In what amounted to the highest number of casualties in a single day in the Gaza Strip since the 2014 hostilities, on 30 March, 18 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces (or died of wounds sustained that day), and another 1,400 were injured, including over half of them by live ammunition, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH). The Israeli authorities accused the MoH of inflating the number of wounded by live ammunition. No Israeli casualties were reported. The majority of the casualties occurred in the context of the first in a series of mass demonstrations, organized as part of the ‘Great March of Return’ and scheduled to take place near the perimeter fence with Israel, between 30 March (‘Land Day’) and 15 May, the 70th anniversary of what Palestinians refer to as the 1948 ‘Nakba’.1

Although demonstrations were largely non-violent, in line with the call of the organizers, some Palestinians approached the fence, threw rocks and, according to Israeli sources, fire bombs at Israeli forces. In anticipation of the protests, the Israeli army significantly increased its presence in the area, erecting earthen embankments to overlook the fence and deploying more than a hundred snipers.

Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights groups have expressed concerns over possible excessive use of force by Israeli forces, citing the high number of casualties among unarmed demonstrators. The Israeli military said it responded only to violent attacks aimed at troops and at breaching the border fence, and stated that ten of the fatalities were members of Hamas and other armed groups. The UN Secretary-General expressed his deep concern about the clashes and casualties, and called for an independent and transparent investigation into the incident.2

Medical facilities in Gaza, which are already overstrained by the longstanding shortages of medical supplies, electricity and fuel, are struggling to cope with the overwhelming number of casualties. The Health Cluster, led by the World Health Organization, is monitoring the situation and providing support, in coordination with all health partners.
These events come in the context of a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza, following more than a decade of an Israeli blockade, recurrent escalations of hostilities and stalled attempts to resolve the internal political divide. As detailed in one of the items in this month’s Humanitarian Bulletin, as of the end of February, over 20,000 people are still displaced from the 2014 hostilities, the most devastating in Gaza since the start of the Israeli occupation in 1967, and are living in precarious conditions and constant uncertainty.

Another item in this month’s bulletin highlights the situation of the fishery sector in Gaza and related concerns. Within a context of high unemployment and food insecurity, the sector is one of the few remaining sources of employment in Gaza, outside of the public service. Citing security concerns, the Israeli navy restricts access of fishers to sea areas only within six nautical miles (NM) from the coast, with an extension to nine NM along the southern coast, twice a year during the sardine season. Although the latter expansions have significantly increased the total catch over the past two years, this remains mainly limited to low-value sardines, making it difficult for fishers to earn a liveable income. Additionally, practices used by the Israeli navy, and to a lesser extent by the Egyptian navy, to enforce the access restrictions, including the firing of live ammunition, have raised a range of protection concerns.

Finally, this Bulletin also highlights the situation of 189 vulnerable communities across the West Bank, with over 220,000 residents, which face challenges in accessing basic health services, and are therefore served by mobile clinics operated by humanitarian partners. However, due to severe funding shortages, since the beginning of 2018, the services to 35 of these communities has been halted, and, unless additional funding is found immediately, another 11 communities will suffer the same fate.
Almost half of the surveyed households indicated that displacement had led to an increase in the level of gender-based violence in their families, and 42 per cent reported an increase in violence against children at home.
homes are reconstructed or rehabilitated. However, the distribution of TSCA has been constantly disrupted due to funding shortages.

This is reflected in the survey’s findings, in which only 41 per cent of surveyed families reported receiving TSCA on regular basis; 13 per cent were uncertain about their current eligibility; and the rest had had their payment stopped or had never received any. Of concern, most families reporting that their TSCA had been discontinued indicated that they did not know the reason.

Inability to pay rent is one of the main drivers of the constant relocation of IDP families. Among the households surveyed, 65 per cent reported that they had relocated between three and ten times since their initial displacement in 2014. Additionally, 35 per cent reported that they are currently not living in their original neighbourhood or area. Many of these families indicated that displacement has had a negative impact on their access to livelihood opportunities, schools and health services.

65 per cent of surveyed IDP households reported that they had relocated between three and ten times since their initial displacement in 2014, negatively impacting on their access to livelihood opportunities, schools and health services.
ALL I WISH IS TO HAVE IFTAR WITH ALL MY CHILDREN AT ONE TABLE.

The house of Marwan Kishko, a 62-year-old with hearing difficulties, in the Az Zeitun area of Gaza city, was almost totally destroyed during the 2014 hostilities. “I have lived with my wife and children in this house for 32 years. After the war we settled in a tent near the rubble of my house for two months, and after receiving cash assistance we moved to a rented apartment. However, the rental cash assistance was cut almost a year ago, I believe because lack of funds.”

Marwan’s wife, Umm Wael, added: “I prepared all the documents in the hopes that we would receive financial assistance to rebuild our home quickly. We submitted the request in March of 2016 and so far have received no answer. We keep waiting but could not afford the rent for the apartment and moved back to our damaged house. But you cannot call this a house. The walls cannot be repaired. The roof is made of corrugated steel sheets supported by iron bars. One evening, a wild dog entered the house and threatened me. I was terrified. All I wish is to have a house before the holy month of Ramadan so I can have iftar with all my children at one table.”
In addition, 64 per cent of heads of households were not working at the time of the survey, well above the unemployment rate of 43.6 percent for the Gaza Strip as a whole during the fourth quarter of 2017. Coping mechanisms include selling assets, purchasing food on credit and reducing dietary diversity. This is of a particular concern for pregnant and lactating women, of whom nearly 20 per cent indicated that they were consuming food that was inappropriate for their needs.

The disbursement of funds pledged by donors for the reconstruction of Gaza following the 2014 hostilities is the main step required to move towards ending prolonged displacement and reducing the vulnerability of IDPs. In the meantime, it is essential that UNRWA and other agencies are adequately funded to maintain the TSCA programme and provide IDPs with the minimal means necessary to maintain their current accommodation. Keeping IDP households better informed about their entitlements and the ongoing challenges to provision of assistance is also essential to reduce vulnerability.
GAZA FISHERIES: FISHING CATCH INCREASES AMID ONGOING PROTECTION CONCERNS

In 1994, a permitted fishing range of 20 nautical miles (NM) was agreed between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In practice, Israel only allowed fishing up to 12 NM until 2006, when the fishing zone was reduced to six and later to three NM. According to the Israeli authorities, in recent years, Hamas has established naval forces with significant military capabilities, requiring the tightening of access restrictions at sea to prevent attacks, such as the infiltration of naval commandos.

Since the ceasefire agreement concluded in the wake of the August 2014 hostilities, the fishing limit has been fixed at six NM, with an extension to nine NM along the southern coast (between Khan Yunis and Rafah) twice a year during the sardine season, from April to June and from September to November. Such extensions in 2016 and 2017 have significantly increased the total catch, which reached their highest levels for the past 13 years. However, the catch remains mainly limited to low-value sardines, making it difficult for fishermen to earn a livable income. Additionally, practices used by the Israeli navy, and to a lesser extent by the Egyptian navy, to enforce the fishing limits, including the firing of live ammunition, have raised a range of protection concerns.

The seasonal extensions of the fishing zone in 2016 and 2017 brought the total catches to their highest levels for the past 13 years. However, the catch remains mainly limited to low-value sardines, making it difficult for fishermen to earn a livable income.

Source: FAO analysis of data from Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture.
The fishing sector in the socio-economic context of Gaza

Within a context of high unemployment and food insecurity, the fishery sector remains a significant source of employment. Fish, particularly sardines, is also a major source of protein, micronutrients and essential Omega 3 fatty acids for Palestinians in Gaza and contributes to nutritional diversity. In 2017, 40 per cent of households in Gaza were estimated to be severely or moderately food insecure and unemployment stood at 43.6 per cent, particularly among vulnerable groups such as women and youth.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture’s Department of Fisheries, there are currently 3,700 registered fishers in Gaza who rely on the sector for their livelihood. It is estimated that Gazan fishers currently support 18,250 other people (based on an average household size of 5.7 people in Gaza). It is also estimated that a significant number of people rely on fishing-associated industries, including repairs and retailing. According to the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), only 2,000 of those registered fish on a daily basis while the remaining 1,700 work sporadically, around once a month, because the income they generate does not cover their operating costs.

Fish catches and revenues have varied considerably over the years. While the fishing limit impacts both catch and revenue, revenues also vary according to the type and quantity of fish available in the given zone. The restriction of fishing to a small area near the coast leads to overfishing and has a negative impact on breeding grounds. According to the Department of Fisheries, the impact of the restrictions on the fishing zone to three NM in 2006 and 2007 only became evident in 2009 when fish breeding grounds in the permitted three NM zone were severely depleted.

Expansion of the fishing zone after 2012 led to a significant increase in both catch and revenue, particularly in 2016 following the seasonal expansion of the fishing zone to nine NM on the southern Gaza coast. In 2016, revenues increased

**TYPE OF FISH CAUGHT BY SEA DEPTH AND NM**

- **1-3 nautical miles**: Small Sardine
- **3-8 nautical miles**: Sardines
- **8-12 Nautical mile**: High value bottom fish sardines
- **10-20 nautical miles**: Tuna, Mackerel, Sardines

proportionally more than the quantity of the catch due to the availability of other types of fish beyond the six NM limit that are more profitable than the fish available in shallow water. The same extension in 2017 resulted in a much lower increase in catch and revenue due to the unusually low fish supply that year. This could be addressed by the continued extension of fishing limits to nine NM or beyond, where fish supplies are less vulnerable to fluctuating conditions.

The Gazan fisheries sector lacks access to essential imports, including fibreglass, boat engines and spare parts, which are restricted by Israel as “dual use” items. Fishing nets and other items are often too expensive for fishermen on their limited income.

Gazan fishers were informally allowed to fish in Egyptian waters between 2011 and 2013, when access within Gazan waters was limited to six NM. During this period, fishermen were able to catch high-value fish more commonly found at 12 NM. According to the Department of Fisheries, a total of 180 tons of mullet was caught in Egyptian waters at 12 NM compared with 21 tons of mullet caught in Gazan waters at six NM during the same period.

According to the Department of Fisheries, a revival of the fishery sector would require the current fishing zones to be extended. A permanent extension of the fishing zone to nine NM throughout the year would likely result in an increase of approximately 20 per cent in both revenue and jobs. According to MoA, the extension of the fishing zone to 12 NM all year round could raise the fish catch to 5,000-6,000 tons, an increase of nearly 50 per cent. This could result in a 60-65 per cent increase in income if coupled with export facilitation, and could also ensure full employment of all current fishermen in Gaza.

An expansion would also release pressure on fish populations within the three to six NM zone, with a positive impact on the carrying capacity of fish stock. The fisheries sector would also benefit significantly from the easing of restrictions
on imports of equipment to meet repair needs (both regular and increased demand resulting from damage during conflict and the confiscation of boats by the Israeli navy).

**FISH CULTURE TO ENHANCE PRODUCTION AND SUSTAIN FISHERIES LIVELIHOOD**

Fish culture (both land and marine-based) has been introduced to Gaza to supplement traditional methods of fishing and generate sustainable livelihoods. Fish production generated from land-based fish culture has been increasing steadily from five tons in 2010 to 435 tons in 2017, according to the Department of Fisheries. The FAO of the UN is piloting a marine cage farm as a social business owned and managed by fishery member institutions in the sea off Gaza to promote development of a marine aquaculture sector that will benefit the fishery community. The cage farm has the potential to promote greater productivity and incomes, and ensure the succession of a sustainable and resilient livelihood to younger fishing generations. Supported by the Government of Italy, this initiative delivers marine aquaculture technologies and capacity development to fishermen and the Gaza Fisheries Syndicate to enable operation of the marine cage farm as a social business. It also promotes access and links to markets. The pilot marine cage farm is expected to produce approximately 150 tons of sea bream per year, contributing an additional 4.5 to 5 per cent to the local fish market. The increased availability of fish is expected to make fish more affordable for consumers, improve consumption levels and dietary diversity, and contribute to the growth of exports and income.

**Continuing protection concerns and lack of accountability**

Live ammunition continues to be widely employed by the Israeli navy to enforce the maritime limits: in 2017 there were 213 shooting incidents registered, resulting in one fisherman killed and 14 injured, including one child.

If arrested, fishermen report being interrogated about Palestinian armed groups and subjected to ill-treatment and verbal abuse prior to their release. This raises serious human rights concerns, including the right to life and respect for due process guarantees enshrined in international law. In 2017, the Israeli navy confiscated 13 boats and another seven incidents of damage, confiscation and loss of fishing equipment were registered. In January and February 2018, four boats were confiscated and not returned, and one more was damaged.

Under international law, the use of firearms should be strictly limited to situations of last resort, i.e. in response to an imminent threat to life. Otherwise, the use of...
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firearms constitutes excessive and unlawful use of force. Violations of these standards that result in casualties must be duly investigated by the authorities and accountability ensured promptly through independent, objective and impartial investigations. Civil remedies, including financial compensation, are also clearly established under international law.

TWO CASES OF FISHERMEN FATALITIES AND LACK OF LEGAL REMEDIES

On 15 May 2017, Mohammad Mjid Fadil Bakr, aged 25, was killed while working on his fishing boat approximately three NM off the coast. Reportedly, the Israeli navy instructed the boat to stop by loudspeaker, while simultaneously opening fire. The boat disregarded the warnings and continued to move until a bullet hit the engine: Mohammad was shot in the back as he was trying to protect the engine. The victim was immediately taken by the navy to a hospital in Israel (Ashkelon), where he was pronounced dead.

On 4 January 2017, another fisherman, Mohammad Ahmad Jameel al Hisi, aged 33, went missing about five NM off the Beit Lahia coast in unclear circumstances. An Israeli navy vessel reportedly crashed into the victim’s boat which “was not visible due to the conditions out at sea”. He was later pronounced dead.

In the cases of the two fatalities, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) requested the opening of criminal investigations by the Israeli Military Attorney General (MAG) and also filed civil complaints for compensation before the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD). There has been little response from the Israeli authorities in either instance. PCHR has received no response to criminal complaints filed regarding four other cases of injuries. Of 11 civil cases filed in 2017, only three responses acknowledging receipt have been received from the MoD.

In the cases of the two fatalities, a Palestinian NGO requested the opening of criminal investigations and also filed civil complaints for compensation, with little response from the Israeli authorities in either instance.
FUNDING SHORTAGES UNDERMINE CONTINUITY OF MOBILE HEALTH CLINICS IN VULNERABLE WEST BANK COMMUNITIES

Over 220,000 Palestinians living in 189 communities across the West Bank lack a permanent clinic and face critical challenges in accessing basic health services. These communities include, primarily, those located in Area C, in the Israeli-controlled parts of Hebron city (H2), and in the closed areas behind the Barrier (the Seam Zone). In many of these areas, the journey to the nearest clinic has lengthened because of the need to travel circuitous ways around settlements and barriers. Access to healthcare can be hampered by the unavailability or high costs of transportation, and in some communities, access to emergency services is challenging as even ambulances face delays.

The most vulnerable in these communities include women during pregnancy and childbirth; sick children and infants; the elderly; and the chronically ill or disabled. The knowledge that health access may be difficult and risky also acts as a psychological stressor that can directly affect health.

To mitigate this situation, ten organizations in the Health Cluster have been operating mobile clinics in vulnerable communities for the past few years. A mobile health clinic team commonly includes a doctor, a nurse and a midwife who visit each community at least once a week. The clinics often operate in structures not intended for this purpose but provide primary health care services, curative treatment and some laboratory tests.

Severe funding shortages since the beginning of 2018 have halted the work of these clinics serving nearly 13,000 people in 35 of the 189 communities. Unless additional funding is found immediately, mobile clinics serving another 11 communities in the Hebron area with a population of over 9,500 will also have to cease work.

On 20 February, the Humanitarian Fund for the oPt, managed by OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Coordinator, released $612,000 to UNRWA to guarantee the continued operation of six medical teams serving 39 communities, mainly in Area C, until mid-2018. To secure the resumption and continuation of the mobile clinic service in all of the 189 communities through the end of 2018, additional $900,000 are required. While the Palestinian Ministry of Health is willing to cover the current and expected gaps, their capacity is estimated to
**Communities Served by Mobile Health Clinics**

- **Functioning**: 72
- **At risk**: 82
- **Closed**: 35

*Some communities received complementary health services from more than one mobile team (Partner).*

**Health Services Provided**
- BRS
- PHC L2
- EMTs
- PHC L2 + Lab

**Legend**
- Barrier: Israeli unilaterally declared East Jerusalem municipal boundary
- Palestinian community
- Settlement built-up, outer-limit and municipal area
- Oslo Areas A and B
- Oslo Area C

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THE MOBILE CLINIC IN KHAN AL AHMAR

The only health service available since the beginning of 2018 in a cluster of five Palestinian Bedouin communities in the Jerusalem governorate known as Khan al Ahmar, is a mobile clinic run by the Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS). Access by Khan al Ahmar’s residents to health facilities in East Jerusalem is restricted by the Barrier and the permit system, and the nearest permanent clinic is in Jericho, 20 kilometres away. Transportation costs to Jericho are often prohibitive for already impoverished families. Both residents and ambulance/health personnel servicing the community often report delays on the roads at flying checkpoints deployed by Israeli forces.

Nurse Nabila Mousa visits six Bedouin communities to the east of Jerusalem, including in Khan al Ahmar, every week:

“In November 2011, PMRC had to halt the mobile clinic service in Khan al Ahmar for six months with disastrous consequences on patients with chronic diseases.”

“I am one of a small team of four comprising a general practitioner, two nurses and a midwife, who visit Khan al Ahmar every Wednesday. We operate in the local mosque, where we treat both acute and chronically ill patients. We also provide preventive care and health education, especially for women, including awareness raising on breastfeeding, pregnancy follow-ups, and early stage breast cancer screening. We also provide limited pharmaceutical services with a range of medications, including antibiotics and drugs for chronic and skin diseases, as well as oral contraceptives and condoms. On average, we treat 50-70 patients per week, 86 per cent of whom are women and children. We rely on solar energy to run the basic medical equipment.”

“We feel responsible for the lives of the people residing in these communities. We often get calls from our patients if we are ten minutes late and they keep asking us to come more frequently. In November 2011, due to funding shortages, PMRC had to halt the mobile clinic service in this area for six months and that was disastrous. Some patients with chronic diseases stopped taking their medication and their condition deteriorated. We also detected many cases of children suffering from extreme skin and respiratory conditions that would have been easily treated if our services had not stopped. At that moment, I realized the critical importance of our work.”

Khan al Ahmar communities, inhabited by about 100 families, are located next to an area planned by the Israeli authorities for the expansion of the Ma’ale Adummim settlement (the E1 plan). They are among the 46 Palestinian Bedouin communities in the central West Bank at risk of forcible displacement due to the coercive environment generated by Israeli practices, including pressure to relocate the community. A hearing at the Israel Supreme Court, on a petition against the demolition of the largest of the five Khan al Ahmar communities (Abu al Helu) is expected by the end of April.
ENDNOTES

1. The ‘Land Day’ is an annual commemoration of mass protests by Palestinian citizens of Israel, which took place in 1976, in response to the Israeli government’s announcement of a plan to expropriate thousands of dunams of land. The ‘Nakba day’ commemorates the forcible displacement from areas that became part of Israel of more than 700,000 Palestinians, over the course of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.


3. Five Israeli civilians, including a child, were also killed over the course of the 2014 hostilities.

4. Estimate from the IDPs Working Group led by OCHA and the Shelter Cluster.

5. This survey was intended to update a re-registration and vulnerability profiling survey carried out in the second half of 2015 by the IDP Working Group under OCHA’s coordination and which targeted 16,000 IDP households. For the main findings see: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/idps_report_april_2016_english.pdf.

6. Households were considered particularly vulnerable if they were headed by a female, an elderly person or a child; if they had one or more member with a disability; or if they were residing in caravans or makeshift shelters.

7. Although these two figures are indicative of the high prevalence of unemployment among IDPs, they are not fully comparable: to be considered unemployed in labour statistics, a person must be actively seeking a job during the reporting period, which is not necessarily the case for all heads of household covered in the IDP survey.

8. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho, Cairo, 4 May 1994. A no-go zone one mile wide along Gaza’s boundaries with Egypt in the south, and another of one mile and half along Gaza’s boundaries with Israel in the north, were also established.


13. A social business is created and designed to combine commercial and social goals with an emphasis on the latter. Investment in social business should lead to equivalent increase in social impact. Profits realized by the business are reinvested in the business itself.

14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 6, 7, 9, 10.

15. Figures provided by al-Mezan Centre for Human Rights.


17. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

18. ICCPR, Articles 2,14,26, and Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.

19. The organizations are: HI: Humanity & Inclusion; UNRWA: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency; Dis-Vi: Italian NGO; CARE International; PMRS: Palestinian Medical Relief Society; MoH: Ministry of Health; HWC: Health Work Committees; MEDICO International; MAP-UK: Medical Aid for Palestinians; and PRCS: Palestine Red Crescent Society.

20. An additional $288,000 were allocated by the HF to UNRWA to maintain food distribution to Bedouin and herding communities in Area C for a period of six months. See Statement by the Acting Humanitarian Coordinator: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/opt-humanitarian-fund-fills-critical-gap-14000-most-vulnerable-palestinians-left-cut-unrwa.