HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT



AUGUST 2013

HIGHLIGHTS

- The reduction in the entry of fuel entering Gaza from the illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt continues to threaten the ability of the sole Gaza Power Plant to operate.
- Food insecurity in Gaza reaches 57 per cent, with a growing category of working, food insecure people.
- Significant rise in casualties during Israeli search and arrest operations in the West Bank.
- Entire community in East Jerusalem displaced to the "West Bank" side of the Barrier.


AUGUST FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	6
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	136
Palestinian children under Israeli detention	NA
Structures demolished in the West Bank	56
Patients' applications to leave Gaza approved by Israel	91%

CAP 2013 FUNDING

401 million requested (US\$)

60% funded



Overview

Largely related to the long-term restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of people and goods to and from the Gaza Strip through Israeli-controlled crossings, the economy and the population in Gaza have become dependent upon the illegal tunnel trade, stemming from smuggling tunnels under the border with Egypt, and the Egyptian-controlled Rafah Crossing, which has become the primary passenger entry and exit point to the outside world. In recent months, as part of efforts to counter insecurity and illegal activities in the Sinai, the Egyptian authorities have closed illegal tunnels and limited the operation of the Rafah Crossing.

IN THIS ISSUE		h
Egyptian measures continue along the border with Gaza	3	
Deteriorating food security levels in the oPt	6	
Clashes during West Bank search and arrest operations result in casualties	9	
Preparations for 2013 olive harvest oc amid ongoing access restrictions		
Challenges face returning school students	13	
Demolitions resume in Area C and East Jerusalem	15	
Palestinian access to Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan	18	

At the same time, there have been only limited easings of the ongoing restrictions imposed at legitimate crossing points from Israel. Consequently, an already fragile humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip has worsened.





The closures of the illegal tunnels have led to a sharp reduction in the transfers of construction materials and heavily-subsidized Egyptian fuel, on which Gaza relies to operate schools and hospitals, water and sanitation facilities and to fuel the Gaza Power Plant (GPP). As of the time of publication, the GPP has been forced to reduce electricity production and may shut down completely, if adequate fuel supplies are not urgently made available. The Rafah Crossing, when open, has been operating a greatly reduced schedule and access is limited to certain authorized categories, including foreign nationals, people holding valid visas, and patients officially referred for medical treatment abroad. Although there has been increase in the number of Gazans, including medical cases, permitted to pass through the Erez Crossing with Israel in the past two months, this has not offset the overall drastic reduction in passage through Rafah.

This latest crisis compounds already worrying developments in the Gaza Strip in 2013, including rising levels of food insecurity. Data from the 2012 Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec) indicate that 34 per cent of Palestinian households in the oPt – approximately 1.6 million people – were food insecure in 2012, reversing improvements reported since 2009. In the Gaza Strip specifically, the 'food insecure' category increased from 44 per cent to 57 per cent, primarily because of the prolonged blockade, which continues to prevent any significant recovery of the local productive economy, especially the export sector. In this context, UNRWA's suspension of its School Feeding programme for the first semester of the 2013-2014 academic year, due to a shortfall in funding, is a worrying development. The programme had been continuously running since 2008, and was intended to provide an estimated 233,000 children with a daily nutritional supplement.

The current crisis is bringing the people of Gaza to a breaking point - Israel, the Palestinian authorities, Egypt and third party states must take urgent action now to ensure adequate supplies, particularly of fuel, to maintain essential services. There is an urgent need for lifting of the long-term restrictions on imports, exports and essential supplies, through the legitimate crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip. This is the one measure that will result in a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation; in the immediate term this will alleviate shortages of fuel and construction materials necessary to maintain a minimum level of essential services and, in the long-term, will increase economic access to fuel and facilitate development and rehabilitation of electricity infrastructure.

The situation in the West Bank this month is also of serious concern. Although the number of search and arrest operations in recent months has remained stable, the frequency and intensity of confrontations during these operations and the number of resulting civilian casualties has increased. The death of five Palestinian civilians in August brings the total number of Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank this year to 14, compared to four during the same period in 2012, while the number of injuries during search and arrest operations has increased by 150 per cent.

Following a lull during the month of Ramadan, August also witnessed a sharp increase in demolitions of Palestinian-owned homes and other property in Area C and East Jerusalem, on the grounds that they lacked Israeli-issued building permits. Of particular concern is the significant rise in demolitions in East Jerusalem so far in 2013, leaving

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almost 250 people displaced, by far the highest number since 2009. In one serious case, the entire Tel al 'Adassa Palestinian Bedouin community in East Jerusalem was forced to relocate to the "West Bank" side of the Barrier this month, following the demolition of all their remaining residential and livelihood structures and orders by the Israeli authorities for them to relocate from the site under threat of fines, arrest and confiscation of sheep for non-compliance. The United Nations has repeatedly called on the Israeli authorities to cease the practice of forced evictions and destruction of civilian property, which remains one of the leading causes of forced displacement, and consequent humanitarian vulnerability, in the oPt. In a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council this month (A/HRC/24/30, 22 August 2013), the UN Secretary-General raised concerns regarding the risk of forcible transfer of a number of Palestinian communities in the West Bank, in violation of international humanitarian law.

EGYPTIAN MEASURES CONTINUE ALONG THE BORDER WITH GAZA

Shortages of fuel and construction materials continue

For the third consecutive month, actions limiting the operation of illegal tunnels located under the border between Egypt and Gaza have resulted in shortages of fuel and construction materials. Out of several hundred illegal tunnels that operated prior to the imposition of restriction in late June 2013, it is estimated that no more than 10 tunnels were operational at the end of August, reducing the import of goods to 20-30 truckloads per day, compared to some 200 truckloads prior to the tunnel crisis. In addition, operations at Rafah Crossing have been limited, restricting access to a few categories of travellers and reducing the operating hours. The Crossing remains the primary exit and entry point to the Gaza Strip for Palestinians, due to the long-standing restrictions imposed by Israel on pedestrian movement via the Erez Crossing in the northern Gaza Strip.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Limitations on access through the Rafah passenger crossing remain, with only limited categories of authorized travelers allowed passage, during reduced operating hours when the Crossing is open; it was closed from 11-17 September and, again, from 20 September through press time. Although more Gazans are passing through Erez, the volume is insufficient to offset the overall drastic reduction in passage through Rafah.

The reduction in the entry of fuel entering Gaza from the illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt continues to threaten the ability of the GPP to operate. The small quantities received from the illegal tunnels are enabling the functioning of only two of the four turbines, with power outages increasing to 12 hours per day, and up to 16 hours per day, in some localities. The threat of a complete shutdown remains high.

The decreased volume of construction materials entering via the illegal tunnels have also resulted in a slowdown in construction activities. On 17 September, it was confirmed that the Government of Israel would permit 50 truckloads a day of construction material for the Gaza private sector through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, in addition to the 20 truckloads that has been allowed in daily since December 2012. These imports began on 22 September. However, these easings of the ongoing restrictions imposed at the legitimate crossing points from Israel are of limited value in addressing the worsening humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

Reduced amounts heavily-subsidized Egyptian fuel threaten to disrupt operations at the sole Gaza Power Plant.

ISRAELI DISTRICT COURT ORDERS STATE TO ELABORATE ON POLICY FOR EXIT PERMITS FROM GAZA

On 29 August, in response to a petition filed by the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem, whose staff were denied permits to exit Gaza, the Israeli District Court instructed the State to explain the inconsistency of its policy in granting exit permits from the Gaza Strip to Israel. The State was requested to clarify why, as stated in the petition, the strict criteria for issuing the permits - restricting them to exceptional humanitarian and medical cases - are frequently not applied. Citing COGAT's website in support of the petition's claim, the Court was informed that Palestinian national soccer team members, international organization workers and traders are allowed into Israel regularly. The Court instructed the State to outline a policy in response to the petition for potential applicants who want to enter Israel occasionally, and not for humanitarian needs. The state has not submitted a response yet.

On 15 August, Israeli media reported that in response to these developments, General Eitan Dangot, Head of COGAT, had instructed the staff at CLA Erez Crossing to make the necessary arrangements to accommodate an increase in the movement of goods and people though Israeli- controlled crossings – Erez and Kerem Shalom - expected in the immediate future. Immediately following the announcement, Erez introduced a service for applicants, who would have normally travelled through Rafah, to depart through Erez. The service is currently available to foreign and dual nationals, as well as Gaza ID holders working for international organizations. Such requests used to be processed rarely and on an exceptional basis only. In the two weeks, following the announcement, Erez staff confirmed receiving 470 such requests.

Overall, there has been a general increase in the number of people leaving Gaza through Erez crossing in the past two months, with July seeing the largest number of travellers crossing through Erez in years: 6,257 people, 86 per cent of whom are Palestinians. This is a 21 per cent increase over the monthly average for the first half of 2013. This trend continued in August with 6,400 people exiting Gaza through Erez. However, this is only



about one per cent of the number of people allowed to exit prior to the second intifada in 2000, when some 26,000 Palestinians crossed Erez on a daily basis, and the vast majority of people in Gaza remain barred from travelling. Also, some of the people who qualify for permits to exit Erez, including authorized medical referral cases, are called for interrogation by Israeli security services.² Despite the increase in movement through Erez, non-registered INGOs and local NGOs continue facing difficulties in obtaining permits.

After a 33 per cent increase in July 2013, the import of goods through Kerem Shalom crossing in August dropped to an average, pre-crisis level, mostly foodstuffs and other basic supplies, including cooking gas. While the Kerem Shalom crossing has the capacity to process some 350 imported truckloads per day, the daily average this month was just 224 truckloads, suggesting that the demand in August has not reached capacity. There are several reasons for Kerem Shalom being underutilized: with over 80 per cent of the Gaza population receiving international aid, and with an unemployment rate of 32 per cent, the majority of the Gaza population cannot afford Israeli-sourced goods, which are more expensive than those smuggled into Gaza via the illegal tunnels from Egypt. In

addition, Israel's continued restriction on the import of basic construction materials and restrictions on the export or transfer of Gaza produce remains unchanged, further minimizing the use of Kerem Shalom.

The closure of illegal tunnels has led to reduced amounts of heavily-subsidized Egyptian fuel, mostly diesel, being transferred to Gaza, threatening to disrupt operations at the sole Gaza Power Plant and 180 fuel stations, as well as negatively impact the functioning of water wells, treatment of sewage and provision of essential medical services. While in July the import of Egyptian fuel remained relatively stable (between 800,000 – 900,000 litres per day), August saw a steady decline, with barely 200,000 litres of Egyptian fuel reaching Gaza daily over the last week of the month, placing additional pressures on the fuel rationing system recently introduced by local authorities in an effort to prioritize the distribution.

2005 the context of Israel's "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip, Israel and the Palestinian Authority reached agreement on a number of provisions related to the movement of persons and goods in and out of the Gaza Strip, including movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The commitments were outlined in the Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles on Rafah Crossing, from 15 November 2005. The agreements were intended to "promote peaceful economic development and improve the humanitarian situation on the ground." In these, it was agreed that Rafah Crossing would be used as a passenger crossing and for exports and that crossing points with Israel would operate continuously (including Karni, Sufa, Nahal Oz, Kerem Shalom and Erez). In the case of Rafah, the parties also agreed to the establishment of a 3rd party Border Assistance Mission from the European Union (EU BAM - Rafah). These agreements were preceded by commitments outlined in the March 2003 Road Map, the 2002 Bertini Commitments and the Oslo agreements of the 1990s.

At the same time, a significant increase in the import of fuel purchased from Israel was recorded, totalling approximately 4.7 million litres in July and August alone, compared to a total of less than two million litres purchased from Israel throughout the first six months of 2013. Most of the Israeli-purchased fuel was petrol, which somewhat helped ease the impact on fuel stations, households with small generators or operation of ambulances, albeit at increased cost. Fuel imported from Israel costs twice, or even three times more than the fuel smuggled from Egypt, as fuel in Egypt is subsidized by the government. In light of increasing layoffs, especially in the construction sector (see July 2013 *Humanitarian Bulletin*), Israeli-sourced fuel is currently an essential commodity that the majority of the population and service providers in Gaza cannot afford

COGAT approved five UN reconstruction and community development projects in Gaza

At the end of August, COGAT announced the approval of US\$ 761,780 worth of UN reconstruction and community development projects in Gaza. As in the past, project approvals

LATEST DEVELOPMENT

In early September, COGAT announced the approval of US\$2.5 million in UN reconstruction and development projects.


that had been pending for months were announced immediately prior to the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee meeting, while no projects were approved in the six months between these meetings (March 2013 to September 2013, respectively). These projects had been pending approval by Israeli authorities for an average of 13 months. The ongoing import restrictions on construction materials, combined with the approval process applied to international organizations have proven problematic and have led to significant delays in project implementation, impeding the ability of agencies to respond to urgent needs. A total of US\$ 92.2 million worth of projects are still pending approval, for an average of 12 months. UNRWA has currently 37 projects in Gaza pending with COGAT, including 32 schools and two health centres, totalling US\$ 92 million. No UNRWA project was approved during this six month period.

*This piece was contributed by WFP, FAO and UNRWA, on behalf of the Food Security Sector.

DETERIORATING FOOD SECURITY LEVELS IN THE OPT

Food insecurity in Gaza reaches 57 per cent

New data on food security in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) highlights disturbing trends. The 2012 Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec)³ results indicate that 34 per cent of Palestinian households – approximately 1.6 million people – were found to be food insecure in 2012, representing an almost complete reversal of the progressive improvements in food security reported since 2009. Food insecurity exists when people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth, development and healthy life.⁴



Food insecurity in the oPt arises from the lack of economic access to food, as opposed to physical access. The increase in food insecurity can be attributed to a number of factors: the restriction on the free movement of people and goods across the oPt continue to constrain trade and, therefore, the potential for sustainable economic growth. In 2012, the Palestinian economy grew by 5.9 per cent, less than half the rate it achieved in 2011. This translated into high unemployment rates and low wages, which, coupled with the increasing cost of living and unstable wages, directly impact households' access to food. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority's (PA) budget deficit and the delays of public sector salaries had a pronounced impact on rising food insecurity. In 2012, Palestinian households spent 50 per cent of their total cash expenditure on food, making them particularly vulnerable to increases in food prices and income fluctuations.

In the Gaza Strip, the situation is particularly concerning with only one in ten households being food secure, while the 'food insecure' category increased to a worrying 57 per cent. The worsening food security situation in Gaza can be can be explained primarily by the prolonged blockade, which continues to prevent any meaningful recovery of the local productive economy. Export restrictions, for example, have continued to confine productive sectors largely to the small and poor local market. The resulting emerging trend in Gaza is a growing category of working food insecure people, which was considerably worsened in 2012 by the delays in public sector wage payments and by the exhaustion of coping mechanisms, on which 89 per cent of households in Gaza continue to rely heavily.

In the West Bank, food security in 2012 was down below its 2009 levels, cancelling the improvements of 2010 and 2011. The considerable decrease in food security in 2012 was softened by the absorption of more households into the 'vulnerable to food insecurity' group and the 'marginally food secure' group, thus avoiding a sharp increase in the food

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RESPONDING TO RISING FOOD INSECURITY

The 2012 SEFSec highlighted the importance of reinforcing household resilience and strengthening coping mechanisms as critical factors in preventing a further increase in food insecurity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The SEFSec also underscored that food security is ultimately driven by employment creation through private sector growth.

Given these findings, the Food Security Sector will continue to work closely with national authorities to complement the national social safety net, as well as provide regular and reliable food assistance to food insecure populations outside of the national system.⁵ The Food Security Sector will also continue to link local production to relief and development assistance programs and strengthen program to economic activity through market development, local purchase, training and community works projects.

Some of the specific activities that are being carried out currently to address SEFSec findings include:

- assistance to farmers, herders and fishers affected by shocks, such as demolition and settler violence, increase access and reduce resource utilization challenges;
- short-term job opportunities and cash transfer support to food insecure households;
- relief food, voucher and cash assistance to food insecure and vulnerable households in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and
- livelihood, local production and support to protect community assets, using conditional and unconditional agricultural inputs, cash-for-work, food, voucher and cash assistance.

Without more attention and resources from the PA and the international community, the productive sectors cannot remain competitive. These aspects are critical towards food security in a society where there is still significant economic reliance on agriculture. Agriculture has been a driving sector in the region in terms of job creation in 2012 and the SEFSec provides evidence that agricultural and livestock production is a mitigating factor against the West Bank's deteriorating socioeconomic environment, in particular.⁶ Despite these facts, agricultural interventions remain largely underfunded in the Consolidated Appeal Process.

insecure category. This indicates that the West Bank still shows some resilience to the more difficult living conditions, but raises concerns for the future, if conditions do not change.

In both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the growth in food insecurity rates was particularly concentrated in the middle and southern governorates, and among refugees. In the West Bank, the gap in food insecurity rates, between Area C versus Areas A and B, has shrunk to an insignificant level in 2012 – with food insecurity actually decreasing in Area C. The reasons for this include the greater relative impact of the PA financial crisis in Areas A and B, and the increased levels of work in Israel and settlements by Area C residents.

Profiling of food insecure households in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip shows less access to employment overall and, those that are employed, tend to work fewer hours and more irregularly. This suggests that, given its temporary nature, employment is no longer a protection against food insecurity in the oPt.

Food insecurity amongst female-headed households was 36 per cent in 2012. Gender disaggregated results for the oPt indicate that external assistance led to a drop in food insecurity among female-headed households; in the Gaza Strip it led to a food insecurity level lower than that of male-headed households.

Approximately 74 per cent of all households in the Gaza Strip reported receiving at least one type of assistance from the Food Security Sector (primarily food assistance), while 24 per cent reported having done so in the West Bank (mostly cash assistance). Overall, assistance pulled more than 32,000 households out of the food insecure category in 2012, yet SEFSec results suggest that assistance could not keep pace with, let alone counter the effects of, the rapidly increasing food insecurity prevalence, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

CLASHES DURING WEST BANK SEARCH AND ARREST **OPERATIONS RESULT IN CASUALTIES**

Intensity of confrontations during such operations in 2013 is on the rise

A number of search and arrest operations carried out in the West Bank by Israeli forces this month triggered violent clashes, which resulted in the death of five Palestinian civilians and the injury of another 52 civilians and one Israeli soldier. While the number of search and arrest operations in recent months has remained stable, the frequency and intensity of confrontations occurring during such operations, alongside the number of resulting casualties among civilians, has been on the rise. This month's incidents bring the total number of Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank this year to 14, compared to four during the equivalent period in 2012.

The deadliest incident this month took place on 26 August, when Israeli military and police forces raided the Qalandia Refugee Camp (Jerusalem governorate) to arrest a man allegedly suspected of organizing disturbances and transferring weapons to others.8 As the operation unfolded, hundreds of local residents came out into the streets and onto rooftops, throwing stones, blocks and other objects at the Israeli forces. According to the IDF, during the incident, Palestinians also opened fire and threw Molotov cocktails at some of the Israeli armored vehicles. Israeli forces responded by shooting live ammunition, killing three men and injuring another 19, including six minors. Among those killed was an UNRWA staff member, while another UNRWA staff member was among the injured. No casualties were reported among the Israeli forces. Unlike most search and arrest operations, which are carried out at night, this operation began between 5am and 6am and lasted until around 7am, when people were on their way to work and school, a fact that seemed to have contributed to the massive nature of the clashes.


Another search and arrest operation on 20 August in the Jenin Refugee Camp triggered similarly violent confrontations. In addition to stone throwing, Palestinians also used fire arms and improvised grenades against the soldiers, who responded by shooting live ammunition, killing two Palestinian civilians and injuring another four; two Israeli soldiers were also injured.9

While the number of Israeli search and arrest operations in recent months has remained stable, the intensity of confrontations during operations and the number of resulting casualties among civilians has been on the rise.

Between January and August 2013, OCHA recorded nearly 2,700 search and arrest operations conducted by Israeli forces throughout the West Bank, marking a slight decrease compared to the equivalent figure in the same period of 2012 (over 2,800). However, the number of civilian injuries recorded so far this year in confrontations during such operations witnessed a 150 per cent increase compared to the equivalent period of 2012 (184 vs 74), and the number of deaths increased from one to six. Similarly the number of Palestinian civilians arrested during these operations in 2013 increased by 56 per cent compared to the previous year (3,131 vs 2,009). The escalation in the intensity of clashes and resulting casualties during these operations appears to have accelerated since last June (see chart).

According to an IDF officer quoted in the Israeli media "in recent months, not a single arrest has occurred without the residents responding – whether it's youths coming out of their houses and throwing stones at the forces, or the use of live fire". ¹⁰

Concerns about possible excessive use of force by Israeli security forces in law enforcement operations have been expressed in the past by the Secretary-General of the UN, and reiterated in connection to the above incidents by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Under international law, the use of firearms in law enforcement is authorized in extremely limited circumstances, namely, self-defence or defence of others against imminent threat of death or serious injury, and only if less extreme means are insufficient. The two incidents this month resulting in Palestinian fatalities have led to the opening of criminal investigations by the IDF and the Israeli Police.




PREPARATIONS FOR 2013 OLIVE HARVEST OCCUR AMID ONGOING ACCESS RESTRICTIONS

Case study on access to land behind the Barrier in the Bethlehem area

On the north-eastern edge of Bethlehem lies an area of land, running from the Convent of St. Elias to Beit Sahur (marked in green on map) belonging to farmers from the Bethlehem area. From atop a nearby hill, with the Israeli settlement of Har Homa looming across the valley, Jamal Salman explains that he has few hopes for this year's olive harvest. Since construction of the Barrier was completed, farmers in the area have had only sporadic access to tend their lands. Jamal now only has regular access to a tiny percentage of his agricultural land, 650 square metres of land, while the rest, around 44 dunums (44,000 square metres), lies behind the Barrier. According to the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, 2,140 dunums of land have been cut off by the Barrier in Beit Sahur alone.¹³


Jamal's case is not unique; many have found themselves in similar circumstances. Communities with olive groves located between the Barrier and the Green Line, in the vicinity of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and along the perimeter fence surrounding the Gaza Strip, face serious challenges in maintaining and harvesting their olive crops. This, in turn, undermines their livelihoods and increases their vulnerability.

Until 2009, access to land isolated by the Barrier on the north-eastern edge of Bethlehem was largely prohibited; since then, permits have been issued for farmers to access their land for a limited period during the olive harvest. Last season, Jamal and his nephew were only granted two-week permits to access their land. While this allowed him some time to harvest his olives, access restrictions imposed during the rest of the year have meant that pruning and tending his trees is no longer possible. As a result, his trees yield less and the profitability of his traditional livelihood is reduced.



*This piece submitted by Oxfam and FAO on behalf of the Food Security Sector Advocacy Group.

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Land holdings of 182 Bethlehem land owners isolated between the Barrier and the Israeli settlements of Gilo and Har Homa (Base map: ©OCHA/2012).

Moreover, access permits are generally limited to only one or two members of the family, and often elderly ones, at that. Salman himself finds it difficult to endure the three kilometre walk to his olive trees: there are no agricultural roads and he is not allowed to bring an animal to help bear the load.

Due to these access restrictions, olive production in the area has all but vanished. Local farmers who formerly relied partially on this sector to sustain their livelihoods have suffered a serious blow to their incomes. Under such conditions, many Palestinians' ability to feed themselves and their families are greatly compromised. It is within contexts like this that 34 per cent of all Palestinian families are now considered food insecure (see piece on the 2012 SEFSec herein).

"We have no way to get to our trees", said Salman. "I need ladders, workers and transport," to adequately harvest olives. Most importantly, Jamal and so many others like him, need access.

CHALLENGES FACE RETURNING SCHOOL STUDENTS

Egyptian and Israeli measures impact right to education

This academic year, 1.1 million Palestinian students returned to their schools in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip¹⁴ knowing they will have to face multiple challenges during the upcoming school-year.

Due to a restrictive planning regime and the limited availability of building permits, the education infrastructure in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, remains insufficient. In East Jerusalem there is a lack of more than 2,200 classrooms,¹⁵ and in Area C of the West Bank, there is a gap of at least 28 new schools. ¹⁶ At least 39 schools, including kindergartens, in Area C and East Jerusalem have stop work and/or demolition orders issued against them by the Israeli authorities.¹⁷

In the Gaza Strip, the closure continues to place a burden on the already stressed education system. As a result, the educational sector cannot provide the quality learning, to which children are entitled to, and cannot cope with the increasing numbers of students. Though Education Cluster partners were able to rehabilitate 217 damaged school buildings after operation "Pillar of Defence" in November 2012¹⁸, 85 per cent of the schools in Gaza continue to run on double shifts and an additional 250¹⁹ schools are needed. UNRWA has currently 32 school projects in Gaza pending with COGAT, totaling US\$ 60.8 million. These projects include nine new constructions and 23 reconstruction projects of damaged school buildings.

The closure of illegal tunnels under the border between Gaza and Egypt has resulted in a significant shortage of construction materials on the local market, at a time when Israel still restricts the import of building materials into Gaza. This has negatively affected the construction of 30 new schools, with contractors stopping work on six schools and

* This piece was submitted by UNICEF on behalf of the Education Cluster

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postponing the tendering process for another 24. In addition, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education faces increasing difficulties in providing Gaza schools with sufficient furniture, stationary and fuel needed to transport teachers and students, especially children with special educational needs, to their schools.²⁰

Early Childhood Development has also been affected, as rehabilitation of kindergartens damaged during operation "Pillar of Defence" may have to be postponed, due to the shortage of construction materials. Save the Children, which is due to rehabilitate 30 kindergartens (out of a total of 76 which were damaged), expects delays, and warns they might have to reallocate funds, should the situation persist.

The Egyptian authorities' repeated closure of Rafah crossing is also impeding students' ability to reach their educational institutions abroad, given the longstanding prohibition on the passage of students through the Israeli-controlled Erez Crossing. According to the Gaza Ministry of Interior, hundreds of students enrolled in universities abroad may be unable to leave Gaza and reach their universities²¹ in time to start the new academic year.

The current situation strongly undermines Palestinian children's right to education, jeopardizing the realization of their full potential.

Shortage of funds forces UNRWA to suspend school feeding program in Gaza

In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA's funding difficulties have reached a critical point. Despite significantly scaling-back humanitarian interventions since 2012 – most particularly within its Job Creation Programme – the Agency's Emergency Appeal²² remains severely underfunded. UNRWA has secured only 40 per cent of the overall request for Gaza emergency programming within the 2013 appeal. The Agency is no longer in a position to ensure the continuity of its core humanitarian interventions. In an attempt to maintain emergency food distributions to more than 720,000 refugees, UNRWA has been forced to

EDUCATION CLUSTER RESPONSE: SUMMER CAMPS

Every year, the Higher Council for Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, national and international NGO's and several UN agencies organize a range of summer camps and activities in order to prepare children for the new school year, and to offer recreational activities in an area where there are very few safe play areas.

This summer, an estimated 20 organizations ran more than 125 summer camps throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza. These activities benefited more than 10,000 Palestinian children and adolescents. Organizations prioritized the most vulnerable children in Gaza, the Jordan Valley and Hebron, including a number of Bedouin communities.

Some camps offered remedial teaching, focusing on language, mathematics and science, while others offered classes in creative writing and debating aimed at high achieving students. A variety of recreational activities was organized, such as sport and play, drama and art, traditional Dabka dancing, Yoga and story-telling. Some summer camps also offered day trips to cultural or historical sites to help children discover their national heritage.

suspend its School Feeding programme for the first semester of the 2013-2014 academic year. The programme had been continuously running since 2008, and was intended to provide an estimated 233,000 children with a daily nutritional supplement. Funding permitting, UNRWA will reinstate the programme with the start of the second semester of the school year. However, the immediate priority for the Agency remains to secure the necessary resources to ensure that food assistance continues to be provided to the poorest refugees in the coming months.

DEMOLITIONS RESUME IN AREA CAND EAST JERUSALEM


Entire community forcibly displaced to "West Bank" side of the Barrier

Following a lull in demolitions and related displacement during the month of Ramadan (beginning 10 July), the Israeli authorities resumed this month the demolition of Palestinian-owned structures in Area C and East Jerusalem. Overall, a total of 56 structures were demolished, including 27 residential structures, displacing 99 people, including 46 children.

On 19 August, all residential and livelihood structures in the Tel al 'Adassa Palestinian Bedouin community in East Jerusalem were demolished, on the grounds that they lacked Israeli-issued building permits. Seven Palestinian households were displaced, comprising 39 people, including 18 children. On 25 August, the remaining members of the community, along with most of its herd, left the area for the "West Bank" side of the Barrier, after being instructed to do so by the Israeli authorities, or face fines, arrest and confiscation of their sheep.

The community, which has existed in the area since the 1950's, is one of at least 17 "dislocated" communities in the Jerusalem area (see box herein). According to the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the permanent evacuation of families from Tel al 'Adassa may amount to a violation of the prohibition on the forcible transfer of individuals or communities under article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. OHCHR has also indicated that the case raises concerns regarding the prohibition on forced eviction under international human rights law, and the enjoyment of the rights to adequate housing and freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family and home.²³

Also in East Jerusalem this month, the Israeli authorities demolished one Palestinianowned residential structure in the area of the planned national park between Al Isawiya and At Tur. Nine people, including children were displaced. These demolitions follow the Israeli authorities' 21 August 2013 leveling of land and destruction of the access road leading to houses in the area. Since February 2012, all five of the Palestinian-



owned houses in the area have been demolished, displacing 45 people, including 26 children, many of whom continue to reside in the area, either in the remains of their previous home or in a re-built structure. The planned national park has raised a number of concerns, including the reduced space that would be available for the residential development of Palestinian communities, as well as the territorial linkage that this park would create between Israeli settlements in the area, disrupting the territorial contiguity of the West Bank.

In 2013, there has been a significant rise in demolitions and displacement in East Jerusalem. The number of people displaced this year in East Jerusalem now stands at nearly 250, by far the highest number since 2009, and more than the combined total of persons displaced in East Jerusalem in all of 2011 (88) and 2012 (71).

The Israeli authorities demolished 20 Palestinian-owned structures, including 11 residential structures, in Area C this month, displacing 33 people, including 15 children. The structures, which were all demolished on 20 August due to lack of building permit, were located in three small Bedouin communities: Humsa Basalia and Al Jiftlik, both in the Jordan Valley, and in Al Baqa'a, in the Jerusalem governorate.

The number of people displaced this year in East Jerusalem by the Israeli authorities' demolition of Palestinian-owned structures stands at approximately 250, by far the highest number since 2009.

WEST BANK COMMUNITIES ON THE 'JERUSALEM' SIDE OF THE BARRIER

By diverging from the municipal boundary, the Barrier has left some 1,400 West Bank residents isolated on the 'Jerusalem' side. This category consists of approximately 17 communities of mixed West Bank and Jerusalem ID card holders, (combined total 3,876). Most of these communities are small, often consisting of a few households, although Al Khalayleh (population, approx. 540), and An Nabi Samwil (population, approx. 175) are more sizable Area C communities, stranded on the 'Jerusalem' side by the Barrier's encirclement of the Giv'at Ze'ev settlement bloc. Many contain 'mixed' households of Palestinians holding either West Bank or East Jerusalem ID cards, with marriages dating back to the time when the Jerusalem municipal boundary was a notional line on the map, and when movement, access and residency was more fluid, especially for those living on the periphery of the municipal line.

Those who hold West Bank residency are now physically separated from the wider West Bank, the previous centre of life for many, by the concrete Barrier. Because of their residency status, they are not allowed by the Israeli authorities to live in, or access services, within the official municipal area, without permission. Of these West Bank residents, approximately 1,000 live in Area C, of whom, 600 hold 'Seam Zone' permits, allowing them to reside in the newly-declared closed area. The remainder, approximately 400, have coordination arrangements which allow them to continue to reside in their current locations and to cross and return through designated checkpoints into the wider West Bank.

The approximately 500 who live within the municipal boundary are dispersed over at least eight different locations, and suffer uncertain residency status, impeded access to basic services and fear of displacement. Some are availing of coordination mechanisms set up by the Israeli Civil Administration, whereby a list of names of the members of the community is maintained at the nearest checkpoint, allowing passage in and out of the Barrier. Others, following legal proceedings, have succeeded in obtaining temporary permits which allows them to continue to reside in their homes and to cross checkpoints. Others have received no special arrangements, and are virtually confined to their homes for fear of arrest. Difficult conditions, along with house demolitions in some communities, is leading to the gradual displacement of families from dislocated communities to the "West Bank" side of the Barrier, as happened recently in the case of the Bedouin community in Tel Adassa. Over 150 other people have reportedly moved out of the communities of Al Khalayleh Bedouin and Nabi Samuel due to unsustainable living conditions.

Regardless of the type of residency and access arrangement, all I,400 West Bank residents are denied freedom of movement within East Jerusalem itself, but are restricted to their homes and to the immediate area. Consequently, they need to cross checkpoints to access services in the West Bank, most importantly education and health. According to the communities affected, they are only permitted to take in limited quantities of food considered appropriate for 'personal consumption' through the checkpoints, with some products prohibited. Their situation mirrors that of the 'Seam Zone' communities in the northern West Bank, who are also isolated between the Barrier and the Green Line. Their customary family and social life is similarly impaired, in that friends and family members from the West Bank who wish to visit them are required to apply for permits to enter Jerusalem, with the result that religious holidays, weddings, funerals and wake-houses take place without the participation of extended families.

Finally, this month, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the eviction of a Palestinian family from their home in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of East Jerusalem, following a legal battle that had lasted for years. The Court determined that the family should be given 18 months before the eviction is implemented.²⁴


PALESTINIAN ACCESS TO JERUSALEM DURING THE MONTH OF RAMADAN

Persons above 60 and children under 12 allowed during the week without permits

As in previous years, the Israeli authorities implemented a number of measures aimed at facilitating access to East Jerusalem of Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank during the month of Ramadan, which ended in August.

As a rule, Palestinians holding West Bank IDs are prohibited from accessing East Jerusalem, unless they obtain a special permit. This prohibition is enforced by the Barrier surrounding the city and the 16 checkpoints erected along it, of which only four are accessible to West Bank ID holders with permits, namely Qalandiya, Gilo, Shu'fat²⁵ and Zaitun CPs.

This year, men above the age of 40, women of all ages and children below the age of 13 were allowed to gain access to Jerusalem, without permits, every Friday and for prayers on the Night of Destiny (Laylat al Qadr). In a new measure implemented this year for the first time, men and women above 60 years of age and children 12 years and under were allowed to enter Jerusalem, without permits, every day during the month, except Saturdays, conditional upon individual security restrictions. Other West Bank ID holders not included in these categories needed to apply for special permits for the purpose of attending the Friday prayers or for family visits. As in previous years, Palestinians from the Gaza Strip continued to be denied access.



--2012 **--**2013

Despite the crowded conditions, access through the checkpoints generally proceeded without incident this Overall, some year. 545,000 Palestinians crossed into East *Ierusalem* checkpoints for Friday prayers, and on the Night of Destiny (Laylat al Qadr).

Also during the month, the Israeli authorities issued an exceptionally high number of permits allowing West Bank ID holders to enter East Jerusalem and Israel for the purposed of "family visits." Overall, some 545,000 Palestinians crossed into East Jerusalem checkpoints on Fridays (four) and on the Night of Destiny, compared to 2012, when over 821,000 entered on five Fridays and the Night of Destiny. Despite the crowded conditions, access through the checkpoints generally proceeded without incident this year. According to the Israeli Civil Administration, some one million Palestinians entered Israel throughout the month.²⁶

As in previous years, with the beginning of the month of Ramadan, the Israeli authorities implemented a number of additional easings of Palestinian movement in the West Bank. The main ones implemented in July entailed the opening up of two key roads leading into the cities of Ramallah and Hebron for Palestinian traffic, facilitating the access of tens of thousands to services and livelihoods.²⁷

End notes

- There was no mention of reopening previously closed crossings under Israeli control, namely Sufa, Karni and Nahal Oz -that have been closed since, 2007, 2008 and 2010 respectively.
- 2. During the first six months of 2013, approximately 1.4 per cent (86 applicants) of all medical referral permit applicants were called for interrogation by the Israeli security services. WHO, "Monthly Report on Referral of Patients from the Gaza Strip," June 2013, available at: http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/wbgs/opt_monthly_report_24july2013.pdf.
- The annual Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec), carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), FAO, WFP and UNRWA, identifies changes in the food security conditions of Palestinian households and monitors key socio-economic and food-related indicators.
- 4. Food Insecure are households with income and consumption below the deep poverty line and households showing a decrease in total food and non-food expenditures, including those unable to further decrease their expenditure patterns.
- The Food Security Sector, which focuses on meeting urgent humanitarian needs, while supporting longer-term, sustainable food security solutions as a part of the Palestinian Authority's development goals.
- 6. In the West Bank, food insecurity levels in rural areas remained virtually stable in 2012 as compared to 2011. This is largely consistent with the sub-regional analysis identifying the northern West Bank, an area characterized by agricultural and livestock production, as insulated from the surge in food insecurity.
- 7. Four additional Israeli soldiers were injured in the West Bank this month in other contexts.
- 8. IDF Website, 26 August 2013.
- 9. One of the two fatalities died 11 days after the incident due to the wounds he sustained during it.
- 10. Amira Hass, Ha'aretz 27 August.
- 11. Refer to the reports of the Secretary-General on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem in 2012 (A/67/372) and 2011 (A/66/356).
- 12. In the West Bank, Israeli security forces act in a law enforcement capacity and are therefore bound by article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 43 of the Hague Regulations. This is in addition to the general principles on the use of force by law enforcement officials, including the principles of necessity and proportionality outlined in the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979).
- ARIJ. 2010. Beit Sahour City Profile. http://vprofile.arij.org/bethlehem/pdfs/VP/Beit%20Sahour_cp_en.pdf.
- 14. Based on MoEHE data 2012/2013.
- 15. Municipality of Jerusalem 2012.
- 16. Based on MoEHE data 2011/2012.
- 17. Education Cluster Vulnerable School Matrix (VSM), August 2013.
- 18. Education Cluster, Gaza Damaged School Database 2012/2013.
- 19. NGO Gisha 2012.
- 20. MoEHE Gaza, August 2013.
- 21. Save the Children, August 2013.
- 22. All UNRWA CAP projects for 2013 are also included in the Agency's 2013 Emergency Appeal.
- 23. "Daily Press Briefing of the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights," Geneva, 27 August 2013.
- 24. See February 2013 "Humanitarian Monitor: for background on the case, available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2013_03_25_english.pdf.
- 25. Shu'fat checkpoint is open only to residents of Anata and Shu'fat refugee camp.
- 21 August 2013 announcement of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, available at: http://www.cogat.idf.il/901-11037-en/Cogat.aspx.
- 27. For details see OCHA, The Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2013.

CONTRIBUTING AGENCIES

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), Al Haq, Badil, Save the Children (UK), Defence for Children International – Palestine Section (DCI-PS), Oxfam GB, Palestine Hydrology Group (PHG), Campaign for the Right to Enter, Action Against Hunger (ACF),

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Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables Conflict-related casualties and violence

Direct Israeli-Palestinian	2011		20	12			20)13					
conflict related casualties	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	August
Palestinian deaths								1					
Gaza	108	14	180	2	253	2	0	0	I	0	0	0	I
West Bank	17	0	3	2	9	4	0*	2	2	0	0	I	5
Total	125	14	177	4	262	6	3	2	3	0	0	I	6
Of whom are civilians ²	62	0	114	4	136	6	3	2	2	0	0	I	6
Of whom are female	3	0	22	0	23	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Palestinian injuries													
Gaza	468	29	1516**	21	1834	14	10	5	4	2	2	2	7
West Bank	1647	57	740	177	3175	254	756	492	657	458	125	135	129
Total	2115	86	2257	198	5009	268	766	497	661	460	127	137	136
Of whom are civilians	2054	59	na	179	n/a	268	766	496	660	460	127	137	136
Of whom are female	151	8	na	13	n/a	8	13	14	9	12	8	12	4
Israeli deaths													
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	П	0	6	0	7	0	0	0	I	0	0	0	0
Of whom are civilians	- 11	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	I	0	0	0	0
Of whom are female	0	0	I	0	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli injuries													
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	l	253***	6	345	6	24	42****	18	33	I	11	5
Of whom are civilians	56	6	na	4	60	3	11	18	4	14	I	8	0
Of whom are female	3	0	na	1	7	0	I	1	2	4	0	0	0

^{*}The figure does not include two Palestinians who died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

*Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

*** Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**** The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

	2011		20	12			20	13					
Tunnel-related casualties ³	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	August
Deaths	36	0	0	0	11	6	2	2	I	3	0	I	0
Injuries	54	0	0	0	18	6	0	12	I	l	0	0	0

Israeli-settler related	2011		20	12			20	13					
incidents resulting in casualties or property damage	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	August
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties ⁴	120	11	7	10	98	7	8	11	17	9	5	6	4
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	48	20	18	268	17	19	14	34	43	28	21	14
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	3	5	5	35	2	2	9	4	5	ı	4	0
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	13	0	I	I	15	2	0	0	2	0	ı	0	I

Civilian Palesti	inians killed	2011		20	12				2013					
or injured by ordnance in Ga		Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	August
Adult	Injured	7	ı	0	I	12	I	0	0	I	2	0	0	0
Addit	Killed	1	0	I	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CLIL	Injured	17	2	0	0	19	5	5	6	0	3	0	0	0
Child	Killed	2	0	0	0	I	I	ı	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand Total		27	3	I	I	34	7	6	6	I	5	0	0	0

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Search and Arrest

	2011		2	012				2013						
	Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August	
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	319	291	367	338	313	287	282	338	370	461	242	333	
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	318	468	391	283	296	411	421	367	459	472	298	NA	

Source: OCHA

Palestinians under	2011		2	012				2013					
Israeli custody (occupation related) ⁶	Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4298	4432	4517	4,451	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801	4827	4828	NA
of whom are women	26	11	10	10	7	10	10	11	14	16	14	11	NA
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	156	178	178	245	159	169	164	155	147	137	134	NA
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	925	990	1031	897	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194	1150	1219	NA

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

Demolition of Structures

Structures demolished⁸

	2011		20	12				20	13				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August
of which in Area C	571	81	28	19	540	120	Ш	2	40	58	69	20	20
of which in East Jerusalem	42	2	7	6	64	21	3	I	6	11	2	I	36
Grand Total	613	83	35	25	604	141	14	3	46	69	71	21	56

^{*20} are in Area B

People Displaced due		2011		20)12			2013						
to demolitions or evictions ⁹		Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August
of whom were displac Area C	ed in	1006	135	0	14	815	243	6	0	40	28	105	52	33
of whom were displac East Jerusalem	ed in	88	6	29	19	71	14	42	10	24	59	11	25	66
Grand Total		1094	141	29	33	886	257	48	10	64	87	116	77	99

Source: Displacement Working Group

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian	2011		20	12				20	13				
children killed - direct conflict	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August
West Bank	2	0	0	ı	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gaza Strip	11	0	40	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Palestinian ch	ildren inj	ured -	direct co	onflict									
West Bank	308	7	222	29	427	36	146	162	291	64	35	22	34
Gaza Strip	125	10	24 - without Gaza war	4	105	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	2
Number of Israeli childre	n killed -	direct	conflict										
oPt	I	0	0	0	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	I	0	0	0	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Israeli childre	n injured	- direc	t conflic	t									
oPt	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Palestinian ch	ildren he	ld in de	tention	by Isra	aeli auth	orities							
In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	164	178	195	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	223	193	195	na
Number of Palestinian ch	ildren dis	placed	by dem	olition	s								
West Bank, inc EJ	618	87	14	10	474	157	23	5	38	41	58	17	46
Number of incidents resu	lting in t	he disru	-	f schoo	1								
oPt	na	4	297	2	321	I	7	4	8	5	4	2	NA

Souce: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children Inernational, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violatons affecting children in armed conflict

Access


Access to healthcare - Gaza	2011	2012				2013							
	2011 Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ¹⁵	872	789	725	894	777	796	907	882	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023
of which approved	721	705	629	820	719	738	836	762	957	900	985	1106	932
of which denied	19	6	5	4	7	2	2	I	0	I	0	7	3
of which delayed ¹⁶	83	78	91	70	17	56	69	119	198	216	180	186	88

Source:WHO

Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank	2011	2012				2013							
	2011 Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	August
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	60	40	22	37.5	34	69	51	24	51	30	N/A	34
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	28	26	15	21	18	52	33	10	32	15	N/A	19
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	36	16	6	21	8	29	17	6	16	4	N/A	24

Source: OCHA

Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2012 and 2013

funding status as of 21 May 2013

	САР	2012	CAP 2013				
Cluster	Total request in million \$	% of funds received	Total request in million \$	% of funds received			
Agriculture	24,921,339	61.4%	31,665,733	42%			
Cash for Work and Cash Assistance	95,559,928	35.5%	70,481,900	47%			
Cluster not yet specified	0	0.0%	0	0%			
Coordination and Support Services	21,167,518	95.7%	21,295,427	138%			
Education	16,662,763	54.7%	22,408,092	31%			
Food Security	170,513,876	83.0%	160,052,254	64%			
Health and Nutrition	20,742,170	86.6%	22,536,007	49%			
Protection	46,131,077	73.8%	53,093,279	51%			
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	24,208,531	55.8%	19,307,048	26%			
Total	419,907,202	72.0%	400,839,740	60.0%			

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS)

^{*} Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

- Conflict-related casualties: includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli
 occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during
 demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the
 context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and
 internal Palestinian violence.
- 2. Civilians: includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a "continuous combatant function" as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
- 3. Tunnel related casualties: figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

- 4. Incidents resulting in casualties: includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
- 5. Incidents resulting in property damage/losses: ibid.

Search and Arrest

- 6. Palestinians in Israeli custody: includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a "security detainee/prisoner". Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a "regular" criminal offense.
- 7. Administrative detainees: Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

- 8. Structures demolished: includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
- 9. People displaced due to demolitions: includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
- **10. People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

- **11. Permanently staffed checkpoints**: staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and 'agricultural gates' along the Barrier.
- 12. Partially staffed checkpoints: checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
- 13. Unstaffed obstacles: includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
- 14. 'Flying' or random checkpoints: checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

- **15. Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
- **16. Delayed applications**: includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint: includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. Truckloads by type: for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.