

HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT

OCTOBER 2015



HIGHLIGHTS

- Rise in violence across the oPt and Israel results in record-high casualties
- Reconstruction of 1,134 homes totally destroyed during the 2014 hostilities underway
- Olive Harvest: concerns over access restrictions in certain areas.


OCTOBER FIGURES

Palestinian killed (direct conflict)	69
Palestinian injured (direct conflict)	7,392
Israelis killed (direct conflict)	8
Israelis injured (direct conflict)	115
Structures demolished in the West Bank	6
People displaced in the West Bank	40

STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN 2015

705 million requested (US\$)

45.9% funded



Overview

The rise in violence that began in mid-September throughout the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) escalated significantly during October. Widespread protests leading to violent clashes with Israeli forces have been accompanied by almost-daily stabbings or alleged stabbing attempts of Israelis by young Palestinians, most of whom were shot and killed on the spot.

The number of casualties among West Bank Palestinians in October 2015 (51 deaths and 7,027 injuries¹) is the highest recorded in a single month since OCHA began monitoring conflict-related casualties in 2005. In the Gaza Strip, casualties in October totaled the largest monthly figure since the end of the 2014 hostilities. Some incidents have generated concerns about the excessive use of force by Israeli security forces, including concerns of extra-judicial executions.²

In his briefing to the Security Council on 22 October, the UN Deputy Secretary-General highlighted that the current wave of violence would not have erupted, “if Palestinians did not still live under a stifling and humiliating occupation that has lasted almost half

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a century". He added, "nowhere is the frustration and anger at the current situation more evident than among the young people." He also remarked that the Palestinian attacks, which in October alone killed eight Israelis and injured over 55 others, have "sharpened a sense of fear amongst the Israeli population", noting that "when confronted with a climate of terror, Israelis rightly expect their authorities to enforce security".

Palestinian frustration is also fuelled by other chronic issues that generate humanitarian vulnerability. Over a year after the end of hostilities in the Gaza Strip, less than ten per cent of the homes that were totally destroyed are under construction. Despite generous pledges by many countries, there is a funding gap for the reconstruction for over three-quarters (9,200 units) of totally destroyed homes. In the meantime, some 95,000 people displaced during the war continue to live in precarious conditions with host families, in rented apartments, prefabricated units, or in the rubble of their previous homes.

On a positive note, in October the Israeli authorities removed a longstanding restriction on the import of gravel to the Gaza Strip, thus facilitating construction activities. However, the remaining import restrictions imposed by Israel in its "dual use" list, as well as the internal Palestinian divide, continue to undermine the delivery of basic services, including the capacity of local institutions to respond to emergencies. This is of particular concern at the onset of winter and the anticipated seasonal flooding and related displacements.

In the West Bank, despite a sharp decline in the number of Palestinian structures demolished in September for lack of a building permit, punitive demolitions targeting the family homes of perpetrators or suspected perpetrators of attacks against Israelis resumed in October. This practice was recently endorsed by the Israeli Security Cabinet, citing the need to deter potential attackers. Punitive demolitions have a devastating impact on families, particularly children, and were recently characterized by the High Commissioner for Human Rights as being "both illegal and counterproductive".

Additional measures approved by the Security Cabinet include the deployment of dozens of roadblocks and checkpoints on many of the main streets leading to and from Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Although a few of these obstacles were removed since then, search and checking procedures at checkpoints have continued to disrupt access by some 140,000 people to services, including educational and health facilities, places of work, and holy sites.

The provision of humanitarian assistance and protection to those most affected by the occupation and violence is essential to alleviate suffering and prevent further deterioration in conditions. In the briefing referred to earlier, UN Deputy Secretary-General emphasized that "the violence is mainly rooted in the absence of a genuine political narrative and horizon... Efforts must be intensified from all quarters to restore Palestinian and Israeli hope that peace is still possible".

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WAVE OF VIOLENCE ACROSS THE OPT AND ISRAEL RESULTS IN RECORD CASUALTIES


Alarming attacks on Israelis and Palestinians and concern over excessive use of force by Israeli forces

The Palestinian protests and confrontations with Israeli police that began in mid-September in the Haram Al Sharif/ Temple Mount in East Jerusalem's Old City,³ rapidly spread throughout the oPt, including all parts of the West Bank and the Gaza-Israel border areas. What followed in October was a wave of violence characterized by demonstrations, violent clashes, and deliberate attacks against civilians that, by the end of the month, left 69 Palestinians and eight Israelis dead and more than 7,300 Palestinians and 115 Israelis⁴ injured.




The number of casualties among West Bank Palestinians in October is the highest recorded in a single month since OCHA began monitoring and reporting on conflict-related casualties in 2005, while the number of casualties in the Gaza Strip is the highest since the end of the 2014 armed conflict.

The violence escalated from 1 October, when an Israeli settler couple in Nablus governorate was shot and killed by a group of armed Palestinians, reportedly affiliated with Hamas. This marked the beginning of a series of attacks, mostly stabbings, by Palestinian individuals not affiliated with any particular faction, but acting on their own to target Israeli forces and civilians in both the West Bank and Israel. The attacks claimed the lives of eight Israelis and resulted in the injury over 55 others, including four children. As a result of this type of incident, 40 Palestinian perpetrators and alleged perpetrators, including ten children,




The number of casualties during October among West Bank Palestinians is the highest in a single month since OCHA began monitoring and reporting on conflict-related casualties in 2005



were killed and another four were injured. The circumstances surrounding some of the incidents remain disputed, including claims that some of those implicated did not actually carry out an attack.


Widespread protests and clashes took place between Palestinians and Israeli forces across the West Bank, particularly at checkpoints and during search and arrest operations. Protests then spread to areas next to the Israeli perimeter fence surrounding the Gaza Strip, resulting in several breaches of the fence. The highest

number of casualties recorded was in Jerusalem governorate (see info-graphic herein), where more than 1,300 Palestinians were injured, the majority in East Jerusalem (mainly Al 'Isawiya, Shu'fat refugee camp and the Old City).



The majority of Palestinian injuries (approximately 57 per cent) as well as three fatalities (including an eight-month-old infant) resulted from tear gas inhalation requiring medical treatment. The second largest category of injury to Palestinians (24 per cent) was from rubber bullets. Finally, 15 per cent of injuries were from live ammunition shot by Israeli forces—more than 1,100 Palestinians—the highest that OCHA has recorded in a given month since 2005. Over 100 of the live ammunition injuries were recorded in three incidents that took place in a single day (11 October) in the northern West Bank: at the checkpoints of Huwwara (Nablus), Tulkarm (Tulkarm), and Qalqiliya city (Qalqiliya).

In addition to Israeli casualties killed or injured as a result of stabbing attacks in October there were 52 Israelis, including 24 civilians and 28 members of security forces, injured in clashes and other incidents, including 45 as a result of stone throwing, two from Molotov cocktails, three from pipe bombs, and one as a result of vehicle ramming. The highest number



The high number of Palestinian deaths and injuries from the use of live ammunition underscores longstanding concerns about the excessive use of force.

of Israeli injuries were in East Jerusalem (33 per cent), followed by the governorates of Hebron (21 per cent), Nablus (13 per cent), Ramallah (11 per cent), Bethlehem (7 per cent), and Salfit, Qalqilya and within West Jerusalem (one injury each).

Concern over excessive use of force by Israeli forces: The high number of Palestinian deaths and injuries by Israeli security forces, particularly those resulting from the use of live ammunition, has underscored longstanding concerns about the excessive use of force in both violent protests and in dealing with stabbing or alleged stabbing attacks.

Initial evidence from some stabbing incidents, including video footage, suggests that the attackers could have been controlled and apprehended using a lesser degree of force.⁵ Concerns are reinforced by quotes in the media by senior Israeli officials, including the Jerusalem District Police Commander and the Interior Security Minister, declaring that the perpetrators of attacks should not leave the scene of a crime alive.⁶

In the West Bank and in dealing with protests next to Gaza's fence, Israeli forces act in a law enforcement capacity. Under international law, the use of firearms in law enforcement circumstances is only permitted in self-defence or in defence of others against imminent threat of death or serious injury, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to protect life.⁷ The applicability of these principles vis-à-vis Israeli forces in the current context has been confirmed by the Israeli Attorney General.⁸

Although several investigations have reportedly been opened into deaths resulting from clashes in the West Bank,⁹ the majority of cases involving the killing or serious injury of protestors, and perpetrators or alleged perpetrators of attacks, have not so far been subjected to investigation and the lack of accountability is a growing concern.

As noted by the UN Deputy Secretary-General in his briefing to the Security Council on 22 October, the rise in Palestinian protests and attacks is taking place against a background of growing frustration with the lack of a political horizon leading to an end to the longstanding Israeli occupation. Other factors generating frustration include concerns about changes to the status quo at the Haram Al Sharif/Temple Mount; continuous settlement expansion alongside severe constraints on Palestinian development in Area C; and a general lack of accountability regarding attacks against Palestinians.

RECONSTRUCTION OF OVER ONE QUARTER OF TOTALLY DESTROYED HOMES ONGOING OR ABOUT TO START

Israel removes restrictions on the import of aggregates

As of early October, reconstruction of 1,134 homes totally destroyed during the 2014 hostilities, constituting less than ten per cent of the total caseload for this category (12,584) was reportedly underway. The reconstruction of the first totally destroyed home funded by UNRWA was completed in October.¹⁰ Funding for an additional 2,250 units, or a further 16 per cent of the caseload is reportedly confirmed, although the timing for the actual financial transfers and the start of work on the ground remains unclear.¹¹

Reconstruction of 1,134 homes totally destroyed during the 2014 hostilities, constituting less than ten per cent of the total caseload for this category (12,584) was reportedly underway.



This section is based on a contribution by the Shelter Cluster

Despite the generous pledges made by many countries during the 2014 Cairo Conference for the reconstruction of Gaza, a funding gap still exists for the reconstruction of over three-quarters (9,200 units) of the totally destroyed homes.¹²

Progress in repairing damaged homes has been more significant, including the completion of nearly 12 per cent of severely damaged homes, allowing an estimated 5,000 displaced people to return home.

	# Units	Completed	In Progress	Funded	Gap
Totally destroyed	12,584	1	1,134	2,250	9,199
Severely damaged	6,773	808	2,390	323	3,252
Major damage	6,213	66	1,018	134	4,995
Minor damage	145,949	69,076	9,165	1,219	66,489


Source: Shelter Cluster, Factsheet, October 2015.

In the meantime, approximately 95,000 people whose homes were destroyed or severely damaged are currently accommodated with host families, in rented apartments, prefabricated units, tents and makeshift shelters, or in the rubble of their previous homes. Their living conditions raise a range of protection concerns, including overcrowding, limited access to basic services, lack of privacy, tensions with host communities, risks due to unexploded ordnance and exposure to weather extremes.

Since May 2015, the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) has continued to facilitate the entry of restricted building materials (mainly cement, aggregates and metal bars) for the reconstruction of totally destroyed homes through its “residential stream”. Imports of these materials were barred following the imposition of the blockade in 2007 and have been restricted since 2010 following classification by the Israeli authorities as “dual-use” (civilian and military) items.

The launch of the residential stream has led to an increase in the volume of these and non-restricted building materials entering Gaza (see chart). In September, a total of 5,411 truckloads of construction materials entered Gaza, an increase of 55 per cent compared with the monthly average since the beginning of 2015 and eight times the monthly average during 2014.

**CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS ENTERING GAZA IN 2015
(IN TRUCKLOADS)**



The Israeli authorities have removed gravel from the “dual-use” list of goods that are restricted from entering the Gaza Strip.

In October, the Israeli authorities removed aggregates (i.e. gravel) from the “dual-use” list of goods. This is the third time this year that the list has been modified, with previous changes including both additions and removals.¹³ Consequently, individuals and organizations will now be able to import aggregates without prior approval from the Israeli authorities through the GRM or other mechanisms. However, the Israeli authorities will retain a quota of 400 truckloads of aggregate per day, despite the recent expansion of the Kerem Shalom crossing that has significantly increased the potential volume of goods that can be processed.

By mid-October restricted materials allocated by the GRM for approved participants in the residential stream totaled nearly 1.7 million tons. However, less than 20 per cent of this amount has so far been procured by beneficiaries from the authorized vendors.¹⁴ The large gap between the GRM allocations and the actual purchase by beneficiaries from authorized vendors can be attributed, among other reasons, to the modality of distribution of financial assistance in installments based on progress. This can also be attributed to the availability of locally produced aggregates (from crushed rubble) and metal bars, which are significantly cheaper than the materials imported via Israel, although the poor quality of these materials poses a risk to the safety of structures built with them.

Despite recent progress, a more rapid pace of reconstruction will demand timely disbursement of donations pledged by the international community at the Cairo Conference one year ago; additional capacity for the entry of construction materials, including reopening crossings other than Kerem Shalom; and the removal of additional critical construction materials and equipment from the dual use list, particularly wood.


A more rapid pace of reconstruction will demand timely disbursement of donations pledged by the international community at the Cairo Conference one year ago

INTERNAL PALESTINIAN DIVIDE CONTINUES TO IMPACT ON THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES IN THE GAZA STRIP

Public employees hired after 2007 have not received salaries for the past 18 months

The longstanding divide between the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip continues to impede the delivery of basic services in Gaza. Despite the formation of a Government of National Consensus (GNC) in April 2014, the GNC has been unable to assume full responsibilities in Gaza due to lack of agreement on key questions related to the transfer of powers.

The lack of clear authority and reporting lines between governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip and their West Bank counterparts has to some extent resulted in duplication



of functions, management gaps, and contradictory administrative orders. Moreover, since the formation of the GNC, there appears to have been a sharp decline in the allocation of funds to all governmental bodies in Gaza, impeding the performance of basic functions and preventing salary payments to public employees hired by the former Hamas *de facto* authorities. This has led to increased work absenteeism.

In the aftermath of the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, thousands of civil and security servants (67,000) were either forced by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah to stop working, or were fired by the new *de facto* authorities (i.e. Hamas). Although some of these employees returned to work (9,000 in health and education mainly), another 51,000 are still being paid by the PA but are not reporting to work. To bridge the gap, the *de facto* Gaza authorities gradually employed around 42,000 new staff, including some 24,000 in the social sector alone. However, since mid-2013, the ability of the *de facto* authorities to pay the salaries of the new employees was severely restricted due to the closure of the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, which were a major source of revenue.

These factors have severely weakened the capacity of public institutions to deliver basic services, including in areas such as housing, health, education, water and sanitation, and electricity supply. The lack of salary payments to those employed by the Gaza authorities since 2007 has had a direct impact on the living conditions of these families.

Gaps in funding and capacity have also had a negative impact on national institutions and the level of preparedness to respond to emergencies, with particular implications for the humanitarian agencies operating in the Gaza Strip. The following are some of the main related concerns:

First responders: All institutions providing immediate assistance during emergencies, namely natural disasters or hostilities have been negatively affected by the internal split. However, because of its pivotal role in emergencies, the impact on the Palestinian Civil Defense (PCD) has been particularly detrimental. Since its formation in 2014, the GNC has not provided any financial, administrative or logistical support to the PCD, including fuel supplies to run emergency facilities and equipment. At present, only about 60 per cent of PCD fuel needs are covered by allocations from the Gaza authorities. Critical funding and capacity gaps are compounded by Israeli restrictions on the import of materials, equipment and vehicles (see section below on *Flood preparedness*) and the damage sustained by PCD work stations and equipment during the previous three armed conflicts. Because it is operating with only partially rehabilitated equipment, the PCD's current capacity is estimated at less than 45 per cent of its full potential capacity.

Delivery of humanitarian assistance: the internal divide has undermined a range of strategic partnerships between humanitarian actors and line ministries, with direct on the delivery of aid. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) has traditionally been one of the most important partners for humanitarian agencies in areas such the provision of emergency assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), food and cash assistance and child protection. The ministry suffers from major funding and capacity constraints, including the inability to mobilize field workers for regular follow-up, beneficiary identification or in case of emergency due to the salary crisis and logistical gaps.

While the level of coordination between the Gaza and West Bank branches of MoSA is somewhat better than among other bodies, the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs suffers from major funding and capacity constraints.

Energy supply: The operation of Gaza's sole power plant (GPP) is permanently undermined by the lack of funds to purchase fuel. The Gaza authorities face problems in collecting electricity payments from customers due to the poor socio-economic circumstances, a situation compounded by a long-running dispute between Gaza and Ramallah about taxation on fuel purchased for the GPP. While a tax exemption has been provided regularly by the West Bank-based Ministry of Finance, this has to be continuously renegotiated and there have been periods where the exception did not apply, thus reducing the volume of fuel that could be purchased. Recurrent fuel shortages caused by a range of factors, including the internal divide, have left the GPP unable to operate at full capacity. On occasions it has been forced to shut down completely, leading to power outages of up to 18 hours a day. OCHA and UNRWA are required to coordinate and distribute emergency fuel to ensure the continuous operation of 130 critical facilities providing health, water and municipal services, primarily through backup generators. Since December 2013, at least nine million liters of fuel have been delivered in this context.

FLOOD PREPAREDNESS IN GAZA UNDERMINED BY IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

Thousands of families at risk of displacement

As the rainy season begins, thousands of families in Gaza will once again be at risk of temporary displacement and destruction of their assets due to potential floods. The winter weather conditions are expected to exacerbate the already fragile living conditions and livelihoods of the population, particularly IDPs.

The Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) began the implementation of four projects aimed at reducing the risk of flooding in low-lying areas. Two of the projects involving the collection and reuse of rainwater have been completed, while the remaining two have been delayed due to Israeli import restrictions on mobile and high pressure jetting pumps, classified as dual-use items. These pumps are required to extract rainwater and wastewater from low-lying areas and pump them to treatment plants or to the sea.



This section is based on information provided by the Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene group (EWASH).¹⁵

In 2013, the Alexa winter storm, one of the strongest recorded in recent decades, struck the oPt from 11 to 14 December. Approximately 10,000 people were forced to evacuate their homes and relocate to temporary shelters in the Gaza Strip. According to the CMWU, low-lying areas across Gaza were flooded in at least 25 locations.



© Photo by Shareef Sarhan\ UNRWA

Civil Defense staff evacuating people from Al Nafaq area in Gaza City in 2013.

By the end of 2015, for the first time in over a decade, approximately 500 farmers will be able to access farm land situated between 100 and 300 meters from the fence, in areas that farmers have not been able to cultivate for the past seven to 15 years.



This section was contributed by the International Committee of the Red Cross

Overall, 25 mobile pumps are urgently required to enable an effective response to potential flooding. Currently only 13 pumps are available in Gaza, of which six are in a poor condition and require replacement. With funding provided by UNICEF, the CMWU applied for seven mobile pumps through the GRM one year ago, but efforts to obtain Israeli approval have so far been unsuccessful. An additional application for three mobile pumps submitted by an international NGO is also pending, while approval for a mobile pump funded by a Qatari charity has been rejected.

One of the delayed CMWU projects is planned for the Sheikh Radwan neighbourhood of Gaza City, a residential area of 250 dunums with more than 1,000 households at high risk of flooding. Items awaiting entry clearance for this project include six vertical and submersible pumps, plus one carrier line to discharge rainwater and sewage flooding to the sea. The other delayed project is for the Al Amal neighbourhood of Khan Younis, where some 20,000 individuals are at risk of flooding: three vertical and submersible pumps and two carrier lines are required.

The impact of the coming winter conditions is a cause of concern for hundreds of families whose homes were destroyed during the 2014 hostilities and who are still living in the rubble of their homes, in pre-fabricated units or in tents, with very limited electricity and water supplies and insufficient sanitation facilities.

RESTORING ACCESS TO LAND IN GAZA'S RESTRICTED AREA ALONG THE PERIMETER FENCE

This area was one of the hardest hit during the 2014 hostilities

The ICRC is one of the few organizations that can access the restricted areas in border areas along Gaza's perimeter fence with Israel, and the organization is facilitating the re-levelling and ploughing of farm lands in these areas. By the end of 2015, for the first time in over a decade, approximately 500 farmers will be able to access farm land situated between 100 and 300 meters from the fence, in areas that farmers have not been able to cultivate for the past seven to 15 years.

Lands in this area were amongst the hardest-hit in last summer's conflict, with over two-thirds of homes destroyed or damaged, and up to 1,800 hectares of agricultural lands affected. Other key physical infrastructure, such as electricity lines, irrigation systems, wells, reservoirs, greenhouses, and warehouses, as well as agricultural equipment and supplies, were severely impacted. Faced with this situation, the majority of farmers did not have the means to rehabilitate their land or purchase seeds.



This programme is an expansion of the first restoration of agricultural land in the border area, which was carried out immediately after the 2014 hostilities. In 2014, 730 hectares of damaged agricultural land up to 1.5km from the border were leveled, and 15 kms of agricultural roads were repaired, benefiting over 1400 affected farmers. More than 1,350 farmers in this area received wheat and pea seeds, with expected harvest of 2,000 metric tons, and received pesticides or assistance to control Red Palm weevil pest, and 410 farmers who lost their houses received cash payments to start irrigated farming.

Due to the presence of explosive remnants of war, ICRC teams also worked with concerned authorities to facilitate their safe clearance. This year, 300 hectares of land were leveled in preparation for the November rainy season; soon those lands will be ploughed so that farmers will be able to sow their crops. In addition, 222 damaged greenhouses located east of Salah Al Deen Road were restored, and two elevated concrete reservoirs, 4.6 km of water pipes, and three metallic irrigation pools and water distribution points are being established to help farmers reconnect to water sources. In areas like Musader, Deir Al Balah, Wadi Salqa, Abassan Kabeera and Abassan Jadeeda, the programme will soon begin rehabilitating roads so that farmers can reach their lands with greater ease.


THE 2015 OLIVE HARVEST SEASON STARTS AMIDST ESCALATING TENSION IN THE OPT

Yield expected to decline from previous year

The olive harvest season started during October amidst escalating clashes and attacks (see section on *Escalation*). There were also recurrent concerns about restrictions on the access of farmers to their olive groves in certain areas and about inadequate law enforcement in the face of settler violence.

According to the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, the olive oil industry makes up 25 per cent of oPt’s agricultural income,¹⁶ and contributes to the livelihoods of approximately 100,000 families.¹⁷ The overall yield this season is projected at 18,000 MT (metric tons) of oil, down 25 per cent from last year (24,000 MT) and nearly the same as in 2013 (17,600 MT).¹⁸

The Barrier has a direct impact on olive-related livelihoods. Palestinian farmers need special permits or prior coordination to access their farming land located between the Barrier and the Green Line, and declared as a ‘closed area’. The approval rate for permit applications during the olive harvest season in recent years has fluctuated between 50 and 60 per cent. For those granted permits, entry to the ‘closed area’ is channeled through some 85 gates designated for agricultural access.



The olive oil industry makes up 25 per cent of oPt’s agricultural income, and contributes to the livelihoods of approximately 100,000 families. There are recurrent concerns about restrictions on the access of farmers to their olive groves in certain areas and about inadequate law enforcement in the face of settler violence.

In approximately 90 Palestinian communities that own land within or in the vicinity of 56 Israeli settlements and settlement outposts, farmers can only access their land by prior coordination with the Israeli authorities. This is generally only for a limited number of days during the harvest and ploughing seasons. During these days, farmers can access their land with some protection from Israeli forces, while the entry of Israeli settlers to these areas is prohibited.

These access restrictions impede essential agricultural activities such as ploughing, pruning, fertilizing and pest and weed management, and have an adverse impact on olive productivity and value. Data collected by OCHA show that olive trees in the area between the Barrier and the Green Line have a reduced yield of approximately 60 percent compared with equivalent trees on the 'Palestinian' side of the Barrier.¹⁹

Olive-based livelihoods in multiple West Bank areas are also undermined by the uprooting and vandalizing of olive trees by Israeli settlers. Between January and September 2015, approximately 11,000 trees and saplings were affected, the largest figure since 2011 when OCHA began recording this indicator. Roughly 45 per cent of the trees damaged were in an incident in Turmus'ayya village in Ramallah, where around 5,000 olive saplings (two to three years old) had been uprooted on the first day of 2015.²⁰ Every year during and prior to the harvesting season, there are numerous reports of Palestinian groves being

PREVENTIVE MEASURES BY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE OLIVE HARVEST

For the fourth year in a row, the Protection Cluster, through the OHCHR-chaired Core Group on Settler Violence, has coordinated the deployment of a protective presence in 67 identified areas of friction where settler violence has been recurrent. Additional areas may be added over the course of the harvest based on newly identified needs. Participating organizations will also collect information on incidents for use in reporting and to inform protection responses (e.g. legal assistance, psychosocial response or further protective presence), and, where appropriate, to trigger inter-cluster responses to incidents of settler violence resulting in property damage.



Trees uprooted in the context of Barrier construction in Bethlehem area

© Photo by OCHA

“We sell crops and live on the money that we make. The most important thing for us is that we are not in debt.”

Ziyad, one of the farmers who benefited from the ICRC land restoration project.

harvested by Israeli settlers, particularly in areas where Palestinian access is restricted.

Intimidation and physical assaults on Palestinian farmers during the harvest season also impact on yields. Such incidents have declined in recent years due to the enhanced deployment of Israeli military forces in sensitive areas around Israeli settlements. In some cases a protective presence is supplied under the coordination of the Protection Cluster (see Box on *Preventive measures*). The rise in incidents since mid-September is likely to affect this trend and result in a higher number of incidents than in recent years.

The prevalence of Israeli settler violence and vandalism against olive trees is closely linked to the lack of adequate law enforcement by the Israeli authorities. According to the Israeli NGO Yesh Din, over 96 per cent of complaints filed with the Israeli police between 2005 and 2014 regarding deliberate damage to Palestinian-owned trees by Israeli settlers, and followed up by the organization, were closed without an indictment.²¹ Inadequate enforcement of the rule of law is not limited to accountability for violent attacks, but also applies to the takeover of Palestinian private and public land, and the expansion of Israeli settlements, which is reflected in the policy of retroactively legalizing settlement outposts built without prior official authorization. Recent media reports indicated that the Israeli authorities intend to legalize four such outposts (Adei Ad, Esh Kodesh, Kida, and Ahiya) in Nablus governorate.²² Two of these settlements are frequently implicated in attacks against Palestinian civilians and property.

Under international law, Israel, as the occupying power, is obligated to protect Palestinian civilians and their property. It must ensure that Palestinians farmers have safe and unimpeded access to their agricultural land throughout the year and ensure accountability for those responsible for attacks.

The prevalence of Israeli settler violence and vandalism against olive trees is closely linked to the lack of adequate law enforcement by the Israeli authorities.

Latest Developments


The Israeli authorities resumed a policy of punitive demolition of homes of Palestinians implicated in attacks against Israeli civilians in October, resulting in several demolitions in East Jerusalem and Hebron. This issue will be addressed in more detail in the November issue of the Humanitarian Bulletin.

DECLINE IN WEST BANK DEMOLITIONS AND DISPLACEMENTS DURING SEPTEMBER

Concerns remain over Palestinian herding communities at risk of forcible transfer

The number of demolitions fell in September 2015 compared with August, which had the highest number of structures demolished (145) by the Israeli authorities in five years. A total of 13 Palestinian-owned structures were demolished for lack of an Israeli-issued building permit, displacing nine people (including five children).

Between January and September 2015, a total of 462 Palestinian-owned structures have been demolished, nearly the same as the equivalent period in 2014. The number of people displaced as a result of demolitions (525) fell by 45 per cent compared with 2014. This reflects the increased



targeting in 2015 of livelihood-related structures (e.g. animal shelters, storage rooms, water cisterns, commercial stands) rather than residential structures.

Eleven of the demolished structures were in Area C, including three commercial structures in Hizma (Jerusalem), one commercial structure in Khamat Sakariya (Bethlehem), and five agricultural and two residential structures in East Tayba Bedouin community (Ramallah). All of those displaced during September resided in this community, which is one of 46 communities in the central West Bank at risk of forcible transfer under an official Israeli “relocation” plan.

In a related move, in September the Israeli Civil Administration advanced the approval of building permits for 35 housing units in one of the relocation sites (Al Jabal West, east of Jerusalem), although the identity of the recipients of such permits and the responsibility for the actual construction remain unclear.

No demolitions of internationally-funded structures took place this month, but 18 structures funded by international donors and provided as humanitarian assistance to three communities in southern Hebron received demolition or stop-work orders. Two of these communities (Halawa and Jinba) are at risk of forcible transfer due to their location in an area designated by the Israeli authorities as a “firing zone” for military training. They are among 12 at-risk communities in this firing zone that are the subject of longstanding litigation at the Israeli High Court of Justice. In the third community, Mantiqat Shi’b al Butum, which is adjacent to the firing zone, a donor-funded school serving 40 students was issued a stop-work order in September. Altogether, the structures targeted this month are worth more than €82,000.

The number of demolitions fell in September 2015 compared with August, which had the highest number of structures demolished (145) by the Israeli authorities in five years.

Endnotes

1. Injury figures include people who received medical treatment by paramedic teams on the ground, in local clinics and in hospitals. according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, 2355 Palestinians were treated in hospitals in connection with October incident.
2. Statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Special Meeting of the Human Rights Council, available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E>.
3. For further details on the initial incidents see OCHA, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 8 - 14 September 2015.
4. The figures of Israeli casualties exclude those that occurred within Israel and did not involved Palestinians from the oPt as either victims or perpetrators.
5. Statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Special Meeting of the Human Rights Council, available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E>.
6. Jerusalem District Police Commander, Moshe Edri, said: "Anyone who stabs Jews or hurts innocent people is due to be killed". (Walla News, 10 October 2015, in Hebrew). The Interior Security Minister, Gilad Arden, declared: "Every terrorist should know that he will not survive the attack he is about to commit".
7. The basic rules on this issue derive from Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations; and are reflected in Principle 9 of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
8. Letter from Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein to the Legal Centre for Minority Rights in Israel (Adalah), 26 October 2015. See also http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=29231
9. According to information provided to OCHA by B'Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights.
10. UNRWA Weekly Update, 22 Oct 2015
11. According to NORG report, 6 Oct 2015
12. Funding for a further 4,000 units should be confirmed by the end of the year.
13. See, OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, September 2015, p. 3.
14. See GRM data: [grm.report/#/Residential](http://www.grm.org.uk/report/#/Residential)
15. EWASH is a coalition of 27 organisations working in the water and sanitation sector in the occupied Palestinian territory. Established in 2002, its members include international and national NGOs and UN agencies.
16. Includes the value of picked olives and processed olive oil (PCBS data 2003-2010 averages). See also Al-Quds, 28 September 2015. <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=410229>
17. This includes 80 000 households who own land holdings containing olive trees according to the PCBS, WFP, FAO and UNRWA's SEFSec 2012 survey, in addition to 20 000 waged labourers and households who work under share-cropping arrangements during the annual olive harvest.
18. www.raya.ps/ar/news/922272.html; PCBS, "Press Release on Olive Press Survey in Palestine" 2014.
19. See OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, February 2014, p. 9.
20. See OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2015, pp. 16-17.
21. Yesh Din, 96.6 percent of Investigations into Attacks on Palestinian Trees are Closed due to Police Failings. Indictments in Only Four Cases, 13 October 2014. Available at: <http://www.yesh-din.org/infoitem.asp?infocatid=633>
22. Chaim Levinson, Haaretz, 1 October 2015.

Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

Conflict-related casualties and violence¹

Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Total	Total	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep

Palestinian deaths

Gaza	108	264	11	4	1	2	2256	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
West Bank (by Israeli forces and Israeli settlers)	13	9	27	4	2	3	58	2	1	1	5	1	3	7	4	3
Total	121	273	38	8	5**	5	2314	2	1	2	5	2	3	7	4	3
Of whom are civilians ²	59	131	30	8	5	5	1573	2	1	2	5	1	3	7	4	3
Of whom are female	3	24	1	0	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

Palestinian injuries

Gaza	476	1485	88	7	8	20	10739	4	2	10	10	13	8	6	4	4
West Bank (by Israeli forces and Israeli settlers)	1635	3179	3882	283	1001	329	6027	126	165	165	213	258	64	133	191	418
Total	2111	4664	3970	290	1009	349	16766	130	167	175	223	271	72	139	195	422
Of whom are civilians	2050	N/A	3965	290	1009	347	NA	130	167	175	223	271	72	139	195	415
Of whom are female	149	N/A	133	23	23	5	2286	11	2	14	9	7	2	9	4	7

Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	4	2	8	0	85	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	1
Of whom are civilians	11	3	2	2	6	0	17	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
Of whom are female	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	151	32	55	15	2629***	8	5	13	12	11	14	8	20	39
Of whom are civilians	56	60	74	19	41	12	952	7	2	9	7	8	9	4	9	13
Of whom are female	3	7	10	6	2	3	34	2	0	7	2	2	2	1	1	2

*September-December fatalities in Gaza include those who sustained injuries during the Israeli offensive on Gaza (July-August)

**See Magen David Adom's report: http://www.mdais.org/h/316/&mod=download&me_id=13228

Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Total	Total	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep

Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties ⁴	132	100	92	5	13	3	107	7	6	8	5	6	4	7	6	6
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	292	269	305	19	17	14	217	15	10	13	8	12	12	8	12	4
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	424	369	397	24	31	17	324	22	16	21	13	18	16	15	18	10
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	20	35	39	10	16	8	87	6	2	4	7	4	7	4	6	11
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	12	14	11	27	20	16	134	10	25	9	8	4	5	8	6	12
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	32	49	50	37	36	24	221	16	27	13	15	8	12	12	12	23

Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Total	Total	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep

Adult	Injured	7	12	4	0	5	11	38	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	24	NA
	Killed	1	2	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	NA
Child	Injured	17	19	19	0	2	7	19	0	3	1	3	3	0	1	13	NA
	Killed	2	1	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
Grand Total		27	34	26	1	7	11	65	0	3	3	3	4	0	1	42	NA

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Total	Total	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
West Bank	2	2	4	2	0	1	13	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0
Gaza Strip	13	42	1	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	306	549	1231	58	113	108	1221	37	31	35	65	47	13	29	36	92
Gaza Strip	121	93	10	0	2	4	3416	0	0	0	4	2	1	2	0	1

Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	1	0	1	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	3	8	0	1	3	16	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	2
Israel	2	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	197 monthly average	163	156	152	185 monthly average	163	182	182	163	163	160	153	156	171
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Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc Ej	618	474	558	44	70	9	651	66	0	60	14	0	17	8	126	5
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Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools¹⁹

oPt	na	321	47	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5	4	14	12	2	0	0	0	10
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Source: OCHA, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

Access

Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ¹⁵	872	777	1148	1038	1,636	1,684	1513	1,489	1429	1615	1539	1,814	2,148	1764	NA	
of which approved	721	719	1010	76	1,292	1,379	1246	1,202	1148	1329	1278	1,529	1,720	1461	NA	
of which denied	19	7	3	213	44	56	39	52	63	27	18	45	140	28	NA	
of which delayed ¹⁶	83	17	135	15	300	249	228	235	218	259	243	240	288	275	NA	

Source:WHO

Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Mon. Ave.	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WVB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	37.5	40.1	31	39	30	29	17	28	54	42	38	27	24	24	12
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	22.3	4	6	6	8	4	7	6	4	6	3	6	5	4
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	18.5	9.5	32	15	25	5.5	13.6	16.2	14.2	12	4	12.5	33.5	2

Source: OCHA

Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon.Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	338	316	422	409	409	413	496	348	372	332	469	276	286	254	273
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	283	491	562	631	584	563	618	384	481	400	526	401	474	380	421

Source: OCHA


Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)⁶

	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon.Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4,451	4227	5477	5527	5,528	5258	5549	5609	5591	5554	5516	5442	5369	9019	5244
of whom are women	26	7	10	14	15	20	16	20	20	18	21	22	22	21	35	23
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	245	132	457	461	463	327	455	424	412	396	391	370	342	341	315
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	897	1062	1609	1534	1,511	1525	1526	1534	1499	1479	1370	1363	1331	1351	1363

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)


Demolition of Structures

Structures demolished⁸




	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Total	Total	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
of which in Area C	577	525	564	27	37	24	493	76	15	77	21	18	41	14	139	11
of which in East Jerusalem	42	63	98	23	11	14	98	5	2	18	2	4	6	8	5	2
of which in Area A	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
of which in Area B	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	619	588	662	50	48	38	601	81	17	95	23	22	47	22	139	13

People Displaced due to demolitions⁹



	2011	2012	2013	2014				2015								
	Total	Total	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	808	805	67	102	10	969	117	0	110	25	0	29	0	201	9
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	71	298	30	34	8	208	0	0	0	0	0	2	22	0	0
of which in Area A	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0
of which in Area B	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	1094	879	1103	97	136	18	1215	117	0	110	25	0	31	22	208	9

Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel¹⁸










Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2015:

Occupied Palestinian territory Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2015 as of 22 September-2015

SRP 2015		
Cluster	Total request in USD	% of funds received
 Coordination and Support Services	23,235,547	90%
 Education	20,330,672	41%
 Food Security	324,704,291	39%
 Health and Nutrition	21,212,516	39%
 Protection	51,935,541	63%
 Shelter/Non-Food Items	224,930,156	41%
 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	39,213,897	49%
Total	705,562,620	45.9%

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.