# HUMANITARIAN MONITOR MONTHLY REPORT 

MARCH 2013

## March Overview

The civilian population in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) continues to pay the price of ongoing conflict and violence, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

In response to the firing of rockets towards Israel by Palestinian armed groups, the Israeli authorities imposed a series of restrictions on the movement of people and goods to, from and within the Gaza Strip. These included the closure for a number of days of Kerem Shalom, the only functioning crossing point for goods between Israel and the Gaza Strip; further restrictions on

## ONTHIS ISSUE

Access restrictions tightened in the Gaza Strip. ... 2
Continued restrictions on exports......... 7
UNDP/PAPP and UNMAS collaborate to safely remove rubble generated during "Pillar of Defense". .... 8
School rehabilitation in Gaza following
"Pillar of Defense". "Pillar of Defense" $\qquad$
Over 30 families temporarily displaced due to Israeli military training................. I I
SCC response targets agricultural land in An Nabi Samwil

13
Current pest and disease shocks in the oPt15

Quarterly Update on Access for Humanitarian Staff. 17 the movement of people across the Erez Crossing; and halving the sea area accessible to fishermen, from six to three nautical miles from the coast. These restrictions have resulted in temporary shortages of some important goods and generally undermined the rights and livelihoods of the most vulnerable.


> 6 The civilian population in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) continues to pay the price of ongoing conflict and violence, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

## *Information for this article was

 provided by OCHA and OHCHR and FAO for the Protection Cluster and Food Security Sector.Developments during March also highlighted the role of the international community in mitigating the impact of violence and conflict on Gaza's civilian population. During the month, two UN agencies collaborated on a project aimed at removing around 50,000 tonnes of rubble generated from the destruction of buildings during the November 2012 "Pillar of Defense" operation, including the safe removal of explosive remnants of war (ERW). Thus far in 2013, two Palestinian civilians have been killed and 17 injured by ERW in Gaza, all but one are children.

The November 2012 hostilities also resulted in damage to nearly 300 educational facilities across Gaza, ten of which incurred major damage. During the month, humanitarian agencies and donors continued the repair of affected schools and tertiary education institutions, with agencies having committed to repair most of the damaged facilities. There remains a significant gap, however, with regard to the rehabilitation of 72 damaged kindergartens.

On a positive note, during the first quarter of 2013, about 90 per cent of applications for permits for international NGO staff to enter Gaza submitted to the Israeli authorities were approved on time, compared to only two thirds of the applications during the last quarter of 2012. This can be partially attributed to a new electronic system implemented during this period, which has increased the efficiency and transparency of the application process. This came alongside a decrease in the approval rate for West Bank and East Jerusalem ID holders' permits to enter Gaza, from 70 to 65 per cent.

The United Nations has repeatedly condemned the firing of rockets by Palestinian armed groups towards southern Israel and called upon the Gaza authorities to ensure those responsible are held accountable. While Israel has legitimate security concerns related to such firing and has the right to address these concerns, its response must be proportionate to the specific security threat, not be directed against the civilian population, and not be punitive in nature. The access restrictions imposed by Israel in March have raised concerns among the humanitarian community regarding Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law, particularly with reference to the prohibition against collective punishment.

## GAZA STRIP

## ACCESS RESTRICTIONS TIGHTENED INTHE GAZA STRIP

## Concerns raised over collective punishment

For the second time since the 21 November 2012 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, Israel re-imposed heightened restrictions on Gaza. According to the Government of Israel, the measures were imposed in response to rockets fired towards southern Israel by Palestinian armed groups on 21 March 2013, and in the broader context of Hamas's failure to respect the provisions of the ceasefire agreement. Erez and Karem Shalom Crossings both experienced significant closures during the month, further limiting the movement of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank and Israel. Fishermen's
access to sea was again reduced from 6 to 3 nautical miles, while access restrictions continued along land adjacent to the border fence. Such restrictions on main access points and natural resources have serious, negative humanitarian impacts on the population of Gaza.

The United Nations has condemned the indiscriminate firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip. ${ }^{1}$ The measures adopted by Israel this month, in response to rocket fire, also raise serious concerns with regard to the prohibition against collective punishment under international humanitarian law.

## Restrictions on the movement of goods and people

On 3 March and between 21 and 27 March, the Israeli authorities allowed access through Erez Crossing only to authorized Palestinian humanitarian cases (medical patients and family visits) and closed the Kerem Shalom crossing, Gaza's sole operating gate ${ }^{2}$ for goods in and out. ${ }^{4}$ The Kerem Shalom crossing was also closed one day this month (4 March) due to a dispute on the Palestinian side between the operators of the crossing and the local authorities.

Since intensification of the closure in 2007, only a limited number of Palestinian humanitarian cases and businessmen have been allowed to cross Erez into Israel and the West Bank; in 2012, an average of just 130 people per day crossed, ${ }^{5}$ hindering access to specialized health care, higher education and livelihood opportunities. Businessmen with ties in Israel and the West Bank important economic actors in Gaza, and prohibitions on their movement further undermine the already fragile economic conditions in Gaza. Movement of people out of the Gaza Strip was further complicated in March by a new regulation requiring travellers to obtain permission to exit from the Hamas authorities prior to departure. ${ }^{6}$

Imports to Gaza through Kerem Shalom
during March 2013 during March 2013

*This includes imports through Karni, Nahal Oz and Sufa crossings.
> $6_{\text {Following the closure }}$ of Kerem Shalom, stocks of cooking gas, dairy products and fresh fruit, which are primarily imported from Israel, began to run low. 9

The recent restrictions on fishing areas will impact about 3,500 fishermen, who are reliant on the fisheries sector for their livelihoods, and their families.

The closure of Kerem Shalom heightened the risk of shortages of supplies for the civilian population, 80 per cent of which receives aid. Approximately 40 per cent of the goods coming through this crossing are foodstuffs and other basic supplies, including cooking gas. Following the closure of Kerem Shalom, stocks of cooking gas, dairy products and fresh fruit, which are primarily imported from Israel, began to run low and WFP was forced to temporarily suspend their food distribution, typically reaching over 600,000 non-refugees in Gaza. The extended closure of the crossing could lead to broader food shortages. In response to medical shortages in Gazan hospitals, on 24 March, the Israeli authorities facilitated the entry of essential medical supplies through the Erez crossing, typically designated for passenger movement only. The closure of Kerem Shalom also resulted in losses to export cash crops, including cherry tomatoes, herbs and cut flowers; approximately 7-10 tonnes of produce were lost, impacting over 50 farmers.

The closure also contributed to delays in the implementation of international projects, including the rehabilitation of homes and service infrastructure. Because of the lengthy and cumbersome approval, coordination and monitoring requirements for international reconstruction in Gaza, agencies are not able to maintain large stocks of construction materials in Gaza, and require regular shipments to maintain project implementation.

## Restrictions on access to fishing areas

On 21 March, the Israeli authorities again reduced the fishing zone off Gaza's coast from 6 to 3 nautical miles (NM). The fishing zone had previously been reduced from 6 NM to 3 NM in January 2009, following Operation" Cast Lead", but this restriction had been eased to 6 NM in the context of the 21 November 2012 ceasefire understanding between Israel and Hamas. ${ }^{7}$

## Gaza's annual fish yields from the sea at various access limitations



According to a joint IDF/COGAT announcement on 21 March, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence "instructed the IDF to narrow the permitted fishing zone for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip from six to three miles" in response to rocket fire from Gaza. Israeli naval forces commenced implementation of the reduction the same day, instructing fishing boats to return to 3 NM .

Though the amount of fish caught has varied greatly by year, depending on both the security situation and quality of the biannual sardine season, this reduction in Gaza's fishing zone is expected to further decrease the already low amount of fish yielded by the sea. The timing of the recent restrictions is of particular concern given that a peak fishing season occurs between April and June, mainly for sardines. Following the extension of the fishing area in November 2012, many fishermen invested in expensive equipment, including lights designed to attract fish from up to 10 NM, which will be less effective if used from a 3 NM distance. The recent restrictions will impact about 3,500 fishermen, who are reliant on the fisheries sector for their livelihoods, and their families. ${ }^{8}$

Sardine shoals, which are mostly found beyond the 3 NM limit, make up 70 per cent of the total fish catch in a good season and form the majority of fishing income. According to FAO, before restrictions of up to 6 NM were implemented in 2006, sardine catches amounted to as much as 2,500 tonnes during peak years, ${ }^{9}$ compared to 234 tonnes in 2012. Restrictions on access to the sea have made the livelihoods of many fishers unprofitable and driven thousands to look for work elsewhere, such as in casual labour or construction. The impact of this loss of livelihoods is felt by each fisher's whole family, and sometimes extended family.

## Restrictions on access to farming land

Access restrictions continue to be imposed on areas along the perimeter fence separating Israel from the Gaza Strip.

Since the November ceasefire, many farmers have been able to access areas up to 300 meters from the fence, sometimes for the first time in years. However, very few farmers have been able to access areas within 300 meters of the fence, except in the days immediately following the ceasefire. Further, in most areas, farmers have been prevented from bringing machinery such as tractors within 300 meters of the fence; many farmers report that, even if they could access their land, the prohibition against machinery effectively prohibits them from being able to undertake the rehabilitation required before any cultivation. The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) also renders some areas unsafe. ${ }^{10}$

According to the Israeli authorities, there have been a number of security-related incidents in the area along the perimeter fence that has affected civilians' access to this area.

In general, farmers across Gaza report feeling acutely insecure about their continued safety and investment in the land that they are able to access. One source of that insecurity is the lack of public clarity over the restrictions themselves: on 10 March 2013, in response

Continuing export restrictions remain one of the underlying causes of high unemployment, poverty and aid dependency in Gaza.
to their requests for information, an Israeli human rights organisation, GISHA, received a letter from the Israeli military spokesperson stating that Palestinians are prohibited from accessing areas within 300 meters from the fence. This contradicted earlier statements by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), stating that farmers may access up to 100 meters from the fence on foot. ${ }^{12}$

Farmers also worry that heightened access restrictions may be re-imposed at any time following a further break-down in the ceasefire. Farmers who had planted rain-fed crops or invested in water- irrigated cultivation in the newly accessed areas up to 300 meters from the fence were concerned that they would not be able to return to their land to harvest in June, with some stating that access restrictions appeared to have gradually increased in the months since the ceasefire. In Gaza and North Gaza Governorates, in particular, farmers reported borrowing money to invest in the land and feared that they would become heavily indebted if unable to harvest their investment.

## CASE STUDY OF A GAZA FISHERMAN

"I have been working as a fisherman for more than 40 years. I inherited this profession from my father and, before him, my grandfather, who was a fisherman in Jaffa before 1948. Since the Israeli government tightened the blockade on Gaza and limited the fishing zone to 3NM, however, I have become a fisherman without sea to sail or fish to catch. I do not earn enough income to support myself and provide food for my family. There are II men working with me, and each of them has a family to feed. So my boat supports around 70 people total, including
 30 children. This is a very difficult time for us, our families, and the whole fishermen community, who have become dependent on humanitarian assistance and charity organizations.

Following the November 2012 cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas, we learned that the Israeli authorities had increased the fishing zone from 3 to 6 NM. We were excited and hoped that this was the first step towards the removal of all restrictions on fishing.Accordingly, we thought we should start preparing for the coming season and upgrade our fishing boats to benefit from the fishing zone increase. I didn't have any financial assets and was not eligible for a bank loan, so my only option was to ask my daughters-in-law for their wedding jewellery, and borrow money from friends and relatives. I managed to collect US\$ 20,000 in total, which I fully invested in fishing equipment, including fishing nets, lights and a power generator, among others. I thought that once I started fishing again, I would earn enough income to live on, as well as to pay back my debts, instead of being dependent on humanitarian assistance and charity.

Unfortunately, all my hopes were crushed after the Israeli authorities reduced the fishing zone back to 3 NM. Every day, I return home empty handed. I lost everything and I don't know how I am going to payback my debts."

The various restrictions imposed by Israel and outlined herein have had a direct, negative impact on civilians unrelated to the hostilities in the Gaza Strip. Israel is bound by international humanitarian and human rights law, which include several provisions related to the protection of civilians and ensuring food, medical and other essential supplies for the civilian population. Under international law, a state has the right to take appropriate measures to ensure its security. However, the connection between Israel's security and the measures taken related to crossings, fishing zones and the buffer zone is not clearly established, nor has any information been provided to suggest how heightened restrictions in these areas would directly contribute to protecting Israel's security. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited." The measures adopted by Israel in March, therefore, raise serious concerns with regard to its obligations under international humanitarian law, particularly with regard to the prohibition against collective punishment. Furthermore, the continued imposition of the blockade has severe cumulative effects on the realization of a wide range of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights of the population in Gaza, and these concerns are exacerbated with the imposition of tighter restrictions.

## CONTINUED RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS

## WFP transfers date bars to the West Bank

As a result of ongoing restrictions, export volumes from Gaza remain considerably below those seen prior to the blockade in June 2007. In the first three months of 2013, there were an average 23 export truckloads per month, mainly cash crops and cut flowers destined for markets abroad, compared to an average of 954 truckloads per month in the first five months of 2007.

Exports have traditionally played an important role in the economy of the Gaza Strip. Prior to the blockade, 76 per cent of all Gaza-manufactured furniture products, 90 per cent of garments and 20 per cent of all food products were marketed for destinations outside the Gaza Strip, mainly Israel and the West Bank. The inability to export or transfer goods out was one of the main factors behind the closing down of some 95 per cent of industrial establishments following the onset of the blockade in 2007. ${ }^{12}$

At present, only a limited number of exports are allowed exit from the Gaza Strip. Some ongoing restrictions, such as requiring export shipments to be palletized at one meter high, increase logistics costs and directly contribute to the inability of Gazan traders to expand market penetration abroad.

Since June 2007, almost the only goods authorized for transfer from Gaza to the West Bank have been locally produced date bars for the WFP school-feeding programme in the West Bank, which began in March 2012. Through this program, WFP is promoting the local Gaza economy while supporting the learning of children from among the poorest


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*Information for this article was provided by UNDP/PAPP and UNMAS.

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> Hostilities in November 2012 generated thousands of tonnes of rubble in the Gaza Strip and left Gaza civilians at increased risk of injury or death due to the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW).
households in the oPt. In March 2013, WFP transferred about 94 metric tonnes (MT) of dates bar to the West Bank. In the first three months of 2013, the date bar transfers made up 12 per cent of all truckloads exiting Gaza, 8 out of a total 69 truckloads, the remainder of which were exports for sale abroad.

Continuing export restrictions remain one of the underlying causes of high unemployment, poverty and aid dependency in Gaza. Access to traditional markets in Israel and the West Bank would contribute positively to re-activating the industrial and agricultural sectors.

## UNDP/PAPP AND UNMAS COLLABORATE TO SAFELY REMOVE RUBBLE GENERATED DURING "PILLAR OF DEFENSE"

## 50,000 tonnes of rubble slated for removal

Efforts continued this month to remove rubble generated during the November 2012 "Pillar of Defense" operation, which witnessed the Israeli bombardment of over 1,600 sites across the Gaza Strip and the firing by Palestinian armed groups of over 1,500 rockets at Israeli targets. These hostilities generated thousands of tonnes of rubble in the Gaza Strip and left Gaza civilians at increased risk of injury or death due to the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW). In response, the United Nations Development Fund/ Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP) launched a project aimed at removing around 50,000 tonnes of rubble generated from damaged or destroyed buildings. The project has been made possible by the UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), which contributed some US\$ 650,000.

The initial UNDP site survey identified almost 80,000 tonnes of concrete rubble to be removed; of this, 30,000 tonnes, located along streets or major public buildings, were removed immediately by the Gaza authorities. In the course of project implementation, UNDP/PAPP noted that additional rubble removal has been carried out by local contractors, hired by the Gaza authorities, without coordination with UNDP/PAPP, resulting in a reduction in the volume of rubble that had been identified for removal. Currently , UNDP is working on removal of about 20,000 tonnes out of the original 50,000 tonnes identified. In March, work was carried out at four Gaza locations, namely Abu Khadra, the "Ministries compound", the Interior Affairs building and Mughraga. Thus far, around 1,000 tonnes of sorted concrete rubble has been transported to the crushing site in Rafah.

Working alongside UNDP/PAPP in this project is the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which is providing technical assistance during the rubble removal process to facilitate the safe removal of explosive remnants of war (ERW). UNMAS data analysis since 2009 indicates that periods of conflict escalation between Gaza and Israel have been followed by a rise in civilian victims of ERW in Gaza.

Thus far in 2013, the total number of Palestinian civilians killed or injured by ERW in Gaza is 19 (two killed, 17 injured), all but one are children. In fact, the number of child

victims this year is already 90 per cent the total number of child victims in all of 2012, and 95 per cent of such casualties in 2011. UNMAS data since 2009 show that victims are caused by munitions that were fired and failed to explode, live munitions that have been accidentally dropped in open areas and munitions in people's homes. Thus far, no ERW has been found in the rubble removed by UNDP/PAPP, but technical support will continue until the project's completion at the end of June 2013.

Since the November escalation, UNMAS has also provided support to the Gaza Police while conducting demolitions to destroy ERWs and has provided training designed to enhance the capacity of the Gaza Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) police to locate, find, move, store and dispose of ERW items according to international standards, in the context of highly limited technical constraints, stemming from the political and security context and the blockade of Gaza. UNMAS also continues to work with the Gaza authorities, UN partners and communities throughout the Gaza Strip to raise awareness regarding the risks posed by ERW.

## SCHOOL REHABILITATION IN GAZA FOLLOWING "PILLAR OF DEFENSE"

## Gap remains for repairs to kindergartens

In the course of the November 2012 military escalation, nearly 300 educational facilities, including kindergartens, schools and tertiary education institutions, were damaged or destroyed, impacting more than 275,000 students. Damages were estimated to be at least US\$ 5 million.

An inter -agency rapid assessment (IRA) carried out in the aftermath of the offensive ${ }^{13}$, and the Education Cluster, identified the need to rehabilitate ten school buildings that
*Information in this article was contributed by UNICEF for the Education Cluster.
> * November 2012 military escalation, nearly 300 educational facilities were damaged or destroyed, impacting more than 275,000 students.


The damage to educational facilities in November came in the context of an everincreasing shortage of schools in the Gaza Strip. It is estimated that 250 new schools are needed now, including 100 UNRWA schools, and an additional 275 schools needed by 2020, in order to accommodate the increase in the student population ${ }^{18}$. Out of 105 schools planned by UN agencies, primarily UNRWA, 67 have been approved by COGAT, 31 are pending approval and 7 were rejected by COGAT due to their proposed locations.

Because of the significant shortage of educational facilities, 80 per cent of MoEHE and 90 per cent of UNRWA schools run on double shifts and some have increased the number of students per classroom up to $40, .^{19}$ According to UNRWA, after completion of the 100 already-planned schools, they need to build 8 schools per year just to stay at 70 to 80 per cent double shifts.

## WEST BANK <br> OVER 30 FAMILIES TEMPORARILY DISPLACED DUE TO ISRAELI MILITARY TRAINING

## Approximately 5,000 Palestinians reside in "firing zones"

Some 200 people, half of them children, from three communities in the northern Jordan Valley (Humsa al Bqai'a, Khirbet ar Ras al Ahmar and Ibziq) were temporarily displaced in March, to make way for military training exercises for the Israeli army. The families were forced to leave their homes for periods ranging from seven to 16 hours overnight. People reportedly stayed with neighbours or relatives, or moved to a nearby location during the training and then returned to their homes upon its completion. According to the residents, no arrangements for their temporary relocation were made by the Israeli military.

Since 1 January 2012, OCHA has recorded almost 30 separate occasions on which the Israeli military undertook training exercises, most of which resulted in temporary displacement. At least 17 communities have been affected, all in the northern Jordan Valley, some of them multiple times. ${ }^{20}$ The impacts of these training exercises have been significant. In addition to the temporary displacement, these incidents resulted in damage to private property, including cultivated fields and infrastructure, and distress and panic, in particular among children.

According to the Israeli authorities, the residents of these communities are "trespassers" in an active training area and they are regularly removed from the area for their own safety. Some of the residents who were evacuated in March reside in areas adjacent to, rather than in, areas previously declared as a "firing zone" (e.g. Hamamat al Maleh, where the majority of the residents have resided there since the 1970s).

Approximately 5,000 Palestinians reside in 38 communities located in "firing zones", mostly Bedouin or herding communities, many of which existed prior to the closing of the area. These are some of the most vulnerable communities in the West Bank. Most residents have limited or difficult access to services (such as education and health), no service infrastructure (including water, sanitation and electricity infrastructure). Over 90

## THE CASE OF HUMSA AL BQAPA

$\omega$
We were forced to leave our modest houses on multiple occasions, taking water and bread, existing in a state of constant fear for the well-being of our children, families, and sheep. We are wondering why Israeli settlers in the nearby settlements of Roi and Beqa'ot are never evacuated by the Israeli army, even though they live in the same area and could easily be affected. Why only us?

Humsa Al Bqai'a resident

Humsa Al Bqai’a, a Bedouin community (pop. ~50) in the northern Jordan Valley, has become increasingly the target of temporary evacuation orders by the Israeli army to make way for military training exercises. Since October 2012, the community has been forced to temporarily evacuate their community on nine occasions for a total of I3 days, including three overnight stays. In March 2013, the community was evacuated three times, during which they stayed in a nearby Bedouin community, using temporary shelter provided by the PA. For evacuations during the day, families leave their homes and belongings
 behind and take very limited amounts of water and food for their kids. For overnight stays, they also take some blankets.

The impact of these evacuations on the community has been devastating, leaving the families suffering from fear, sadness, uncertainty and psychological instability. The community has in general been informed by the Israeli authorities a few days in advance that they need to evacuate their homes. ${ }^{23}$ However, on one occasion they received only a few hours warning and two other times, training was cancelled at the last minute, rendering people confused, anxious and feeling insecure.Among the worst affected are some 15 children under five years old.

The families of Humsa AI Bqai'a report being e non-registered refugees. Since 1948, they report living continuously in the northern Jordan Valley; however, due to Israeli settlement expansion and Israeli-imposed restrictions on access to grazing land, they have gradually settled more permanently in the area of AI Bqai'a Valley. The community reside on privatelyowned land, with the families who live there year-round paying annual rent of 300JDs to its owners from Tammun.

While the community is formally located within the bounds of an Israeli-declared "fire zone" located south of Roi and Beqa'ot settlements (see map), the families report that the land on which they live is mainly agricultural land that is regularly cultivated and ploughed by its Tammun owners. Between 2000 and October 2012, they report that there were neither incidents of military training in their community nor demolitions.

The designation of large swaths of land around the community as "firing zones" has severely hindered the families' access to grazing land and their ability to sustain their livelihoods, which are dependent on some 2,000 heads of sheep. These pressures have increased over the past six months as a result of Israeli army military training; during the evacuations, the community is forced to leave their sheep, their main source of income, unattended for long hours.

The families report seeing military jeeps and tanks travelling in the area during the duration of the military training period but do not report hearing any firing in their vicinity. Given the nature and newness of this measure, there is a concern among residents that this may be a new method by Israeli authorities to force them to permanently leave their homes in this area.

percent of the communities are water scarce, accessing less than 60 litres per capita per day ( $1 / \mathrm{c} / \mathrm{d}$ ), compared to the $100 \mathrm{l} / \mathrm{c} / \mathrm{d}$ recommended by the World Health Organization; over half access less than $30 \mathrm{l} / \mathrm{c} / \mathrm{d}$. Food insecurity in Area C, generally, reaches 24 per cent and rises to 34 per cent among herders, many of whom live in firing zones.

The Israeli authorities regularly carry out demolitions in these communities, either in the context of demolition orders or when executing eviction orders. Many of the communities have sustained multiple waves of destruction. While there are ten Israeli settlement outposts located either partially or completely in firing zones, they do not normally face demolitions of their structures. ${ }^{21}$

Residents of firing zones also regularly face settler violence, ${ }^{22}$ access and movement restrictions, and confiscation of their property. Combined, the conditions outlined herein contribute to a coercive environment that creates pressure on many Palestinian communities to leave the areas declared "firing zones,' even in the absence of their formal evacuation.

The declaration of $18 \%$ of the West Bank as closed military zones for training purposes, including inhabited areas, raises serious legal and humanitarian concerns. Under international humanitarian law, as an occupying power, the Israeli authorities must at all times protect Palestinian civilians against acts of violence, or threat thereof, and from any form of forced transfer or destruction of property. Training that relates directly

6Israeli military training has had a significant impact on civilians. In addition to temporary displacement, there has been damage to private property, including cultivated fields and infrastructure, and distress and panic among residents, in particular among children. 9
*Information in this article was contributed by the Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC). pressures and restrictions place An Nabi Samwil residents at-risk of displacement.

was plowed, fenced and planted with tree seedlings, including plum, apple and olive trees. According to the owner, the land, which is located next to the Israeli settlement of Har Smuel, has been targeted in the past with settler violence, including land leveling activities. Following the rehabilitation, he reports that "besides the value of the products of the trees in the future, the most important thing is that the land's cultivation helps us protect it from confiscation."

A combination of pressures and restrictions place An Nabi Samwil residents at-risk of displacement. In order to access services in the remainder of the West Bank, An Nabi Samwil residents must pass through a nearby checkpoint (Al Jib), while movement into the rest of Jerusalem, for the vast majority of the residents, who hold West Bank IDs, is prohibited. Residents also face a virtual ban on construction, stemming from its location in Area C, and settlement activity. According to the village council, many families, especially young couples, have moved out of the community in recent years, to areas on the "West Bank" side of the Barrier. ${ }^{25}$


## CURRENT PEST AND DISEASE SHOCKS IN THE OPT

Concerns over damage to Agriculture-related Livelihoods

A number of agricultural pest and disease shocks threatened agriculture-based livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in March. While these threats have been successfully controlled thus far, through responses by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Israeli and Palestinian authorities, concern remains about potential damage to Palestinian-owned livestock and crops. Agriculture is an important source of income and a shock absorber in the oPt. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), during the second quarter of 2012, an estimated 111,430 of employed workers were employed in the agricultural sector (out of a total of 877,400 employed people), of which 36 per cent were women and 64 per cent men.

In early March, FAO's Locust Watch reported sightings of several small, immature swarms of Desert Locusts in Egypt, with at least one swarm entering Israel's Negev Desert. In mid-March, Hebron governorate declared a state of alert after the appearance of small isolated groups of the insects. The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), in cooperation with the Palestinian Civil Defense, took measures to control the threat successfully through spraying pesticides. In support of this effort, the Israeli authorities transferred to the Palestinian Authority over 200 tonnes of pesticide in order to meet the possible challenge of a locust swarm.

To date, no significant crop losses have been reported. However, the threat of a recurrence is still possible, as the previous swarms are believed to have laid eggs in the Sinai and Negev deserts. It is expected that these broods will hatch and produce new generations of locusts within 14 to 40 days, depending on weather conditions - with dry weather greatly reducing the amount of eggs able to hatch.

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## ${ }^{6}$ Agriculture is an

 important source of income and a shock absorber in the oPt. $\%$
## QUARTERLY UPDATE ON ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN STAFF <br> ACCESS INCIDENTS RESULT IN LOSS OF 52 WORKING DAYS; ACCESS TO AND FROM GAZA BY HUMANITARIAN STAFF IMPROVES

The number of access incidents affecting humanitarian organizations operating in the oPt, as well as the number of staff affected in these incidents, increased by almost 20 per cent this quarter compared to last quarter. In the first quarter of 2013, there were 146 access incidents affecting 568 staff compared to 124 incidents affecting 489 staff in the last quarter of 2012. Incidents this quarter resulted in the loss of 52 working days.

Sixty-four (64) per cent of incidents affecting UN staff involved demands to search UN vehicles in violation of the 1946 Convention on UN Privileges and Immunities: ${ }^{27} 92$ per cent of these took place when passing through checkpoints controlling access to the Jerusalem area. Seventy (70) per cent of incidents affecting NGO staff involved delays in passing the Erez Crossing between Gaza and Israel.

The increase in access incidents is the result of several factors: there were fewer incidents in the previous quarter due to fewer staff movements during the holiday period as well as an increase this quarter of staff being prevented from entering Jerusalem during holiday closures on the West Bank. In addition, there were temporary limitations on access for Palestinians under 50 years of age for Friday prayers (which occurred twice this quarter), despite exception from such closures for those with international organizations permits.

## Number of Access Incidents per Month



| Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun $\mid$ Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2012 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN GAZA APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES

In March 2013, COGAT announced approval of US\$ 18.2 million worth of UN reconstruction projects for Gaza, including seven schools, three WASH and 16 community development projects. Similar to the previous quarter, project approvals were announced several days prior to the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee meeting, while no projects were approved in the six months between these meetings (September and March respectively). These projects had been pending approval by Israeli authorities for an average 14 months, despite internal COGAT documents stating that projects will be approved within two months.

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This quarter, about 90 per cent of applications for permits for international INGO staff to enter Gaza were approved on time, a significant improvement over the last quarter of 2012. 8

## Status of UN Reconstruction Programme for Gaza

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| I. Completed | 77 | 118,571,084 | 6 | 839 | 4 | 20 | 11 | 10 | 147 | 50 | 5 | 9 |
| 2. Ongoing | 61 | 160,048,079 | 11 | 1670 | 3 | 27 | 1 | 7 | 72 | 16 | 2 | 7 |
| 3.Approved but not yet started | 53 | 137,027,096 | 14 | 449 |  | 20 | 1 | 11 |  |  |  | 20 |
| 4.Awaiting COGAT approval | 49 | 80,529,032 | 9 | 521 |  | 31 |  | 1 |  |  |  | 13 |
| 5. Suspended | 3 | 2,572,568 | 8 | 78 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| 6. Rejected | 25 | 51,941,347 | 22 | 399 |  | 7 | 2 | 2 |  |  |  | 7 |
| 7. Not submitted to COGAT | 4 | 331,119,485 |  | 7141 |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Grand Total | 272 | 881,808,691 | 10 | 11097 | 7 | 105 | 15 | 32 | 219 | 66 | 7 | 57 |

The overall number of permit applications by UN national staff to enter or leave the Gaza Strip, as well as the approval rate, increased slightly this quarter compared to the previous one: from 165 to 224 applications and from 87 to 89 per cent of approvals. However, the approval rate for West Bank and East Jerusalem ID holders' permits to enter Gaza decreased, from 70 to 65 per cent.

Out of 125 permit request for UN national staff from the West Bank to enter East Jerusalem, only 37 per cent ( 46 permits) were approved on time, while 51 per cent (or 64 permits) remained pending by the end of the reporting period. Full data was not available for the previous quarter to allow for comparison. There were inconsistent trends across UN agencies in terms of rates of acceptance and denial, with some agencies having all or nearly all their permit applications approved, while others encountered 100 per cent rejection of applications.

About 90 per cent of applications for permits for international INGO staff to enter Gaza were approved on time, while the remainder were approved, but after the requested travel date. This represents a significant improvement over the last quarter of 2012, when only 67 per cent of permit applications were approved on time. The average processing days for permits was 11 days. The improved approval rate and processing time are in part due to the electronic system implemented in late 2012, which has increased the efficiency and transparency of the permit process. Non-registered INGOs continue to face difficulties in applying for permits.

A further US $\$ 80.5$ million worth of projects are still pending approval, and have been for an average nine months. Pending projects include 520 housing units, 31 schools and 14 infrastructure and community development projects. Delays in the approval of reconstruction projects increase the cost of assistance and unnecessarily prolong the hardship of the affected population.

## End notes

I. See, for example,"Statement by UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Mr. Robert Serry, on rocket fire from Gaza and increased tensions on the ground," 5 April 2013.
2. Rafah is currently being used to transfer construction materials for the Qatari projects as a special measure allowed by the Egyptian authorities.
3. Erez and Kerem Shalom were scheduled to be closed on 25 and 26 March due to the Jewish holiday of Passover.
4. This figure includes all Palestinians who exited Erez, including patients and business people.
5. See Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), "PCHR concerned about new Ministry of Interior Affairs procedure requiring prior approval before permitting travel via Beit Hanoun (Erez) crossing," 28 February 2013.
6. See http://www.cogat.idf.il/Sip_Storage/FILES/8/3688.pdf.
7. Number of registered fishermen according to the Palestinian Authority Department of Fisheries.
8. This figure is the maximum for the peak year of 2004. As-a-whole, the catch fluctuated from I,0002,000 tonnes from 2000 to 2008.
9. According to Protection Cluster monitoring of access by farmers and shepherds in the ARA conducted between 20 February and 18 March 2013.
10. See OCHA oPt, "Locked In:The Humanitarian Impact of Two Years of Blockade on the Gaza Strip," August 2009, pg. 6.
II. Assessing agencies included UNICEF, UNESCO, Save the Children, Terres des Hommes Italy, UNRWA and MoEHE.
12. These include six for the MoEHE, three for UNRWA and one private school.
13. Including 6 I UNRWA schools and vocational training centres.
14. In some schools, given different types of repairs needed, work will be carried out by more than one agency. To date, UNICEF has repaired 48 out of 94 school buildings, PAH has contracted engineering companies and their repairs will begin shortly. Islamic Relief andWelfare Association repairs are ongoing.
15. For more information and details, please contact Constantijn Wouters at cwouters@unicef.org.
16. United Nations Country Team, "Gaza in 2020 - Liveable place, 2012".
17. OCHA, Easing the Blockade, March 201I. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_ easing_the_blockade_201I_03_english.pdf.
18. In terms of displacement, this included 12 communities, i.e. the Al Maleh Bedouin communities (Hamamat AI Maleh Al Burj, Hamamat AI Maleh and Al Meiteh); and Ein al Hilwa-Wadi Al Faw; Humsa AI Bqai'a; Khirbet ar Ras al Ahmar; Ibziq; Khirbet Tana;Al Hadidiya; Khirbet Tal Al Himma; and Humsa; and Khirbet Yarza. In terms of damages/distress, this also included Khirbet 'Atuf; Al 'Aqrabaniya; Ein Shibli; Aqaba; and Khirbet Tuwayel.
19. Those include Magen Dan (Salfit), Mitzpe Kramim (Ramallah), Ma'ale Rehav'am (Bethlehem), Tko'a D (Bethlehem), Mitzpe Yair (Hebron), Hill 833 (Hebron), Ma’ale Hagit (Ramallah), Givat Sal'it (Tubas), Hill 777 (Nablus), Hill 836 (Nablus), and Yitav East (Jericho).
20. Residents of Firing Zone 918, in South Hebron, for example, are exposed to regular attacks and harassment by Israeli settlers living in the area.
21. Recently, the people report being instructed by the Israeli Civil administration officials and the Israeli army to sign a paper saying that staying in the community during the training exercise will threaten their life.
22. In 2010, SCC, in cooperation with ARIJ, had carried out a project in An Nabi Samwil to improve sustainable access to food for vulnerable female-headed households, which was part of a project to address food insecurity in the "Seam Zone" areas in the Jerusalem and Ramallah governorate.
23. For additional information, see OCHA oPt report, "Displacement and Insecurity in Area C of the West Bank," August 201I, p 9.
24. An EuFMD (The European Commission for the control of Foot-and-Mouth disease) mission from FAO to assess the situation and discuss the most feasible action is currently underway.
25. Israel is a signatory of this convention without reservation.

## CONTRIBUTING AGENCIES

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO),AI Haq, Badil, Save the Children (UK), Defence for Children International - Palestine Section (DCI-PS), Oxfam GB, Palestine Hydrology Group (PHG), Campaign for the Right to Enter,Action Against Hunger (ACF),

For more information: Mai Yassin, yassinm@un.org, +972 (0)2 5829962

## Annex: Monthly IndicatorTables

## Conflict-related casualties and violence ${ }^{1}$

| Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |

## Palestinian deaths

| Gaza | 108 | 14 | 180 | 2 | 253 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| West Bank | 17 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 4 | $3^{*}$ | 3 |
| Total | 125 | 14 | 177 | 4 | 262 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Of whom are civilians ${ }^{2}$ | 62 | 0 | 114 | 4 | 136 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Of whom are female | 3 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Palestinian injuries

| Gaza | 468 | 29 | $1516^{* *}$ | 21 | 1834 | 14 | 10 | 5 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| West Bank | 1647 | 57 | 740 | 177 | 3175 | 254 | 756 | 492 |
| Total | 2115 | 86 | 2257 | 198 | 5009 | 268 | 766 | 497 |
| Of whom are civilians | 2054 | 59 | na | 179 | n/a | 268 | 766 | 496 |
| Of whom are female | 151 | 8 | na | 13 | n/a | 8 | 13 | 14 |

Israeli deaths

| Israel, Gaza and West Bank | 11 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Of whom are civilians | 11 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Of whom are female | 0 | 0 | I | 0 | I | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Israeli injuries |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Israel, Gaza and West Bank | 122 | 1 | 253*** | 6 | 345 | 6 | 24 | 42**** |
| Of whom are civilians | 56 | 6 | na | 4 | 60 | 3 | 11 | 18 |
| Of whom are female | 3 | 0 | na | 1 | 7 | 0 | I | I |

*The figure includes two Palestinians who died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005
** Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-2| November)
*** Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
**** The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

| Tunnel-related casualties ${ }^{3}$ | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Deaths | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| Injuries | 54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 12 |


| Israeli-settle | ated | 2011 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| casualties or damage | erty | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Incidents leadin casualties ${ }^{4}$ | alestinian | 120 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 98 | 7 | 8 | 11 |
| Incidents leadin property/land | alestinian <br> s | 291 | 48 | 20 | 18 | 268 | 17 | 19 | 14 |
| Incidents leadin Casualties | raeli | 23 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 35 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| Incidents leadin Property/land d | raeli <br> $s^{5}$ | 13 | 0 | I | I | 15 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian Pal | ans killed | 2011 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ordnance in |  | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Adult | Injured | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Adult | Killed | I | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Injured | 17 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Child | Killed | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Grand Total |  | 27 | 3 | I | I | 34 | 7 | 6 | 6 |

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## Search and Arrest

|  | $2011$ | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Monthly Average | Oct | Nov | Dec | Monthly Average | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Search Campaigns (West Bank) | 349 | 319 | 291 | 367 | 338 | 313 | 287 | 282 |
| Palestinians detained (West Bank) | 262 | 318 | 468 | 391 | 283 | 296 | 4II | 421 |

Source: OCHA

| Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related) ${ }^{6}$ | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Monthly Average | Oct | Nov | Dec | Monthly Average | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Total as of the end of the month | 5326 | 4298 | 4432 | 4517 | 4,45 I | 4593 | 4713 | 4764 |
| of whom are women | 26 | II | 10 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 10 | II |
| of whom are administrative detainees ${ }^{7}$ | 240 | 156 | 178 | 178 | 245 | 159 | 169 | 164 |
| of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings | 633 | 925 | 990 | 1031 | 897 | 1069 | 1118 | 1196 |

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through
B'Tselem)

## Demolition of Structures

Structures demolished ${ }^{8}$

|  | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| of which in Area C | 571 | 81 | 28 | 19 | 540 | 120 | 11 | 1 |
| of which in East Jerusalem | 42 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 64 | 21 | 3 | 1 |
| Grand Total | 613 | 83 | 35 | 25 | 604 | 141 | 14 | 2 |

*20 are in Area B

| People Displaced due to demolitions or evictions ${ }^{9}$ | 201 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| of whom were displaced in Area C | 1006 | 129 | 0 | 14 | 808 | 243 | 6 | 0 |
| of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem | 88 | 6 | 29 | 19 | 71 | 14 | 42 | 10 |
| Grand Total | 1094 | 135 | 29 | 33 | 879 | 257 | 48 | 10 |

Source: Displacement Working Group

## Child Protection

| Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| West Bank | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Gaza Strip | 11 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Number of Palestinian children
injured - direct conflict

| West Bank | 308 | 7 | 222 | 29 | 427 | 36 | 146 | 162 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gaza Strip | 125 | 10 | $24-$ without <br> Gaza war | 4 | 105 | 3 | 3 | 0 |

Number of Israeli children killed -
direct conflict

| oPt | I | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{I}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Israel | I | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{I}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Number of Israeli children injured

- direct conflict

| oPt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Israel | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | $\mathbf{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

| In Israel and oPt | 192 <br> monthly <br> average | 164 | 178 | 195 | 198 <br> monthly <br> average | 219 | 236 | 236 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Number of Palestinian children
displaced by demolitions

| West Bank, inc EJ | 618 | 87 | 14 | 10 | 468 | 156 | 23 | 5 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools ${ }^{19}$ |

Souce: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children Inernational, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violatons affecting children in armed conflict

## Access

| Access to healthcare <br> - Gaza | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2011 Monthly Average | Oct | Nov | Dec | 2012 Monthly Average | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ${ }^{15}$ | 872 | 789 | 725 | 894 | 777 | 796 | 907 | 882 |
| of which approved | 721 | 705 | 629 | 820 | 719 | 738 | 836 | 762 |
| of which denied | 19 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 2 | I |
| of which delayed ${ }^{16}$ | 83 | 78 | 91 | 70 | 17 | 56 | 69 | 119 |

Source:WHO

| Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank | 2011 | 2012 |  |  |  | 2013 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 201 I Monthly Average | Oct | Nov | Dec | $2012$ <br> monthly ave | Jan | Feb | Mar |
| Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ${ }^{17}$ | 38 | 60 | 40 | 22 | 37.5 | 34 | 69 | 51 |
| Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint | 22 | 28 | 26 | 15 | 21 | 18 | 52 | 33 |
| Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents | 25 | 36 | 16 | 6 | 21 | 8 | 29 | 17 |

## Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.


## Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2012 and 2013 funding status as of 26 April 2013

| Cluster | CAP 2012 |  | CAP 2013 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total request in million \$ | \% of funds received | Total request in million \$ | \% of funds received |
| 0 Agriculture | 24,921,339 | 45.3\% | 30818180 | 16.2\% |
| Cash for Work and Cash Assistance | 95,559,928 | 34.9\% | 70481900 | 23.1\% |
| Coordination and Support Services | 21,167,518 | 95.9\% | 21295527 | 22.8\% |
| 1 Education | 16,662,763 | 54.7\% | 21779922 | 2.5\% |
| (8) Food Security | 170,513,876 | 83.0\% | 160052254 | 31.0\% |
| Health and Nutrition | 20,742,170 | 86.8\% | 22536007 | 13.2\% |
| 1 Protection | 46,131,077 | 73.8\% | 55336641 | 23.3\% |
| Shelter and Non-food items | na | na | na | na |
| Water, Sanitation and Hygiene | 24,208,53 I | 55.8\% | 19307048 | 10.8\% |
| Total | 419,907,202 | 70.9\% | 401,607,479 | 33.9\% |

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS)

## Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

## Casualties

1. Conflict-related casualties: includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. Civilians: includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a "continuous combatant function" as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. Tunnel related casualties: figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.
Israeli settler-related violence
4. Incidents resulting in casualties: includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. Incidents resulting in property damage/losses: ibid.

## Search and Arrest

6. Palestinians in Israeli custody: includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a "security detainee/prisoner". Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a "regular" criminal offense.
7. Administrative detainees: Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

## Demolitions

8. Structures demolished: includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. People displaced due to demolitions: includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. People affected by demolitions: includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

## Access West Bank

11. Permanently staffed checkpoints: staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and 'agricultural gates' along the Barrier.
12. Partially staffed checkpoints: checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. Unstaffed obstacles: includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. 'Flying' or random checkpoints: checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

## Access to health

15. Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez: includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. Delayed applications: includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

## Movement of humanitarian staff

17. Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint: includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.
Imports to Gaza
18. Truckloads by type: for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

## Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.

[^0]:    *Information in this article was contributed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

