commercial crossing point and a temporary checkpoint in the northern Jerusalem area of Ar Ram.

A further three checkpoints are planned around Jerusalem (Mazmouria checkpoint, and Sawahira and Nabi Samuel gates).
Palestinian communities and access to Jerusalem
Palestinians rely on hospitals in East Jerusalem for routine, emergency and highly specialist treatment. There are six hospitals in East Jerusalem: August Victoria, Al Makassed, St. John Ophthalmic, St. Joseph's, Red Crescent Maternity and Princess Bassma hospitals that offer specialist tertiary healthcare for the entire West Bank population. On average, 3,000 patients are referred by the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH) to East Jerusalem hospitals annually. West Bank ID card holders must have a letter of referral from a Palestinian hospital and coordination documents from the receiving hospital in East Jerusalem before they can apply to the Israeli authorities for a permit. This is a complicated and time-consuming process which can take many weeks to complete.

The need to get a permit to reach a hospital, the difficulties in travelling to East Jerusalem because of the Barrier and checkpoints, in addition to the general unpredictability of access for patients, has led to a 50% drop in patient admissions in these hospitals. The number of out-patients also fell by more than half between 2002 and 2003, and continues to drop.

Medical staff from the West Bank also faces difficulties getting to work. There are 1,168 employees working in the six non-governmental hospitals in East Jerusalem and approximately 70% are West Bank residents requiring permits. Permits generally need to be renewed every three months and are valid only until 7 pm. Few permits are given to people under 25 years old. Even those with permits face long lines at the four Jerusalem checkpoints open to them which can cause delays in patient care, including surgery schedules.
Specialist hospitals in East Jerusalem

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
The large Palestinian city of Nablus in the northern West Bank. On the outskirts of Nablus city there are three large and densely populated refugee camps (Camp No. 1, ‘Askar and Balata camps). Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
Nablus, a city encircled

Nablus city, the economic and service centre of the northern West Bank, has a population of more than 130,000 people and serves as a regional hub for an estimated 350,000 people in the governorate.10

Nablus is a market and manufacturing centre, a focus for services, an educational centre – home to the large An Najah University – and the location of important medical facilities. Nablus has 13 health centres and six hospitals including the major referral hospitals of Rafida and Al Watani. Access into and out of Nablus is, therefore, essential.

Nablus is considered a centre of militant activity by the IDF and has been the focus of large scale military operations. The IDF conducts almost nightly search and arrest campaigns into Nablus and surrounding villages, in addition to its three refugee camps. Between June 2005 and April 2007, for example, the IDF conducted over 1,000 search and arrest campaigns in Nablus governorate – an average of more than 10 each week.11

Nablus is encircled by 14 Israeli settlements and 26 outposts (see map opposite). The settlements are connected to each other by a series of roads used primarily by settlers that stretch around the city and across Nablus governorate.

These roads are in turn linked to ten checkpoints, including seven encircling Nablus city. All Palestinians going in and out of Nablus are required to cross these checkpoints. In April 2007, only 10% of Nablus buses (22 out of 220) and 7% of Nablus taxis (150 out of 2,250) had permits to access and use the checkpoints around Nablus city. Only 50 private Palestinian cars were permitted to use the checkpoints.12

In addition, more than 70 obstacles installed by the IDF block the road junctions and physically prevent Palestinian traffic from reaching the roads used primarily by settlers. Palestinian vehicles also need a permit to travel on these roads. Palestinians caught without a permit can be fined or prosecuted.

Under these conditions, it is impossible for the Nablus economy to function normally. Unemployment in Nablus governorate increased by 44.5 percent between 1999 and 2006 (18.2 to 26.3%).13 Many businesses, no longer accessible by customers and traders, have been forced to relocate to smaller towns and villages.14 These new centres, however, cannot substitute for the large urban markets in terms of the volume of customers and levels of trade.

There are also persistent difficulties for patients reaching hospitals and students reaching schools and universities.
Checkpoints and other physical obstacles surrounding Nablus city
Palestinians traveling south from Nablus city must pass through the main Huwwara checkpoint. In 2007, the IDF announced plans to expand this checkpoint at a cost of approximately USD 2.3 million. Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005.
Settlements and Palestinian urban centres
Hebron city was the commercial and industrial centre of the southern West Bank. The H2 area of Hebron is now largely deserted.

Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005
Hebron City

Hebron city, in the southern West Bank, has a population of more than 165,000 Palestinians and is a centre for commerce and manufacturing. It is also a natural urban centre for the approximately 560,000 Palestinians within Hebron governate.

Hebron city is also the location of the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Ibrahim Mosque and holds great religious significance for both Muslims and Jews. Following a massacre in 1929, the city’s surviving Jewish population was evacuated by the British Mandate authorities.

Since 1967, more than 24 Israeli settlements have been established in Hebron governate, creating a ring around its urban centre and fragmenting the outlying agricultural areas. Between 1979 and 1983, Israeli settlers established four settlements inside the Old City itself — Avraham Avinu, Beit Romano, Beit Hadassah and Tel Rumeida.

The insertion of settlers into the heart of a densely populated Palestinian city has led to frequent violence between the two communities. In February 1994, a Hebron settler, Baruch Goldstein, killed 29 Palestinian worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque. Subsequently, an observer force known as the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), was established in May 1994 and continues to monitor and report on the situation.

As the following series of maps show, Israeli settlements lie on the southern edge of the Old Suq. They are home to approximately 600 settlers who are protected by around 1,500 IDF soldiers. The settlers are connected to the Tomb of the Patriarchs and to the larger settlement of Kiryat Arba by a corridor lined with 87 obstacles that physically prevent access by the local Palestinian population.

The presence of settlers has led to strict security measures imposed by the IDF. These have included closing markets and shops to create “buffer zones”. This has left Palestinian property increasingly at risk of being taken over by settlers.

These measures have made it virtually impossible for Palestinians to bring their goods to sell in the Old Suq. Increased restrictions and fears of settler violence have also driven potential customers away to rural markets in surrounding villages. All vehicle traffic is banned by the IDF in the Old Suq and many Palestinians who were living and running businesses there have since moved out.

Today, the Old Suq is almost deserted. Before September 2000 there were 1,610 shops licensed in and around the Old City. Around 650 shops are closed by military order and another 700 closed due to the drop in trade. Of those remaining in the Old Suq, only 10% are still functioning.

Of the 10% of the original population who still live in the Old City, eight out of 10 adults are unemployed and an estimated 75% live below the poverty line. A recent survey conducted by the Ministry of National Economy found that the average income per household in the area is about $160 per month while the average for the West Bank is $405.

The Old Suq in the centre of Hebron has served as the commercial heart of the city for hundreds of years. It is now largely deserted.

The IDF withdrew from approximately 80% of Hebron city (H1) in January 1997, as part of the Oslo Accords. The remaining part, H2 which includes the settlements, remains under Israeli control.

The Old Suq in the centre of Hebron has served as the commercial heart of the city for hundreds of years. It is now largely deserted.
Shops on a once busy street in the H2 area of Hebron city. This area is occupied by settlers and is off-limits to most Palestinians.
Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2006.
Closures block access to Hebron

The map shows the extent of Hebron city’s encirclement by roadblocks, settlements and other Israeli infrastructure.

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
As this map shows, the Old Suq (area in Green) has been cut in two by Israeli settlement construction and security measures (area shaded in purple). In this area there are virtually no Palestinian businesses still operating and Palestinian residents are strictly controlled.

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Settlements and Palestinian urban centres

One of the IDF and Border Police checkpoints established in and around Hebron’s Old Suq. In addition to these physically manned checkpoints, there are numerous road blocks and gates which have virtually closed off the Old Suq area from the rest of H2 and Hebron. Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005.

Settlers occupy the second storey of these buildings and throw garbage and human excrement onto the street lined with Palestinian shops and houses below. Palestinians have been forced to put up wire mesh to stop solid objects hitting people passing. Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005.
Endnotes

1. In his autobiography, **Warrior**, the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon highlighted the strategic importance of establishing Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem to secure the city as the country’s capital: “Looking at the long-term development of the city, I believed that the answer was to create an outer ring of development around the Arab neighbourhood . . . If we could develop a greater Jerusalem along these lines that would eventually include a population of a million people or so, then the city would be secured into the future as the capital of the Jewish people.” Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, **Warrior – an Autobiography**, Touchstone, 2001, p. 359.

2. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), between 1967 and 2002 81.8% of all housing units built in Arab East Jerusalem were for Israelis, as opposed to 18.2% for Palestinians. Source: **Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook**, No.7, June 2005, p. 171.


5. Source: Population figures based on the PCBS 1997 census, 2006 population projection estimates. PCBS reports that there are approximately 253,000 Palestinian residents living in the “J1” area of Jerusalem i.e “the parts of Jerusalem that were area annexed by Israel”. This figure has been used to estimate the number of people eligible for a Jerusalem ID card. The actual number of Palestinians holding this type of ID card is unknown.

6. A person can apply directly or through an institution (for example, a school or a hospital). Before January 2006, the Palestinian District Liaison Officers (DCL) often coordinated requests for permits on behalf of individuals. However, since the election of the Hamas government in early 2006, the Israeli authorities have ceased all communication with their Palestinian counterparts and now individuals are forced to apply for permits in person to the Israeli DCL offices. Applying for a permit often involves travelling long distances and waiting in line, only to have to return the next day or following weeks to receive a permit if it is granted. Applicants who are rejected can re-apply and may be accepted the second time but the outcome is always unpredictable. Permits are only issued for a specific reason i.e. to work, to study, for family reunification or a certain social event and the permit applications are often refused on the basis of security.


11. Source: OCHA, **Protection of Civilians database**.


16. For more information on TIPH’s mandate and activities see www.tiph.org

17. This settlement is not within the H2 boundary but was established between 1968 and 1972 on the eastern border of the municipality of Hebron. It currently houses 7,500 settlers, including the population of the adjacent Giva’at Kharsina settlement.

18. As of June 2006, these closures include: 17 IDF/Border Police checkpoints, seven inner city gates (six of these iron gates were removed by Palestinians as they were located away from Israeli observation points. The only remaining gate is located near Al Qazazin street close to the Beit Romano settlement) and 77 roadblocks. These are not included in OCHA’s overall physical obstacle count for the West Bank.


22. Source: Hebron Rehabilitation Committee.

23. Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, Hebron.
This chapter examines the impact that the settlements and other Israeli infrastructure have on Palestinian rural life, in particular, on the ability for Palestinians to access jobs, markets and farming land as well as water resources.
Access to jobs and markets

Rural communities depend on access to land, markets and commercial centres. They also rely on farm labourers.

In May 2007, 40.4% of people in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) reported difficulties getting to work in the previous six months.\(^1\) They cited the primary reasons as physical obstacles, such as checkpoints and roadblocks (77.9%) and the inability to obtain permits from Israeli authorities (71.2%).

Reaching markets has become an expensive and time-consuming problem for farmers and businesses.

Since 2000, transport costs have nearly doubled mostly because of delays faced at checkpoints and the more circuitous routes that trucks are being forced to take to avoid roads primarily reserved for Israeli use (see graph below).

Between 1967 and 1992, more than 1,300 military orders were issued to regulate Palestinian life in the West Bank.\(^2\) Approximately one-third relate to economic issues including agriculture, land ownership, infrastructure development, water resources, tariffs and taxation and business licensing. Many of these regulations imposed additional costs, putting Palestinians at a comparative disadvantage to Israeli producers who often enjoy freer access to Palestinian markets.

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**Consumer Price Index (CPI) for transportation and communication in the West Bank\(^3\)**

(1996-2007)

Source: PCBS, monthly CPI survey.
Since the start of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the Jordan Valley has been perceived as having a strategic importance to Israel’s security. The first settlements in the West Bank were established in the Jordan Valley as early as 1968. Seventeen settlements were established by 1977 and by 2005 the number stood at 32.

By 2004, the settler population had risen to 7,380. Although the population is quite small, most settlers in the Jordan Valley are farmers who cultivate large land areas.

For Palestinians, the Jordan Valley is an integral part of the West Bank. An estimated 53,000 Palestinians live in the Jordan Valley (including the population of Jericho) with an economy based primarily on agriculture.

As detailed in Chapter 1, much of the Jordan Valley has been declared closed military areas/fire zones and/or nature reserves by the GOL. This has significantly limited the land available for Palestinian farming and herding communities who are squeezed by Israeli settler infrastructure on the one hand and areas that are off-limits to them on the other.

Five Palestinian communities (Al Farisiya, Al Malih, Khirbet as Ras al Ahmar; Khirbet Humsa and Al Hadidiya) are located within Israeli declared closed military areas (see map p.106). Palestinian farmers caught grazing their livestock on the lands traditionally used by these villages now face the risk of their animals being seized, their identification cards temporarily confiscated, fines and even arrest.

Palestinian access to the Jordan Valley had deteriorated sharply over the last two years with increased restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities. Access has improved since April 2007 although checkpoints and roads reserved primarily for Israeli use continue to restrict Palestinian movement:

- Between May 2005 and April 2007, only Palestinians with an identity card proving that they reside in the Jordan Valley could enter this area or live there. All others were excluded, including Palestinians who owned land in the Jordan Valley. Palestinians working inside Israeli settlements, however, were issued permits to be present in the Jordan Valley during the day.

- Since the formal lifting of permit restrictions in April 2007, Palestinian movement from the West Bank into the Jordan Valley is controlled through four main checkpoints – Tayasir, Hamra, Ma’ale Efrayim and Yitav (see map on p.106). Without permits, access is only possible through Tayasir and Hamra checkpoints, and only by public transportation. Private Palestinian vehicles continue to be prohibited from entering the Jordan Valley. Long pedestrian queues are regularly reported at the checkpoints.

- Palestinian travel along Route 90, the main Jordan Valley route – traditionally a key access corridor to the northern West Bank – is restricted. Settlers and other Israelis are the primary users of this road.

- Unless they are residents of Jericho or the Jordan Valley, Palestinians from the West Bank require checkpoint permits to travel north via Al Auja. Only Palestinians with Jericho residency, Jerusalem ID holders and residents of Bethlehem and Hebron can exit Jericho via the main DCO checkpoint to the south. Other Palestinians can only travel on the narrow and winding Al Mu’arrajat road to reach the rest of the West Bank.
Al Jiftlik village, Jordan Valley: development inhibited

Al Jiftlik village has a population of approximately 5,500 Palestinians. It is located in the northern Jordan Valley (on the junction of Road 90 and 57) and surrounded by fertile land on which villagers have traditionally depended for growing crops and grazing animals.

Today, as the two maps on the following pages illustrate, the village is surrounded on all sides and fragmented by settlements, military bases, closed military areas, nature reserves, roads primarily for Israeli use and checkpoints. The two closest settlements, Argaman (established 1969) and Massu’a (1970) are home to 166 and 140 Israelis respectively who cultivate extensive areas of land beyond the settlements’ outer limits.10

Al Jiftlik’s livestock farmers now have limited areas on which to graze their animals. Traditionally, livestock have grazed and watered in the hills surrounding the village. However, because land has been confiscated for settlements and military bases, and most of the remaining land lies in closed military areas, grazing land is scarce and many natural springs cannot be reached. As a result, most livestock farmers are forced to buy expensive fodder.

Those farmers who continue to raise livestock and grow crops face delays at checkpoints and longer journey times to reach local markets such as those in Tubas and Tammoun. Perishable produce, such as meat and dairy products, risks spoiling before reaching market.
Location of Al Jiftlik village

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Al Jiftlik is located in Israeli controlled Area C. New construction can only legally take place on the basis of an Israeli permit. These are extremely difficult to obtain. Only limited construction in the village has been approved by the Israeli authorities since 1967, resulting in overcrowding.

Buildings constructed without a permit risk being demolished by the IDF. Throughout 2005 and 2006, a total of 24 Palestinian structures were demolished in Al Jiftlik. On 23 January 2007, the IDF demolished five shelters displacing 32 Palestinians, including 17 children.

A positive development in 2006 was the approval of an Al Jiftlik ‘master plan’ by the Israeli authorities. However, the area it covers is too small. It leaves approximately 2,000 residents, or about 40% of the population, outside the approved urban area. Construction of new houses (after appropriate permits are granted) can occur within the master plan. However, houses built after 1967 outside the perimeter of the plan are considered illegal and face the continued threat of demolition.

Only 25% of village residents are currently connected to an electricity network and the water network is in need of repair. The newly approved master plan will include electricity and water connection but only for residents within its borders. In contrast, the nearby settlements of Mekhora, Argaman and Massu’a, enjoy electricity, running water and sophisticated irrigation systems.
Al Jiftlik, a village encircled by Israeli infrastructure

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
When the Barrier is completed, over ten percent (10.2%) of West Bank land will be isolated in the area between the Barrier and the Green Line. This includes some of the most fertile land and water reserves in the West Bank.

In October 2003, the area between the Barrier and the Green Line in the northern West Bank was declared closed by military order. All Palestinians living in this area are required to obtain 'permanent resident' permits from the Israeli authorities. Non-resident Palestinians who need to enter the area, in particular farmers, must apply for a visitor permit to access their farmlands and water resources through designated gates.

Eligibility requirements for Palestinians needing visitor permits have become increasingly stringent. Consequently, fewer Palestinians are obtaining such permits. Those who are unable to prove direct ownership of the land - for example, relatives to landowners such as nephews, uncles, cousins and grandchildren, landless labourers, sharecroppers and leaseholders - find that their access to the closed areas is now virtually impossible.

By mid-2006, only 40% of farming families with land in closed areas could reach their family holdings.

For the minority who are granted permits, access is restricted to a specific gate. Gates open and shut irregularly, and can be totally shut without warning. Only 26 gates in the northern West Bank are open to Palestinians on a regular basis, typically for short periods in the early morning, noon and late afternoon, and ‘visitors’ are prohibited from staying on their land overnight.
Many gates are ‘seasonal’, open only for a limited period during the olive harvest. This regime prevents the ploughing, pruning, spraying and weeding required throughout the year that is necessary for optimum yields. Tractors and other agricultural equipment and materials may not be allowed through, and an individual’s land may be located a long distance from the gate over difficult terrain.

Restrictive gate openings and permit allocations are already having a negative impact on agricultural practices and on rural livelihoods. Many farmers cultivate their land infrequently or not at all, or have changed to lower maintenance and lower yield crops. The longer term consequences for these communities is uncertain, as they lose contact with the land on which they depend both for their present livelihood and for their future survival.  

Palestinian women waiting to pass through a gate in the Barrier with their permits visible. Photo by OCHA / Steve Sabella, 2005.

Habla gate (Qalqilya governorate) opens three times daily and is restricted to permit holders, who are individually checked. Additional permits are required for agriculture vehicles and private vehicles are not allowed to pass. Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.
Jayyus village (Qalqiliya governorate)

Hundreds of farming families in Jayyus (population 3,200) are now separated by the Barrier from their farmland. Prior to the construction of the Barrier, more than half of Jayyus village depended on agriculture for their livelihoods. Now, the communal village lands of approximately 1,270 hectares are almost inaccessible:

- 11% of the village’s land was already taken for the building of Zufin settlement (established in 1989) to the west of the village;
- 4.5% of the village’s land was requisitioned for the actual construction of the Barrier;
- 68% of the villages’ agricultural land (864 hectares) now lies isolated on the opposite side of the Barrier and is off-limits to those without a visitor’s permit.

The village’s six main agricultural wells are also isolated. Water for domestic consumption, pumped from a well shared with a neighbouring village, is also affected by Israeli restrictions. At just 23 litres per capita per day, domestic consumption in Jayyus is far below the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 100 recommended litres. Water shortage is common in the summer, with villagers buying expensive tankered water.\(^1\)

Scores of greenhouses are also isolated west of the Barrier. The produce of the greenhouses – tomatoes, cucumbers, beans and sweet peppers – require daily irrigation and care otherwise it quickly falls prey to disease and rot. The restrictive gate and permit regime makes access difficult: the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the High Court on behalf of Jayyus and other villages charging that “the gate opening times are severely limited, arbitrary and in no way reflect the basic needs of the population”.\(^2\) By August 2004, a year after the Barrier was completed around Jayyus, local production had fallen from seven to four million kilograms of fruit and vegetables.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) By August 2004, a year after the Barrier was completed around Jayyus, local production had fallen from seven to four million kilograms of fruit and vegetables.
Jayyus village lands and water resources cut off by the Barrier

As the map shows, in addition to concerns for their present livelihoods, Jayyus residents fear for their future. Plans show the expansion of Zufin settlement (see map above) onto village lands now separated from them by the Barrier, to include over 1,000 housing units, elementary, high and nursery schools, several synagogues in addition to sports and recreation facilities.17
Access to water

Water scarcity is a major concern in the West Bank where access to, and control over, water resources is a constant struggle. Under international law, a significant part of the water sources that Israel uses to meet its needs, including that of the settlements, should be shared equitably and reasonably by both Israelis and Palestinians.\(^{18}\)

Israeli per capita water consumption is more than five times higher than that of West Bank Palestinians (350 litres per person per day in Israel compared to 60 litres per person per day in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem). West Bank Palestinian water consumption is 40 litres less than the minimum global standards set by the World Health Organization (WHO).\(^{19}\)

Under the Oslo Agreement, nearly six times more aquifer water was allocated for Israeli use. For example, of the 362 million cubic metres of water pumped from the Western Aquifer, that lies beneath Israel and the West Bank, for example, 22 mcm is for Palestinian use while 340 mcm is for Israeli.\(^{20}\)

Israel’s agricultural settlements in the West Bank, in particular the Jordan Valley, are large consumers of water. A 1993 report by Peace Now found that, per capita, irrigated areas of settlers were 13 times larger than the area accorded to Palestinians.\(^{21}\)

Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company, which sells water to Palestinian towns and public bodies, supplies an estimated 54% of all water to Palestinians in the West Bank.\(^{22}\) However, during times of shortage, such as in the summer months, the company prioritises settlements over Palestinian communities, often leaving Palestinian communities with a shortfall.\(^{23}\) In summer months, in particular, residents of a number of cities in the West Bank, such as Hebron, Bethlehem and Jenin, face water restrictions.\(^{24}\)

Many Palestinian villages who find themselves short of water resort to buying supplies from water tankers at considerable expense. According to a 2005 report by the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) an estimated 30% of surveyed communities in the West Bank (190 communities) were not connected to a water network and relied primarily on tankered water and rainwater collected in household cisterns.\(^{25}\)
Irrigation of large agricultural areas by settlers in the Jordan Valley. Photo by OCHA / Nir Kahal, 2006.
Settlements and conflict over resources

The conflict over resources in the West Bank has led to violence between settlers and Palestinians. Settler violence often revolves around control of natural resources. Incidents include the destruction, vandalism and theft of land and property, crops and livestock.\(^{26}\)

Incidents show a seasonal pattern, with increases in property and land damage observed during periods of intensive agricultural activity for Palestinians, e.g., preparing land or harvesting olives. The majority of these incidents are reported close to Israeli settlements and other parts of Area C.

During the olive harvest season (October - November), the IDF has facilitated safe access for some Palestinians. They arrange for seasonal gates in the Barrier to be opened, allowing access to olive groves in the closed areas. They also accompany harvesters to land near settlements where settler harassment is most common.

Despite its obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the life, property and rights of Palestinians under occupation, the Israeli authorities frequently do not investigate incidents of reported settler violence nor take a proactive approach to protecting local Palestinian populations near Israeli settlements and outposts.\(^{27}\)

In her 2005 report into unauthorised settler outposts, Talia Sasson, former head of the State Prosecution Criminal Department of Israel, concluded that:

“IDF soldiers have the enforcement powers like those given to the police officers, by virtue of the procedure for enforcing the law in the territories, which is included in the IDF command. In practice, however, IDF soldiers do not enforce the law, are not aware of the law enforcement procedure, and are not at all interested in functioning like police officers. The spirit conveyed by the commander, as described to me, is that IDF soldiers are not to examine in a legal framework, the acts of the settlers, who are doing a Zionist act in building the outposts, even though it is illegal”.\(^{28}\)

Palestinian children from Tuba and Maghayir al Abeed, in the southern Hebron hills, have been attacked repeatedly while on their way to school. They are now provided with a daily IDF escort to and from their school in Tuwani to protect them from nearby settlers in Ma’on settlement. Photo by OCHA, 2005.
Southern Hebron - Masafer Yatta

In the early 1970s, the IDF designated part of Masafer Yatta a closed military area, leading to many forced evictions of Palestinian residents. Settler intimidation and the gradual encroachment onto Palestinian land began when settlements were established in southern Hebron in 1982.

Between 1998 and 2002, 75 families (837 people) from 11 hamlets were forced to leave the area of Masafer Yatta.29

The settlements and outposts built along the southern ridge of the Hebron hills are today connected to Israel and other settlements by a network of roads catering for settlers and which cut off Palestinians living in Masafer Yatta from the rest of the West Bank.

Most residents who have been displaced report either being victims of, or witnesses to, attacks by settlers. Half of the families interviewed reported filing complaints with the IDF or with the Israeli Police. None, however, had resulted in punitive action against settlers.30

Families forced to move away from southern Hebron lose their traditional lifestyle and means of support. Many have exhausted their savings, fallen deeper into debt and rely increasingly on humanitarian aid. Of the 122 persons who considered themselves employed before their displacement, only 28 have jobs today.

Um al Kher Bedouins village next to Karmel settlement. Photo by J.C. Tordai, 2007.


3. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a statistical tool used for measuring changes in the purchased prices of goods and services during different temporal intervals, providing a measure of inflation. Transport includes purchased prices of automobile parts, petrol, insurance and public transportation services. Communications includes costs of telephone and mail.

4. The Jordan Valley is the stretch of fertile land located at the base of the mountain ridge that runs adjacent to the Jordan River. The valley crosses Israel and the West Bank; reaching from the Sea of Galilee in the north to the Dead Sea in the south. For the purposes of this report, the Jordan Valley is defined as that part of the area within the West Bank.

5. Source: OCHA *Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database*. For more details see Annex 2.


11. Area C is the term designated under the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1995). The agreement divided the oPt into three jurisdictional areas with Area C remaining under full Israeli control.

12. Source: OCHA *Protection of Civilians Database*.


26. A case was reported in southern Hebron where a persistent loss in water resources due to the presence of the settlements and settlers was one of the reasons that forced the herding communities to sell their sheep (OCHA field survey, November 2005).


29. The UN Security Council in 1994 also adopted a resolution calling upon Israel to take and implement measures such as the confiscation of arms to prevent illegal acts of violence by Israeli settlers.


31. In November 2005, OCHA conducted a survey of Palestinian families displaced by the violence and encroachment on to Palestinian land by settlers and outpost residents in the area of Masafar Yatta in southern Hebron. The findings show that the internal displacement of the families was the result of security concerns and economic difficulties arising from the action of settlers based in the area. The displacement has pushed the majority of the families into poverty, with nearly half of them becoming recipients of humanitarian aid.

32. According to B’Tselem, most of the complaints filed by Palestinians in Hebron District with the Israeli Police between 1999 and October 2004, were closed for lack of evidence. The number of complaints decreased over the period suggesting diminishing confidence in Israeli authorities.
Settlements and Palestinian rural centres
As the preceding chapters demonstrate, West Bank settlements and other Israeli infrastructure have a profound impact on Palestinian life. They deprive Palestinians of access to land and limit their ability to move freely.

This concluding chapter addresses the increasing pressure on land, resources and movement, and the socio-economic consequences for Palestinians – unless there is a political process that moves the parties beyond the current impasse.

Settler numbers continue to grow at a rate of 5.5% a year¹ – equivalent to adding one and a half busloads of new settlers each day to the 450,000 living in the West Bank in 2007. This rate of growth is three times that of Israel itself. The majority of new arrivals settle in the large settlement blocs west of the Barrier where over 80% of all settlers currently reside.

Based on the current growth rate, the settler population will double to nearly 900,000 in just 12 years.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian population is growing at a rate of around 2.5% a year – which means the Palestinian population will double in less than 30 years to around four million.

The problem is obvious: the West Bank’s resources are finite. As both settler and Palestinian populations expand, it is inevitable that the pressure on natural resources – namely land and water – will increase. It is equally inevitable, based on trends of the last 40 years, that the growth of settlements, roads and other infrastructure will come at the expense of Palestinian development and freedom of movement around the West Bank.
Pressure on land

Exacerbating the pressure on land is the geographical demarcation of the West Bank under the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Under the Oslo Accords – which was an interim agreement intended to lead to a final settlement – the West Bank was divided into three jurisdictional areas:

- **Area A**: Under full control of the Palestinian Authority and comprised primarily of Palestinian urban areas.
- **Area B**: Under Palestinian civil control, Israeli security control and comprising the majority of the Palestinian rural communities.
- **Area C**: Under full Israeli control, except over Palestinian civilians.
- Palestinian designated Nature reserve
- Special case (Hebron H2)

Approximately 40% of the land area of the West Bank is made up of areas A and B that come under Palestinian administrative jurisdiction.

The remainder of the West Bank, Area C – around 60% – remains under Israeli control.

As no final settlement has yet been agreed, this interim situation has remained geographically frozen.

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Little Palestinian development has been allowed in Area C. Buildings permits, for example, are rarely given by the Israeli authorities and buildings constructed without a permit are frequently destroyed. Between May 2005 and May 2007, 354 Palestinian structures were destroyed by the IDF in Area C.²

Palestinian residential areas already have a population density double that of Israeli settlements.³ Overcrowding is particularly severe in the West Bank’s 19 refugee camps.

Much of the agricultural and grazing land of many rural communities lie in Area C. So too are the remaining large reserves of land for future Palestinian development.

The expansion and development of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure has nearly all occurred in Area C as a comparison of the two maps opposite shows.
Settlements are illegal under international law. A state can impose security measures on the population it occupies for immediate military purposes but not transplant its own population into that territory.

As violence escalated in September 2000, the closure regime focused on those West Bank roads mainly used by Israelis to severely restrict Palestinian movement. These continuing measures are justified by the GoI as necessary to protect Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks. As this report demonstrates, these measures are also intimately linked to maintaining settler access and their quality of life.

The roads have become corridors to link settlements to Israel. They have also fragmented the West Bank, into a series of enclaves, isolating Palestinian communities from each other.

Palestinians now mostly move from one enclave to another via a network of checkpoints, alternative roads or through tunnels or bridges under roads primarily reserved for settlers. This provides a measure of transport contiguity – in the sense that enclaves are linked – but not territorial contiguity because West Bank land is divided by Israeli roads and other infrastructure.

Transport contiguity may satisfy short-term humanitarian needs but cannot ultimately lead to a sustainable economy. It also does not provide the basis for a two state solution.⁵

The construction of the Barrier since 2002 has further fragmented the West Bank and has reinforced the permanence of the settlements. The route of the Barrier is determined by the settlements. The Barrier cuts deep into the West Bank, looping around the settlements, stretching 22 kms to encircle Ariel settlement at its most intrusive point.

Without the settlements, the Barrier could follow the Green Line with minimal disruption to Palestinian life.

An agreement may yet be reached to reverse the current expansion of settlements and address their removal. An important milestone occurred in 2005 when the GoI evacuated all of the approximately 8,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip, in addition to several hundred settlers from four small settlements in the northern West Bank.

But these steps did not address the relentless progress of the settlement enterprise over the past 40 years throughout most of the West Bank.

Unless the problems caused by the existence and expansion of settlements are addressed, the dismal humanitarian outlook for Palestinians will intensify. Moreover, the socio-economic and even the territorial basis for a sustainable long-term solution will also remain elusive.

As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his final report to the Security Council on the Middle East, settlement expansion is “the single biggest impediment to realizing a viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity”.⁶

Diminishing prospects?
Conclusion

Palestinian enclaves in the regional context

Source: see Annex 2 and 3.
Endnotes

1. Includes both East Jerusalem and West Bank settlements. Source: http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/statistics.html


3. OCHA Protection fo Civilian database.

4. According to OCHA data, the population density in Israeli settlements is 2.4 persons per dunum. The population density in Palestinian built-up areas is 4.6 persons per dunum.

5. According to the GoI’s unilateral ‘disengagement’ plan, Israel plans to achieve ‘transportation contiguity’ within the West Bank. This may include the easing of internal closure and the construction of tunnels, gates, highways, and bridges linking communities on different sides of the Barrier. Israel plans to reduce the number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank. These moves are expected to “make it easier for Palestinians to lead a normal life in Judea and Samaria, and will facilitate economic and commercial activity” (Prime Minister’s Office Communications Department, Addendum A-Revised Disengagement Plan-Main Principles, 2005 p.3).

Annex 1

Israeli settlements under international law

Under international law, Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), including East Jerusalem, are illegal. The illegality of Israeli settlements has been recognised by the international community including through resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Fourth Geneva Convention

Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, states: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."1

According to a Commentary produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), this sub-article was intended “… to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate existence as a race”.2

A conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the application of international humanitarian law in the oPt was convened in July 1999 at the recommendation of the UN General Assembly (Resolution ES-10/6, 24 February 1999). The conference participants (including 114 High Contracting Parties) reaffirmed the illegality of settlements.4

International Court of Justice

In 2004, the ICJ delivered an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the Barrier being constructed in the West Bank, following a request from the UN General Assembly.3 In the context of this opinion, the ICJ concluded that the Israeli settlements established in the oPt, including East Jerusalem, are in breach of international law.6 The majority opinion of the Court concluded that “the route chosen by the wall gives expression in loco to the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security Council”.7 The majority of justices (14 to one) concluded that the construction of the Barrier and its associated regime in the West Bank is contrary to international law.

Settlements and the peace process

The construction and growth of Israeli settlements have also been acknowledged as a fundamental obstacle to peace by the international community. For example, in his final report on the Middle-East in December 2006, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluded that “However, Israel’s central failure lay in not halting the settlement enterprise, even though this is a clear phase I obligation under the road map. The continuation and even consolidation of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure on occupied land are the main reasons for the mistrust and frustration felt by ordinary Palestinians, which often find their outlet in violence of one form or another”.8

In April 2006, the then Secretary-General directly called upon Israel “to cease settlement activity and other actions that could prejudice final status issues, and encourage it to recognize that a peaceful solution in the conflict cannot be imposed unilaterally or outside the framework of a comprehensive regional peace”.9

Roadmap obligations

The freezing and/or dismantling of Israeli settlements have been a cornerstone of major peace initiatives. The most recent plan, the Quartet’s10 Roadmap was presented to the Government of Israel (GoI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2003.11 The plan, earlier endorsed by the UN Security Council, called upon the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security.
The Roadmap contains specific provisions in relation to settlement activity. Under Phase I, the GoI is under an obligation to:

- Immediately dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001;
- Freeze all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements) consistent with the Mitchell Report; and
- Take “no actions undermining trust, including … confiscation and / or demolition of Palestinian homes and property … or to facilitate Israeli constructions …”

The second phase of the Roadmap called for the “Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement launched by an international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements …” was envisaged.

Examples of UN resolutions, statements and reports on Israeli settlements

Adopted resolutions

The UN Security Council has not adopted any recent resolutions referring directly to Israel’s settlement activity. However, in the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s a number of resolutions were passed including:

- Resolution 904 (1994), adopted following the killing of Palestinian worshippers at Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron by an Israeli settler: “Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to continue to take and implement measures, including, inter alia, confiscation of arms, with the aim of preventing illegal acts of violence by Israeli settlers”.
- Resolutions 465 (1980): “Deploring the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and occupied Arab territories since 1967”; “Deeply concerned over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlement policy … and its consequences for the local Arab and Palestinian population”; and “Determines … that Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention … and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East”.
- Resolution 446 (1979): “Establishes a Commision consisting of three members of the Security Council … to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem”.
- Resolution 452 (1979): “Emphasizing the need for confronting the issue of the existing settlements and the need to consider measures to safeguard the impartial protection of property seized” and “Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlements policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East”.

In addition, the UN General Assembly has regularly passed resolutions referring to Israeli settlements following the formation of a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in 1968. In January 2007, the General Assembly once again reaffirmed that “Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, … are illegal and an obstacle to peace and economic and social development” and demanded “the immediate and complete cessation of all Israeli settlement activities in all of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. The General Assembly also expressed its grave concern “about the dangerous situation resulting from actions taken by the illegal armed Israeli settlers in the occupied territory”.12
UNSC Commission Report

Under Resolution 446 (1979) the UN Security Council established a commission to examine the situation relating to settlements in the “Arab territories” since 1967, including East Jerusalem. Among the Commission’s conclusions and findings were:

The GoI is engaged in wilful, systematic and large-scale process of establishing settlements in the occupied territories.

- In addition to private contributions coming mostly from outside Israel, the financing of the settlement policy is essentially a governmental matter.
- The settlement policy has brought drastic and adverse changes to the economic and social pattern of the daily life of the remaining population.
- The pattern of the settlement policy is causing profound and irreversible changes of geographical and democratic nature in those territories, including Jerusalem.
- In view of the magnitude of the problem of settlement and its implications for peace in the region, the Security Council should keep the situation under constant survey.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967

Professor John Dugard, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, concluded that settlements represent a new form of colonialism. His January 2007 report found that “Today there are over 460,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Moreover, Israel has appropriated agricultural land and water resources in the West Bank for its own use. This aspect of Israel’s exploitation of the West Bank appears to be a form of colonialism of the kind declared to be a denial of fundamental human rights and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations as recalled in the General Assembly’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960 (Resolution 1514 XV).”
1. Israel has occupied the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem since 1967. As the Occupying Power, Israel is bound by a number of principles of international humanitarian law including the Hague Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Regulation Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, August 12, 1949.


3. UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/6, Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (A/RES/ES-10/6), 24 February 1999.


6. ICJ, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004 (A/ES-10/273), para 120.


10. The Quartet consists of the UN, the US, the EU and Russia.


OCHA has gathered together numerous primary resources (satellite imagery, topographic maps, Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics data, etc.) and has constructed a geo-database detailing all facets of the Israeli presence in the West Bank, including:

- Settlements
- Outposts
- Land cultivated by Israelis
- Military bases
- Closed military areas
- Fenced military buffer zone
- Nature reserves
- Roads primarily for Israeli use
- The Barrier / closed areas

This annex describes each of these categories, their geographical definition, the data they are associated with (quantity, area and population) and their respective sources.
Feature definitions and sources

1987 - 2005 Settlement built-up areas

Sources
- 2005: Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.
- 1987: Soviet Military Maps (1:50,000) available at the Berkeley University Library website. (http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/EART/israel/israel50k.html)

Definition
The settlement built-up area represents only the settlement urban fabric such as residential areas, shopping centres, schools, infrastructure and at times industrial zones.

2005 Example
Mevo Dotan built-up area (Jenin governorate)

1987 Example
Maccabim built-up (located in No Man’s Land)

Features drawing based on settlement built-up information contained in 1987 Soviet Military Maps (1:50,000). This information has been adapted by photo-interpretation from the Spot Panchromatic Image captured in March 2005. This explanation is also valid for the 1987 outer limits as described on the opposite page.
1987 - 2005 Settlement outer limits

Sources
- 2005: Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.
- 1987: Soviet Military Maps (1:50,000) available at the Berkeley University Library website. (http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/EART/israel/israel50k.html)

Definition
The built-up areas are encircled by a track, a road or a fence which defines the settlement outer limits or current physical perimeter. However, for some settlements – especially in East Jerusalem – the road network does not clearly encircle any land around the urban fabric. In these cases, the line marking the settlement outer limits follows the edge of the defined urban fabric (built up). See below the 1987 outer limits of Maccabim, the outer limits and the built-up are in some parts the same.

2005 Example
Mevo Dotan outer limits perimeter (Jenin governorate)

1987 Example
Maccabim outer limits (located in No Man's Land)
Outpost outer limits in 2005

Sources
Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.

Definition
The outpost outer limit represents land encircled by one or several roads that start from and end up at any group of caravans (or in a few cases permanent structures) which are home to settlers.

Example
Bracha A outer limits (Nablus governorate)

Land cultivated by Israelis in 2005

Sources
Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.

Definition
Land cultivated by Israelis within the vicinity of settlements. These areas are not located outside the settlements and outposts outer limits. This coverage was obtained by photo interpretation of the 2005 March panchromatic satellite image and verified in the field.

Example
Land cultivated by Israelis nearby Ro’i settlement (Tubas governorate)
Military bases outer limits in 2005

Sources
Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.

Definition
The outer limit represents land encircled by one or several roads that start from and end up at any Israeli military fabrics.

Example
Military base outer limits (Bethlehem governorate)

Closed military areas (Fire zones)

Sources
2002-2004 Survey of Israel topographic maps (1:50,000)

Definition
Area under IDF control. According to the Survey of Israel topographic maps, the entry into a fire zone is forbidden.

Example
Closed military areas in the Jordan Valley
Fenced military buffer zone along the Jordanian border in 2005

Sources

Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.

Definition

The fenced military buffer zone is the area located between Road 90 and the Jordan river. Cover obtained by photo interpretation of the 2005 March panchromatic satellite image and verified in the field.

Example

Fenced military buffer zone in the Jordan Valley
Israeli designated nature reserves in 2005

Sources

2002 - 2004 Survey of Israel topographic maps (1:50,000)

Definition

“A territory where animals, vegetation, inanimate objects, land, caves, water and landscape, that are of scientific or educational importance, therefore being guarded and protected from unwanted changes in their appearance, their biological composition and or their course of natural development and which the Minister of Interior Affairs declares, according to article 22, to be a Nature reserve”. Act of National Parks, Nature Reserves, National Sites and Commemoration Sites - 1998. (http://www.parks.org.il/BuildaGate5/portals/parks/imagesP/sub33/333960627-TblName_49_0_1-a-hokganim.doc)

Example

Nature reserves located east of Nablus city
The actual/projected route of the Barrier and ‘closed areas’ in May 2007

Sources
- Israeli Ministry of Defense, Revised Route of the Security Fence Updated map as of April 30th 2006 (http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/seamzone_map_eng.htm)
- Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in June 2006. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.
- OCHA field observations in April 2007.

Definition
Since 2002, the Government of Israel has been constructing a Barrier, which it states is solely a security measure to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian militant attacks. It consists of nine-metre high concrete walls, ditches, trenches, wire fences, patrol roads and razor wire. The Barrier does not follow the 1949 armistice line – the Green Line – but veers significantly eastwards into the heart of the West Bank. Since October 2003, the area between the Barrier and the Green Line has been declared closed by military order. All Palestinians residing there or wishing to enter these areas, including farmers, are required to obtain a permit from the Israeli authorities. Access to these areas is now regulated by a restrictive gate and permit regime. It is expected that this regime will be extended to the rest of the West Bank once the Barrier is completed.

Example
The barrier around Qalqilya city & Habla village (Qalqilya governorate)
Road primarily for Israeli use in 2005

Sources
- Israel — the New Road Atlas, MAPA Publisher, Tel Aviv Israel, 2005 edition.
- Spot Panchromatic Image (2.5m resolution) captured in March 2005. This satellite image has been made available by the European Commission.

Definition
By order of the IDF (see below legend taken from Israel — the New Road Atlas), Israelis are allowed to travel only on certain roads in the West Bank. These roads interconnect the features of the Israeli presence in the West Bank already defined in this Annex and seamlessly link to the road network in Israel (roads bear the same name and number in both areas). On this road network, Palestinian use is generally partially or totally prohibited.

2005 Example
Road network primarily for Israeli use in the Northern West Bank

Closures

Sources
OCHA observations in the field. Closures are collected using a Global Positioning System (GPS)

Definition
See Inset pp. 63-65.

Example
See Inset pp. 63-65.
Geographical measurements, placename and population sources

Area and names

Calculation of area covered by Israeli infrastructure

Land areas covered by each feature of the Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database is calculated using Esri Arc Map software tools.

Source of placenames


- 1987-2004 Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies map of Jerusalem - Quarter, sub-Quarters and Statistical Areas

Sources of population in residential areas

Settlement population


Population growth rate in Israel

- Israel in figures, 2005 (http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/isr_in_n05e.pdf)
Endnotes

1. Panchromatic white and black image. However, a RGB (color) image captured in December 2003 has been used in this technical paper for readability purposes.

2. Compilation based on 139 of the 149 settlements existing in the West Bank. Demographic information not available in Statistical Abstracts of Israel (ICBS) for 9 settlements, excludes Maccabim settlement of which population is merged with the population of a city located in Israel and the 17 Industrial/commercial settlements or areas for recreation or quarrying.

3. Small population numbers (less than 200 people) are not listed in ICBS 1987 Statistical Abstract of Israel. To estimate the 1987 missing population numbers, the 1996-2004 average growth rate has been calculated. Then, the subtracted results have been further compared with available numbers for the same localities for years between 1988 and 1996.
Annex 3

Governorate map and source of other geographical features
Governorates in the West Bank

ISRAEL

JENIN

TULKARM

QALQILIYA

SALFIT

NABLUS

RAMALLAH

JERICHO

BETHLEHEM

HEBRON

ISRAEL

JORDAN

Dead Sea

1967 armistice lines

1949 armistice lines

Israel security barrier

Green Line

No Man’s Land

Mount Scopus

Jerusalem municipality

Jerusalem

Tubas

Kilometers

0

5

10
Source of other geographical features

(ex: 1949 Armistice lines, Jerusalem municipality boundary, Palestinian governorate boundaries, Palestinian built-up, etc.)

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