

مجموعة الرقابة الفلسطينية



PALESTINIAN MONITORING GROUP

TREND ANALYSIS

Under the Pretext of Security: Colonization and Displacement in the Occupied Jordan Valley

1. Introduction

Situated along the eastern border of the Occupied West Bank, the Jordan Valley is of critical geopolitical importance given its large land area and abundant water and agricultural resources.¹ Since the beginning of its occupation in 1967, Israel has employed a number of measures to reinforce exclusive Israeli control over the area, including: seizing Palestinian-owned land; building and expanding Israeli settlements; declaring large areas as “closed military zones”; placing other movement restrictions; and destroying private Palestinian property. Combined, these measures have systematically functioned to increase Israel’s military and settler presence in the area, while **creating untenable living conditions** for the region’s Palestinian residents.

Statements by Israeli leaders, along with facts on the ground, strongly suggest that Israel intends to retain control over the Jordan Valley as part of its “convergence” plan. Toward this end, Israel has **entrenched its closure regime** in the area; Palestinian movement within the Valley and between it and other parts of the West Bank is impeded by checkpoints. In the northern Jordan Valley, access is denied to all Palestinians whose official place of residence is outside the northern Jordan Valley – some 2 million Palestinians – unless they obtain access permits from the Israeli military. Palestinians who have always resided in the northern Jordan Valley, but whose official place of residence is in neighbouring towns, are **at risk of being forcibly displaced** during Israeli army raids. In effect, while Israel has abandoned its plan to build a physical Wall along the Jordan Valley, its measures have created a **virtual wall** that isolates the Jordan Valley from the remainder of the Occupied West Bank.

This Trend Analysis examines Israeli practices ranging from settlement construction and land confiscation to the closure policy and destruction of Palestinian property.² In so doing, the report demonstrates how, under the pretext of security, Israel has prolonged its colonization of the Jordan Valley by consistently reducing the space available to Palestinian communities, generating the **conditions for their displacement**, and creating “facts on the ground” that impede the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.

¹ This report is based on Palestinian Monitoring Group (PMG) Daily Situation Reports, PMG field work, and information obtained from the PA Ministries of Local Government, Planning, Civil Affairs, Waqf and Religious Affairs, Education and Higher Education, and Health, the Palestinian Land Authority, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

² A subsequent PMG report will focus on viability issues in the Jordan Valley area, including control over water and agricultural resources and the economic impact of Israeli policy.

2. Background

There exists **no consensus as to the precise borders that demarcate the Occupied Jordan Valley in the West Bank**, primarily as a result of the various definitions utilized by each of the political regimes that have ruled the area over the past century.³ Generally speaking, however, the Jordan Valley area of the Occupied West Bank is bound by the 1967 border to the north and south, by the Jordan River and the Dead Sea to the east, and by the eastern slopes of the West Bank mountain ridge to the west. Defined as such, the Jordan Valley area constitutes more than a quarter of the total area of the West Bank.

In addition to its sizeable land area, the Jordan Valley is a region renowned for its rich agricultural land, its abundant water resources, and its famed historical and religious sites, hence its vitality on the geo-political, demographic, and economic levels. Its most populous city, Jericho (*Ariha*), is widely believed by historians to be the world's oldest, continuously inhabited city. Politically, **the Jordan Valley is the border area between the West Bank and Jordan. Thus, it would be one of the two land links between a Palestinian state and the world.**⁴

Israel's Definition of the Jordan Valley & its Importance

Israel's definition of the "Jordan Valley" is shaped by what Israeli leaders deem to be strategic and military considerations that date back to 1967 and result in the incorporation of a much larger swathe of land into the definition of the Jordan Valley than do strictly geographic definitions.

At the heart of these considerations is the "Allon plan". In 1967, **Yigal Allon**, Israel's then Deputy Prime Minister and later its Foreign Minister, proposed the creation of "defensible borders" for Israel by *inter alia* imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, or what he **specified as an area covering some 700 square miles (1,813.5 km² or 32 per cent of the West Bank area)**. In 1976, Allon publicly articulated his plan in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*:⁵

...[A]part from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of 'the green line,' **this same goal [i.e. "strategic depth and defensible borders"] can be achieved through absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab population**, concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samarian and Judean mountains [West Bank mountains] to the west—from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. **The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population.** Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule [bold emphasis added].⁶

The "Allon plan" – as it became known – has guided the various measures the Israeli military has imposed over the Valley since the beginning of the occupation. Numerous Israeli leaders, including Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, Benjamin Netanyahu, Shaul Mofaz, and Ehud Olmert⁷ have insisted on the importance of maintaining control over an average of a 10-20-kilometres-wide strip of land along the West Bank's Jordan Valley border, allegedly to safeguard Israel's security. Indeed, it was the Allon plan that provided a critical impetus for Israel's illegal settlement construction and expansion in the Jordan Valley area, particularly in the 10 years following the 1967 war (see *Figure 1* below).⁸ Its impact on Israeli policy towards the Jordan Valley continues to date.

³ West Bank Jordan Valley areas that are at and below sea level alone amount to 762 km² or 13.486 per cent of the West Bank's land area. Palestinian Ministry of Planning.

⁴ The other land link is Rafah in the Gaza Strip.

⁵ The plan was first presented by Allon in 1967 to the then Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and was finalized in 1970.

⁶ Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, 55 (1), p. 47.

⁷ For example, see: Dore Gold, "After the Hamas Victory: The Increasing Importance of Israel's Strategic Barrier in the Jordan Valley," *Jerusalem Issue Brief* 5 (17), 7 February 2006. The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA), Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. URL: < <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-17.htm>>.

⁸ Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its civilian population to the territory it occupies. In addition, Article 8 (b, viii) of the 1988 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines the establishment of settlements as a war crime indictable by the ICC.

3. Palestinian Communities

There are a total of **44 Palestinian localities** in the Jordan Valley area, some of which are located along the slopes of the West Bank mountain ridge (*see attached map*).⁹ Of these, 17 have a chiefly nomadic population and the remaining 27 are primarily sedentary communities with an **approximate population of 56,000** (see *Annex I*).¹⁰ The majority of the population (about 76 per cent) resides in the Jericho Governorate. Refugees constitute **an estimated 39 per cent of the population (21,677)**, of whom about 1/3 live in Aqbat Jaber and 'Ein as Sultan refugee camps.¹¹

Jordan Valley communities are **primarily dependent on agriculture and animal grazing**. They occupy a built-up area of approximately 20 km²,¹² and have a total structural plan area of at least 58 km².¹³

There are **38 schools** in the region serving roughly 13,000 students and employing about 700 teachers.¹⁴ Approximately half of the teachers reside outside the locality in which they teach, a percentage that has been reached following efforts by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education, as well as UNRWA, to diminish the impact of closure on the ability of teachers to access their schools.

The area, nonetheless, remains dependent on urban centers in Jericho, Nablus, and Tubas for educational services, especially secondary and undergraduate education. Similarly, there is considerable dependence on health services in the cities of Jericho, Jenin, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem, which makes access difficulties stemming from Israeli checkpoints of great consequence (see *Section 4.4* below).

General Stabilization in Population Figures for Palestinian Localities in the Jordan Valley Area

Prior to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, **the size of the refugee and non-refugee population of the Jordan Valley area was larger than it is currently.** This is partly due to the high level of displacement that occurred during the June 1967 war. For example, according to UNRWA, the population of Aqbat Jaber refugee camp decreased from 28,008 in June 1967 to 4,991 in September 1967. Likewise, the population of 'Ein as Sultan refugee camp decreased from 19,042 to 2,310 between June and September 1967. However, in the almost 4 decades since then, Israeli policy has limited livelihood options and development prospects in the Jordan Valley area and there has been extremely limited or no growth in numerous Palestinian locales. By 2005, the population of Aqbat Jaber had reached only 5,510, while that of 'Ein as Sultan stood at 1,723.

Additionally, some **localities were entirely depopulated during the war and later completely destroyed by Israel**, like Nuwei'ma and al 'Ajajra refugee camps as well as Al Himma, As Sakout, Ad Deir, Khirbet Jabaris, and Marj al Ghazal. Following a decree from the late Palestinian President Yassir 'Arafat, Marj al Ghazal was rebuilt and now has a population of 385, the majority of whom are refugees.

⁹ As noted, there is no consensus regarding the precise borders demarcating the "Jordan Valley" in the West Bank. For the purposes of this report, the PMG has included all Palestinian locales located at or below sea level, those located east of the Allon road, and those west of the Allon road that lie within an Israeli-declared closed military zone and/or are directly impacted by Israel's closure of the Jordan Valley area.

¹⁰ This figure is based on information obtained from PCBS, the Palestinian Ministries of Planning and Local Government, and UNRWA. Many of these localities are not recognized by the Israeli authorities, especially those inhabited by a predominantly nomadic population.

¹¹ Total figures are *estimated numbers* that were calculated based on raw data obtained from both PCBS (1997) and UNRWA (2005)—please see *Annex I*. Among these, only the figures for Aqbat Jaber and 'Ein as Sultan refugee camps are those voluntarily supplied to UNRWA by *registered* refugees whereas the remaining UNRWA figures are estimates provided to UNRWA by social workers, municipalities, and local committees, among others.

¹² Palestinian Ministries of Planning and Local Government.

¹³ Palestinian Ministry of Local Government. The structural plan generally refers to the area that has been allocated to meet the current and future development needs of a particular locale, and in which regulations regarding land use and construction have been specified in order to best meet those needs.

¹⁴ Calculations were made based on raw data from the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education. Data exclude Beit Hasan, An Nassariya, and Al 'Aqrabaniya.

4. Colonizing and Controlling the Jordan Valley

4.1 Building Israeli Settlements

Among the first Israeli settlements to be built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) were in the Jordan Valley, such as Argaman, Mehola, and Qalya, which were built in 1968 in the central, northern, and southern Jordan Valley respectively. In fact, in the 10 years following the 1967 war, 21 Israeli settlements were built in the Jordan Valley area (see *Figure 1* below).

Currently, there are **38 settlements** in the Jordan Valley area, **constituting some 20 per cent of Israeli settlements in the OPT**. These settlements have a settler population of roughly 9,400 and a built-up area exceeding 15 km².¹⁵


Many Israeli settlements in the OPT have a jurisdictional area that is at least double their built-up area. The ratio for Jordan Valley settlements is often times bigger; for example, the jurisdictional area of Rimonim settlement is over 10 times its built-up area.

The 38 Jordan Valley settlements fall under the authority of the 2 largest settlement Regional Councils in the Occupied West Bank, namely, Beqa'ot Hayarden (Jordan Valley) and Megillot (Dead Sea). Unlike the 4 other settlement Regional Councils that have 10-25 per cent of land within their bounds brought under the jurisdiction of the Regional Council, in the Jordan Valley the Regional Councils have 90-100 per cent of the area's land brought under their jurisdiction. As such, **nearly all the Jordan Valley area has been officially**

sanctioned by Israel as a land reserve for future Israeli settlement expansion. In addition to these 38 settlements are **7 settlement outposts** that were established in the post-Oslo era¹⁷ and numerous **Israeli military bases**.¹⁸

The majority of Israeli settlements, 24, are located in the central Jordan Valley area, with an additional 10 settlements located in the north and 4 in the south. Settlements are primarily concentrated along 2 major

Figure 1: Settlement Construction (excluding outposts) in the Jordan Valley by Establishment Date, 1967—1989¹⁶



¹⁵ Palestinian Ministries of Planning and Local Government. The total number of settlements excludes the settlement of Elisha, which was evacuated during the current Palestinian *Intifada*. Israel's colonial settlements in the Jordan Valley in alphabetical order are: Almog, Argaman, Araqzia, Avenat, Beit Ha'arava, Bitronot (or Shila or Brosh), Bkaot, Elisha, En Hogla (or Mehane Nevo), Gilgal, Gitit, Hamra, Hemdat, Kochav Hashachar, Lido Yehuda, Ma'ale Efrayim, Maskiyot, Masu'a, Mehola, Mekhora, Mitzpe Daragot, Mitzpe Shalem, Mitzpe Yericho, Na'ama, Netiv Hagdood, Niran, North Dead Sea Solar Ponds, Patzael, Pelas, Qalya, Rimonim, Ro'i, Rotem, Shadmot Mehola, Tomer, Tzori, Vered Yericho, Yafit, and Yitav. The estimated settler population excludes the population figures for Araqzia, Avenat, Bitronot, En Hogla, Lido Yehuda, Mitzpe Daragot, North Dead Sea Solar Ponds, Pelas, Rotem, and Tzori, which are unavailable.

¹⁶ The settlements of Araqzia, Lido Yehuda, Avenat and North Dead Sea Solar Ponds are not included. The settlement of Elisha is included.

¹⁷ The outposts are: Givat Salit, Ma'ale Shlomo, Ma'ale Shlomo South, Mitzpe Kramim, Mul Nevo, Yitav East, and Mevo'ot Yericho. Palestinian Ministry of Planning.

¹⁸ Ibid.

roads: (1) **Road #90**, which runs north-south along the Jordan River; and (2) what is referred to as **the Allon Road**, built in the 1970s along the eastern slopes of the West Bank mountain range. Israeli settlements are also located along the 4 east-west, settler by-pass roads that connect Road #90 with the Allon Road. One of these east-west links connects the Jordan Valley to Tel Aviv (the Trans-Samaria Highway or Road #505) and another connects it to Occupied East Jerusalem and then to areas in Israel (Road #1).

Israeli settlements are continually expanding, especially in the Valley's centre and north, and new infrastructure is being established, such as the current construction of a Jewish religious university in Wadi al Malih in the north. This is **consistent with Israeli government plans** to double the Israeli settler population in the Jordan Valley area by 2008;¹⁹ more than NIS 500 million were approved by the Israeli government between 2003 and 2005 to attract new settlers, through building new housing units and tourist sites, providing agricultural subsidies and tax-cuts, and offering grants to couples who newly settle in the Valley.²⁰ Moreover, Israeli media reported that in May 2006, Israeli military officials signed decrees ordering the expansion of several settlements, including Maskiyyot (est. 1987), which is slated to house evacuated Gaza settlers.²¹ This expansion would transform Maskiyyot from a quasi-military (*nahal*) settlement into an official settlement "locality". According to Israeli media, the settlements covered by the expansion orders are "earmarked to join settlement blocs that would be annexed to Israel under Olmert's plan for convergence."²²

Transforming settlements from military posts into civilian settlements is not a new phenomenon in the Jordan Valley; Patzael (est. 1972) and Gilgal (est. 1973) are but two examples of military posts that were later transformed into civilian settlements.²³ Though Israel argues that the Jordan Valley area is of important military value, only 6 to 8 settlements out of 38 (or 16-21 per cent) are of a predominately military nature.²⁴

4.2 Declaring "Closed Military Zones"

Under the pretext of "security", Israel has declared **more than 400 km² of the Jordan Valley (7 per cent of the OPT) as "closed military zones"**. These areas, which include open-fire zones and military training sites, are inaccessible to Palestinians.²⁵ A portion of this area includes dozens of minefields located east of Road #90, behind a 20-meter-wide fence structure that Israel set up along the Jordan River after the 1967 war.

By declaring such a large amount of land closed, Israel has drastically reduced **the amount of land available to Palestinians for agricultural and animal grazing activities, the major livelihood sources for Jordan Valley area communities**. These activities have also been seriously impeded by Israel's obstruction of Palestinian access to the water resources of the Jordan Valley area. In addition, Israel has reduced the amount of land available for projects designed to benefit Palestinian communities in the area; a large portion of the closed military area is owned by *Al Waqf* administration (religious endowment), which owns more than 80,000 dunums (20,000 acres) in the Jordan Valley area. This *Al Waqf* land is supposed to be utilized for the benefit of Palestinian communities (e.g. for community centers, orphanages, schools, etc.);²⁶ however, declaring large parts of it as a "closed military zone" renders the land useless for such a purpose.²⁷

¹⁹ Negotiations Support Unit (NSU), "Update on Israeli Settlement Activity and the Wall: 1 May – 31 August 2005," p. 3.

²⁰ Ibid; and NSU, "Summary of Recent Settlement Activity: Oct 1, 2003 – Feb 29, 2004," p. 1.

²¹ The orders for expansion had originally been signed by Shaul Mofaz in late 2005 when he was Defense Minister and later authorized by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. See Nadav Shragai and Amos Harel, "IDF authorizes expansion of West Bank town of Betar Iit," *Ha'aretz*, 22 May 2006.

²² Ibid.

²³ Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL).

²⁴ Palestinian Ministries of Local Government and Civil Affairs. Please note that some settlements retain part of the military character after having been transformed into a predominately civilian settlement (e.g. Hamra).

²⁵ Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL).

²⁶ Palestinian Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs. *Waqf* land is land that is held in trust by the *Waqf* administration and is intended for religious or cultural activities.

²⁷ Ibid.

To enforce the inaccessibility of military zones to Palestinians, the Israeli authorities have employed a number of “security” measures that strangle Palestinian communities. For example, between 1996 and 2000, Israeli policy was characterized by the demolition of makeshift tents of Palestinian Bedouins located in the closed military zones. Measures undertaken by the Israeli army in the post-2000 period have been primarily confined to **delivering notices through the District Coordinating Liaison (DCL) demanding that livestock owners evacuate a given military area** (see *Annex II*).


Violence by Israeli settlers towards Palestinian livestock owners in settlement-adjacent areas reinforces measures undertaken by the Israeli army to restrict Palestinian access to land in the Jordan Valley area. Such settler activity includes pursuing and assaulting Palestinians grazing sheep as well as opening fire towards animals. For example, on 11 June 2006, Israeli settlers from Mehola settlement pursued livestock owners, prevented them from grazing sheep in the vicinity of the settlement, opened fire in the air, and threatened to kill the shepherds. Also, on 28 May 2006, Israeli settlers opened fire towards a herd of Palestinian-owned camels near the village of Al ‘Auja (in the Jericho Governorate), killing 1 camel and injuring another”.²⁸

Israel’s Policy Targeting Livestock Owners in Closed Military Zones: Pre-1990 Approaches

Though the policy of prohibiting Palestinian access to closed military zones remains unchanged, prior to 1990, Israeli army practices that targeted livestock owners differed. According to Palestinian residents, previously employed measures included: using air patrols to pursue shepherds near military zones; verbally informing Palestinians that they were prohibited from owning animals and threatening those who failed to comply with the risk of being evacuated from their villages; confiscating or killing animals; physically assaulting sheep herders; imprisoning privately-owned sheep; and holding court trials between 1968 and 1987 to impose fines on Palestinian animal owners (e.g. 25 JDs per cow).



Sign posted at Israeli firing range in the northern Jordan Valley (May 2006)



Fences along the north-south area between the Jordan River and Road #90 that separate the West Bank from Jordan (May 2006)

²⁸ PMG Daily Situation Reports, 12 June 2006 and 29 May 2006.

4.3 Seizing Land

Another method Israel has employed to reinforce its control over land in the Jordan Valley area is for the Israeli army to **declare privately-owned Palestinian land as Israeli “state land”**. A recent example is an order signed by the Israeli army’s Head of State and Absentee Land on 29 December 2005 that declares 1,194.124 dunums (298.531 acres) of Al ‘Auja land as Israeli “state land” (see *Annex III*). This designation came despite the fact that this land was registered as *Al Waqf* (religious endowment) property prior to the 1967 war,²⁹ as proven by a land registration certificate that was recently re-issued (see *Annex IV*).³⁰

Additionally, the Israeli military issues orders for land confiscation. In 2005, Israeli military orders were issued to confiscate 120.777 dunums (30.194 acres) of land in the Jordan Valley area. The Israeli military “justified” the confiscation of all of this land on the grounds that it is for “military purposes” and most orders provide further details of these purposes.³¹ Approximately **57 per cent of land confiscated in 2005 in the Jordan Valley through military orders was for military checkpoints** – be it their construction, maintenance, expansion, or transfer to other locations – that are used to deny Palestinians free movement throughout the area (see *Table 1* below).³²

Table 1: 2005 Land Confiscation Orders Affecting the Jordan Valley by Purpose and Amount

No. of Orders	Stated Reason for Confiscation	Amount (Dunums)	Remarks	% of Total Land Confiscated
4	Checkpoints ³³	59.5	Of which 11 is an extension for Musa al 'Alami checkpoint	49.27
1	Transferring a checkpoint	10	-	8.28
7	Surveillance Points	31.55	Of which 0.8 seized through an announcement and the rest through military orders	26.12
2	Setting up security devices around settlements	0.027	1 around Al Hamra, and 1 around Mekhora	0.02
1	Military Bases	19.7	Huhet military base	16.31
15	-	120.777	-	100

Issuing military orders for land confiscation, however, is only one of the methods Israel uses to effectively seize Palestinian land.³⁴ Orders for land confiscation do not include land in the Closed Zone located between

²⁹ See *supra* note 26.

³⁰ Palestinian Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs.

³¹ Please note that the Israeli army occasionally issues an announcement that alters the purpose for which a land confiscation order was initially issued.

³² Order numbers of confiscation orders issued in 2005 by the Israeli military that affect land in the Jordan Valley and neighbouring mountain ridges are: T/03/95 (a 5th extension of a previous order); T/78/05; T/79/05; T/142/05; T/160/05; T/162/05; T/180/05; T/181/05; T/192/05; T/199/05; T/205/05; T/207/05; T/207/05; T/217/05; and T/221/05.

³³ Please note that land confiscation orders for checkpoints or surveillance points are usually continually renewed.

³⁴ Israeli settlers have also participated in the *de-facto* seizure of Palestinian-owned land; for instance, according to Al ‘Auja Village Council, a settler from Yitav settlement seized control over 1,000—2,000 dunums (250—500 acres) of Al ‘Auja agricultural land next to Yitav checkpoint, under the protection of the Israeli army.

the Wall and the 1967 border to which Palestinians have little or no access. Nor do they include land that was previously declared “state land” over which the Israeli military has yet to exercise direct control. In 2003, the Israeli army issued military order #T/81/03 for the confiscation of 424 dunums (106 acres) of land from the northern Jordan Valley area and neighboring towns for “military purposes.” This land later turned out to be for Wall construction along the north-eastern edge of the 1967 border; however, the Ministry of Civil Affairs reports that much more land was effectively seized in the process of constructing the 40-km-long Wall in the northern Jordan Valley in 2004³⁵ because Palestinians have been denied the right to cultivate their land or carry out any construction on either side of the Wall.³⁶

4.4 Restricting Movement and Access

Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement into and within the Jordan Valley area have intensified considerably over the course of the last 1 ½ years. These restrictions are made possible through the placement of military checkpoints at major road intersections and the imposition of a permit regime that governs entry into Jordan Valley areas east of the Allon road as well as movement between the northern and southern areas of the Jordan Valley. Combined, these measures function as a **virtual wall** that separates the Jordan Valley area, particularly its northern part, from the remainder of the Occupied West Bank.

There are currently 6 Israeli checkpoints in the Jordan Valley area, all of which were established after the beginning of the current *Intifada* in September 2000. These are: DCO; Caramello (At Tayba); Ma’ale Efrayim; Al Hamra; Tayasir; and Yitav checkpoints (see table in *Annex V* for detailed information on each of these checkpoints).³⁷ **Five (5) of the checkpoints are located at major road intersections between the Jordan Valley and other West Bank Governorates and 1 separates the northern Jordan Valley area from the southern Jericho Governorate.**³⁸ Flying checkpoints, which in 2005 totaled 298 in the Jericho governorate alone, further consolidate the restrictive measures implemented at the area’s 6 permanent checkpoints.

In general, the checkpoints function to enforce Israel’s closure of the Jordan Valley through obstructing Palestinian pedestrian and vehicular traffic and entirely prohibiting it under situations of total closure. In the past year, however, this general practice has acquired a new dimension. **Since March 2005, the Israeli army has implemented additional measures to separate the northern Jordan Valley area from the remainder of the West Bank as well as from the southern parts of the Valley.**³⁹ According to the Palestinian District Coordinating Liaison (DCL), some of these measures had been selectively applied since 2001, but were only officially implemented after March 2005. Additionally, residents of the Jordan Valley stress that while actual procedures are not always strictly adhered to by Israeli soldiers positioned at checkpoints, this phenomenon should not be understood as arbitrary since it occurs frequently and, hence, seems to be part of a larger policy that seeks to make further difficult the movement of Palestinians.

A Palestinian’s age, place of residence, and profession are now part of the criteria necessary for being able to travel to and from the Jordan Valley. **Obtaining a permit for internal travel is required for** Palestinians wishing to travel to the northern Jordan Valley through Al Hamra or Tayasir checkpoints and whose addresses on their IDs are outside the northern Jordan Valley area. The permit requirement also applies to

³⁵ 200 plant nurseries were destroyed in Kardala, Bardala, and ‘Ein el Beida during the process of Wall construction. Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL).

³⁶ The Israeli army issued a prohibition of construction order (1/04/7564) that prohibits construction near the Wall segment in the Northern Jordan Valley. Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL).

³⁷ Al ‘Alami checkpoint, through which passengers to Jordan must pass, is not included as it deals only with movement to and from the border with Jordan.

³⁸ As indicated in *Annex V*, until recently, the Jordan Valley area had 7 permanent checkpoints. However, Ad Duyuk checkpoint, which was established in 2000, was removed in April 2006.

³⁹ On 16 March 2005, the Palestinian Authority resumed security responsibility over the city of Jericho and Al ‘Auja, among others, in accordance with the Jericho Protocol. However, this agreement has been violated numerous times by the Israeli army through its raids and imposition of curfew on those areas. For more information, see PMG Monthly Summary Reports.

those whose ID cards indicate that they reside in the northern Jordan Valley and other parts of the West Bank and who wish to travel southwards to Jericho city and its suburbs through Yitav checkpoint. Traveling direct to Jericho via Route #90 is no longer possible as the Israeli military has closed with cement blocks the segment of the road between the village of Al 'Auja and Jericho city.

According to the Palestinian District Liaison Office in Jericho, between 1 January and 28 March 2006, there were 1,066 permit applications submitted by Jordan Valley residents for crossing internal checkpoints.⁴⁰ Of these, approximately 74 per cent (788) were accepted and 10 per cent (106) were under inspection. By comparison, there were only 37 permit applications for accessing Occupied East Jerusalem and areas within Israel for personal needs (e.g. medical or family reasons), almost all of which (36) were rejected.⁴¹ Although approval rates of permit applications for crossing into the Jordan Valley area are higher than those for accessing Occupied East Jerusalem as well as Israel, **Israel's unilaterally-created permit requirement still denies Palestinians their basic right to visit relatives, work, cultivate their land, and travel in the Occupied Jordan Valley without obtaining permission from the Israeli military.**



Tayasir Checkpoint between Tubas and Jenin & the northern Jordan Valley (May 2006)

Unrestricted access to the northern Jordan Valley is also denied to Palestinians who have always resided in the northern Jordan Valley but who hold IDs that indicate addresses in nearby Tammun or Tubas. This is particularly significant as many northern Jordan Valley communities are a natural expansion of neighbouring towns. Palestinians on both sides of Al Hamra and Tayasir checkpoints are part of the same extended families that have owned land in the Valley for decades. Furthermore, northern Jordan Valley communities have shared services with others west of the major checkpoints as a result of being part of the same Governorate (Tubas). Yet, most of the Palestinians who have resided in the northern Jordan Valley but hold IDs that indicate addresses in nearby towns are forced to apply for an **address change** or are at risk of being forcibly displaced from their homes in the northern Jordan Valley. For example, between 9:30pm and 11pm on 02 June 2006, the Israeli army raided the village of 'Ein al Beida – which is located east of Road #90 in the northern Jordan Valley – imposed curfew, searched a number of houses, and expelled 3 families,

⁴⁰ This constitutes more than one third of the permit applications submitted to the Israeli District Coordinating Office (DCO) during that period and is the second highest figure after permit applications for merchants to enter Israel.

⁴¹ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL). There are no earlier figures available for comparison as the Palestinian DCL previously refused to coordinate applications for permits to cross internal checkpoints on the grounds that this provided legitimacy to the Israeli military's permit requirement within the West Bank. However, after receiving numerous requests from civilians who needed assistance, the Palestinian coordinating office began submitting permit applications on behalf of civilians.

claiming that their ID cards do not indicate that they are residents of the village. The families include 9 children and 1 toddler. One of the families was only visiting relatives in 'Ein el Beida.⁴²

As a result, the **number of Palestinians in the Jordan valley who have officially changed their places of residence has increased dramatically** from 945 in 2004 to 1,935 in 2005 and reached an unprecedented 3,000 in the first four months of 2006.⁴³ Palestinians who do not change their addresses fear traveling to other parts of the West Bank, lest they are prohibited from returning to their homes by Israeli troops positioned at checkpoints, or risk being forcibly displaced during Israeli army raids on their villages. Some of those expelled try to return by crossing through military areas and avoiding the main roads, hoping that they will not be stopped by Israeli army patrols.

Palestinians who *do* have their addresses changed, however, sometimes risk being **charged a fine at checkpoints if the address listed on their IDs does not match that in the computerized database used by the Israeli military**. The Palestinian DCL has received complaints about such cases wherein the fine per civilian reached up to NIS 500 (approximately US\$ 114) and/or the civilian's ID was confiscated. Between 1 January 2006 and 25 April 2006, the DCL returned 190 ID cards confiscated by the Israeli army at checkpoints to their owners, which is only a fraction of the total number of ID cards confiscated since some are never returned or are destroyed by the Israeli army. The possession of an ID card is required for passage through any Israeli checkpoint; therefore, those whose IDs are confiscated are unable to move beyond their immediate locale until their ID cards are returned or they obtain new ones.

In January 2006, the Israeli army began implementing a new procedure in the Jordan Valley area by making **registration lists of Palestinian Bedouins** who work primarily in seasonal agricultural activities or raise livestock in the Jordan Valley area. Those whose names are on the registration lists are allowed to pass through checkpoints without acquiring access permits, while those who refuse to have their names registered are **at risk of being displaced** under the pretext that their place of residence is elsewhere. This increases the pressure placed on this segment of the Palestinian population, which has already been economically strangled by being prohibited from accessing areas declared as closed military zones.⁴⁴

The aforementioned measures targeting Palestinians wishing to travel to and maintain residence in the Jordan Valley area – in particular the permit regime – resemble those applied to Palestinians wishing to enter Occupied East Jerusalem or the Closed Zone between the Wall and the 1967 border, wherein the territory in question is, in effect, treated as Israeli territory and Palestinians are thus subject to measures similar to those required to enter Israel. Israel's intensified measures vis-à-vis the Jordan Valley area **signal its clear intent to de-facto annex the area**.

Impact of Closure

The impact of Israel's closure practices on Palestinians is immense; they hamper the ability of Jordan Valley farmers who reside in the northern districts of the West Bank (a majority) from accessing their land. Not only are non-resident land owners in need of permits to access their property, but they also face difficulties in hiring laborers from other parts of the West Bank as *they* also need permits.⁴⁵

⁴² PMG field work.

⁴³ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL), which in turn obtained the figures from the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, Jericho.

⁴⁴ There were two preceding periods wherein the Israeli army prepared registration lists of Palestinians residing in the Jordan Valley; the first was in late 2004 during preparations for Wall construction and the second was in early 2005 for Palestinians living in the central region of the Jordan Valley (i.e. northern Jericho Governorate), such as residents of Az Zubeidat, Marj Na'ja, and Marj al Ghazal. Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL).

⁴⁵ As previously noted, the impact of Israeli policies on the agricultural sector, among others, will be addressed in an upcoming PMG report.

Moreover, farmers incur additional costs due to transportation delays and increased spoilage of agricultural products at checkpoints that reduces their value. These problems have become even more acute following the closure of Bisan checkpoint terminal and the re-routing of commercial traffic into Israel to the Jalama checkpoint terminal, north of Jenin.⁴⁶ The Jalama checkpoint terminal is much farther away – in some cases taking farmers 4 hours to reach due to movement restrictions along the way – and area farmers report that it is sometimes closed, without prior notice, for “security reasons.”

While Palestinian farmers now face increased difficulty in carrying out their work, Palestinian taxi and service drivers residing in the northern Jordan Valley who are **under 35 years of age now need to search for entirely new jobs** because they are not permitted to cross Al Hamra or Tayasir checkpoints.

By depriving Palestinians of their sources of livelihood, Israel’s military checkpoints contribute to the **inability of Jordan Valley residents to live and make a living in the Jordan Valley**. Indeed, in the Jericho Governorate alone, **unemployment reached 13.64 per cent in 2005**, the highest figure since the beginning of the current *Intifada*.⁴⁷

Israeli checkpoints also have a damaging impact on the provision of health services to Palestinian residents of the Jordan Valley area. As with other West Bank locales, there is a high dependency on health services in urban centers, particularly for specialized medical care. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the Jericho public hospital is the only hospital in the Jordan Valley area. However, given the dispersion of Palestinian localities throughout the Jordan Valley area along with the number of Israeli checkpoints and the intensity of restrictions imposed therein, Jordan Valley area residents often face greater difficulty obtaining health services than in other parts of the West Bank.

Additionally, medical staff working in clinics located throughout the area face great difficulty carrying out their work. According to the Offices of the Ministry of Health in the city of Jericho, which sends staff to local clinics, doctors and nurses who reside outside the Jordan Valley area face difficulty reaching the Ministry office in Jericho and then encounter significant hardship attempting to move from the main office to treat patients in local clinics, some of which are located up to 75-km-away from Jericho city. Given high temperature levels in the Jordan Valley area, delays at Israeli checkpoints often times result in the spoilage of medicine being transported by Ministry staff, even though it is transported in portable refrigerators.

Palestinian access to education is similarly restricted by Israeli closures. Most schools in the Jordan Valley area provide only elementary education and, hence, students are required to commute to other locales for secondary education, passing through checkpoints on a daily basis. Likewise, checkpoint delays negatively affect the ability of university students to regularly attend classes in cities adjacent to the Jordan Valley area as well as the ability of school teachers to commute to schools in the area.⁴⁸

Also affected are Palestinians returning from Jordan through Allenby Crossing who are forced to take a long detour route through Ma’ale Efrayim or At Tayba checkpoints (that increase travel distance to more than 100 km) to reach the northern area of the West Bank, unless they apply for and receive a permit to travel through the northern Jordan Valley via Yitav checkpoint and then either via Al Hamra or Tayasir checkpoints.

Repercussions of Israeli-imposed movement restrictions become even more severe during periods of total closure where even university students, medical personnel,⁴⁹ and permit holders are prohibited from crossing through certain checkpoints.

⁴⁶ Palestinian commercial trucks have been prohibited from crossing since 03 October 2005. Palestinians holding West Bank IDs and possessing permits to enter Israel have been barred from crossing through Bisan checkpoint terminal since 28 February 2006.

⁴⁷ Calculations made based on raw data from PCBS.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Education and Higher Education.

⁴⁹ Ministries of Education, Health, and Civil Affairs.

4.5 Demolishing Houses and Other Destruction of Property

Palestinian residents of the Jordan Valley face the constant threat of having their houses and livestock barracks demolished by the Israeli military on the basis that they were built without the required licenses. These practices are hardly new. As in Occupied East Jerusalem, since 1967, Israeli military authorities have consistently refused to provide building permits for Palestinians residing in certain Jordan Valley localities.

With the signing of the Oslo accords, Israeli demolition practices were slightly altered; **demolition practices now apply primarily to localities in Area C**, which falls under Israeli security and administrative control and wherein building permits must be granted by the Israeli military. However, about 90 per cent of the Jordan Valley area is designated as Area C and, hence, a zone where demolition of Palestinian property is always a possibility.⁵⁰ As noted previously, a high percentage of the area's land has been brought under the jurisdiction of the 2 largest Israeli Settlement Regional Councils in the West Bank, meaning that nearly all the Jordan Valley area has already been officially sanctioned by Israel as a land reserve for future Israeli settlement expansion.⁵¹

Of particular importance, the built-up areas of **20 out of the 44 Palestinian localities located in the Jordan Valley area, are located in Area C.**⁵² These areas comprise 22 per cent of the total built-up area for Palestinian communities in the Jordan Valley area.

Many Palestinians who apply for building permits receive rejections from the Israeli military, while others refrain from applying because they are aware that building permits for new construction are rarely granted. The same applies for those wishing to renovate houses that were built before 1967 but are now located within Area C. Among the most prominent examples of the difficulties Palestinians face in obtaining a building permit is the case of Al Jiftlik, home to 4,401 Palestinians and located in Area C. There is no school in Al Jiftlik, so students attend classes in tents. Despite the graveness of this situation, it took over 1 year for the Israeli military to grant permission to construct a school (construction was subsequently suspended due to the absence of funding).⁵³ According to records from the Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs, **this is one of only two cases where building permits for construction in Area C were granted for Jordan Valley residents.** The other was for the construction of an unpaved road.

In addition to houses, numerous Palestinian educational and medical facilities, like clinics and schools, face the threat of demolition. On 24 April 2006, the Israeli army notified Palestinian residents of Wadi al Malih in the northern Jordan Valley area that it would close and demolish one medical clinic, a clinic that was set up in a tent to provide medical services to residents of the area.⁵⁴ Notices of demolition are not empty threats; according to the Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs, between 2001 and 2005, in 81 per cent of the cases in which demolition notifications were reported to the Ministry, demolition actually took place.⁵⁵

The Israeli army also targets with demolition makeshift tents and livestock barracks inside Palestinian localities, like Al Jiftlik, Al 'Auja, Fasayil, 'Ein el Beida, and those in Al Buqei'a and Al Malih. As noted previously, while earlier periods – for example between 1996 and 2000 – were characterized by the Israeli military's destruction of livestock facilities in areas designated as "closed military zones", direct attacks on

⁵⁰ Around 60 per cent (3,393/5,655 km²) of the West Bank is Area C, of which 1,178 km² are located in the Jordan Valley area, or more than 1/3. Palestinian Ministry of Planning.

⁵¹ See p. 4 above.

⁵² Palestinian Ministry of Local Government.

⁵³ Funding was suspended following the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections.

⁵⁴ PMG Daily Situation Report, 25 April 2006.

⁵⁵ Between 2001 and 2005, records of the Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho DCL, show that there were 340 reported cases of civilians being notified about the demolition of their property. During the same period, there were 277 reported cases where demolition took place. Also, 35 per cent of the notifications were received in 2005 and 21.6 per cent of the demolitions occurred in 2005.

livestock owners continue to date, now under the additional pretext that construction is prohibited in areas designated as Area C *inside* Palestinian localities.

Furthermore, farmers in the Jordan Valley have increasingly suffered from having their **agricultural equipment confiscated, their vendor stalls on both sides of Road #90 destroyed, and/or their agricultural produce set on fire by the Israeli army.** For example, of the 174 instances in which civilian property was confiscated over the first five years of the current *Intifada*, 34.5 per cent of those confiscations occurred in 2005. In general, the Israel army destroys farmers' property using bulldozers and armored vehicles and fails to give property owners prior warning of immediate demolition. According to vendors, in some cases, the pretext for demolition was that vendors' stalls need to be placed 20-meters away from Road #90. However, even when vendors adhered to that stipulation, their stalls were still demolished.

5. Conclusion

“I believe that in four years' time Israel will be disengaged from the vast majority of the Palestinian population, within new borders...In any case, our security border will be along the Jordan. There are strategic considerations for this that we cannot relinquish.”

~ Ehud Olmert, Israel's Prime Minister, quoted in *Ha'aretz*, 10 March 2006

Contrary to Yigal Allon's 1976 assertion that it was largely “devoid of population,” the Jordan Valley area has had established Palestinian communities since well before the onset of Israel's occupation in 1967. However, since then, **Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Jordan Valley area has systematically and progressively debilitated the ability of Palestinian residents to carry out any of the basic activities necessary for their existence.**

Routine activities, such as raising livestock, growing and marketing agricultural products, building houses, schools, and clinics, accessing their property, maintaining employment, traveling within the Valley and to other parts of the West Bank, and even maintaining residency status in the Jordan Valley, have become extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible.

Decades of Israeli military measures have systematically reduced the space available for Palestinian development, primarily through the seizure of land and restrictions on Palestinian movement in the area. They have **lead to either the forced displacement of Palestinians or to the creation of displacement conditions through harsh and untenable living conditions.** Thus, the very existence of Palestinians residing there is under threat. At the same time, the Israeli government continues to approve plans that encourage sustained colonial expansion in the Jordan Valley.

Recent statements by Israeli leaders, along with facts on the ground, strongly suggest that Israel intends to retain control over the Jordan Valley as part of its “convergence” plan. Israel's recent intensification of measures restricting Palestinian movement both into and within the Jordan Valley area resembles those applied to Occupied East Jerusalem and the Closed Zone between the Wall and the 1967 border. Much of the Jordan Valley area is already effectively treated as Israeli territory where Palestinian residents face permit requirements similar to those for entering Israel.

The potential impact of Israeli measures on the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is colossal; not only are Palestinians' economic activities on the eastern border of the West Bank destabilized, but the land reserve necessary for the development of a future Palestinian state is itself being swallowed. In other words, Israeli measures in the Jordan Valley are unilaterally imposing a vision of final status that undermines the two-state solution, the cornerstone of a negotiated peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

**ANNEX I: POPULATION SIZE AND REFUGEE FIGURES IN THE JORDAN VALLEY
AREA BY LOCALITY AND GOVERNORATE**

NAME	GOVERNORATE ¹	POPULATION SIZE (2005) ²	ESTIMATED NO. OF REFUGEES ⁵	
Al 'Auja	Jericho	4,010	453	Below Sea Level
Al Jiftlik	Jericho	4,401	42	
An Nabi Musa	Jericho	N/A	44	Nomadic Population
An Nuwei'ma	Jericho	1,165	89	
Aqbat Jaber Refugee Camp	Jericho	5,510 ³	5,510	
Az Zubeidat	Jericho	1,340	929	
Deir al Qilt	Jericho	N/A	N/A	
Deir Hajla	Jericho	N/A	N/A	
Deir Quruntul	Jericho	N/A	N/A	
'Ein ad Duyuk al Foqa	Jericho	814	45	
'Ein ad Duyuk at Tahta	Jericho	967	54	
'Ein as Sultan Refugee Camp	Jericho	1,723 ³	1,723	
Fasayil	Jericho	900	299	
Jericho (Ariha)	Jericho	20,416	9000	
Marj al Ghazal	Jericho	385	261	
Marj Na'ja	Jericho	767	351	
TOTAL	JERICHO	42,398	18,800	
Al 'Aqrabaniya	Nablus	895	483	
An Nassariya	Nablus	1,354	784	
Ar Rajman	Nablus	N/A	N/A	
Beit Hasan	Nablus	1,192	423	
Duma	Nablus	2,220	89	
'Ein Shibli	Nablus	198	141	
Furush Beit Dajan	Nablus	1,159	216	
Jafa an Nun	Nablus	N/A	N/A	
Khirbet al Marajim	Nablus	N/A	N/A	
Khirbet Tall al Ghar	Nablus	N/A	1	
Khirbet Tana	Nablus	N/A	N/A	
Majdal Bani Fadil	Nablus	2,184	3	
Shihda wa Hamlan	Nablus	N/A	21	
Tall al Khashaba	Nablus	N/A	2	
TOTAL	NABLUS	9,202	2,163	
Badiw al Mu'arrajat	Ramallah	799	415	
TOTAL	RAMALLAH	799	415	
Al 'Aqaba	Tubas	300 ⁴	N/A	
Al Farisiya	Tubas	213	15	
Al Hadidiya	Tubas	183	N/A	
Al Malih	Tubas	206	N/A	
Bardala	Tubas	1,577	230	
'Ein el Beida	Tubas	1,081	13	
Ibziq	Tubas	N/A	N/A	
Kardala	Tubas	165	8	
Khirbet ar Ras al Ahmar	Tubas	N/A	N/A	
Khirbet 'Atuf	Tubas	N/A	N/A	
Khirbet Humsa	Tubas	N/A	N/A	
Khirbet Tell el Himma	Tubas	N/A	33	
Khirbet Yarza	Tubas	N/A	N/A	
TOTAL	TUBAS	3,725	299	
GRAND TOTAL	-	56,124	21,677	

¹ According to PCBS's Governorate divisions.

² PCBS, 2005. Note that these are projected mid-2005 population figures based on the 1997 Census.

³ 2005 estimated population. Data requested from UNRWA by the PMG.

⁴ Negotiations Support Unit, Negotiations Affairs Department.

⁵ The numbers for the Nablus, Ramallah, and Tubas Governorates as well as for Az Zubeidat, Marj al Ghazal, Marj Na'ja, and An Nabi Musa in the Jericho Governorate are from the 1997 PCBS estimates. The figures for the remaining localities in the Jericho Governorate are 2005 figures provided to the PMG by UNRWA. Please see *supra* note 10.

ANNEX III: DECLARATION OF LAND AS ISRAELI STATE PROPERTY⁵⁷

Israeli Defence Forces
Civil Administration of the Area of Judea and Samaria
The Officer in Charge of the Properties of the State and Absentees in the Area of Judea and Samaria
Order Concerning the Properties of the Government (Judea and Samaria)
(No. 59) – 1967

Declaration on the Properties of the State

With reference to the powers bestowed upon me in accordance with Article (2 C) under the Order Concerning the Properties of the State (Judea and Samaria) (No. 59) – 1967, I hereby declare that the area which is detailed in the Annex and marked on the attached map is properties of the state.

Each person who wishes to receive interpretations or another explanation to make clear the content of this Declaration of the Properties of the State or with regard to the Annex shall have the right to head to the Office of the Officer in Charge of the Properties of the State and Absentees at the District Coordination Office in Jericho on Sunday through Thursday from 08:00 until 14:00 or call by telephone no. 02-9941434, 02-9943865 or 050-6218079.

Each person who has any claim or challenge against the content of this certificate shall have the right to submit a challenge to the Committee of Challenges which is present at Ofer Camp near the village of Beituniya in the district of Ramallah within **45** days from the day on which this Declaration is disseminated.

Date: **December 29, 2005**

Yosi Sigal
The Office of the Officer in Charge of the
Properties of the State and Absentees

Annex


The piece of land as registered in accordance with the Register of Lands, Block – 32 – Piece – 1 of the land of the village of Al ‘Auja in the district of Jericho.

The area of the land is approximately 1,194 dunums (in accordance with the registration in the Register of Lands) of the village of Al Auja.

A map which shows the boundaries of the land is available at the Office of the Officer in Charge of the Properties of the State and Absentees at the District Coordination Office in Jericho.

⁵⁷ PMG translation. Original order on file at the PMG.

**ANNEX IV: LAND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE FOR
PIECE 1 OF BLOCK 32, AL 'AUJA⁵⁸**



**Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Department of Lands and Survey
Land Registration Certificate**

**Issued forth with reference to the Decision of the
Council of Ministers, issued on 3/10/1995 A.D.**

This entry includes one page only (1/1)
District: Jericho Lands **Village:** Al 'Auja **Name &
 No. of Block:** 33 Al Baghlat al Qibliya
Parcel No.: 1
Type of Land: Miri / Waqf
 Dunums Square Metres
Area: 1194 124

Name of controller	Interests	Notes
Department of Islamic Endowments and Affairs	1	Miri - real Waqf
Grand Total of Interests =	1	

Date of Certificate: 27/02/2006
 Employee's Name and Signature:
Fees paid according to receipts no. (exempted from fees) Date: 27/02/2006

- Important Note:**
1. This registration represents the fact on ~~(the register)~~ (list of titles) ~~(lists of claims)~~ as it is on 31/5/1967
 2. This certificate shall not be valid for the purposes of selling, purchasing and concluding of contracts.
 3. The Department of Lands and Survey shall bear no consequences or responsibilities which may result from this certificate.
 4. The registrations derived from the lists of claims shall be non-final.

Director of Legal Affairs
 Documentation and Photocopying Head of Section
 Tayseer al 'Assaf

⁵⁸ PMG translation. Original order on file at the PMG.

ANNEX V: ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY AREA⁵⁹

Location	Date of Establishment	Permit Requirements	Restrictions Related to:		
			Age	Place of Residence	Profession
DCO (24 hours): Controls movement between Jerusalem and Jordan Valley					
<i>Southern entrance to the city of Jericho, near Road #1 that connects Jerusalem to the Jordan Valley</i>	2001	* In situations of total closure, holders of WB IDs, excluding Jericho Governorate residents, need to apply for crossing permits	* No current age restrictions; Jericho ID holders under 30 years of age were forbidden from exiting the city of Jericho from 1 April – 12 May 2006	* Jerusalem ID holders occasionally prohibited from entering the city of Jericho	* Students, teachers, medical personnel, and those traveling to Jordan do not need permits to cross checkpoints
Ad Duyuk Checkpoint: Controlled movement between Ramallah and the Jordan Valley					
<i>North-eastern entrance to the city of Jericho, on Road # 449 (Al Mu'arrajat) which leads to Ramallah through Caramello Checkpoint</i>	2001	-	Checkpoint was removed on 26 April 2006 , in accordance with the Jericho Protocol, but the infrastructure still remains →Past measures: * Free movement for holders of Jericho city and Al 'Auja village IDs; permits required for other WB ID holders; permit exception for students, teachers, medical personnel, and those traveling to Jordan * The checkpoint was closed from 8 pm to 5 am, between 14 February & 5 April 2006, in violation of the Jericho Protocol * Jericho ID holders under 30 years of age prevented from exiting, between 1 & 5 April 2006 * All Palestinians allowed to enter and exit between 5 April and 26 April '06		
Caramello (At Tayba)⁶⁰ (24 hours): Controls movement between Ramallah and Jordan Valley					
<i>At the intersection between Road #449 (Al Mu'arrajat, that connects Road #90 to the Allon road) and the Allon Road (segment # 458)</i>	2000	-	* No restrictions * Palestinians from the northern West Bank districts and Jericho governorate began using this checkpoint, as a result of the policy of separating the central and northern JV from its southern part and the remainder of the West Bank, thereby increasing travel times and cost		

⁵⁹ Information obtained from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jericho (District Coordinating Liaison—DCL).

⁶⁰ Alternative names for the checkpoint also include Rimoinim and Rammun.

Location	Date of Establishment	Permit Requirements	Restrictions Related to:		
			Age	Place of Residence	Profession
Ma'ale Efrayim (24 hours): Controls movement between Nablus/Salfit and the Jordan Valley					
At the intersection between Road #505 (Trans-Samaria Highway) and the Allon Road (between segments #508 and #458)	N/A	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * No restrictions * Palestinians who used to travel through Al Hamra checkpoint began using this checkpoint, as a result of the policy of separating the central and northern JV from its southern part and the remainder of the West Bank. In so doing, Palestinians are forced to travel up to an additional 120 km. 		
Al Hamra (5 am-10 pm): Controls movement between Nablus/Tubas and the Jordan Valley					
At the intersection between Road # 57 (that connects Road #90 to the Allon Road) and the Allon Road (between segments #578 and #508)	2002	* Jericho ID holders except residents of Al Jiftlik town, official residents of the northern Jordan Valley area west of the Allon road, and other West Bank ID holders need to apply for a permit to cross	* Official residents ⁶¹ of the northern Jordan Valley area east of the Allon road who are under 35 years of age are forbidden from crossing, as of 2 February 2006	* Only official residents of the northern Jordan Valley area east of the Allon road as well as Al Jiftlik town are allowed to cross, beginning in 2005	* Commercial truck drivers need a permit, after 15 March 2005 * Students, teachers, medical personnel, and farmers whose names are on the Israeli army's registration lists do not need permits to cross checkpoints
Tayasir (5 am-10 pm): Controls movement between Tubas/Jenin and the Jordan Valley					
On Road # 5799 that branches off from the Allon road (segment 578)	2001	* Jericho ID holders, official residents of the northern Jordan Valley area west of the Allon road, and other West Bank ID holders need to apply for a permit to cross	* Official residents of the northern Jordan Valley area east of the Allon road who are under 35 years of age are allowed to enter but forbidden from exiting, as of 2 February 2006	* Only official residents of the northern Jordan Valley area east of the Allon road (mainly Kardala, Bardala, and 'Ein el Beida) are allowed to cross, beginning in 2005	* Students, teachers, medical personnel, and farmers whose names are on the Israeli army's registration lists do not need permits to cross checkpoints
Yitav (24 hours): Controls movement between the northern & central Jordan Valley and Jericho City					
Located between Al Auja Town and Jericho City	2005	* Northern Jordan Valley and other WB ID holders need to apply for a permit to cross after 15 March 2005	* On various occasions, preventing residents of Jericho city and its suburbs and Al 'Auja village who do not have magnetic ID cards from crossing	* Only residents of Jericho city and its suburbs as well as Al 'Auja village are allowed to cross freely, after 15 March 2005	* Students, teachers, medical personnel, and farmers in Al 'Auja area do not need permits to cross checkpoints

⁶¹ For the purposes of this table, "official residents" means those whose residency in a particular locale is indicated on their IDs, as opposed to physical presence.