

HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT

NOVEMBER 2013



Overview

November marked one year since the Egyptian-mediated ceasefire understanding between Israel and Hamas, which ended an eight day escalation of hostilities. The year that passed has witnessed the lowest level of violence and civilian casualties registered in Gaza and southern Israel in 13 years. Additionally, there has been limited improvement in people's access to fishing areas at sea and to farming areas along the fence with Israel.

Overall, however, Gaza has seen a deterioration in living conditions. The majority of the Israeli-imposed restrictions on the movement of people

and goods to and from the Gaza Strip have remained in place, with at least one of them (import of building materials) tightened. The impact of those measures has been compounded since June 2013 by the halt in the smuggling of construction material and fuel via the illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt.



Overflowing sewer in Gaza City

Photo by OCHA

HIGHLIGHTS

- Due to the ongoing fuel shortage, the Gaza Power Plant shut down triggering one of the most serious energy crises in the Gaza Strip in recent years, with potentially serious humanitarian ramifications.
- The deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Gaza has impeded efforts to mitigate some of the consequences of the November 2012 hostilities, particularly among families who lost their homes, those severely injured, and children affected by psychosocial distress.
- Demolitions in East Jerusalem in 2013 resulted in the displacement of nearly 300 Palestinians, by far the highest number since 2009 and far exceeding the combined annual totals for 2011 and 2012.

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
NOVEMBER FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	9
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	320
Structures demolished in the West Bank	25

CAP 2013 FUNDING

401 million
requested (US\$)

62% funded



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Coordination Saves Lives



Since 1 November, the Gaza Power Plant (GPP) has been forced to shut down due to the fuel shortage, triggering one of the most serious energy crises in the Gaza Strip in recent years, including electricity outages of up to 16 hours per day. The water and sanitation sector has been one of the hardest hit: a number of sewage pumping facilities have started to overflow and the frequency of water supply to households has decreased dramatically. The provision of health services has also been impacted by the energy crisis. Among other ramifications in the health sector, government hospitals have reduced non-urgent surgeries by almost half in order to save fuel needed to run generators to power life-saving equipment.

Particularly affected by the deterioration are those who continue struggling with the consequences of the November 2012 hostilities, including families that remain displaced, those severely injured, and children experiencing psychosocial distress. This overall deterioration is a matter of concern, not only in itself, but also as a critical factor undermining the ceasefire and potentially leading to the resumption of large scale violence.

There are worrying signs of an overall deterioration in the West Bank as well, with a sharp increase in casualties over the past year. In November alone, six Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces and 308 were injured. Two of this month's fatalities and six of the injuries occurred at military checkpoints in the West Bank. In recent years, there has been a gradual easing of mobility restrictions between the main Palestinian cities and villages. However, checkpoints have continued to impede Palestinian movement and remain frequent flashpoints of violence. At present, there are 59 permanently staffed military checkpoints within the West Bank, in addition to 25 "partial checkpoints" staffed on an ad-hoc basis, and a monthly average of about 250 flying checkpoints deployed for several hours at a time at different locations.

Also of concern in the West Bank is the fact that the number of structures demolished and people displaced in East Jerusalem so far this year (almost 100 and 300 respectively) is by far the highest recorded since 2009. This month, the Israeli authorities issued new demolition orders against ten apartment buildings in an East Jerusalem community separated from the city by the Barrier, placing additional 1,500 residents at risk of displacement. Forced displacement has a serious physical, socio-economic and emotional impact on Palestinian families and communities, depriving people of their homes, often their main source of physical and economic security.

Despite the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, the ceasefire reached a year ago between Israel and Hamas is still holding, offering a window of opportunity to address some of the drivers of humanitarian vulnerability affecting Gaza's population. Additionally, the ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority present an even more significant opportunity to improve the living conditions of the entire Palestinian population in the oPt and ending the ongoing occupation. As stressed by the UN Secretary General on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, "after two decades of talks and far too many adverse developments on the ground [...] we cannot afford to lose the current moment of opportunity. I ask all in the international community to work together to translate the solidarity expressed on this occasion into positive action for peace and justice."

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS


A winter storm, characterized by heavy rains, strong winds, low temperatures and snowfall hit the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) on 11 December, exacerbating the already poor humanitarian situation for large segments of the Palestinian population. For information about the humanitarian impact of the storm and the response provided see OCHA's Situation Reports

GAZA: WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES SEVERELY DISRUPTED DUE TO THE ENERGY CRISIS

Emergency responses and structural solutions urgently required

On 1 November, the Gaza Power Plant (GPP) shut down, due to the ongoing fuel shortage and depletion of its fuel stocks, triggering one of the most serious energy crises in the Gaza Strip in recent years, with potentially serious humanitarian ramifications. At present, Gaza relies on electricity bought from Israel (120 megawatts-MW) and Egypt (30 MW), which covers roughly 38 per cent of the demand. Therefore, families in Gaza are facing power outages of around 16 hours per day. The current fuel crisis has compounded an already fragile humanitarian situation generated by the longstanding Israeli restrictions and more recent measures imposed by the Egyptian authorities, in the context of security concerns in the Sinai. The Egyptian actions include the closure or destruction of smuggling tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, and increased restrictions on the movement of people and goods through the Rafah Crossing, which had become the main entry/exist point for Gaza residents, given the longstanding restrictions imposed by Israel at Erez Crossing.

Electricity demand by sources of supply (in megawatts)



* Based on a demand of 475 MW estimated for the winter season

Gaza relies on electricity bought from Israel and Egypt, which covers roughly 38 per cent of the demand. Families in Gaza are facing power outages of around 16 hours per day

As of November, the supply of fuel through the tunnels has come to an almost complete halt. In recent years, Gaza had become dependent on smuggled, subsidized Egyptian fuel, with approximately 1 million litres per day entering Gaza through the tunnels until June 2013. The lack of an agreed mechanism between the Palestinian authorities in Ramallah and Gaza allowing for the purchase of (more expensive) fuel from other sources, including Israel, has further complicated the situation.

While all essential services are affected, one of the hardest hit is the water and sanitation sector, as none of its 291 facilities are functioning adequately.¹ Due to electricity shortages, back-up generators need to be used more often, requiring more fuel, which is neither readily available nor affordable. Equipment that is increasingly affected by overuse and fluctuations in the power supply requires more frequent repairs. The largest sewage pumping facility in Gaza overflowed and at least ten other sewage pumping facilities are on the verge of overflowing. When there is a power outage, sewage facilities need to divert the bulk of the sewage to emergency lagoons, many of which have weak embankments, and discharges are increasingly difficult to control.

Before the most current crisis, some 90m³ of raw or partially treated sewage flowed into the Mediterranean Sea every day; now all sewage emanating from Gaza it is untreated, creating ever-growing pollution, public health risks and economic challenges. Significant

3,000 AFFECTED BY SEWAGE OVERFLOW

On 13 November, one of the main sewage pumping stations in Gaza City (which previously handled 60 per cent of the city's sewage) failed and discharged over 35,000 m³ of untreated sewage over a large area in the neighborhood of Az-Zeitoun, south of Gaza City. Approximately 3,000 people were directly or indirectly affected and exposed to public health risks, including diarrhea. By the time of publication, the sewage spill had not yet been addressed and clean-up operations had not started. Six school compounds located in the vicinity of sewage pumping stations are at risk of being flooded if there are additional overflows.

investment in sewage treatment facilities was already required prior to the latest crisis, as new facilities need to be built and older ones refurbished, to cope with current demand. To deal with the needs of Gaza's urban population, strategically placed treatment facilities and a complete upgrade of the water and sewage network are needed.

The energy crisis has also affected the quantity and quality of water, with water consumption reduced to 40 litres per person per day (l/p/d) on average, well below the 70-90 l/p/d recorded earlier this year and the recommended 100 l/p/d. Just 15 per cent of people in Gaza receive water daily, for five to six hours, and it is increasingly difficult to pump water to the upper floors of buildings.

Due to a longstanding practice of over-extraction from the underlying coastal aquifer, alongside sea water seepage, over 90 per cent of the water supplied to households via the network is not potable, requiring people to purchase desalinated water for drinking and cooking purposes. In November, water desalination units operated by the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) saw their capacity reduced by 75 per cent due to power shortages, forcing many households to obtain their desalinated water from private and unregulated sources. This month, nearly 900,000 complaints were made to the CMWU on the lack of municipal water provision and sewage treatment.²

Small quantities of fuel have been distributed to alleviate the immediate emergency. This fuel was provided through emergency funding by the Turkish government, which aims to provide 800,000 litres of fuel to the most critical sewage, solid waste and health facilities for a period of four months (200,000 litres per month).

In the absence of energy from the GPP, the WASH sector needs approximately 400,000 litres of fuel per month to maintain a reasonable level of functioning, the solid waste sector 150,000 litres and the health sector 500,000 litres. Therefore, until additional electricity feeder lines are established there is a need for a more structural solution.³

These solutions should include a clearly identified administrative settlement between Ramallah and Gaza to purchase additional fuel through Israel, at an agreed price. Additional measures discussed include better collection of outstanding electricity bills and the installation of pre-paid electricity meters for consumers in Gaza. While the

Water desalination units operated saw their capacity reduced by 75 per cent due to power shortages, forcing many households to obtain their desalinated water from private and unregulated sources.

payment of electricity bills in Gaza had improved prior to the energy crisis, the lack of service provision threatens to undercut progress made on that front.

A YEAR FROM THE ISRAEL-HAMAS CEASEFIRE

Deterioration in living conditions undermines the fragile calm

One year has passed since the Egyptian-mediated ceasefire understanding between Israel and Hamas. The ceasefire, which was reached on 21 November 2012, ended the eight-day Israeli military operation and the escalation of hostilities in Gaza and southern Israel.⁴ It offered a window of opportunity to address some of the drivers of the protracted humanitarian situation affecting Gaza's population. However, despite some achievements, there has been an overall deterioration in living conditions. This deterioration has impeded efforts to mitigate some of the hostilities' consequences, particularly among families who lost their homes, those severely injured, and children affected by psychosocial distress.


Fragile calm achieved

The year since the ceasefire witnessed a significant decline in clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army, Palestinian rocket firing, and Israeli airstrikes. As a result, 2013 registered the lowest number of casualties in Gaza since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000. The number of Palestinian fatalities in the Gaza Strip during the first 11 months of 2013 decreased by 96 per cent compared to 2012 (267 vs 10), although the percentage of civilians killed during both years remained the same (roughly half). So far in 2013 there have been no Israeli civilian casualties in the Gaza context.

The total number of Palestinian injuries also decreased, from 1,484 in 2012 to 55 so far in 2013. The bulk of the civilian injuries occurred in the context of Israeli enforcement of access restrictions to fishing areas at sea and land areas along the fence separating Israel and the Gaza Strip; despite the improvement in access (see below), these areas

This section is based on inputs provided by various Clusters and Sectors, including WASH, Protection, Child Protection, and Food Security

Palestinian fatalities in the Gaza Strip*



Source: B'Tselem for 2000-2004, OCHA for 2005-2013

* Year 2000 covers only the period from 29 September. Year 2013 covers through the end of November

have remained a key threat to the life and security of civilians.

Another protection challenge, inherited from the November 2012 escalation, has been the increased threat posed by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). In 2013, ERWs caused 26 civilian victims, including two boys killed and another 20 children and four adults injured. UNMAS intervention in 2013 has substantially decreased that risk, thanks to a much improved and safer ERW management process by the local police; alongside increased awareness amongst the population as a result of a risk education programme rolled-out with partners and implemented in schools and civil society groups, as well as the media.

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NO ACCOUNTABILITY⁵

One year after the ceasefire agreement, accountability for reported violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) during the November 2012 hostilities, committed by Israel, the de facto authorities and Palestinian armed groups, continues to remain elusive. According to information available, not a single criminal investigation has been opened by the Israeli authorities into allegations of violations of IHL by the Israeli military; and no measures have been taken by the de facto authorities to investigate credible allegations of IHL violations by its forces or other armed groups in Gaza.

Health and psychosocial impact continue

Over the course of the hostilities, 1,046 Palestinians, the majority of whom are believed to be civilians, including 446 children, were injured. The Gaza Ministry of Health estimated that over 100 of them may have sustained permanent disabilities as a result of the injuries inflicted. These newly disabled, along with thousands of already disabled residents of the Gaza Strip, depend on regular access to medical services for their survival and wellbeing. Since June 2013, however, all such services have been severely disrupted due to lengthy power shortages, following the halt in the smuggling of fuel via illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt. This has been compounded by the longstanding shortage of drugs, resulting from insufficient funding and the poor coordination between the Gaza and Ramallah authorities.

The psychosocial impact of the November 2012 hostilities on children was particularly devastating and many children continue to suffer ill effects. From November to December 2012, the number of people UNRWA clinics treated for psychological trauma doubled; 42 per cent of those treated in December were children under the age of nine. According to a UNICEF assessment conducted directly after the ceasefire, children in the north Gaza and Gaza City governorates were the most affected, with significant differences in symptoms observed among girls and boys. Overall, boys showed more emotional symptoms, such as increased levels of fear, insecurity, anger and difficulties in concentrating, while girls displayed more physical symptoms, such as changes in eating patterns, crying, clinging to parents even at bed times, aches and nail biting. Older children were proportionally more affected than younger ones.⁶

A recent study carried out by the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme has indicated that 30 per cent of the children exposed to high levels of war trauma during November's hostilities have developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).⁷ The study also revealed that parents who were exposed to violence during last years' hostilities are likewise psychologically affected, in particular mothers. Between January and November 2013, psychosocial emergency teams managed by the Palestinian Center for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (PCDCR) and supported by UNICEF have provided psychosocial support services for over 24,000 children, and raised the awareness of at least 15,500 caregivers on ways to support the positive psychosocial wellbeing of their children across the Gaza Strip.

PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS – THE CASE OF NOUR

Eleven-year-old Nour lives in Beit Lahia, in the northern Gaza Strip. Since last November's hostilities, he has been suffering from a number of emotional symptoms and behavioral problems, including fear, nightmares, introversion, aggressiveness, limited social relationships and low academic achievements. Nour was a normal and well behaved child until his brother was killed during the hostilities. The emergency psychosocial team managed by PCDCR and supported by UNICEF visited the family immediately after the ceasefire and provided psychosocial support to Nour and his family. He was included in a group counseling activity for affected children, which revealed a need for more specialized one-on-one individual counseling. The PCDCR counselor has provided psychosocial support, educational support (through active learning) and life skills training to Nour, who has now improved his performance in school and developed a better psychosocial status, showing less fear and heightened social skills.

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A psychosocial group counseling session implemented by PCDCR with support from UNICEF in Northern Gaza.

Access Restricted Areas (ARA) – increased access to sea and land

In the context of the ceasefire, the Israeli authorities extended the permissible fishing area from three to six nautical miles (NM) from Gaza's coast. This decision was reversed in March 2013, in response to the launching of rockets by Palestinian armed groups, and re-implemented two months later. Given that the richer and more profitable fishing shoals are located beyond ten NM, the impact of this extension on the livelihoods of fishermen has remained limited.

Access to farming land along the perimeter fence with Israel also increased, although the parameters of the new regime were never officially communicated, maintaining a high degree of uncertainty. For the first time in years, many Palestinians have been able to routinely access areas up to 300 metres from the fence. Prior to November 2012, the Israeli authorities had made statements that Gazans were prohibited from accessing areas closer than 300 metres from the fence on land. In practice, the "no go zone" on land was at times enforced a few hundred metres beyond this, with a "high risk zone" extending sometimes up to 1,500 metres from the fence. Despite the slight easing of the access restrictions following the November understanding, the imposition of restrictions continues to impact negatively on the livelihoods of Gazans, and entry into newly accessible areas remains unsafe and precarious. Moreover, the methods used by the Israeli military to enforce the access restrictions have continued to result in killings, injuries, detention and property destruction and damage.⁸ Overall, despite the improved access, farmers have been largely reluctant to invest in the newly accessible areas due to the uncertainty and lack of clarity on the nature of the restrictions in place, compounded by the absence of adequate infrastructure, irrigation systems in particular.⁹

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Restrictions on imports and exports continued

In December 2012, as part of the ceasefire understanding, Israel slightly eased the restrictions on the import of basic construction materials for the commercial sector, in place since 2007, allowing the entry of 20 truckloads of aggregates per day into Gaza. In September this quota was expanded to 70 truckloads per day.¹⁰

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Latest developments: on early December, the Israeli authorities announced the lifting of the ban on the import of basic construction materials for international projects, with the first four truckloads of cement and aggregates entering Gaza on 10 December. The ban on the import of such materials for the private sector remained in place.

However, this improvement was short-lived: on 13 October 2013, following the discovery of a 1.8 km long underground tunnel leading from the Gaza Strip into Israel, the Israeli authorities halted the entry of construction materials, both for the commercial sector and for international organizations, citing concerns that such materials could be used for military purposes.

The ceasefire understanding did not result in any change in the longstanding ban on the transfer of goods from Gaza to the West Bank and Israel, formerly the main markets for Gazan products. This has continued to prevent any reactivation of the productive capacity in the Gaza Strip, resulting in high unemployment levels.

The shortage in construction materials has resulted in the loss of income for some 30,000 people previously employed in the construction sector. As highlighted by the World Bank, in the first quarter of 2013 the construction sector accounted for more than 80 per cent of Gaza's growth.

Families remained displaced

Over the course of the November 2012 hostilities, 382 housing units in Gaza were either totally destroyed (184 units) or damaged beyond repair (198 units), displacing almost 2,500 persons, and as many as 8,000 housing units sustained minor damage. Nearly 70 per cent of the families who lost their homes (1,718 people) have remained displaced, residing either in rented accommodation or with host families. All displaced families have received cash assistance from various sources, to cover the rental expenses and the purchase of essential items lost with the house.¹¹

Additionally, most of the affected families received financial assistance to carry out the reconstruction or repair of their homes themselves, through purchase of materials available in the market. Up to June of this year, over 500 households across the Gaza Strip were engaged in one of several such programmes run by UN agencies and NGOs. The vast majority of these families have had to suspend their building due to the shortage/high prices of materials.¹²

Overall deterioration in living conditions

The halt in smuggling activities via the tunnels under the border with Egypt compounded the situation created by the longstanding Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods and people, further undermining people's livelihoods. Particularly hit were those employed in construction, agriculture and fishing. Additionally, the almost total halt in the smuggling of food products via the tunnels has triggered an increase in food prices – 11 per cent for bread, 33 per cent for rice, and seven percent for vegetable oil. Combined, these factors are expected to be reflected in an increased number of families affected by food insecurity. Figures for 2012 indicate that 57 percent of the population is affected by food insecurity, up from 44 percent in 2011. About 1.1 million people (about 65 percent of the population) are already receiving food aid.

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WEST BANK CHECKPOINTS REMAIN FLASHPOINTS OF VIOLENCE

Two killed and six injured during the month in checkpoint incidents

In November, six West Bank Palestinians (including three unaffiliated civilians) were killed by Israeli forces and 308 were injured; another Palestinian died of wounds sustained earlier this year. Two of the unaffiliated civilians were killed by Israeli forces in incidents that occurred at military checkpoints in the West Bank, and another six were injured in similar circumstances. While in recent years there has been a gradual easing of mobility restrictions between the main Palestinian cities and villages in the West Bank, checkpoints have remained a key point of friction between the military and the civilian population.

The two incidents resulting in fatalities took place on the night of 7 November. The first took place south of Nablus city, next to the Za'tara (also known as Tapuah) checkpoint, which controls all traffic in the northern West Bank along Road 60, the main north-south traffic artery in the West Bank. For reasons unclear, a 28-year-old man from Mirka village (Jenin) arrived at the site and, according to the Israeli media, opened fire with a flare gun at Israeli-plated vehicles, before being shot and killed by the soldiers staffing the checkpoint. The second incident, which ended in the killing of a 23-year-old man from Hebron city, occurred at the Wadi Nar (also known as Container) checkpoint that controls the single route connecting the northern and southern West Bank available to Palestinians. Its circumstances remain disputed: according to the Israeli Border Police's spokesperson, the man was shot while approaching the policemen staffing the checkpoint with a knife and refrained from stopping after being ordered to do so; according to the man's brother, who was driving the vehicle that reached the checkpoint, he did not carry a knife and was shot without warning, immediately after stepping out of the car.¹³

Despite the gradual easing of mobility restrictions in recent years, checkpoints have remained a key point of friction between the military and the civilian population.

Checkpoints, in conjunction with other physical obstacles and permit requirements, are part of a comprehensive system which the Israeli authorities, citing security concerns, use to control Palestinian movement in the West Bank. At present, there are 59 *permanently staffed* military checkpoints within the West Bank (excluding those located on the Green Line). Of these, 35 are located at road intersections with the Barrier and are used to restrict Palestinian access to Barrier enclaves, to East Jerusalem, and to Israel;¹⁴ another 13 checkpoints are located along main routes on the "West Bank side" of the Barrier; and 11 within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (see table below). Additionally, there are 25 *partial checkpoints*, which have permanent infrastructure, but are staffed on an ad-hoc basis at varying frequencies, as well as dozens of 'flying' checkpoints deployed on a daily basis along roads and junctions, which operate for several hours at a time without permanent infrastructure; so far in 2013, OCHA recorded a monthly average of 246 flying checkpoints.

Since 2008, the Israeli authorities have gradually relaxed restrictions on the Palestinians' movement between the main towns and villages in the West Bank, improving people's access to services and livelihoods. The majority of these easings entailed the opening of blocked routes while maintaining or developing infrastructure on the ground. This has involved, among others, the replacement of roadblocks with road gates, which are generally kept open, and the turning of some permanently-staffed checkpoints into partial checkpoints.

Despite this improvement, operational checkpoints (permanent, partial and flying) have continued to impede Palestinian access. In some of the checkpoints, crossing has remained a time-consuming and difficult experience for Palestinians. This is the case of Gilo checkpoint between Bethlehem and East Jerusalem, which controls the movement of Palestinians holding special permits across the Barrier. During October 2013, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme (EAPPI), an international NGO providing protective presence, reported that between 4 and 7:30 in the morning, an average of almost 4,600 people, mostly workers, crossed the checkpoint. According to

the organization, on 70 per cent of the days, the area of the checkpoint was characterized as “chaotic” and “dangerously overcrowded”; on some of the days, it required up to 40 minutes for people to pass. Checkpoints in the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron city (H2) are also highly problematic, with frequent reports of incidents of abuse and intimidation affecting Palestinians crossing them on foot to reach homes, schools, clinics or workplaces. Checking procedures at checkpoints on key junctions often generate traffic congestion delaying access to critical services: this month, a Palestinian girl with a congenital disability, who was suffering a severe chest infection, died while en route to a hospital, held up by a traffic jam caused by the Wadi An Nar checkpoint (see above).¹⁵

As a site of daily friction between Israeli forces and Palestinian civilians, checkpoints are often flashpoints of violence and targets for Palestinian stone-throwing. So far in 2013, five civilians have been killed during checkpoint incidents and another 80, including 22 children, have been injured, excluding casualties in the context of demonstrations. While the number of fatalities represents an increase compared to 2012 (two), the number of injuries significantly decreased (80 vs 164).

Permanently staffed checkpoints by type

Checkpoint type	Checkpoint description	Number
Israel and East Jerusalem	Located along the Barrier (except one) and controlling access into Israel and East Jerusalem for Israelis (mostly commuting settlers); Palestinians holding Jerusalem IDs; and a limited number of other Palestinians holding special permits. Some of these checkpoints are also used to control commercial traffic into Israel.	21
Palestinian enclaves	Located along the Barrier and controlling access of Palestinians holding special permits to and from communities isolated by the Barrier; ¹⁶ some of these checkpoints also allow permit holders’ access to farming land isolated by the Barrier, as well as to workplaces within Israeli settlements.	11
Israel and East Jerusalem + enclaves	Combines the two categories detailed above.	4
Main route	Located on routes on the eastern, ‘Palestinian’ side of the Barrier and controlling Palestinians’ vehicular movement from one area to another; some of these checkpoints are also used to prevent Israelis’ entry into Area A.	14
Hebron city	Located within or next to the H2 area of Hebron city and controlling Palestinians’ movement into or within that area; some of these checkpoints are also used to prevent Israelis’ entry into the PA controlled area of Hebron (H1).	11
	Total	59

EAST JERUSALEM DEMOLITIONS AND DISPLACEMENT - THE HIGHEST SINCE 2009


A number of developments in November in East Jerusalem highlight concerns regarding ongoing restrictions on Palestinian residential growth and public space in the city, and resultant displacement. Six demolitions were recorded in the city this month, bringing the number of structures demolished so far in 2013 to 98, almost equal to the combined total from 2012 (64) and 2011 (42). Of the structures demolished in 2013, 35 were homes, 39 were livelihood/commercial structures and 24 were uninhabited dwellings and different types of infrastructure. This has resulted in 298 Palestinians displaced, including 153 children, by far the highest number since 2009 and far exceeding the combined annual totals for 2011 (88) and 2012 (71). Almost 400 additional Palestinians have been otherwise affected by the 2013 demolitions, due to the demolition of structures related to their livelihood.

Of note, three of November's demolitions were carried out by the residents themselves following the receipt of demolition orders from the Israeli authorities, to avoid further fines and to salvage some of the materials invested in the construction. In one of the cases, on 11 November, two Palestinian families from Beit Hanina began to demolish the zinc caravans in which they had been residing since their former homes in an apartment building were demolished by the Israeli authorities, in February 2013. The following day the demolition was completed by the Israeli authorities, displacing for the second time this year 14 people, including six children. So far in 2013, Palestinians have self demolished at least 19 structures in these circumstances, of which 12 were in East Jerusalem.


Demolitions in East Jerusalem are carried out by a number of Israeli authorities, including the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry of Interior and the Israel Nature and Parks Authority (INPA), targeting residential structures, both inhabited and under construction, commercial buildings, and animal shelters, in addition to land leveling and destruction of roads and other infrastructure. In many cases, demolitions took place after protracted legal proceedings, including the payment of fines, and involved the destruction of

Demolitions in East Jerusalem in 2013 resulted in 298 Palestinians displaced, by far the highest number since 2009 and far exceeding the combined annual totals for 2011 and 2012. Almost 400 additional Palestinians have been otherwise affected.

Demolitions and displacement in East Jerusalem



Percentage of structures demolished in 2013 by implementing body



furniture and personal belongings. Forced displacement has a serious physical, socio-economic and emotional impact on Palestinian families and communities, depriving people of their homes, often their main source of physical and economic security. Displacement has have a particularly devastating impact on children. including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety.

All of these structures were demolished for lack of requisite building permits. 'Illegal' building has been widespread in East Jerusalem, largely because opportunities for authorized construction remain extremely limited as a consequence of the restrictive planning regime. Over 35 per cent of the land in the Israeli-defined municipal area of East Jerusalem has been confiscated since 1967 for settlement use, and only 13 per cent of the total East Jerusalem area is available for Palestinian construction. However, much of the latter is already built-up, the permitted construction density is limited and the application process is difficult and expensive. A range of issues related to land registration complicates the process even further.¹⁷ Combined, these factors make it extremely difficult for Palestinians to obtain building permits from the Israeli authorities. It is estimated that at least 33 per cent of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack Israeli-issued building permits, placing over 93,000 Palestinian, to some extent, at risk of displacement.

New National Park approved

Of note, at least a third (33 out of 98) of demolished structures this year were in areas known to be designated as green or national park areas. Of these, about half (17 out of 33) were known to be in the area planned by the Israeli authorities as the Mount Scopus Slopes National Park between At Tur and Al 'Isawiya, resulting in the displacement of 41 people and otherwise affecting 115 people. On 15 November, the Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee approved the plan, reversing an earlier decision by the Israeli Minister of Environmental Protection to freeze it. The plan will affect some 740 dunums of land belonging to the two communities, prohibiting any residential construction in the area. This is despite the local residents' longstanding cooperation with the Israeli organization Bimkom to develop an alternative plan to address critical


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OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory

EAST JERUSALEM: OPEN SPACES PROJECT



housing and other infrastructural needs in Al 'Isawiya.¹⁸

The newly-approved National Park forms part of a project to create a series of contiguous parks and 'open spaces' in the environs of the 'Holy Basin', extending from the Old City to the E1/Ma'ale Adummim settlement bloc to the east of the city. If implemented, this park will further reduce the space available for residential development to meet the natural growth needs of Palestinian in East Jerusalem.¹⁹

Demolition orders place 1,500 at risk of displacement.

In addition, between 30 October and 1 November the Israeli authorities issued new demolition orders against ten apartment buildings in the Ras Khamis neighbourhood of East Jerusalem. The buildings include more than 200 housing units in total, placing approximately 1,500 residents at risk of displacement. Although Ras Khamis forms part of the area unilaterally annexed to Israel and included within the Jerusalem municipal boundary following the 1967 war, in recent years it has been physically separated from the rest of the city by the Barrier, thus constraining residents' access to services and livelihoods. Such localities have not usually been targeted by demolition orders or actual demolitions in recent years, despite the evident proliferation of construction due the apparent absence of interest or oversight by the Israeli authorities in such East Jerusalem localities, now located on the 'West Bank' side of the Barrier.

FROM THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

[...] Meanwhile, Palestinians continue to be displaced through house demolitions in Area C of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Of particular concern are developments in East Jerusalem, where this year alone, some 100 structures have been demolished, displacing 300 people. Hundreds more Palestinians are at risk because their homes were built without Israeli-issued building permits. This underscores the importance of Palestinian access to a fair planning and zoning regime. I remind Israel of its obligation to protect the population under occupation.

SUPPORTING AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS OF BARRIER-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

Reduction in irrigation costs allows resumption of cultivation in the "Seam Zone"

On 25 November, the Advisory Board of the Emergency Relief Fund (ERF) for the oPt carried out a field visit to agricultural areas located behind the Barrier in the Qalqiliya and Tulkarm governorates. The delegation, headed by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator James Rawley, consisted of representatives of UN agencies and donor countries. The Palestinian Minister of Agriculture and the Governor of Tulkarm also joined the delegation for part of the visit.

The purpose of the visit was to observe the implementation of two ERF projects aimed at preventing further erosion of the agricultural livelihoods as well as potential displacement from this area. The projects benefit farmers in these governorates who cultivate land in

RE-ROUTING THE BARRIER

Some changes to the built route of the Barrier have been ordered by the Israeli High Court of Justice. The new route around Khirbet Jubara (Tulkarm), completed in May 2012, reconnects 2,900 dunums of land, including the built-up area of the village, to the rest of the West Bank. Despite the resulting improvement in terms of access to services and workplaces, the new route leaves approximately 12,200 dunums of land in the “Seam Zone”. In Jayyus (Qalqiliya), the new route is expected to be finished by the beginning of 2014. More than half of Jayyus’ population depends totally on agriculture for their livelihoods. The re-routing will ‘restore around 2,220 dunums of land and two artesian wells to the ‘Palestinian’ side of the Barrier, but will continue to isolate around 6,000 dunums of prime agricultural land. Five artesian wells will also remain isolated behind the re-routed Barrier, although two of them will be connected to Jayyus for domestic consumption.

the “Seam Zone”, the closed military area between the Barrier and the Green Line, whose livelihoods have been severely undermined by the permit regime imposed by the Israeli authorities since 2003.


ERF projects benefit farmers who cultivate land in the “Seam Zone”, whose livelihoods have been severely undermined by the permit regime imposed by the Israeli authorities since 2003.

In the absence of connections to the electricity network, farmers incur high irrigation costs to operate the generators used to extract water from wells. The ERF projects have supported fuel purchase for 13 wells benefitting 506 farming families.²⁰ Under the projects’ scheme, beneficiaries have equal access to irrigation water from these wells, paying only 40 per cent of the real cost. On average, each farmer has saved approximately US\$ 600 of his/her seasonal irrigation costs. With the support of the projects, some 30 farmers who had previously abandoned their land in the “Seam Zone”, have resumed cultivation. Overall, over a period of five months, the projects contributed to the extraction of almost 1.3 million cubic meters of water used for the irrigation of 4,600 dunums.

The long-term strategy to increase the sustainability of agriculture in this area is to hook wells to the grid and transform them into an electrical pumping system, which will result in a 50-70 per cent reduction in irrigation costs. This strategy has already been implemented regarding one of the 13 wells, and a project to convert another three wells was recently approved under the Community Resilience and Development Programme (CRDP).²¹

Since the beginning of 2013, the ERF in oPt, which is managed by UN OCHA, has funded 19 projects addressing urgent needs in the areas of Water & Sanitation, Health & Nutrition, Agriculture, Protection and Education, for a total amount of US\$ 3.4 million. Of the projects approved, seven were implemented by national NGOs, five by international NGOs, six in partnership between national and international NGOs and one by UN agencies.²²

ERF allocations per month and cumulative total



INTER-AGENCY SIMULATION ON SUDDEN ONSET DISASTER

Lessons learned will improve performance in a real case

On 19 and 20 November, OCHA and the World Food Programme (WFP) held an Inter-Agency Emergency Simulation exercise in East Jerusalem and Gaza, with the participation of field staff from Gaza and the West Bank. The participants included most UN agencies, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and national and international NGOs. Representatives from the Israeli Ministry of Defense (COGAT) and the donor community in the oPt were observers of the exercise. The Palestinian Civil Defense was unable to observe the exercise due to difficulties in obtaining permits for its staff to access East Jerusalem.

The purpose of the exercise was to simulate response to potential emergencies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, test the existing Inter-Agency Contingency Plan (IACP), and assess strengths and weaknesses of current coordination structures. The scenario was of an earthquake, with aftershocks that were felt across the region, including Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Jericho and Ramallah.

The simulation exercise highlighted various strengths and weaknesses in the current emergency preparedness and response systems in the oPt. For the most part, the key elements of the contingency plan were successfully implemented, including the convening of the HCT, the effective mobilization of the Cluster system, the identification of



The purpose of the exercise was to simulate response to potential emergencies in, test the existing Inter-Agency Contingency Plan, and assess strengths and weaknesses of current coordination structures

strategic priorities, media engagement and the drafting of a flash appeal. Participation organizations complemented each other's work and cooperated efficiently on issues such as setting up camps for displaced people. Overall, coordination between different actors was positive, and donors that participated as observers showed a willingness to engage and support the multi-lateral response system.

Some of the main challenges included difficulties in cluster-level coordination between East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, partly due to technical difficulties in communication. The exercise also revealed discrepancies between agencies on needs assessment methodologies and prioritization processes, which contributed to delays in the emergency response. Finally, in Gaza, NGOs were not effectively engaged in Cluster meetings despite the critical role they play in the emergency response. An evaluation team produced a set of lessons learned and recommendations aimed at improving performance in a real case.

End notes

1. This includes 205 water wells, 42 main sewage pumping stations, 15 districts sewage pumping stations, 4 wastewater treatment plants, 10 main water desalination plants and 15 water lifting stations with reservoirs.
2. Information provided via the UNICEF-led WASH Cluster.
3. There are indications that negotiations are underway between the PA and Israel to purchase another 100 MW of power for Gaza. However, a longer-term solution to provide Gaza with the required 450MW – needed for the energy deficit now and to address the water crisis through energy-intensive desalination projects – is still lacking.
4. For further information and analysis on the escalation and its impact see OCHA, *Fragmented Lives Humanitarian Overview 2012*, May 2013.
5. Provided by OHCHR/Protection Cluster. See also the Protection Cluster Update on accountability for reported violations of international law by Israel during the escalation of hostilities in Gaza and southern Israel between 14 and 21 November 2012 (issued on 21 May 2013), available at http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_Update_Accountability_Reported_IL_Violations_05.2013_EN.pdf.
6. Impact of Hostilities on Children in Gaza, Rapid Psychosocial Assessment, UNICEF, 2012
7. Gaza Community Mental Health Programme "Long-Term Psychological Effects of the Last Israeli Offensive on Gaza on Palestinian Children and Parents", November 2013.
8. See Protection Cluster Update on the Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip (1 January to 30 June 2013), available at http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_ARA_Update_January-June_2013_EN.pdf.
9. *Ibid.*
10. These including 40 truckloads of aggregates, 20 truckloads of cement and 10 truckloads of steel bars.
11. The de-facto authorities in Gaza completed the distribution of a one-time allotment of US\$ 3,000 for each family with a totally destroyed house, and US\$ 2,000 for families whose house sustained major damage. Families whose homes were totally destroyed also received another US\$ 2,000 from Mercy for Relief and Development, a local non-profit association.
12. According to the Shelter Sector, the construction of 68 shelters destroyed during the November 2012 hostilities has been stalled and construction not yet initiated for another 201 shelters, due to the closure of the crossings and the unavailability of construction materials.
13. On the various versions see Gideon Levy, *Ha'aretz*, 22 November 2013.
14. This figure excludes 74 "agricultural gates", used to control access to farming land behind the Barrier.
15. For further details on this case see Al Haq: <http://www.alhaq.org/documentation/weekly-focuses/761-14-year-old-palestinian-girl-dies-en-route-to-hospital-after-delays-at-checkpoint>
16. Checkpoints controlling access to East Jerusalem for EJ communities isolated from the rest of the city by the Barrier are considered enclaves.
17. OCHA, *East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns*, March 2011, p.p. 30. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf
18. See 'Planning Challenges in Al 'Isawiya' in *East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns*, pp. 42-43.
19. See 'The Open Spaces Project' in *East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns*, pp. 58-59.
20. Similar projects were implemented for the first time in 2012. As a result, almost all farmers managed to fully pay debts that they had accumulated in previous years. Also, the health of their fruit trees improved resulting in better quality produce.
21. <http://www.undp.ps/en/forms/callforproposals/2012/CRDP%20concept%20noteeng.pdf>.
22. For more information about the ERF please visit <http://www.ochaopt.org/erf.aspx>.

Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

Conflict-related casualties and violence¹

Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties	2011	2012	2013										
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov

Palestinian deaths

Gaza	108	253	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	9
West Bank	17	9	4	0*	2	2	0	0	1	5	0	3	6	23
Total	125	262	6	3	2	3	0	0	1	6	1	4	9	32
Of whom are civilians ²	62	136	6	3	2	2	0	0	1	6	1	2	6	26
Of whom are female	3	23	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Palestinian injuries

Gaza	468	1834	13	10	5	4	1	2	2	7	5	1	5	55
West Bank	1647	3175	251	756	495	654	458	122	136	130	370	119	315	3791
Total	2115	5009	264	766	500	658	459	124	138	137	375	120	320	3846
Of whom are civilians	2054	n/a	264	766	499	657	459	124	138	137	374	120	320	3842
Of whom are female	151	n/a	8	13	14	10	40	8	12	4	10	4	15	138

Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3
Of whom are civilians	11	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Of whom are female	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	6	24	42	18	33	1	11	5	7	15	5	167
Of whom are civilians	56	60	3	11	18	4	14	1	8	0	3	9	2	73
Of whom are female	3	7	0	1	1	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	9

*Two Palestinians died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

** Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

*** Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**** The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

Tunnel-related casualties ³	2011	2012	2013											
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Total
Deaths	36	11	6	2	2	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	14
Injuries	54	18	6	0	12	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	20

Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

	2011	2012	2013											
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Total
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties ⁴	120	98	7	8	11	17	10	7	6	4	8	9	4	91
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	17	19	24	38	45	29	22	16	28	36	23	297
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	24	27	35	55	55	36	28	20	36	45	27	388
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	2	1	9	4	5	1	2	0	4	4	3	35
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	13	15	2	0	0	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	8
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	4	1	9	5	5	4	2	2	4	4	4	43

Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

		2011	2012	2013											
		Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Total
Adult	Injured	7	12	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	Killed	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Child	Injured	17	19	5	5	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Killed	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	
Grand Total		27	34	7	6	6	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012	2013											
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Total
West Bank	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Gaza Strip	11	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	308	427	36	146	162	291	64	35	22	34	139	25	125	1079
Gaza Strip	125	105	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	10

Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	3	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	223	193	195	180	179	159	NA	211 monthly average
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Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc Ej	618	474	157	23	5	38	41	58	17	46	53	19	29	457
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Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools¹⁹

oPt	na	321	1	7	4	8	5	4	1	2	15	NA	NA	47
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Source: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

Access

Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012	2013											
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Mon. Ave.
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ¹⁵	872	777	796	907	882	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023	1303	1420	NA	1106.7
of which approved	721	719	738	836	762	957	900	985	1106	932	1182	1314	NA	1043.1
of which denied	19	7	2	2	1	0	1	0	7	3	5	11	NA	3.2
of which delayed ¹⁶	83	17	56	69	119	198	216	180	186	88	116	95	NA	134

Source: WHO

Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012	2013											
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Mon. Ave.
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	37.5	34	69	51	24	51	30	33	34	45	30	23	40.1
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	18	52	33	10	32	15	12	19	22	10	8	22.3
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	8	29	17	6	16	4	8	24	60	13	13	18.5

Source: OCHA

Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013											
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Mon. Ave.
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	338	313	287	282	338	370	461	242	333	252	281	435	359
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	283	296	411	421	367	459	472	298	341	416	314	529	432

Source: OCHA


Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)⁶

	2011	2012	2013											
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Mon. Ave.
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4,451	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801	4827	4828	4762	4806	4753	NA	4227
of whom are women	26	7	10	10	11	14	16	14	11	12	12	5	NA	10
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	245	159	169	164	155	147	137	134	134	135	140	NA	132
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	897	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194	1150	1219	1295	1299	1299	NA	1062

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

Demolition of Structures


Structures demolished⁸



	2011	2012	2013											
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Total
of which in Area C	571	540	120	11	2	40	58	69	32	20	93	13	19	477
of which in East Jerusalem	42	64	21	3	1	6	11	3	1	37	2	8	6	99
Grand Total	613	604	141	14	3	46	69	72	33	57	95	21	25	576


*20 are in Area B

People Displaced due to demolitions or evictions⁹



	2011	2012	2013											
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Total
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	815	247	6	0	40	32	101	48	33	108	7	43	665
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	71	14	40	10	24	59	30	0	63	6	34	18	298
Grand Total	1094	886	261	46	10	64	91	131	48	96	114	41	61	963

Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2012 and 2013

funding status as of 29 October 2013

Cluster	CAP 2012		CAP 2013	
	Total request in million \$	% of funds received	Total request in million \$	% of funds received
Agriculture	24,921,339	61.4%	31,665,733	42%
Cash for Work and Cash Assistance	95,559,928	35.5%	70,481,900	49%
Cluster not yet specified	0	0.0%	0	0%
Coordination and Support Services	21,167,518	95.7%	21,295,427	94%
Education	16,662,763	54.7%	22,408,092	38%
Food Security	170,513,876	83.0%	160,052,254	73%
Health and Nutrition	20,742,170	86.6%	22,536,007	54%
Protection	46,131,077	73.8%	53,093,279	64%
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	24,208,531	55.8%	19,307,048	31%
Total	419,907,202	72.0%	400,839,740	62.0%

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS)

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.