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© Photo by Mohammed Dahman

A boy in a demonstration at the fence in Beit Lahiya, Gaza, 2 February, 2018.

HIGHLIGHTS

- The international Commission of Inquiry into the protests in Gaza releases its initial report.
- Departure of TIPH mission increases protection concerns for H2 residents of Hebron.
- Palestinian access to land behind the Barrier increasingly rejected due to bureaucratic reasons.
- Improvements to Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism expected to improve its effectiveness.

OVERVIEW

In February, the Israeli government implemented a law enacted in 2018 to withhold USD 140 million in Palestinian tax revenue transfers. According to the Israeli authorities, this is equivalent to the sum paid by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the families of Palestinians convicted of security-related offenses in Israeli courts. In response, the PA announced that it would refuse to accept any of the customs duties and other taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the PA and transferred to it monthly: these allocations account for approximately 65 per cent of the PA's budget.

These developments come in the wake of record shortfalls in funding to Palestinians and to humanitarian and development aid agencies operating in the oPt including due to the recent halt of all US government assistance. The humanitarian impact will be particularly serious in Gaza where unemployment, poverty and food insecurity are more acute, exacerbated by the PA's policy in recent years of withholding the payment of salaries and allowances to employees.

The 'Great March of Return' protests at the Gaza perimeter fence continue, with five Palestinians killed in February. This brings to 189 the number of Palestinians killed and to 28,210 the injured since the protests began, on 30 March 2018. Another 76 Palestinians were killed and 238 were injured during hostilities and access related incidents. On 28 February, the independent and international Commission of Inquiry into the protests in oPt (CoI), appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council, released its initial report. The CoI investigated all demonstration related fatalities between 30 March 2018 and 31 December 2018 (189 Palestinian fatalities) and tracked more than 300 injuries caused by Israeli forces during the protests. With the exception of two cases, the Commission found reasonable grounds to believe that the use of live ammunition by Israeli forces against demonstrators was unlawful. The Israeli government has rejected the findings of the report as biased and failing to consider the threat posed by violent acts from Gaza.

In January 2019, improvements were introduced to the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) following a joint review by the UN, Israel and the PA. This


FEBRUARY FIGURES

Palestinians killed (direct conflict)	6
Palestinians injured (direct conflict)	1,304
Israelis killed (direct conflict)	1
Israelis injured (direct conflict)	10
Structures demolished in the West Bank	52
People displaced in the West Bank	105

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 2019

351 million (US\$)
Requested

7.3% funded



should facilitate the implementation of humanitarian and development projects. The GRM was established as a temporary mechanism following the 2014 hostilities to enable materials to enter Gaza for the reconstruction and repair of housing and infrastructure. As detailed in this month's Bulletin, more than 85 per cent of the homes destroyed or severely damaged had been rebuilt by the end of 2018, although 13,000 people remain displaced. The improved GRM aims to address difficulties involved in importing 'dual-use' items, other than building materials, that have impeded the implementation of urgently needed interventions, especially for water and sanitation.

The Bulletin also discusses the decision by Israel not to renew the mandate of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), established to assist in "monitoring and reporting efforts to maintain normal life in the city, thus creating a sense of security among Palestinians in Hebron".¹ The departure of TIPH monitors, combined with intensified harassment and restrictions against residents and the remaining protective presence actors, is increasing the protection risks, and human rights violations, faced by the Palestinian population. The effect of harassment and intimidation on schoolchildren in particular is reported in the recent OCHA survey of H2.


The final item in this month's Bulletin concerns the significant decline in the number of permits issued by the Israeli authorities for Palestinian farmers and agricultural workers to access land behind the Barrier. According to new data, the majority of applicants are rejected for failing to meet additional bureaucratic requirements for permit approval rather than on security grounds. Even when granted a permit, farmers must access their land through designated gates or checkpoints, the majority of which only open during the annual olive harvest. This undermines the livelihoods of thousands of Palestinian families. In its 2004 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice declared the route of the Barrier to be illegal and called for it to be dismantled. The Court also stated that the gate and permit regime violates Israel's obligations under international law and should be revoked.

In her [briefing](#) on the oPt to the Security Council on 20 February, the Assistant Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ursula Mueller, highlighted that: "The international community is mobilizing to provide assistance, but funding is diminishing while needs and constraints continue to grow. Ultimately, the solution is not humanitarian. The lives and well-being of people must be placed beyond political considerations, and humanitarian aid facilitated and supported."

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Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator,

Ursula Mueller



TIPH members patrolling the closed military area of Tel Rumeida, in H2 Hebron, 6 February, 2018.

ISRAEL TERMINATES TIPH OPERATIONS IN H2: FURTHER SHRINKING OF HUMANITARIAN SPACE LEAVES RESIDENTS FACING INCREASED PROTECTION RISKS

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) has left the H2 area of Hebron city following the Israeli government's decision not to renew its mandate beyond 31 January 2019.² Combined with intensified harassment and restrictions against residents and the remaining protective presence actors in the area, this increases the protection risks faced by the population, particularly schoolchildren. In his [remarks](#) to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, UN Secretary General António Guterres expressed regret at Israel's decision not to renew TIPH's mandate. He expressed the hope that an agreement can be reached to "preserve this long-standing and valuable arrangement".

Background on the H2 area of Hebron

Israel exercises full administrative and security control over the 20 per cent of Hebron city known as H2, which is home to some 33,000 Palestinians and a few hundred Israeli settlers. This area has witnessed multiple cycles of violence between Israeli settlers, Israeli forces and Palestinian residents in the context of continuous settlement activities.

The centre of H2 is physically separated from the rest of the city through 121 access and movement obstacles, including 21 permanently-staffed checkpoints. Around 7,000 Palestinians in these areas must cross a checkpoint to reach their homes on foot.

Protection and human rights concerns primarily stem from harassment, intimidation and violence of the Palestinian residents, including children, by Israeli settlers. Israeli forces have repeatedly failed to protect the population and have participated in acts of harassments. According to a household survey carried out by UNOCHA in August 2018 in the H2 area of Hebron, 85 per cent of households surveyed identified harassment by Israeli soldiers and settlers as key concerns affecting access by children to education. Eighty-eight per cent of school children residing in this area (some 2,200 children) must cross a checkpoint to reach school. Around 90 per cent of households with schoolchildren reported at least one incident of delay, harassment, physical search or detention on their way to school in the first half of 2018.

Israeli policies and settler violence linked to settlements and their expansion have generated a [coercive environment](#)³ that undermines the living conditions of Palestinians, including their security, sources of livelihoods, access to services, and family and social life, forcing thousands of residents to leave over the last two decades.⁴

"I also regret the decision by Israel not to renew the mandate of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron.

I hope an agreement can be found by the parties to preserve this long-standing and valuable arrangement."

UN Secretary General,

António Guterres

15 February 2019

Background to TIPH

The temporary international presence in Hebron began in 1994 pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 904 “to guarantee the safety and protection” of Palestinians following the massacre of 29 Palestinians in Al Ibrahimi Mosque by an Israeli settler.⁵ In 1997, TIPH redeployed in accordance with the Hebron protocol to assist in “monitoring and reporting efforts to maintain normal life in the city, thus creating a sense of security among Palestinians in Hebron”.⁶

TIPH reports were shared with the Palestinian and Israeli authorities, and with the five contributing countries.⁷ According to the media, a leaked TIPH report covering 20 years of information and based on over 40,000 recorded incidents, found that “the city is more divided than ever, due to the actions of the Israeli government and Israeli settlers.” It also found that Israel is in “severe and regular breach” of the right to non-discrimination and of the obligation to protect the population living under occupation from deportation, while “radical Israeli settlers” make life in the Israeli-controlled area difficult for its Palestinian residents.⁸

The Israeli authorities accused the observers of interfering with Israeli forces; creating friction with settlers; cooperating with radical organizations; and promoting the de-legitimization of Israel.⁹ The accusations came alongside two incidents by TIPH members in late 2018: the slapping of an Israeli child, which was followed by a letter of apology from the head of TIPH describing the action taken against the TIPH member, and the puncturing of tyres on a vehicle belonging to an Israeli settler.

Consequences of terminating TIPH’s protective presence

The departure of over 60 TIPH internationals, increases the risk of increased tension in H2 and exacerbates the protection risks, including those resulted from human rights violations, facing Palestinian residents, particularly schoolchildren. TIPH was unique in that it was the only organization in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron city (H2) authorized to access any part of H2 on foot and with a vehicle, at any time, to document incidents and provide a protective presence.¹⁰

Further shrinking of humanitarian space

Since the announcement of the termination of TIPH’s mandate, the Protection Cluster has observed an increase in the number of incidents of settler harassment and intimidation (excluding those resulting in casualties or property damage), including intrusive close-up filming of humanitarian actors and verbal abuse, with a monthly average of four such incidents recorded in 2019, compared to two in 2018.

Following an incident that threatened the safety of two of their Ecumenical Accompaniers EAPPI temporarily suspended their operations in the area. Protective presence actors have also observed increased restrictions on their operations in H2 by Israeli forces, including access restrictions, particularly in and around Shuhada Street, a focus for settler violence.

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This comes in the wider context of continued pressure on human rights defenders marked by arrests, detention, harassment and legislation aimed at constricting humanitarian and civil space. These measures effectively curtail the ability to ensure the required protection.¹¹

Mother of two in constant fear for her children's lives after departure of international presence

"I have two children with hearing impairments. The other day, my son was almost shot at the checkpoint because he didn't hear the Israeli soldier telling him to go through the metal detector again. He was lucky that people at the checkpoint intervened on his behalf. He could have been shot on the spot. Now, I'm constantly worried... Previously, internationals would escort them to the checkpoint and back, and that gave me peace of mind."

Jackline Fakhouri, aged 47, as-Salaymeh neighbourhood H2, Hebron.

Residents attempt to fill the void left by TIPH's departure

The departure of TIPH and subsequent rise in harassment and access restrictions facing humanitarian actors has heightened protection concerns and anxiety among residents. Residents have adopted community measures with the formation of a committee to organize initiatives for parents to escort groups of children to and from school, as well as instructing children on means to protect themselves.

"Now, I'm constantly worried... Previously, internationals would escort my children to the checkpoint and back, and that gave me peace of mind."

According to Noora Nassar, the head of Qurtoba School, the departure of TIPH has left both children and teachers "exposed, unprotected and living in constant fear". "Our main goal now is to ensure that the educational process continues and our children are able to reach school and return home safely...We are training children on how to protect each other."

Around a dozen Palestinian volunteers wearing blue vests began to accompany children from the Israeli-manned Checkpoint 56 on Shuhada Street, but were subsequently prohibited by Israeli military order from carrying out such activities. Calls for international activists to join the initiatives have also been publicised. These initiatives have raised concerns among residents regarding the potentially provocative impact on settlers.

In his February address to the UN Security Council, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nikolay Mladenov, confirmed that the United Nations "continues to engage with relevant Member States and the parties on the ground to ensure the protection, safety and wellbeing of civilians in Hebron, and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory."¹²


FEWER PERMITS GRANTED TO ACCESS LAND BEHIND BARRIER

Recent findings indicate a significant decline in the number of permits issued by the Israeli authorities for Palestinian farmers and workers to access their land in the West Bank behind the Barrier. According to official data obtained by the Israeli organization HaMoked, the approval rate for permits for landowners fell from 76 per cent of applications in 2014 to 28 per cent in 2018 (up to 25 November).¹³ Permits issued to agricultural workers declined from 70 per cent and 50 per cent of applications in the same period (See chart 1).

The approval rate for permits for landowners fell from 76 per cent of applications in 2014 to 28 per cent in 2018 (up to 25 November). Permits issued to agricultural workers declined from 70 per cent and 50 per cent of applications in the same period.

In the northern West Bank where OCHA has been monitoring since 2012, 2018 marked the lowest approval rate for Barrier permits issued across all categories of eligible Palestinians (See chart 2). The majority of rejections are now based on failure to meet the increasing bureaucratic requirements necessary for permit approval.

Chart 1 HaMoked: Permit applications for farmers and agricultural workers



Most of the land located between the Barrier and the Green Line, the 'Seam Zone', has been declared closed under an Israeli military order.¹⁴ Palestinians living in the closed area or who need to enter the area, including for agricultural purposes, must apply for a special permit from the military authorities according to a defined list of categories.¹⁵ If granted approval, farmers have to cross designated gates or checkpoints to reach the closed area, (see Barrier crossings below). In its 2004 Advisory Opinion that declared the route of the Barrier to be illegal, the International Court of Justice stated that the gate and permit regime violate Israel's obligations under international law and should be revoked.

Permit-related regulations intensified

To apply for or to renew a permit, Palestinian landowners must prove a connection to the land in the closed area by submitting valid ownership or land taxation documents, in addition to satisfying the security considerations necessary for all Israeli-issued permits. Bureaucratic requirements have become more cumbersome and costly since 2017, when the Israel authorities required farmers who inherit land to register the plot in their own name in the land registry (*tabu*), and pay a fee proportional to the value of the land. Previously, farmers were required only to provide an inheritance document and the land deed with the permit application. Although permits for landowners are generally valid for up to two years, the renewal process can force farmers to remain inactive and agricultural income may be lost in the period between the expiry of the current permit and the issuing of a new document.

Lost Harvest

Abdul Aziz Ziyab owns four dunams of land planted with oranges and lemons behind the Barrier in the Qalqilya area. His two-year landowner permit expired on 27 December 2018 and was not renewed until 29 January. He made repeated but unsuccessful visits to the Palestinian DCL, eventually being granted a permit when he presented himself directly to the Israel DCL and threatened not to leave without the document. This waiting period coincided with the citrus season and Abdul Aziz lost his entire crop, which he estimates was worth between NIS 7,500-9,000. Only one of his eight children has a permit but is employed elsewhere: the others have been rejected on the basis that the size of the land in question is 'not enough'. One of his sons has applied for a permit as an agricultural worker and the result is pending.



Palestinians living in the closed area or who need to enter the area, including for agricultural purposes, must apply for a special permit from the military authorities according to a defined list of categories.

Since 2014, spouses and children can no longer apply for permits on the landowner's behalf. They fall into the category of 'farmer's family member' whose permits are valid from three months to two years, or 'agricultural worker' with permits valid from three to six months, although they can be issued for two years. For these categories, permit approval is dependent on the size of the plot and the crops grown. The onus of looking after the land falls on older landowners as younger, more able-bodied family members may be rejected (See box below). Additional workers are needed during the labour-

intensive annual olive harvest when, according to the Israeli authorities, “recognizing the uniqueness and significance of the olive harvest season, agricultural employment permits beyond the set quota can be requested for members of the farmer’s family”.¹⁶ Although these permits can be issued irrespective of the size of the land, they are only valid for two to three months.

I can't work my land without help

Yusra Qaisy owns eight dunams of land behind the Barrier in the vicinity of Alfei Menashe settlement in Qalqilya, which she shares with over twenty family members. They grow lemons, guava, cauliflower and winter crops, and could earn up to NIS 3,000 per month. She has a two-year Barrier permit which is currently valid until March 2019. Her husband has been refused a permit on the grounds of ‘not having enough land’. Her daughter’s permit has not been renewed since 2017 on the same grounds. The permit of her son Mohammed expired in July 2018 and was initially renewed; however, it was taken from him by soldiers at the Barrier gate on the grounds that it had been renewed incorrectly due to ‘not having enough land’. Only one of her sons has a permit but does not use it as he is employed elsewhere. Yusra is sick and cannot see well; she says that she is unable to cultivate the land without the help of her family members. The land, which was the main source of income for her family, now lies fallow.

Applicants are increasingly rejected less on security grounds than for a variety of bureaucratic reasons that include ‘no connection to the land’ or ‘not having enough land’.

Applicants are increasingly rejected less on security grounds than for a variety of bureaucratic reasons that include ‘no connection to the land’¹⁷ or ‘not having enough land’. Some 83 per cent of the requests in the data obtained by HaMoked were denied for failing to meet the criteria. OCHA monitoring based on data supplied by the Palestinian DCL offices in Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Salfit districts, and covering all categories of Palestinians requiring permits to reside or access the closed area, show that 2018 had the lowest approval rate since recording began in 2012.¹⁸

Chart 2: Barrier permit applications in the northern West Bank



Barrier crossing points

OCHA monitors the number of gates through which Palestinians are permitted to access their land in the closed area during the olive harvest, the only period when most of these crossing points operate. In December 2018 there were 77 operable gates, plus a number of checkpoints, through which Palestinians could access their land.¹⁹ Of these, 55 only opened during the few weeks of the olive harvest, and only for limited hours on those days, and remained closed the rest of the year. An additional nine gates are considered 'weekly' in that they open for some day(s) of the week throughout the year in addition to the olive season. Only 13 gates along the completed 465 kilometres of the Barrier open daily. Of the 77 gates, 47 require access permits and 30 operate via prior coordination, although the majority of the latter only open for short periods during the olive harvest.

Access restrictions to land behind the Barrier impede essential year-round agricultural activities such as ploughing, pruning, fertilizing, and pest and weed management. As a result, there is an adverse impact on olive productivity and value. Data collected by OCHA over the last few years in the northern West Bank show that the yield of olive trees in the area between the Barrier and the Green Line has reduced by approximately 55-65 per cent in comparison with equivalent trees in areas that can be accessed all year round.²⁰

Of 77 operable gates, 55 only opened during the few weeks of the olive harvest, and remained closed the rest of the year.

The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion

Following a wave of Palestinian attacks including suicide bombings, in 2002, Israel began building a Barrier with the stated aim of preventing such attacks. The majority of the Barrier's route is located within the West Bank; it separates Palestinian communities and farming land from the rest of the West Bank, and contributes to the fragmentation of the oPt. In its Advisory Opinion of 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established that the sections of the Barrier that run inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, together with the associated gate and permit regime, violate Israel's obligations under international law. The ICJ called on Israel to cease construction of the Barrier inside the West Bank, to dismantle the sections already completed and repeal all legislative measures related to it.



IMPROVEMENTS TO THE MECHANISM FOR THE IMPORT OF RESTRICTED ITEMS TO GAZA LIKELY TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS

In February 2018 the UN agreed with the Israeli government and the PA to undertake a joint review of the temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) to improve its functionality, transparency and predictability. In consultation with a variety of stakeholders, the parties introduced various improvements to the GRM in January 2019 and these are expected to facilitate the implementation of humanitarian and development projects.

As part of the blockade it has imposed on Gaza since the takeover by Hamas in 2007, citing security concerns, Israel restricts the entry of materials it considers to have a ‘dual-use’ civil and military capacity, including basic building materials. Established following the 2014 hostilities, the GRM was a temporary mechanism agreed by Israel and the PA to expedite the entry of materials into Gaza for reconstruction purposes, while acknowledging Israel’s security concerns.²¹ At the request of the parties, the UN facilitates the import of materials via this monitoring mechanism, while at the same time advocating for a full lifting of the blockade in accordance with international law and consistent with Security Council Resolution 1860.

As highlighted in chart 1, since its inception, the GRM has facilitated the entry of large quantities of cement and other building materials for the reconstruction and repair of housing and infrastructure.²² The decline in cement imports during 2018 is due to a number of factors unrelated to import restrictions: the general economic decline in Gaza, reduced donor funding and the fact that the reconstruction process is drawing to an end. Nearly 100,000 people were displaced due to the destruction or severe damage of their homes during the 2014 conflict, but more than 85 per cent of these homes had been rebuilt by the end of 2018.²³ As illustrated in chart 2, the import of dual-use items other than building materials has been more challenging and unpredictable, impeding the implementation of urgently needed interventions, especially in the field of water and sanitation (see case study).

Improvements introduced to the GRM in January 2019 are expected to facilitate the implementation of humanitarian and development projects.



These improvements agreed to the GRM are expected to significantly enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism by streamlining applications and approval for large-scale projects, and of items defined by Israel as having a dual civilian and military use. The parties also agreed to improve the GRM by expanding the number of contractors and businesses allowed to import materials; providing increased access for donors to monitor their projects; adopting clear deadlines for approving projects; clarifying procedures for imports of dual-use items; and other technical adjustments to make the mechanism more user-friendly and help stimulate economic activity. The Israeli authorities have committed to processing all dual-use items within 45 working days, in addition to providing better links between the GRM and Israeli mechanisms for the review of requests (see case study).

Improved water supply to Khan Yunis area delayed

In January 2016, the European Union approved funding for a project to improve the quality of water pumped to some 50,000 people in the al-Satar and al-Amal areas of Khan Yunis governorate. The project consists of two water tanks with a capacity of 5,000 cubic meters each, to be connected to the main pipelines and supplied by desalinated sea water. Implementation was awarded to a private contractor under the supervision of Gaza's Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) and was scheduled to be completed by January 2017.

The project required 116 different items designated as dual-use. An application for the import of these items was filed with the GRM in January 2016. It took some 18 months for all of the approvals to be granted. In addition, the contractor was obliged to obtain additional clearance for 33 specific items, including chemicals and telecommunications equipment, through a separate mechanism run by the Israeli authorities and which lacks the accountability of the GRM: these items were finally approved in January 2018. As a result, completion of the project was rescheduled for the second quarter of 2019, more than two years behind the date scheduled.

The Israeli authorities have committed to processing all dual-use items within 45 working days, in addition to providing better links between the GRM and Israeli mechanisms for the review of requests.




Water pumping station serving 50,000 Palestinian residents in Khan Yunis. March, 2019.

The UN has established a Project Management Unit (PMU) in Gaza to work with all relevant stakeholders and collect information about current and potential projects; to identify opportunities for interventions achievable within short timeframes; to address blockages and delays to facilitate the smooth implementation of urgent projects; and to assist project implementers with all issues related to the GRM. The PMU has already started its support to the implementation of a package of urgent economic and humanitarian interventions for Gaza agreed by members of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) at its last meeting in September 2018.


The PMU is well-placed to facilitate the smooth implementation of various humanitarian projects. These include finalizing the reconstruction of buildings damaged in the 2014 conflict, plus the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and service provision facilities, including in the critical energy, water and health sectors. The PMU is already working closely with humanitarian agencies and partners in Gaza to advance projects through research, data collection, technical advice and support for the coordination of imports.

The UN has established a Project Management Unit in Gaza to work with all relevant stakeholders and collect information about current and potential projects; identify opportunities for interventions; to address blockages and delays to facilitate the smooth implementation of urgent projects; and assist project implementers with all issues related to the GRM.

Cement import to Gaza per year via KS (tons)



Number of items approved per quarter



Salah Salama is the Mukhtar of al-Amal neighbourhood in Khan Yunis.

“Al-Amal neighbourhood has 40,000 residents, of whom more than 35,000 are unemployed. The residents only receive water for between 2-4 hours each day, which is not enough for family needs. Most of the time this coincides with electricity cuts, which hinder pumping even when water is available.”

The water supply is salty and residents buy water from private providers. “We have 20 persons in our house and are obliged to buy around 3,000 liters of drinking water a month at a cost of NIS 60. I can afford this but most people can’t. People in difficult economic circumstances are forced to drink the available pumped water, which is undrinkable, or get water from those who can afford it.”

“I’m a nurse and I volunteer at al-Nasser hospital in Khan-Yunis three days a week. Many patients there suffer infections due to drinking salty water. We really need desalinated water to prevent the health issues most of the residents suffer from.”

Following the 2018 GRM review, the Israeli authorities confirmed that, in future, all such ‘dual-use’ items would be processed within 45 working days and that better links would be developed between the GRM and alternative channels to provide a more consistent performance. The UN’s Project Management Unit (PMU) will also ensure in future that GRM project managers have a single focal point to obtain their materials from, and that blockages in the process are proactively identified and resolved in a coordinated manner.

ENDNOTES

1. Follow [link](#) for more information on the mandate of TIPH.
2. The renewal of the mission was contingent on the approval of both the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority every six months.
3. See Secretary General Reports to the Human Rights Council A/HRC/37/43, paras. 24-28; A/HRC/34/39, para. 44; A/72/564, paras. 36-57.
4. See UNOCHA factsheet on "[The humanitarian impact of Israeli settlements in Hebron city](#)" and "[The isolation of Palestinians in the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron city continues](#)".
5. Over 50 Palestinians were killed and hundreds were injured during the massacre and its aftermath. S/RES/904. UN Security Council Resolution 904, S/RES/904 strongly condemned "the massacre in Hebron and its aftermath which took the lives of more than fifty Palestinian civilians and injured several hundred others".
6. Follow [link](#) for more information on the mandate.
7. The [contributing countries](#), Norway, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland and Turkey, fund and provide observers for the mission in Hebron.
8. Haaretz, February 26 2019. Uri Blau. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-confidential-report-claims-israel-regularly-breaks-international-law-in-hebron-1.6747523>
9. Quotation from Israeli Minister of Public Security and Strategic Affairs on 17 January 2019, according to the [Hebron Fund Organization](#)
10. Protective presence refers to the physical presence and monitoring of incidents by internationals as a form of deterrence against acts of violence.
11. For more details, see "Humanitarian operations undermined by de-legitimization, access restrictions and administrative constraints". The Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2018.
12. Security Council briefing on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, 20 February 2019.
13. The data were obtained following a freedom of information request by HaMoked and, following no substantive response, a petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice. Despite assurances from the Israeli Civil Administration to HaMoked that the data were up-to-date at the time of delivery (25 November), doubts remain whether the 2018 figures include the data for the 2018 olive harvest, which could significantly alter the 2018 figures for agricultural workers.
14. In the northern West Bank, the land between the Barrier and the Green Line was declared closed by military order in October 2003. In January 2009, the closed area designation was extended to all or part of areas between the Barrier and the Green Line in the Salfit, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron districts, plus to various areas between the Barrier and the Israeli-defined municipal boundary of Jerusalem.
15. In certain areas Palestinians still access the closed area by means of verbal approval from the Israeli authorities, referred to as 'prior coordination'.
16. Unofficial translation from fifth edition of the Standing Orders published by the Israeli authorities, which detail the regulations governing access to areas behind the Barrier.

17. In February 2017 a number of Palestinian District Civil Liaison Office (DCL) offices in the northern West Bank (Jenin, Qalqiliya, Tulkarm and Salfit) reported that they had been informed by their Israeli counterparts that registered owners with less than 330m² of land are ineligible for a permit. The new regulations were not communicated officially but in conversations between the Israeli DCL and their Palestinian counterparts.

18. The Israeli authorities have justified the expansion of restrictions by stating that they are concerned that a growing number of Palestinians are using Barrier permits to enter Israel illegally.

19. This figure excludes Barrier checkpoints not used to access agricultural land but by residents of the “Seam Zone” to reach workplaces and essential services in the rest of the West Bank.

20. For further details on the methodology used for data collection, see February Humanitarian Bulletin 2014, p 12. Link: <https://www.ochaopt.org/2014/agricultural-productivity>

21. For a detailed account of the GRM’s structure and functioning see: [GRM website](#).

22. An interactive database with information about materials and projects processed, see: [GRM website](#)

23. See [Shelter Cluster Factsheet](#), January 2019.