

## Overview

Developments during September highlighted some of the key challenges that humanitarian organizations operating in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) encounter while providing assistance and protection to people affected by the occupation and conflict.

In Area C of the West Bank, the Israeli authorities demolished during the month close to 100 Palestinian-owned structures lacking a building permit, resulting in the destruction and forced displacement of two small herding communities in the Jerusalem hills and in the Jordan Valley.<sup>1</sup> In the latter case, attempts to provide post-

demolition shelter assistance were repeatedly impeded by the Israeli authorities, who demolished or confiscated items delivered. In the past year, there has been a worrisome increase in the Israeli military's demolition of humanitarian assistance:

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### HIGHLIGHTS


- Rising prices for key commodities in Gaza.
- Israeli military to pilot use of summons in lieu of night arrests for children.
- Donor-funded aid seized or demolished multiple times this month.
- Response plans target areas vulnerable to settler violence.

### SEPTEMBER FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	1
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	375
Palestinian children under Israeli detention	179
Structures demolished in the West Bank	94
Patients' applications to leave Gaza approved by Israel	91%

### CAP 2013 FUNDING

401 million requested (US\$)
61% funded



Demolitions in Az Zayyem Bedouin community.



since the beginning of 2013, Israeli forces demolished 99 donor-funded structures, up from 79 in all of 2012.

This month also saw deterioration in access to education in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron city (H2), which included the temporary closure of some schools, the injury and arrest of school-age children, and declining school attendance. The usually tense situation in this area was exacerbated this month by the killing of an Israeli soldier by a Palestinian sniper, as well as by the influx of tens of thousands of Israelis for the Jewish holidays. Humanitarian organizations providing protective presence reported that their interventions to facilitate the crossing of students and teachers through the Israeli checkpoints in this part of the city have been largely unsuccessful.

In the Gaza Strip, this month witnessed a positive development when the Israeli authorities began allowing 50 truckloads of construction materials to enter Gaza daily for commercial uses. To a limited degree, this amount compensated for the sharp reduction in the supply of such materials via the illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt. However, this development was short-lived. On 13 October, the Israeli authorities halted the entry of all types of construction materials, including for projects implemented by international organizations, following the discovery of a tunnel running from Gaza into Israel, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. If not lifted in the coming days, this new impediment would result in a suspension of critical projects in the area of services and infrastructures, as well as in the lay-off of workers, compounding the already fragile humanitarian situation.

Humanitarian organizations also continue to face mobility restrictions to their staff, including due to the application of a permit regime to national staff seeking access to East Jerusalem, as well as in and out of Gaza. While some agencies have nearly all their permit applications approved, others regularly encounter 100 per cent rejection of applications. In the Gaza Strip, the work of international NGOs has continued to be impeded also by the de-facto authorities, including due to demands related to the application of tax regulations, as well as due to the linkage created between these demands and the issuance of exit permits.

On the other hand, September also provided some examples of opportunities available for successful intervention by humanitarian actors. One such case is related to the issue of Palestinian children in Israeli military detention. Following the publication of a study on this subject earlier this year, UNICEF began intensive engagement with the Israeli authorities to discuss the implementation of its recommendations. This initiative recently led to a number of related announcements by the Israeli military, including the testing of a summons procedure in lieu of night arrests, during which incidents of abuse of children are being regularly reported.

Also this month, in advance of the start of the annual olive harvest season, the humanitarian community initiated a range of activities aimed at supporting Palestinian

olive growers affected by Israeli settler violence. These included the conduct of a comprehensive needs assessment, which resulted in the identification of over 500 families that sustained damage to olive groves since 2011 for cash assistance. Additionally, the Protection Cluster coordinated a protective presence intervention in areas affected by settler violence involving 11 organizations to be implemented during this harvest season.

Under international humanitarian law, an occupying power is responsible for ensuring that the basic needs of the population under occupation are met. It is also obliged to respect and protect humanitarian staff and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

*\*This piece includes inputs from the Food Security Sector and the Protection Cluster.*

## RESTRICTIONS CONTINUE ALONG BORDER WITH EGYPT

### Rising prices for key commodities

#### **Movement of people**

Since early June 2013, the Egyptian authorities have intermittently closed the Rafah Crossing, which is the primary exit and entry point to the Gaza Strip for Palestinians, due to the long-standing restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of people via the Erez Crossing. This month, the crossing was closed continuously between 11-17 and 20-27 September, for a total of 15 days out of 30 scheduled open days during the month. When open, the operating hours have been reduced to four hours per day, six days a week, for limited categories of travellers, from the previous schedule of nine hours daily, seven days per week.

September saw the lowest number of travellers through Rafah crossing since February 2011. On average in September, approximately 113 travellers were allowed to cross into Egypt and around 103 others to enter Gaza on a daily basis, most of whom were medical cases, students, people holding visas and foreign nationals, far below the daily average of approximately 1,860 who crossed in June 2013. By the end of the month, the Border and Crossing Authority (BCA) in Gaza reported that approximately 4,000 people were registered and waiting to travel to Egypt and other destinations.

Following the increase in the number of Gazans permitted to cross through the Erez Crossing in the past two months, September witnessed a slight decrease, mainly attributable to the closure of the crossing due to the Jewish holidays.

Restrictions imposed at Erez and Rafah crossings by the Israeli and Egyptian authorities severely limit Palestinians' freedom of movement and impede their right to enter and exit the Gaza Strip, as well as create humanitarian hardship (see case study herein).

Measures continued this month to restrict the operation of the illegal tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border and limit the opening of the Rafah Crossing.

*September saw the lowest number of travellers through Rafah crossing since February 2011.*

## **Movement of goods**

In recent years, the illegal tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border have essentially served as the main channel for the supply of construction materials to Gaza, as these remain restricted via the official crossings with Israel, despite the recent improvements described below. They have also been the primary entry point for smuggled fuel, which, due to Egyptian subsidies, is significantly cheaper than fuel imported from Israel. September witnessed a slight increase in traffic through the tunnels compared to the previous month: between 10 and 20 tunnels have been reportedly operating, and the daily number of truckloads increased from 10 at the beginning of the month, to 30-40 daily by the end. However, it is estimated that fewer than 900 truckloads of goods entered Gaza through the tunnels during the entire month, compared to over 5,000 truckloads prior to the current restrictions.

On 22 September, the Government of Israel began allowing fifty truckloads of construction materials for commercial uses to enter Gaza daily via the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom Crossing, in addition to the 20 truckloads of aggregates per day allowed since December 2012. According to the Palestinian Constructors' Union, an estimated minimum of 300 trucks of construction materials are needed per day; this represents almost the entire current capacity of Kerem Shalom for all imports. Due to the shortage, at the end of the month prices of building materials remained about 20 per cent higher than June 2013 prices.

September also witnessed an increase in the amount of fuel smuggled through the illegal tunnels, with between 300,000-400,000 litres of fuel, mostly diesel, reportedly entering Gaza daily in the last week of the month, compared to approximately 200,000 litres at the beginning. However, this is still only 40 per cent of the approximately one million litres which entered daily prior to June 2013. By the end of the month, the Gaza Power Plant (GPP) had fuel reserves of less than one million litres, compared to its pre-June reserve of up to eight million litres. The majority of the 180 fuel stations operated partially, mostly selling Israeli petrol, with long queues continuing at the fuel stations selling Egyptian diesel when available. Power outages remained at up to 12 hours per day in most areas, negatively impacting the routine functioning of water wells, sewage treatment and the provision of essential medical services.

## **Increasing pressure on livelihoods**

The Egyptian-imposed restrictions are compounding pre-existing pressures on livelihoods in Gaza. Noting that the construction sector accounted for more than 80 percent of Gaza's growth during the first quarter of 2013, and that most construction material was smuggled through the illegal tunnels, the World Bank recently warned that "recent measures by the Egyptian authorities to reduce tunnel activity are expected to result in a significant decline in the construction sector's output over the coming months. This will likely, in turn, cause an overall decline in growth in Gaza especially given the important role that this sector has played in driving growth in recent years."<sup>2</sup> The food

There is already deterioration in the food security situation in Gaza in recent months, with increases in the price of key commodities.

security situation in Gaza has already shown deterioration in recent months, with price increases in commodities such as bread (up 11 per cent), vegetable oil (up 7 per cent), rice (up 33 per cent) and in other goods that are vital to Gaza's economy, in particular fuel and construction materials. This is leading to an increase in food insecurity, both directly, through the surge in food prices, and indirectly, through the rise in unemployment as a result of economic constraints. The possibility of delays in the payments of salaries by the de-facto authorities of Gaza may further exacerbate the overall situation and have consequences on food security levels. In 2012, reversing the progressive improvements in food security registered since 2009, delays in the payment of public sector salaries and social benefits contributed to driving food insecurity levels up in Gaza, from 44 per cent in 2011 to 57 per cent in 2012 Gaza, and further deepened households' reliance on food assistance.<sup>3</sup>

#### PALESTINIAN NEWBORN DIES AT RAFAH BORDER

\*This case study provided by WHO.

On 26 September 2013, 8-months pregnant Iman Mashrawi, travelled from Morocco, where she has lived for four years, to visit her family in the Gaza Strip. After flying into Cairo, she spent a night in the airport before embarking on the long taxi ride to El Arish, and then taking another taxi to the Rafah Border Crossing. Her family, who in the past had come to Cairo to assist her, was now unable to leave Gaza due to restrictions imposed at the crossing by the Egyptian authorities. According to Iman, her trip to Rafah was long due to repeated security checks, so that by the time she reached the crossing on the 27<sup>th</sup> of September, it was already closed for the day.

The trip had left Iman extremely tired and, in light of her condition, her family urged her to seek special humanitarian access at the crossing, but according to Iman, officials on the Egyptian-side of the Crossing refused to allow her to pass. When she requested to be allowed to rest in the small prayer area inside the passenger terminal until the Crossing opened, she was also refused. At this point, according to Iman, she was exhausted and asked to be transferred to a hospital, but officials at the Crossing indicated that they were unable to assist her.

An Egyptian man working with his children at a nearby kiosk invited her to stay in their house until the terminal opened the following day. Although she was not due to deliver for another month, she began experiencing contractions. When her contractions intensified, the man called for an ambulance multiple times, asking that she be taken to hospital because she was in labor, but was informed that no ambulances could move during the night-time curfew imposed in the area. As a result, the man and his wife decided to take Iman to the hospital themselves. According to Iman, "we were delayed at a security checkpoint for two hours and then I delivered the baby in his car, and the baby was alive....It was night (at 10 pm), I had neither family nor medical assistance during delivery."

At that point, Iman recounted that she fainted, and the security men allowed the car to go to the hospital. "When I woke up, I was in hospital and the Egyptian man and his wife were the only persons there. They offered me their condolences on the death of my son, Mohammad." The following day, the Mashrawi family coordinated back-to-back ambulance travel across Rafah border for the traumatized Iman, who carried the body of her baby; he was buried in Gaza.

Concerns have also been raised regarding the impact on livelihoods and deteriorating economic conditions in the access restricted areas. Pre-existing pressures stemming from imposition of the access restrictions on land and sea areas have been compounded recently by stricter Egyptian restrictions along the maritime border, with Gaza fishermen unable to illegally fish in Egyptian waters and few able to cope with rising fuel prices.

Overall, there are concerns that many in Gaza are resorting to negative coping mechanisms. According to Palestinian human rights groups, there is a significant increase in the number of Palestinians arrested this year while trying to cross the fence into Israel, mainly in search of employment. The Protection Cluster has recorded the arrest of 57 Palestinians, including at least 27 children, in this context in 2013, compared to 52, including at least 20 children, in 2012. According to the Protection Cluster, in September 2013 alone, 10 people (including three children) were arrested in this context by Israeli security forces, six of whom were released. On 30 September, an unarmed man in North Gaza was shot and killed by the Israeli military and a second man, also with him, was detained. They were believed to be trying to cross into Israel at the time for work purposes. On 10 August, a Palestinian man was killed on the Israeli side of the fence, also believed to be trying to cross into Israel for employment.

\*This piece was submitted by UNICEF on behalf of the Child Protection Working Group of the Protection Cluster.

## FOLLOW-UP TO CONCERNS OVER TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN CHILDREN IN ISRAELI DETENTION

Israeli military to pilot use of summons in lieu of night arrests

In February 2013, UNICEF released a paper, *“Children in Israeli Military Detention – Observations and Recommendations,”*<sup>4</sup> which included 38 evidence-based recommendations to ensure better protection of children who come into contact with the Israeli military court system. In response to the paper, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated it would study the conclusions and work to implement them through on-going cooperation with UNICEF.

Intensive engagement between UNICEF and the Israeli authorities has resulted in a number of developments concerning Palestinian children held in Israeli military detention.

In this context, the Military Advocate General (MAG) designated the “Military Prosecutor for Judea and Samaria” (West Bank) as the focal point for dialogue with UNICEF on this issue. The Military Prosecutor has been engaging closely with UNICEF and has been reviewing the recommendations of the UNICEF paper. This engagement is core child protection work and is facilitating a deeper analysis and understanding of the process of military arrest, detention and prosecution in the West Bank.<sup>5</sup> There are four key developments thus far:

The first and most important is that the IDF Central Command (which covers the West Bank) has agreed to pilot-test the use of summons in two areas of the West Bank, in lieu of night arrests. This is a critical development, because, if implemented effectively, it will contribute to addressing a number of concerns related to the first 24 hours after arrest, during which children are the most vulnerable. In particular, it will contribute to

reducing the number of night arrests, a traumatic experience for the whole family, and the allegations of abuse en route to the interrogation centre. UNICEF estimates that it will take about two months for the IDF to design and commence the test.

Second, the Military Prosecutor stated that since June 2013, the remand hearings for children are held separately from adults. This is the result of a verbal agreement between the prosecution and the judges. Keeping children separated from adults is a core principle of juvenile justice.

Third, two Military Orders have been issued in 2013 in relation to Palestinian children appearing before Israeli military courts: one, Military Order 1711, which came into effect in April 2013, reduces the time a Palestinian child can be detained prior to appearing before a military court judge for the first time.<sup>6</sup> The new order reduces the time from four days to 24 hours for children aged 12-13, and from four to two days for children aged 14-15. There is no change for children aged 16-17. It should be noted that these time periods can be extended for an additional 24, 48 or 96 hours for exceptional and urgent investigative purposes.

Another order (Military Order 1726), which came into effect on 6 October 2013, stipulates that the remand of a child can only be extended for periods up to 10 days. After a cumulative period of investigation exceeding 15 days, the jurisdiction to extend the remand of the child lies with the Military Court of Appeal.

Finally, the Military Prosecutor has committed to following-up with different authorities to elaborate a set of rules that will “embody the Best Interests of the Child”<sup>7</sup> and better ensure the universality of children’s rights principles and standards.

Despite this progress, concerns remain: allegations of violations against Palestinian children during the arrest, interrogation and detention process have continued, and a course has yet to be set for implementing many of the report recommendations.<sup>8</sup> Over the next six months, UNICEF will continue to engage with the MAG and advocate for the implementation of all 38 recommendations of the UNICEF paper. These recommendations include the prohibition of practices such as blindfolding, painful restraint and solitary confinement of children. They stress that except in extreme circumstances, children should not be arrested at night, a lawyer or family member should be present during interrogation of child suspects and a video-recording should be made.

At the end of September 2013, 179 boys aged 12 to 17 years were in Israeli detention for alleged security violations.<sup>9</sup> Of these, 96 were in pre-trial detention and 66 were serving a sentence. Over the past two and a half years the number of Palestinian children detained has fluctuated at around 200 per month. The monthly average for 2013 shows that 215 children per month were in Israeli military custody, a 9.7 per cent increase compared to 196 per month in 2012.



*If implemented effectively, the use of summons will contribute to addressing a number of concerns related to the first 24 hours after arrest, during which children are the most vulnerable.*



\* This piece contributed by the Food Security Sector and the Protection Cluster.<sup>10</sup>

## PLANNED HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE DURING THE 2013 OLIVE HARVEST

Cash assistance and protective presence targeting areas vulnerable to settler violence

Nearly 51 per cent of cultivated land in the oPt, mostly in the West Bank, is planted with olive trees, and the olive oil industry makes up 25 per cent of the country's agricultural income<sup>11</sup> and contributes to the livelihoods of approximately 100,000 families.<sup>12</sup> The value added to olive mills alone constitutes USD 5.4 million per year.<sup>13</sup> However, Palestinian farmers and traders have limited access to local, national, and export markets, and Israel-imposed restrictions on access to land and natural resources, as well as Israeli settler violence in the West Bank have severely impacted the Palestinian olive industry.

Approximately 150 Palestinian communities have some of their agricultural land isolated between the Barrier and the Green Line, and to access their farmlands and water resources, Palestinian farmers must enter through one of 74 gates, the majority of which (52) are only opened during the olive harvest months. During these months, the farmers must make use of a 'prior coordination' mechanism or otherwise obtain 'visitors' permits from the Israeli authorities. During the remainder of the year, most of these gates remain closed, and the trees are left untended, resulting in lower yields and incomes.

The difficulties created by access restrictions have been further compounded by Israeli-settler harassment and violence, both to Palestinians and their properties. From 2009 to the end of August 2013, 38,532 trees were destroyed or damaged in such incidents;<sup>14</sup> there has been a 25 per cent increase in the number of olive trees damaged in 2013 compared to the previous year.<sup>15</sup> Many incidents occur in agricultural areas that have been encroached onto by settlements, where farmers have already lost land and olive trees and are, therefore, more vulnerable to economic loss.

To alleviate the impact of Israeli settler violence against Palestinian farming communities, the Food Security Sector, through a FAO project and in coordination with the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and OCHA, have been performing case-by-case needs assessments<sup>16</sup> and providing response to families affected by settler violence (as well

Approximately 150 Palestinian communities have agricultural land isolated between the Barrier and the Green Line.



Olive tree damaged as a result of settler attacks in Qaryut, Nablus governorate.



as demolitions). During the needs assessment phase, 512 households were identified to receive cash assistance for damages incurred between 2011 and 2013, including for damage to olive groves. The cash given to families is to be spent on income generating agricultural activities. Targeted farmers will also receive guidance and technical support while their assets are being rebuilt or rehabilitated. To ensure an equitable allocation of resources to the largest number of affected families, the maximum payment per incident is USD 5,000.

In addition, the Protection Cluster, through the OHCHR-chaired Core Group on Settler Violence, is leading an initiative that seeks to coordinate protective presence provided by organizations to deter Israeli settler violence targeting Palestinian farmers during the olive harvest. The initiative, which takes into account the lessons learned during the 2012 olive harvest, involves fifteen organizations, including eleven organizations focusing on providing protective presence. The Core Group on Settler Violence has coordinated coverage of 84 identified areas of friction where settler violence has been problematic, and which will be the target of protective presence responses by the participating organizations, with the flexibility to cover other areas of friction identified during the harvest.<sup>17</sup> Participating members will also collect information on incidents of settler violence in communities where they are providing protective presence; this information will be used for reporting and to inform protection responses (e.g. legal assistance, psychosocial response, or further protective presence), and where appropriate, to trigger inter-cluster responses to incidents of settler violence resulting in property damage. Also, to mark the start of the olive harvest, the Protection Cluster issued an *Update on Settler Violence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem*, highlighting ongoing protection

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**CASE STUDY: PREMIÈRE URGENCE – AIDE MÉDICALE INTERNATIONALE (PU-AMI) TO SUPPORT OLIVE FARMERS DURING COORDINATION PERIOD**

For the second consecutive year, the French NGO Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI) will provide support for olive farmers who own or rent lands located within the vicinity of settlements and inaccessible without Israeli permission. Three villages are targeted for Cash-For-Work assistance: Kuffr Qaddum (Qalqilya governorate), Urif and Burin (Nablus governorate). Assistance is intended to maximise the harvest yield and provide some protection from settler attacks due to the greater numbers of farmers present on the land, some of whom are employed through the PU-AMI Cash-For-Work initiative.

*Latest Developments:* PU-AMI has faced some challenges in Kufir Qaddum, where implementation has already begun. On 1 October, farmers were prevented from accessing their lands for reasons that are unclear, and on 6 October, following the injury of a settler in the Ramallah governorate, only a limited number of farmers were allowed access to their lands. Finally, farmers have not been able to access their trees on Fridays and Saturdays, due to the weekly demonstration (against the closure of the main road to the village) and the Jewish Sabbath.

In addition, for a period of seven days PU-AMI staff and those employed through the cash-for-work program were prevented from accessing areas beyond the Barrier. However, after several discussions with the Israeli authorities, PU-AMI staff were finally authorized to enter the areas.

*\*This piece submitted by the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme (EAPPI8), on behalf of the Education Cluster, with additional input from OHCHR.*

*The worrying trend of increased military activity this month was compounded by a rise in settler abuse towards Palestinian school children on their daily commute.*

concerns regarding settler violence, including in relation to the lack of law enforcement and accountability for settler violence.

## **RISING TENSIONS REDUCE ACCESS TO EDUCATION IN THE H2 PART OF HEBRON CITY**


Attendance rates decline and schools closed temporarily

Access to education in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron city (H2) faced a number of impediments in September, including an increased Israeli military presence, the influx of tens of thousands of Israelis for the Jewish holidays, the shooting of an Israeli soldier, and numerous direct confrontations between Israeli forces, Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents. Combined, these events resulted in declining school attendance, the closure of some schools and the injury and arrest of school-age children.

This month, the commute to school for both children and teachers from the Palestinian-controlled Hebron (H1) to H2, and within the H2 area itself, was beset by delays and harassment at Israeli military checkpoints around the Old City. Most, if not all, children's school bags were searched by soldiers on a daily basis, despite the attempted interventions of internationals providing protective presence. This practice appears to have become accepted as normal by students, who open their bags as a matter of routine when entering the checkpoint, in anticipation of the inevitable search. Female teachers have been made to pass through metal detectors, despite a long-standing understanding that they can use a side gate.

The 22 September killing of an Israeli soldier near 'Al Fayha and Al-Ibrahimiya schools in H2 had a significant impact on the schooling of Palestinian children in H2 and across Hebron. Intensive Israeli military operations following the incident caused the closure of three schools the following day, and falling attendance rates upon re-opening for several days afterwards. This, together with the arrival of an estimated 50,000 Jewish visitors to the city for the holiday of Sukkot and the accompanying reinforcement of military forces, resulted in heightened tensions, marked by eight days of violent clashes. This period saw the detention of hundreds of youths and numerous serious injuries, and once again caused the temporary closure of schools in the area, including three monitored by international organizations providing protective presence (Al Fayha, Al-Ibrahimiya and Qurdoba).

The above events were compounded by a rise in settler abuse towards school children on their daily commute. September incidents, ranging from verbal insults to violent attacks, peaked in the Shuhada Street area. There are concerns that such harassment will continue, following news on 24 September that Israeli settlers had re-occupied the Abu Rajab house settlement, located between Al Fayha and Al Ibrahimiya schools, and close to where the Israeli soldier was shot two days previously. The settlers were removed soon after. Though children in the H2 area have been regularly exposed to difficult conditions en route to school, this month, some began expressing heightened fears and anxiety to internationals providing protective presence in the area.



A concern also surfaced in September regarding the possible handover of Al Rajabi House (located across from Wadi Al Hussein and the settlement of Kiryat Arba) to Israeli settlers; a final hearing to decide the ownership of the house was held on 2 September 2013, but a decision has not yet been issued. With at least 200 Palestinian students passing in front of the House on a daily basis, the handing over of the House to the settlers will most certainly add further constraints on the ability of the students (most of whom are females) to reach their schools in the area.

The Israeli military maintains exclusive security control over H2 in order to protect five Israeli settlements (combined population of a few hundred) that have been established within the boundaries of the city. In this context, the Israeli military imposes a range of access restrictions on Palestinians,<sup>19</sup> the worst affected being the approximately 6,000 people living in areas adjacent to the settlements. There are 21 Palestinian primary and secondary schools distributed across H2, of which five are located in the worst affected areas: Al Ekhawwa secondary school, Al Fayha primary school, Al Mutanabbi primary school, Al Ibrahimiya primary school, and Qurdoba primary school. Because of a ban on Palestinian vehicular movement along some of the main traffic arteries there, as well as the measures adopted to control pedestrians' access into these areas, the five schools can be reached by most of their students and staff only on foot and require the crossing of one or more checkpoints. The access regime applied in the restricted areas has turned students' and teachers' daily trip to and from school into a long and unpredictable journey.

*All but one of the demolitions this month took place in Area C of the West Bank.*


## SECOND HIGHEST MONTHLY PEAK IN DEMOLITIONS IN 2013

Entire herding community displaced in the Jordan Valley

The majority of the demolitions took place on 16 September, in the herding community of Mak-hul in the Jordan Valley, when Israeli forces demolished all the community's residential and livelihood structures (except two fodder storage rooms and a solar panel). In total, 58 structures, including 19 residential tents and kitchens, 28 animal barracks and pens, nine latrines, and a storage room were demolished; a zinc shed that was used as a kindergarten was also partially demolished. Some of these structures were donated by international organizations. As a result, ten families comprising 48 people, including 16 children, were displaced. After the incident, the Israeli authorities declared Mak-hul a "closed military zone", prohibiting the families from returning to their community until 6 am the next day. Despite the order, the majority of the residents remained in the immediate vicinity of the demolition site and spent the night there in the open, along with their herds (approx. 1,700 sheep).

A total of 94 Palestinian-owned structures were demolished this month due to the lack of Israeli-issued building permits; this is the second highest monthly total since the beginning of 2013.<sup>20</sup>

Efforts by international and local agencies to deliver shelter-related humanitarian assistance to the displaced families in Mak-hul were prevented by Israeli forces on a number of occasions. On the day the demolitions took place, a truck carrying 22 post-demolition kits, donated by an international agency was seized by Israeli forces staffing



the Tayasir checkpoint (which controls access to the Jordan Valley from the northern West Bank). On 20 September, large numbers of Israeli forces seized a truck carrying five tents, along with 20 fencing units, provided by another international agency, in the presence of representatives of 10 donor countries, UNOCHA, two international NGOs, and representatives of the Tubas Governorate. In total, 22 post-demolition kits and 15 temporary residential tents, funded by donors (10) or erected by Palestinians in solidarity with the community (5), were demolished and/or seized following the initial demolition on the 16th.

### LATEST DEVELOPMENT


On 3 October (outside the reporting period), Israeli forces demolished an additional four temporary residential structures, two of which were donated by an international NGO. OCHA field reports indicate that residents are still unable to re-build their homes and shelters for their herd. As a result, many of the residents are still staying with their relatives in nearby communities.

On 24 September 2013, the Israeli High Court issued an injunction for the community, according to which the Israeli military was prevented until at least 8 October 2013 from evicting the community and from demolishing tents that are built there. The court stated that this injunction did not apply to structures demolished for security reasons or military operations.

Large-scale demolitions also took place this month in the Az Zayyim Bedouin community, where 18 structures, nearly the entire community, were demolished on 11 September. Those demolitions led to the displacement of seven families, comprising 41 people, over half of whom were children. This community is located within an area planned for the expansion of the Ma'ale Adummim settlement (Jerusalem governorate) and its territorial linkage with East Jerusalem settlements (the E1 Plan).

Demolitions in Mak-hul and Az Zayyim followed the Israeli authorities' demolition of all structures in the Bedouin community of Tel al 'Adassa on 19 August, and the community's subsequent displacement to the "West Bank" side of the Barrier. Referring to these cases, the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, this month,


*The measures currently confronting the humanitarian community in the oPt impede its ability to meet the needs of vulnerable Palestinians.*



## DEMOLITION OF DONOR-FUNDED STRUCTURES

In the past year, there has been a worrisome increase in the Israeli military's demolition of donor-funded assistance. Between 1 January and 30 September 2013, Israeli forces demolished 99 donor-funded structures, including 40 residential structures, 34 animal/livestock-related structures and 22 WASH-related structures (including 10 cisterns and 11 latrines), up from a total of 79 in all of 2012. During the same period, the Israeli military seized 37 items of donor-funded assistance, mainly residential shelters (33).

**Donor-funded structures demolished in the West Bank**



indicated that “these mass demolitions raise serious concerns about the prohibition on forced eviction under international human rights law ... (and that) there are also serious concerns that the recent wave of demolitions violates the prohibition on destruction of property under international humanitarian law. We urge the Israeli authorities to halt all such demolitions.”<sup>21</sup>

## QUARTERLY UPDATE ON ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN STAFF IN OPT

### More staff affected by access incidents

While the number of access incidents recorded in the third quarter of 2013 (July-September) remained almost the same as in the second quarter (112 vs 110), the number of staff affected in those incidents more than doubled (765 vs 353), resulting in the loss of 86 working days. Demands for search of UN vehicles, in contravention of the 1946 Convention of UN Privileges and Immunities, continue to be the main cause of incidents affecting UN staff. Over half of all incidents reported in the third quarter resulted from such demands, and nearly 90 per cent of these took place when passing through Barrier checkpoints which control access to the Jerusalem area. By contrast, over half of all incidents affecting NGO staff involved delays at crossings between Israel and Gaza Strip, controlled either by Israeli or Gaza local authorities.


### Positive trends in movement of staff to and from Gaza

Following a significant decrease recorded in the previous quarter of the year, the number of permit applications submitted to the Israeli authorities on behalf of UN national staff to enter or leave the Gaza Strip returned to normal during this quarter: from 166 to 293 applications. The decline during the second quarter was primarily due to a new restriction introduced by the Gaza local authorities at Bet Hanoun crossing, which discouraged staff from applying to the Israeli authorities; that restriction was in the meantime successfully addressed. Additionally, the approval rate for such applications to the Israeli authorities increased from 68 to 87 per cent in the second and third quarters respectively.

Unlike UN international staff, entry of international staff of INGOs to the Gaza Strip requires a permit by the Israeli authorities. About 85 per cent of the applications for such permits this quarter were approved on time for scheduled travel. While this is well above last year's quarterly average rate of approval (67 per cent), the average processing time of

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Permit Approval Rate





applications slightly increased from 12 to 15 days between the second and third quarters of 2013, primarily due to Israeli holidays.

Also this quarter, in response to the intermittent closure and reduction of operations at the Egyptian-controlled Rafah crossing, starting from 15 August the Israeli authorities relaxed some of the travel restrictions, and allowed foreign and dual nationals, as well as Palestinian ID holders working for international organizations who would have otherwise travelled through Rafah, to leave Gaza via Erez. This resulted in an 18 per cent increase in the overall number of people exiting Gaza through Erez in the third quarter, compared to the previous two quarters (6,112 compared to 5,030). Despite this easing, the vast majority of the Gaza population remains ineligible for exit permits via the Erez crossing.

In the West Bank, out of 230 permit applications for UN national staff to enter East Jerusalem, 71 per cent were approved, six per cent were rejected and 23 per cent remained pending, representing a 24 per cent increase in the rate of approval compared to the previous quarter.

### ***Demands by the Gaza local authorities continue affecting INGOs***

The operations of INGOs in the Gaza Strip have also been continuously impeded by the Gaza de-facto authorities. While the controversies remain concerning the collection of VAT and income tax from such organizations and their staff, these issues have affected the processing of applications for exit permits for the national staff of some INGOs. Moreover, despite a commitment to the contrary, the local authorities have continued to demand such staff to apply individually, while rejecting annual lists provided by the INGOs. Further complicating the situation is the 'no contact' policy of some donors, prohibiting contact with the Hamas authorities. The ensuing tension is narrowing the operational independence of some organizations and, at times, restricts on-going humanitarian operations.

### ***New Gaza projects approved by Israel***

At the beginning of September, COGAT approved a total of US\$ 2.5 million worth of UN reconstruction and community development projects in Gaza. As in the past, project approvals that had been pending for months were announced immediately prior to the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee meeting, while no projects were approved in the six months between these meetings (March 2013 to September 2013, respectively). These projects had been pending approval by Israeli authorities for an average of 13 months.

Restrictions imposed by Israel on the import of certain materials to the Gaza Strip have either prevented the implementation of planned humanitarian projects, resulted in significant delays or increased costs for agencies. Among the affected projects are schools, health facilities, housing units, and sewage infrastructure. The approval process of UN projects remains cumbersome; currently, US 92.2 million worth of rehabilitation and community development projects remain pending, for an average of 12 months. Lifting those restrictions becomes all the more important in the light of recent restrictions

imposed at Rafah Crossing and measures taken to close illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt, with negative impact on the already fragile Gaza economy and livelihood of the population (see piece on Gaza herein).

## End notes

1. According to the Israeli authorities, the demolition of Palestinian-owned structures built or renovated without a construction permit issued by the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) is a law enforcement activity. Obtaining a permit for construction is extremely difficult for Palestinian residents. Some 70 per cent of Area C is virtually off-limits as it is designated for the use of Israeli settlements or the Israeli military, while 29 per cent is subject to planning legislation that is from the 1940s and conservatively interpreted by the ICA. Less than one per cent of Area C has been planned by the ICA for Palestinian use. In East Jerusalem, only 13 per cent is allocated for Palestinian construction, most of which is already built-up.
2. World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 25 September, 2013, para. 2.
3. Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey 2012, a joint effort between PCBS, FAO, UNRWA and WFP.
4. UNICEF oPt, "Children in Israeli Military Detention: Observations and Recommendations," February 2013, pg. 1. As part of its mandate, UNICEF has been documenting violations against children under arrest and detention by the Israeli military and using this documentation to inform its advocacy and programming in response to children's needs and rights. Following an increasing number of allegations of ill-treatment of children in military detention, UNICEF conducted the review of practices related to children who come into contact with the military detention system, from apprehension, to court proceedings and outcome.
5. For more information on the process, see UNICEF oPt, "Children in Israeli Military Detention: Observations and Recommendations, Bulletin No. 1," October 2013. Available at <http://www.unicef.org/oPt>.
6. This measure, announced in late 2012, goes some way towards addressing recommendation 7(i) of the UNICEF paper by ensuring that children under the age of 14 have prompt access to an independent judicial review of the legality of their detention.
7. Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
8. See UNICEF October Update for recent allegations of abuse.
9. Latest data available.
10. Direct contributors are Food Security Advocacy Group, FAO and PU-AMI, for the Food Security Sector and OHCHR, for the Protection Cluster.
11. Includes the value of picked olives and processed olive oil (PCBS data 2003-2010 averages).
12. This includes 80 000 households who own land holdings containing olive trees according to the PCBS, WFP, FAO and UNRWA's SEFSec 2012 survey, in addition to 20 000 waged labourers and households who work under share cropping arrangements during the annual olive harvest.
13. Calculations made by FAO WBG's Food Security Unit based on PCBS agricultural statistics over various years.
14. See Protection Cluster Update on Settler Violence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, October 2013. Source of data, OCHA Protection of Civilians database.
15. Reference period Jan-August 2012 and 2013.
16. The assessments were conducted by ACTED, UAWC, COOPI, and ARIJ.
17. OHCHR has mapped the focal points of all the participating organizations and has circulated a list of contacts for protective presence actors, including contacts for Palestinian DCLs in each district (updated by OCHA field teams), the Israeli Civil Administration, and OCHA to report access-related issues.
18. In Hebron City, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme (EAPPI) implements a protective presence project aimed at supporting Palestinian children's access to the Qurdoba School, which is located in H2.
19. In 2012 OCHA recorded 120 barriers and other restrictions around Hebron Old City that impede Access to Education. See: [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_movement\\_and\\_access\\_report\\_september\\_2012\\_english.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_and_access_report_september_2012_english.pdf)
20. One house was demolished this month by its owner in East Jerusalem (Jabal al Mukabbir village) following receipt of a demolition order from the Israeli authorities, in order to avoid the imposition of fines.
21. Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rupert Colville, Geneva, 24 September 2013. See <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13786&LangID=E>.

# Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

## Conflict-related casualties and violence<sup>1</sup>

Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties	2011	2012				2013								
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep

### Palestinian deaths

Gaza	108	14	180	2	<b>253</b>	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
West Bank	17	0	3	2	<b>9</b>	4	0*	2	2	0	0	1	5	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>
Of whom are civilians <sup>2</sup>	62	0	114	4	<b>136</b>	6	3	2	2	0	0	1	6	1
Of whom are female	3	0	22	0	<b>23</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Palestinian injuries

Gaza	468	29	1516**	21	<b>1834</b>	14	10	5	4	2	2	2	7	5
West Bank	1647	57	740	177	<b>3175</b>	254	756	492	657	458	125	135	129	370
<b>Total</b>	<b>2115</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>2257</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>5009</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>766</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>661</b>	<b>460</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>375</b>
Of whom are civilians	2054	59	na	179	<b>n/a</b>	268	766	496	660	460	127	137	136	374
Of whom are female	151	8	na	13	<b>n/a</b>	8	13	14	9	12	8	12	4	10

### Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	0	6	0	<b>7</b>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Of whom are civilians	11	0	3	0	<b>3</b>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Of whom are female	0	0	1	0	<b>1</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	1	253***	6	<b>345</b>	6	24	42****	18	33	1	11	5	7
Of whom are civilians	56	6	na	4	<b>60</b>	3	11	18	4	14	1	8	0	3
Of whom are female	3	0	na	1	<b>7</b>	0	1	1	2	4	0	0	0	0

\* Two Palestinians died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

\*\* Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

\*\*\* Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

\*\*\*\* The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

Tunnel-related casualties <sup>3</sup>	2011	2012				2013								
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Deaths	36	0	0	0	<b>11</b>	6	2	2	1	3	0	1	0	0
Injuries	54	0	0	0	<b>18</b>	6	0	12	1	1	0	0	0	0

### Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

	2011	2012				2013								
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties <sup>4</sup>	120	11	7	10	<b>98</b>	7	8	11	17	9	5	6	4	8
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	48	20	18	<b>268</b>	17	19	14	34	43	28	21	14	25
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	3	5	5	<b>35</b>	2	2	9	4	5	1	4	0	4
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages <sup>5</sup>	13	0	1	1	<b>15</b>	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0

### Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

		2011	2012				2013								
		Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Adult	Injured	7	1	0	1	<b>12</b>	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0
	Killed	1	0	1	0	<b>2</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Child	Injured	17	2	0	0	<b>19</b>	5	5	6	0	3	0	0	0	0
	Killed	2	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## Search and Arrest

	2011	2012				2013								
	Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	319	291	367	<b>338</b>	313	287	282	338	370	461	242	333	252
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	318	468	391	<b>283</b>	296	411	421	367	459	472	298	341	416

Source: OCHA


### Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)<sup>6</sup>

	2011	2012				2013								
	Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4298	4432	4517	<b>4,451</b>	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801	4827	4828	4762	4806
of whom are women	26	11	10	10	<b>7</b>	10	10	11	14	16	14	11	12	12
of whom are administrative detainees <sup>7</sup>	240	156	178	178	<b>245</b>	159	169	164	155	147	137	134	134	135
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	925	990	1031	<b>897</b>	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194	1150	1219	1295	1299

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

## Demolition of Structures


### Structures demolished<sup>8</sup>



	2011	2012				2013								
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
of which in Area C	571	81	28	19	<b>540</b>	120	11	2	40	58	69	20	20	93
of which in East Jerusalem	42	2	7	6	<b>64</b>	21	3	1	6	11	2	1	36	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>613</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>94</b>

\*20 are in Area B

### People Displaced due to demolitions or evictions<sup>9</sup>



	2011	2012				2013								
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	135	0	14	<b>815</b>	243	6	0	40	28	105	52	33	108
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	6	29	19	<b>71</b>	14	42	10	24	59	11	25	66	6
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1094</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>114</b>

## Child Protection

### Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012				2013								
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
West Bank	2	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gaza Strip	11	0	40	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

	2011	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
West Bank	308	7	222	29	427	36	146	162	291	64	35	22	34	139
Gaza Strip	125	10	24 - without Gaza war	4	105	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0

### Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

	2011	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
oPt	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

	2011	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
oPt	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

	2011	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	164	178	195	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	223	193	195	180	179

### Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

	2011	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
West Bank, inc EJ	618	87	14	10	474	157	23	5	38	41	58	17	46	53

### Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools<sup>19</sup>

	2011	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
oPt	na	4	297	2	321	1	7	4	8	5	4	1	2	15

Source: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

## Access

### Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012				2013								
	2011 Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing <sup>15</sup>	872	789	725	894	777	796	907	882	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023	1303
of which approved	721	705	629	820	719	738	836	762	957	900	985	1106	932	1182
of which denied	19	6	5	4	7	2	2	1	0	1	0	7	3	5
of which delayed <sup>16</sup>	83	78	91	70	17	56	69	119	198	216	180	186	88	116


Source: WHO

### Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012				2013								
	2011 Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint <sup>17</sup>	38	60	40	22	37.5	34	69	51	24	51	30	N/A	34	45
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	28	26	15	21	18	52	33	10	32	15	N/A	19	22
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	36	16	6	21	8	29	17	6	16	4	N/A	24	60

Source: OCHA

## Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

\* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

## Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2012 and 2013

funding status as of 29 October 2013

Cluster	CAP 2012		CAP 2013	
	Total request in million \$	% of funds received	Total request in million \$	% of funds received
Agriculture	24,921,339	61.4%	31,665,733	42%
Cash for Work and Cash Assistance	95,559,928	35.5%	70,481,900	49%
Cluster not yet specified	0	0.0%	0	0%
Coordination and Support Services	21,167,518	95.7%	21,295,427	94%
Education	16,662,763	54.7%	22,408,092	37%
Food Security	170,513,876	83.0%	160,052,254	71%
Health and Nutrition	20,742,170	86.6%	22,536,007	54%
Protection	46,131,077	73.8%	53,093,279	64%
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	24,208,531	55.8%	19,307,048	31%
<b>Total</b>	<b>419,907,202</b>	<b>72.0%</b>	<b>400,839,740</b>	<b>61.4%</b>

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS)

# Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

## Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

## Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

## Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

## Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

## Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

## Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

## Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

## Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

## Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.