INTRODUCTION

This publication brings together a series of factsheets that were published by OCHA over the course of the past five years, highlighting different issues of humanitarian concern in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). The facts and figures have been reviewed and updated for this compilation, which comes on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the start of Israel’s military occupation.

The occupation is a key driver of humanitarian needs, to which the international community responds. Occupation denies Palestinians control over basic aspects of their daily life and largely determines their ability to move unimpeded within the occupied territory, exit and return, develop large parts of their territory, build on their own land, access natural resources or develop their economy. Some of the restrictions behind these realities have been imposed in response to Palestinian attacks or citing security justifications.

Although occupation is intended to be temporary, Israel increasingly treats parts of the occupied area as its own sovereign territory, seizing lands, intensively exploiting natural resources, establishing permanent communities and altering the demographic composition. These measures have increasingly fragmented the Palestinian territory, isolating communities, rupturing social cohesion, affecting economic activity and depriving Palestinians of many of their human rights.

Under international law, Israel is required to protect the Palestinian population under its control and provide for its welfare and well-being; it must also respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of this population. As affirmed by various authoritative international institutions, from the International Court of Justice to the Security Council, transferring parts of a State’s own civilian population to an occupied territory, unilaterally annexing territory acquired by force, and destroying homes and other property without a legitimate military reason, among other practices, are acts that contravene international law.

In large areas of the West Bank, occupation-related laws, policies and practices have generated pressures on residents, which place them at risk of forcible transfer. Key to this is a restrictive and discriminatory planning regime in Area C and East Jerusalem, which makes it virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits, resulting in the demolition, or threat of demolition, of homes, schools and other structures.

In the Gaza Strip, Israel’s 10-year-long land, air and sea blockade, imposed following the violent takeover of Gaza by Hamas, isolates 2 million Palestinians from the West Bank and the rest of the world. The access restrictions, imposed by Israel again citing security justifications, and recurrent rounds of active hostilities, have devastated Gaza’s economy, resulting in more than 40% unemployment, poor access to basic services and aid dependency.

The internal political divide between the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007, resulted in a split of the Palestinian civil service and increased the hardships for Gaza’s population. A salaries crisis, ongoing since 2014, along with the underfunding of the Gaza-based ministries, the duplication of functions and the lack of clear reporting lines, has undermined the capacity of local institutions to deliver basic services, respond to emergencies and many other key functions. Recent measures adopted by the Palestinian Authority have increased electricity blackouts to up to 20 hours a day and impacted the availability of essential services and livelihoods, resulting in a further serious deterioration in living conditions.

Prolonged occupation compounds humanitarian needs and hampers their alleviation, leaving vulnerable households struggling to cope. In 2017, 1.8 million Palestinians are in need of active protection measures provided by the humanitarian community, due to their exposure to conflict and violence, displacement or restricted access to livelihoods and essential services.

The prolonged occupation, with no end in sight, cultivates a sense of hopelessness and frustration that drives continued conflict and impacts both Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians possess the skills and resources necessary, if allowed access, to develop self-sustaining livelihoods. Therefore, a political solution that ends the occupation is the single most important priority to reduce humanitarian needs and advance development goals in the occupied Palestinian territory.

1. The land blockade is also being referred to by various stakeholders as a “closure”. Israel has justified the sea blockade citing the need to address threats from the “significant military capabilities” developed by the Hamas naval forces.
4.88 million Palestinians live in the oPt, with 2.97 million in the West Bank and 1.88 million in the Gaza Strip. Source: PCBS 2016

43% of the oPt population are Palestine refugees and nearly 50% are below the age of 18. Source: UNRWA 2016

47% of the population of the Gaza Strip and 16% of the population of the West Bank. *Moderately to severely food insecure

Source: (WFP, FAO, UNFPA, PCBS); SEFSEC 2014

41% unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip and 20% in the West Bank. Source: PCBS Q4 2016

5.2 persons is the average Palestinian household size in the oPt. Source: PCBS 2015

79 litres/capita/day (l/c/d) in the West Bank. 66 litres/capita/day (l/c/d) in the Gaza Strip. WHO standard is 100 l/c/d.

* Due to water losses through the network, consumption is significantly lower than water supply.
KEY DRIVERS OF HUMANITARIAN VULNERABILITY

THREATS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY

Palestinian civilians across the oPt have been subjected to threats to their lives, physical safety and liberty from conflict-related violence, and from policies and practices related to the administration of the Israeli occupation. The Gaza Strip has witnessed three major escalations of hostilities in the last ten years, with the 2014 conflict recording the highest loss of civilian life in a single escalation since 1967. Although the 2014 ceasefire has largely held, pervasive insecurity and the threat of violence continues. In the West Bank, the violence that erupted in late 2015 has continued at a reduced level, with perpetrators or alleged perpetrators of attacks or attempted attacks against Israelis representing the majority of Palestinian fatalities. Concerns remain over excessive use of force by Israeli forces in their response to such attacks and the lack of accountability by all sides for violations during successive hostilities in Gaza, despite numerous investigations carried out by the Israeli authorities.

FORCED DISPLACEMENT

The forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinians across the oPt takes place in the context of Israel’s prolonged occupation, compounded by escalations in hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip. The 2014 conflict resulted in the highest rate of internal displacement since 1967, displacing 100,000, of whom about 29,000 are still awaiting the reconstruction of their homes (as of July 2017). Throughout the West Bank, many Palestinians are at risk of forcible transfer due to a coercive environment generated by Israeli policies and practices, which create pressure on residents to leave their communities and which are often implemented against the backdrop of the expansion of nearby Israeli settlements. These practices include the demolition of homes, schools and livelihoods on the grounds of the lack of building permits, which are almost impossible to obtain; 2016 recorded the highest number of demolitions in the West Bank since OCHA started recording this trend in 2009, followed by a significant decline in the first half of 2017. Other pressures include promotion of plans to relocate Palestinian Bedouin communities to urban townships; restrictions on access to natural resources; the denial of basic service infrastructure; and the lack of secure residency.

MOVEMENT AND ACCESS RESTRICTIONS

Citing security considerations, Israel restricts Palestinian movement within the oPt, including between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, through a combination of physical obstacles (such as the Barrier and checkpoints) and bureaucratic constraints (particularly permits, and the designation of areas as restricted or closed). While the restrictions on Gaza have continued, the volume of produce entering and leaving Gaza has risen significantly since the 2014 hostilities. The number of Palestinians allowed to leave Gaza by the Israeli authorities, also increased after the 2014 hostilities, but has been again in decline since the second half of 2016. The isolation of Gaza has also been exacerbated since 2014 by Egypt’s closure of the Rafah crossing. In the West Bank, in recent years, the Israeli authorities have eased some long-standing restrictions, improving Palestinian access to key urban hubs. However, physical and administrative obstacles continue to restrict Palestinians from entering East Jerusalem, areas isolated by the Barrier, ‘firing zones’, the Israeli-controlled parts of Hebron city (H2), and land around or within Israeli settlements. In addition, temporary travel restrictions have been imposed, whereby Israeli forces block one or more of the main entries of communities where the perpetrators of attacks against Israelis live or from where stone and Molotov cocktails are regularly thrown at Israeli vehicles.

RESTRICTIONS ON HUMANITARIAN SPACE

Humanitarian organizations continue to face a range of obstacles imposed by the Israeli authorities. These include physical and administrative restrictions on the access and movement of humanitarian actors, especially national employees, who face increasing difficulty in obtaining permits to enter and exit the Gaza Strip since 2016. Other obstacles include restrictions on the delivery of materials needed for humanitarian projects and limitations on the implementation of projects that involve building, expanding or rehabilitating infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, Area C or East Jerusalem. In Gaza, although the import restrictions remain, a temporary mechanism put in place since 2014 has facilitated the entry of restricted construction materials. In the West Bank, 2016 witnessed an unprecedented number of donor-funded structures demolished or seized, on the grounds of lack of a building permit. Such obstacles have hampered the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance and protection to Palestinians throughout the oPt. Humanitarian operations in Gaza are also impeded by restrictions imposed by the Hamas authorities, in addition to the continuing closure of the Rafah crossing with Egypt and the ongoing internal Palestinian divide.
In June 2007, following the military takeover of Gaza by Hamas, Israel imposed a land, sea and air blockade on the Gaza Strip, which intensified earlier access restrictions.

On a daily average, less than 240 Palestinians were allowed out of Gaza via Israel in the first half of 2017, as compared to 420 in the first half of 2007, before the blockade. In September 2000, prior to the second Intifada, the daily average was approximately 26,000.

38% of the applications to Israel for exit permits for medical treatment outside Gaza submitted in 2016 were rejected or delayed (meaning that patients missed their appointments). This marked a seven-year low in the approval rate.

The Egyptian-controlled Rafah crossing has been effectively closed since October 2014, including for humanitarian assistance; in the first half of 2017 it has opened exceptionally on 16 days only.

A monthly average of 272 truckloads of commercial goods exited Gaza between January-June 2017, up from 178 in 2016. This represents less than a third of the equivalent figure in the first half of 2007 (961).

Access to areas within 300 metres of the Gaza side of the perimeter fence with Israel is largely prohibited and areas several hundred meters beyond are not safe, preventing or discouraging agricultural activities.

Fishermen are only allowed to access 40% of the fishing areas allocated for this purpose under the Oslo Accords.

The unemployment rate at the third quarter of 2017 was 46.6%, while among youth it stood at 64.9% and 71% among women.

Around 47% of households in Gaza suffer from moderate or severe food insecurity.

97% of piped water is unfit for human consumption.

More than 70% of Gaza’s population receives some form of international aid, the bulk of which is food assistance.

1. About two million Palestinians in Gaza are ‘locked in’, unable to access the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territory and the outside world. Movement restrictions imposed by Israel since the early 1990s and which were intensified after the events of June 2007, citing security justifications, have had a profound impact on living conditions in Gaza and fragmented the territorial unity and the economic and social fabric of the oPt. Those eligible for exit permits constitute a small minority, primarily patients, business people and staff of international organizations. The isolation of Gaza has been exacerbated by Egypt’s closure of the Rafah crossing also.

2. Longstanding access restrictions imposed by Israel have undermined Gaza’s economy, resulting in high levels of unemployment, food insecurity and aid dependency. These include restrictions on the marketing of goods in the West Bank and Israel; on the import of certain goods to Gaza; and on the access of people to agricultural land and fishing waters in Gaza. The easing of some of these restrictions since the 2014 ceasefire has not enabled a significant reactivation of the economy. The impact of access restrictions is compounded by recurrent rounds of hostilities, which have resulted in the loss of assets and people being left with long-term disabilities; a chronic energy crisis; and the ongoing internal Palestinian divide.

3. Restrictions on the import of goods considered by Israel as “dual use” items continue to undermine the quality of basic services and impede efforts to address housing needs. Limited access to construction materials and critical equipment since 2007 has delayed the construction, repair and upgrade of homes and infrastructure, needed to address rapid population growth and the devastation caused by recurrent hostilities. This has undermined the quality of health, education, and water and sanitation services available in Gaza, and prolonged the displacement of those who have lost their homes. Although since 2014 the entry of restricted construction materials has been facilitated by a temporary mechanism (the GRM), the import of other restricted items, particularly those required for water and sanitation projects, remains a major challenge.

4. The blockade has raised concern about collective punishment and other provisions under international humanitarian and human rights law. While the relaxation of certain restrictions since 2014 is welcomed, this is no substitute for a full lifting of the blockade on Gaza in line with Security Council resolution 1860.
**GAZA STRIP KEY FACTS**

- **Population**: 1.88 M (PCBS 2016)
- **Need humanitarian assistance**: 1.3 M
- **Moderate/severe food insecure households**: 47%
- **Uncovered energy needs**: 80%
- **Potable piped water**: 3%

**TRAUCLOADS EXITING GAZA**

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**TRAUCLOADS ENTERING GAZA**

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**EREZ: CROSSINGS INTO ISRAEL**

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*The figures reflect the number of times people crossed, but not the actual number of people crossing.*
The Gaza Strip has witnessed three major escalations of hostilities in the last ten years: in December 2008-January 2009; in November 2012; and in June-August 2014. Over 3,800 Palestinians and 90 Israelis were killed in these escalations. The 2014 hostilities were the most intense to date and saw the highest loss of civilian life in Gaza since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967 (1,460 civilian fatalities). Over 920 Palestinian children were killed in these hostilities. Some 225,000 children in Gaza required some form of psychosocial support and child protection interventions in 2017. During the 2014 hostilities, 142 Palestinian families had three or more members killed in a single incident. Some 900 people, a third of them children, were permanently disabled and about 100 underwent amputation of limbs. Over 18,000 homes were destroyed or severely damaged during the 2014 conflict, displacing 100,000, of whom about 20,300 remain displaced as of November 2017. UNRWA schools serving as emergency shelters for displaced families were struck by Israeli missiles in the 2008/09 and 2014 escalations. In 2014, Palestinian groups were found responsible for hiding weapons in three UN facilities that were not being used as shelters at the time. Infrastructure and basic services have been severely affected; in the 2014 conflict, seven schools and four hospitals and clinics were destroyed and 252 schools and 78 health facilities damaged. At least 36 Palestinians, including 14 children, have been killed as a result of the detonation of explosive remnants of war (ERW) left after the three escalations, and 244 have been injured. The UN has cleared and destroyed 29 metric tonnes of ERW from 149 unexploded aerial bombs from the 2014 hostilities. Israeli criminal investigations into alleged violations of the laws of war led to the prosecution of soldiers in five cases; the highest sentence was seven and a half months imprisonment for a soldier convicted of stealing a credit card. No meaningful investigations have been carried out by Palestinian authorities.

1. In the context of 50 years of occupation, 10 years of Hamas rule and blockade and internal Palestinian division, recurrent rounds of conflict have compounded an already precarious humanitarian situation in Gaza, generating significant displacement and undermining the quality of health, education, water and sanitation services. The destruction of productive assets has also contributed to high unemployment, food insecurity and aid dependency. Children have been particularly impacted by the conflict, leaving them with a deep sense of insecurity, fear and hopelessness.

2. Major escalations have resulted in large-scale loss of life and injury, compounded by an almost total absence of basic protective measures, such as bomb shelters or effective warning systems. The precarious situation of the public health system impedes the provision of appropriate care and rehabilitation to those who sustained long-term injuries and disability.

3. Restrictions on the import of construction materials, and funding gaps, have delayed the reconstruction and repair of destroyed and damaged homes, prolonging displacement. The living conditions of thousands of families still displaced raise a range of humanitarian concerns, including disrupted livelihoods, lack of privacy, gender-based violence and ERW-related risks.

4. The conduct of the hostilities by both sides has involved serious violations of international humanitarian law, including of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack. However, accountability for these violations has remained elusive. Impunity denies victims and survivors the justice and redress they deserve, and prevents the deterrence of future violations.

1. While the recurrent rounds of hostilities also impacted on Israel’s civilian population, due to the mandate of agencies operating in the oPt, this factsheet focuses on the humanitarian impact inside the Gaza Strip.

2. According to the Israeli authorities, the number of Palestinian non-combatants killed during the 2014 hostilities was 761.

PALESTINIAN FATALITIES FROM CONFLICT IN GAZA

- Escalation in hostilities: *Operation Cast Lead*
- Hamas takes over Gaza and Israel imposes a blockade
- Israel intercepts flotilla headed to Gaza from Turkey
- Egypt launches military campaign to destroy smuggling tunnels
- UN-Israeli “Bertini Commitment” easing access restrictions
- Second Intifada starts

PALESTINIAN FATALITIES AND DAMAGE TO HOMES FROM ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Operation</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2008/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Fatalities</td>
<td>2,251</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally Destroyed (Housing Units)</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>3,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe/Major Damage (Housing Units)</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial/Minor Damage (Housing Units)</td>
<td>147,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>54,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Shelter Sector Gaza, Shelter Advocacy Fact Sheet, 5 March 2013.

FAMILIES STILL DISPLACED as of November 2017

- Reconstruction in progress ~17%
- Reconstruction pending* ~83%

* No funding available
3. Disputes over the funding and taxation of fuel, as well as over the collection of payments from electricity consumers, have undermined the functioning of Gaza’s sole power plant (GPP) and led to its recurrent shutdown. To cope with the long blackouts, service providers are resorting to back-up generators, which depend on the availability of fuel and are not designed for continuous use. The import of new generators and spare parts is restricted by Israel. The recent decision by the PA to reduce payments for Israeli-supplied electricity from the Israeli grid has aggravated the crisis significantly.

4. The shortage of power and of fuel to operate water and wastewater treatment facilities has reduced access to water and increased the risk of waterborne diseases. The limited operation of water pumps and water desalination plants has led to a decline in water consumption and hygiene standards. The shortening or suspension of sewage treatment cycles has led to the increased pollution of the sea along the Gaza and southern Israel coast. There is a constant risk of back-flow of sewage onto streets, which may lead to flooding, displacement, and waterborne diseases.

5. Following the Hamas takeover, key donors reduced and/or conditioned their funding for humanitarian and development projects in Gaza. This contributed to the channeling of assistance towards sectors and institutions free of Hamas control, not necessarily to areas where assistance is most needed. Restrictions stemming from counter-terrorism legislation in their countries of origin, along with the “no contact” policy with Hamas imposed by some donors, have further restricted the operational space of international NGOs in Gaza.
**ELECTRICITY DEMAND/SUPPLY IN MEGAWATTS (MW)**

- **Deficit**
  - Egypt
    - Jan: 30 MW
    - Apr: 120 MW
    - June: 80 MW
  - Israel
    - Jan: 60 MW
    - Apr: 120 MW
    - June: 80 MW
  - GPP
    - Jan: 30 MW
    - Apr: 120 MW
    - June: 80 MW

Until mid-April 2017: 240 MW

Mid-April - mid-June 2017: 300 MW

From late June 2017: 280 MW

**GAZA STRIP TOTAL**

- **450 MW Demand**
  - Deficit: 80%
  - Percentage of demand met

**SALARY CUTS**

- **Staff in the Health, Education and Water and Sanitation Sectors**
  - Non-working staff paid by West Bank-based PA: 19%, 4,984
  - Working staff paid by the West Bank-based PA: 23%, 5,903
  - Working staff paid by Hamas authorities: Irregular payments: 58%, 15,055

**30-50% cut since March 2017**

**WATER SUPPLY IN GAZA FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMER**

- **110 L/C/D** Produced Water

- **4-6 Hrs** of electricity available/day

- **3-5 Hrs** of water available/day every 5 days

**66 L/C/D** Reach Households

- **30%** lost due to network leaks

**HEALTH**

**FINANCIAL APPROVALS OF MEDICAL REFERRALS (# OF PATIENTS)* - 2017**

**AVERAGE WAITING TIME FOR E.N.T. * ELECTIVE SURGERY AT SHIHA HOSPITAL (IN MONTHS) - 2017**

**DIARRHEA CASES AMONG CHILDREN UNDER 3 - 2017**

*Financial approvals are granted by the West Bank-based Ministry of Health

*ENT: Ear, nose and throat

*Postponement of elective surgeries is a measure adopted by hospitals to cope with the energy shortages.

*The incidence of diarrhea is an indicator of the quality of water, sanitation and hygiene services and habits.
KEY FACTS

- By the end of 2016, there were 572 fixed movement obstacles, including 44 permanently-staffed checkpoints, 52 partially-staffed checkpoints, and 376 roadblocks, earthmounds and road gates.1

- More than 100 additional obstacles, including 18 permanent checkpoints, segregate part of the Israeli-controlled area Hebron city (H2) from the rest of the city.

- While the number of obstacles has remained largely constant in recent years, the types have changed: dozens of roadblocks were turned into road gates and some checkpoints are only occasionally staffed, allowing greater mobility when tension declines.

- In 2016, Israeli forces deployed an average of 107 ad-hoc ‘flying’ checkpoints along West Bank roads each week.

- Over 400 kilometres of roads are prohibited or highly restricted for Palestinian-plateled vehicles, excluding military roads and roads inside settlements.

- About 88,000 Palestinians living in 23 localities are forced to use detours, which are two to five times longer than the direct route, to reach the closest city or service centre, excluding East Jerusalem.

- Some 85% of the 712 kilometres-long Barrier’s route runs inside the West Bank rather than along the “Green Line”. Where the Barrier is complete, currently 65% of the route, most Palestinian farmers must obtain special permits or ‘prior coordination’ to reach their land isolated between the Barrier and the Green Line.

- Palestinians holding West Bank IDs require permits to enter East Jerusalem, except men over 55 and women over 50. Between 2011 and 2015, on average, 17% of the permit applications by patients seeking access to East Jerusalem or Israeli hospitals were rejected.

- Access to 20% of the West Bank is prohibited by military order on the grounds that the area is designated as a ‘firing zone’ for military training, or as a border buffer zone.

- Palestinians access to the over 10% of the West Bank lying within the municipal boundaries of Israeli settlements, is prohibited by military order; farmers can reach their private land within or around settlements twice a year at most, subject to ‘prior coordination’.

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1. Excluding checkpoints on the Green Line, ad-hoc ‘flying’ checkpoints, and closures within Hebron city.
2. International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004.
JAYYUS
Access of Jayyus’ farmers to most of their agricultural land, which is isolated behind the Barrier, is subject to a restrictive permit regime, and is possible only through a designated gate, undermining the village’s main source of livelihood.

HIZMA
Citing the need to prevent stone throwing at Israeli vehicles, in 2016, the army blocked the main entrances to Hizma village (6,500 residents) for 37 days, hampering people’s access to services, as well the commercial life in the village.

KAFR AQAB
Kafr Aqab falls within the municipal boundary of Jerusalem but is separated from the rest of the city by the Barrier. Residents must cross a checkpoint to access services and places of work in the rest of the city, and the municipality has effectively stopped delivering services in the area.

BANI NA’IM
Since the end of 2015, the army has blocked some or all of the main entrances to Bani Na’im (26,500 people) for prolonged periods, following attacks against Israelis carried out in other locations by residents of the town, disrupting access to services and livelihoods.

HEBRON H2
Over 100 checkpoints and roadblocks separate the settlement area of Hebron city, from the rest of the city. Several streets within this area are designated for the exclusive use of settlers and Palestinian traffic is banned.

NABLUS BYPASS ROAD:
The Nablus bypass road, which connects Elon Moreh settlement to the south, has been largely banned for Palestinian use since 2000, blocking the main route into Beit Dajan village (4,200 people) and impeding access to farming land by six Palestinian villages.
Over 60 percent of the West Bank is considered Area C, where Israel retains near exclusive control, including over law enforcement, access and movement, and planning and construction.

Some 300,000 Palestinians live in 532 residential areas located partially or fully in Area C, alongside 400,000 Israeli settlers residing in approximately 230 settlements, some of them (‘outposts’) established without the formal approval by the Israeli authorities, but with their support.

Less than 1% of Area C is covered by a planning scheme for Palestinian communities approved by the Israeli authorities.

The annual average rate of approval of applications for building permits in Area C for Palestinians between 2009 and 2016 stood at less than 3%.

Between 2009 and 2016, Israel demolished over 4,000 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C on the grounds of lack of building permits, while over 12,500 demolition orders are currently outstanding.

Palestinian entry to, or residence in, nearly 30% of Area C is prohibited on the grounds that the area is designated as a ‘firing zone’ for military training; 6,200 Palestinians living in 38 communities in these areas face the risk of forcible transfer.

The development or cultivation of 14% of Area C designated by Israel as ‘nature reserves is severely restricted.

More than 70% of communities located entirely or mostly in Area C are not connected to the water network and rely on tanker water at vastly increased cost. Water consumption in some Area C communities drops to 20% of the minimum recommended standard (20 out of 100 litres per day per capita).

Nearly half of the Area C communities report that their access to emergency and basic health care is hampered by the long distances to the nearest clinic, and/or the need to pass a checkpoint.

Were Palestinians allowed to access and develop Area C without the current restrictions, Palestinian GDP would increase by an estimated 35% [The World Bank, 2013].

1. The restrictive planning regime applied by Israel in Area C makes it virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits, impeding the development of adequate housing, infrastructure and livelihoods. Public (also called ‘state’) land has been automatically allocated to Israeli settlements or for military training, while most private Palestinian land is zoned as agricultural land, where construction is severely restricted. Along with other constraints, this regime contributes to the creation of a coercive environment on residents, leading to risk of forcible transfer.

2. Palestinian homes, animal shelters, water cisterns and service infrastructure built without permits in Area C are routinely destroyed or seized, displacing already vulnerable families and disrupting their livelihoods. Humanitarian assistance provided in Area C, some of it in response to demolitions/seizures, has been also increasingly targeted in recent years. Demolitions and displacement have led to entrenched poverty and increased aid dependency among residents of affected communities. The psychosocial impact of demolitions and displacement on children is disproportionally high.

3. Due to the restrictive planning regime, most Palestinian communities in Area C are not connected to the water network, and/or face impediments on the rehabilitation of existing connections and the construction or repair of water cisterns. This situation forces already vulnerable households to buy water from private vendors, at rates up to five times the price of piped water. The recent reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee may facilitate an improvement in the water supply to some Area C communities but the results are yet to be seen.

4. Over a third of Palestinian communities in Area C lack a primary school, forcing children to travel or walk long distances to reach the nearest school. Some of these children face additional challenges on their way to school, such as the need to cross a checkpoint, or exposure to harassment by Israeli settlers. To cope with this situation, affected families often move out of the community, leave their children during the week with relatives in the community where the school is located, or entirely withdraw them from school, a practice particularly affecting girls.

5. As an occupying power, Israel has the obligation under international humanitarian law to ensure that the basic needs of Palestinians living in the territory it occupies, including in Area C, are met. Where needed, Israel must agree to, and facilitate, the delivery of humanitarian relief and protection. The destruction of private or public property is prohibited, unless absolutely required for military operations. Also prohibited is the forcible transfer of Palestinian civilians, including within the occupied territory, as well as the transfer of part of Israel’s population into the occupied territory.
PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS IN AREA C BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY (2013)

Approx. 300,000 Palestinians

- Village: 125,460 (42%)
- City/Town: 123,189 (41%)
- Hamlet/Encampment: 31,456 (11%)
- Refugee Camp: 17,795 (6%)

Source: OCHA 2013

COMMUNITIES PARTIALLY / TOTALLY IN AREA C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of built-up area in Area C</th>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Estimated residents in Area C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 50%</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>175,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 99%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>67,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>297,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA 2013

DEMOLITION ORDERS AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN AREA C BY STATUS: 1988-2016

16,087 demolition orders

- Ready for execution: 3%
- File closed: 1%
- Executed: 21%
- On hold due to legal proceedings: 18%
- In Process: 57%

Source: Israeli Civil Administration

PALESTINIAN STRUCTURES DEMOLISHED/SEIZED IN AREA C

Houses in the Palestinian Bedouin community of Arab al Jahalin al Jabal, east of Jerusalem, against the backdrop of the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adummim.

© Photo by OCHA.
Around 320,000 Palestinians currently reside in East Jerusalem, in addition to 212,000 Israeli settlers who reside in the settlements which have been constructed and expanded since 1967, contrary to international law.

Since 1967, over 14,500 Palestinians have had their Jerusalem residency revoked by the Israeli authorities.

Approximately 4.5 million Palestinians from the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) are prohibited from residing in East Jerusalem and cannot enter the city without Israeli-issued permits, which are difficult to obtain. Those who obtain permits can only use three of the 13 checkpoints along the Barrier.

Tens of thousands of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are physically separated from the urban centre by the Barrier and are effectively abandoned by the municipality; they must cross crowded checkpoints to access health, education and other services to which they are entitled as residents of Jerusalem.

35% of the land in East Jerusalem has been confiscated for Israeli settlement use; only 13% of East Jerusalem is zoned for Palestinian construction, much of which is already built up.

At least a third of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack Israeli-issued building permits, which are difficult to obtain, potentially placing over 100,000 residents at risk of displacement.

Since 2000, the Israeli authorities have demolished some 1,400 houses and other structures in East Jerusalem. In 2016, East Jerusalem recorded the highest number of demolitions since 2000.

At least 180 Palestinian households in East Jerusalem are at risk of forced displacement due to settler activities, particularly in the Old City, Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhoods.

There is a chronic shortage of classrooms in East Jerusalem: 2,600 additional classrooms are required to accommodate Palestinian children and many existing facilities are substandard or unsuitable.

76% of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and 83% of the children live below the Israel-defined poverty line.

1. Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and of the surrounding West Bank hinterland contravenes international law and it is not recognized by the international community.\(^1\) Israeli settlement activity in East Jerusalem is illegal and occurs at the expense of land and resources for Palestinian construction and development.

2. Many Palestinians in East Jerusalem are at risk of forcible displacement from demolitions, settler evictions and revocation of residency, due to their lack of a secure legal residency status. In the long term, failure to address these factors risks undermining the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem.

3. Palestinians in East Jerusalem benefit from certain advantages compared to their counterparts in the rest of the West Bank, in particular regarding freedom of movement and access to the Israeli health system. However, they face significant constraints in accessing housing and services due to a combination of a restrictive planning system and a discriminatory allocation of municipal resources.

4. Due to the Barrier’s deviation from the Israeli-declared municipal boundary, certain Palestinian areas in East Jerusalem are physically separated from the urban centre, and have been effectively abandoned by the municipality. Basic facilities and services are degraded or lacking entirely, forcing residents to cross checkpoints to access health, education and other services to which they are entitled. The Palestinian Authority has no jurisdiction in these areas and the Israeli police seldom enter, thus creating a security vacuum manifested in unsupervised/wildcat building, as well as increasing lawlessness, crime and drug trafficking.

5. Israeli measures, including the annexation of land, the construction of the Barrier, and the use of the permit regime, have increasingly cut off East Jerusalem from the rest of the oPt. These measures impede access of Palestinians from the rest of the oPt to services in East Jerusalem, including health facilities that provide specialised and emergency health services. Physical and bureaucratic obstacles also restrict access of medical staff to hospitals and clinics, access of students to their schools, and the enjoyment from normal family life.

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\(^1\) See UN Security Council resolutions 252, 267, 471, 476 and 478.
The official municipal boundaries of Israeli settlements, which cover more than 10% of the West Bank, are declared ‘closed military areas’ and are off-limits for Palestinians. Over 400 kilometres of West Bank roads serving Israeli settlers (excluding internal settlement roads) are prohibited or highly restricted for Palestinian-plated vehicles, citing security concerns. Over 800 Palestinians in East Jerusalem are currently at risk of eviction due to legal cases initiated under the Israeli court system, mainly by settler organizations claiming ownership over the properties.

1. Settlements are illegal under international humanitarian law as they violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of the occupying power’s civilian population into occupied territory. The establishment and constant expansion of settlements has also involved the infringement on the human rights of Palestinians, including the right to property, to freedom of movement and to equality before the law.

2. The official seizure of land for the establishment and expansion of settlements, alongside the takeover of land by settler groups, have deprived Palestinians of their property and reduced the space available for them to sustain their livelihoods. In some areas, this has also affected the access of Palestinians to water sources used for irrigation, livestock and domestic consumption. The loss of land and water resources has increased the vulnerability of rural communities, generating the need for humanitarian interventions, including food and cash assistance.

3. The Israeli authorities’ failure to adequately enforce the rule of law on Israeli settlers has increased the level of threat to Palestinians and their property in many West Bank areas. This has included not only the failure to hold perpetrators of attacks accountable, but also the retroactive “legalization” of settlements built on Palestinian land taken over by force. Despite this, in recent years the Israeli authorities have adopted some preventive measures which have contributed to a decline in the frequency of settler attacks.

4. Many of the restrictions on Palestinian movement, which undermine access to basic services and livelihoods, are imposed to protect Israeli settlements and facilitate their daily life, at the expense of Palestinians. The Israeli authorities have justified most of the Barrier’s deviations from the from the Green Line, which resulted in the isolation of Palestinian land and communities, by the need to protect the settlements blocs from Palestinian attack. Many checkpoints and roadblocks divert Palestinian traffic from certain roads serving the settler population, onto secondary and longer routes. Farmers are allowed to reach their land within or around the outer limits of settlements twice a year at most, subject to prior approval by the Israeli authorities.

5. The loss of land, exposure to violence and/or access restrictions, along with the application of a restrictive planning regime, have generated a coercive environment placing many of these Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer. This risk is particularly high among Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities in areas planned for settlement expansion; those living in and around properties in East Jerusalem purchased or claimed by settler organizations; and those living in the vicinity of the settlement compounds in Hebron city.

1. Out of a sample of 1,174 cases monitored by the Israeli organization Yesh Din.
2. This has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the United Nations Security Council.
Between 2009 and 2016, Israeli authorities demolished or seized over 4,800 Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank, mostly in Area C and East Jerusalem.

Less than 1% of Area C and some 13% of East Jerusalem have Israeli approved plans, allowing Palestinians to apply for building permits.

The average rate of approval of applications for building permits for Palestinians in Area C in 2009-2016 stood at less than 3%. There are currently over 12,500 demolition orders pending against Palestinian property in Area C.

More than 70% of communities located entirely or mostly in Area C are not connected to the water network and rely on tankered water at vastly increased cost.

46 Palestinian Bedouin communities in the central West Bank, home to some 8,000 Palestinians, the majority registered Palestine refugees, have been targeted by the Israeli authorities for “relocation” to a number of designated sites.

Nearly 30% of Area C is designated as “firing zones” for Israeli military training where residency or access is prohibited. These areas are home to over 6,200 Palestinians at risk of eviction.

Access of Palestinian farmers to land isolated by the Barrier is restricted to 84 agricultural gates, of which 65 operate only during the olive harvest.

Over 14,500 East Jerusalem Palestinians have had their IDs revoked since 1967.

At least a third of Palestinians in East Jerusalem live in unlicensed homes and face the risk of demolition and displacement. Over 800 Palestinians are at risk of eviction due to legal cases initiated mostly by Israeli settler organizations.

Nearly a third of the housing units in the settlement-affected area of Hebron city were abandoned by their Palestinian residents and are currently vacant.

1. Many Palestinians across the occupied West Bank, particularly in Area C, East Jerusalem, and the settlement area of Hebron city (H2), are at risk of forcible transfer. Certain Israeli policies and practices applied in these areas create a coercive environment, which generates pressure on Palestinians to leave their communities. These include the demolition and threat of demolition of homes, schools and livelihoods; denial of service infrastructure; access restrictions on farming and grazing land; poor law enforcement on violent settlers; the active promotion of ‘relocation’ plans; and revocation of residency rights, among others.

2. The restrictive and discriminatory planning regime applied in Area C and East Jerusalem makes it virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain the requisite Israeli building permits. Public and confiscated land in those areas has been allocated almost exclusively to Israeli settlements or to the military. Most private land has been zoned as agricultural or ‘green’, or not planned, impeding the issuance of permits in these areas. To meet their housing and livelihood needs, many Palestinians are left with little choice than to build without permits, risking demolition and displacement, or to move elsewhere.

3. Access to large agricultural areas across Area C is prohibited or severely restricted, undermining the livelihoods of Palestinian communities, especially areas between the Barrier and the Green Line, and Palestinian farmland within or next to Israeli settlements, which can be reached only a few days a year. Access to traditional grazing land in areas designated as ‘firing zones’ is prohibited. Cultivation or grazing in areas declared as ‘nature reserves’ is heavily restricted.

4. The Israeli authorities have facilitated the takeover by Israeli settlers of properties in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and Hebron city (H2) and the establishment of settlements there. In many cases this has involved the eviction of families residing in those properties and generated a range of restrictions for those living nearby, including on the use of public space, on residential growth and on freedom of movement.

5. Most Palestinians living in annexed East Jerusalem are considered ‘permanent residents’ of Israel under Israeli law. While this status ensures some social and economic rights, it can be revoked on various grounds, forcing people to leave the city or preventing them from returning. This has been implemented mainly towards Palestinians who failed to prove that Jerusalem is their ‘centre of life’, or who have obtained residency in another country.

1. “Displacement and relocation to alternative residential areas, as a result of demolition orders, and a coercive environment, could amount to individual and mass forcible transfer and forced evictions, contrary to the obligations of Israel under international humanitarian and human rights law,” Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/31/43, 20 January 2016, para. 68.