Overview

Words cannot express the enormity of the loss and human suffering sustained by the people of the Gaza Strip during the seven weeks of hostilities in July and August. It was the deadliest and most destructive escalation since the start of the Israeli occupation in 1967. At least 1,486 Palestinian civilians, including more than 500 children, were killed and around 11,000 people were injured, up to ten per cent of them with long-term or permanent impairments. Some half a million people were displaced at the height of hostilities, and approximately 108,000 were made homeless. Around 13 per cent of the housing stock was damaged, including up to 20,000 homes totally destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. The extensive damage to public infrastructure further undermined the already precarious access to basic services that prevailed prior to the conflict, including electricity, water and sanitation, health, and education.
Albeit to a lesser extent, the hostilities also had a severe impact on the Israeli civilian population. Communities in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip were under uninterrupted rocket and mortar fire, resulting in five civilian deaths, including one child, along with damage to property and mass displacement.

Tensions rose significantly in the West Bank in June, when the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli youths near Bethlehem triggered a large scale military operation. Later in the summer, protests against the Israeli attacks in Gaza resulted in the deaths of several Palestinians and a record number of injuries, prompting concerns of excessive use of force by Israeli forces. Also of concern during the reporting period were the resumption of punitive home demolitions and the declaration of extensive areas as ‘state land’; based on past experience, this is a precursor for the allocation of land for the expansion of settlements.

Despite the open-ended ceasefire reached on 26 August, the crisis in Gaza is far from over. The challenges ahead to address the immediate humanitarian needs and to launch reconstruction activities are enormous. Humanitarian actors have appealed for US$551 million to carry out over 100 projects. While 42 per cent of this sum has already been delivered or pledged, distribution among organizations has been uneven, leaving some organizations handling vital needs, particularly among non-refugees, largely unfunded.

Funding alone will be inadequate for Gaza to start a meaningful recovery; the establishment of a more permanent and stable ceasefire is required, as well as the lifting of the longstanding Israeli blockade of Gaza.

Finally, there must be accountability for the lives lost, homes destroyed and damage wrought in contravention of international law, to provide victims and survivors with the justice and compensation they deserve, and to deter repetition.

The donor conference expected to take place in Cairo on 12 October is a key opportunity for the international community to work towards transformational change in Gaza. Reconstruction is urgently needed, but financial pledges must be backed with political will to address the root causes of suffering and move from despair to hope.
WEST BANK

SHARP INCREASE IN CLASHES AND CASUALTIES ACROSS THE WEST BANK

Use of live ammunition by Israeli forces triggers concerns about excessive use of force.

The period between June and August 2014 was marked by heightened tensions across the West Bank, in which clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces intensified and led to casualties and many arrests of Palestinians (see section below on Arrests).

Initially triggered by Israeli military operations following the abduction and killing of three Israeli youths near Bethlehem on 12 June, the protests continued in the wake of the abduction and killing of a Palestinian boy in East Jerusalem on 2 July, and against the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. Stringent restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on Palestinian access to Al Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan (29 June to 27 July) also contributed to the tensions and clashes. These events exacerbated pre-existing frustrations resulting from ongoing settlement expansion and the collapse of peace negotiations.

According to the Israel Security Agency (previously known as the General Security Service or Shabak), July witnessed a record number of attacks carried out by Palestinians against Israeli forces and settlers across the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). A total of 507 attacks were recorded during that month, of which 90 per cent involved the throwing of firebombs, compared with less than 100 in May and June.1

In virtually all of the clashes, Palestinians threw stones, and in several cases Molotov cocktails and fireworks, at Israeli forces. The use of live fire against Israeli forces was also reported on a few occasions. Israeli forces responded by shooting tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, rubber bullets and live ammunition. The large number of Palestinian casualties during those incidents has prompted serious concerns about excessive use of force.2

Fatalities

Between 1 June and 31 August 2014, Israeli forces killed a total of 27 Palestinians throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, of whom five were children. This is more than double the number of Palestinians fatalities recorded in the first five months of the year, and equals the figure of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces during all of 2013. No fatalities were recorded among Israeli forces during these clashes.

Half of the fatalities (14) were incurred in clashes that erupted following protests against the Gaza hostilities and restrictions on access to Al Aqsa Mosque; seven deaths resulted from confrontations during search and arrest operations; one in the context of a clash following a settler attack;3 and the remaining five in unclear or disputed circumstances.

A third of all fatalities (nine) during this period, including three children, occurred in Hebron governorate. Of these, three people were killed on 25 July in Beit Ummar village...
Nearly a quarter of all Palestinian injuries during June-August (757) were from live ammunition, a sharp rise compared with previous periods, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of all injuries. For example, between January and May 2014, live ammunition accounted for 15 per cent of all injuries (147 people), in 2013 it was four per cent (161 people), and two per cent (60 people) in 2012. The remaining injuries during the three-month period resulted mainly from rubber and rubber-coated metal bullets, tear gas inhalation, and physical assault.

The highest number of injuries was in Jerusalem governorate (45 per cent). The frequency and intensity of clashes in Jerusalem, particularly within the Israeli-declared municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, peaked during the first week of July following the abduction and killing of a 16 year old boy from Shu’fat by a group of Israelis. The number of injuries increased again during the week of 22-28 July as a result of protests against the Gaza offensive and access restrictions to Al Aqsa Mosque during the final week of Ramadan: the total of 493 injuries was the highest recorded in a single week by OCHA in Jerusalem governorate since 2006. Overall, 38 Israeli forces were injured due to stone-throwing in the Jerusalem area and the

during a protest against the Israeli offensive on Gaza; one of the fatalities (aged 47) was a staff member with a Palestinian child rights organization, Defence for Children International. Further clashes afterwards led to the killing of another two men, one of them while attempting to help the other, who had been shot. According to eyewitnesses, the three fatalities were shot by snipers positioned on the rooftops of the surrounding buildings, and none of the victims were taking part in the confrontations or posing a threat to soldiers at the time of the incident.

Also in Hebron governorate, on 10 August in Al Fawwar camp (Hebron), Israeli forces shot and killed an 11-year-old boy in the back with live ammunition. Eyewitnesses reported that the incident occurred as Israeli forces were leaving the camp following a search and arrest operation and no stone throwing or clashes were ongoing at the time.4

Injuries

During the reporting period, Israeli forces injured at least 3,102 Palestinians, including 460 children, representing a three-fold increase on figures for injuries in the first five months of 2014. At least 48 members of the Israeli military and police forces were also injured during this period.

Nearly a quarter of all Palestinian injuries during this period (757) were from live ammunition, a sharp rise compared with previous periods, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of all injuries. For example, between January and May 2014, live ammunition accounted for 15 per cent of all injuries (147 people), in 2013 it was four per cent (161 people), and two per cent (60 people) in 2012. The remaining injuries during the three-month period resulted mainly from rubber and rubber-coated metal bullets, tear gas inhalation, and physical assault.
The period between June and August 2014 was marked by heightened tensions and clashes across the West Bank, alongside concerns over excessive use of force by Israeli forces in crowd control situations. The resulting rise in casualties started amid Israeli military operations triggered by the abduction and killing of three Israeli youths near Bethlehem, on 12 June, and continued in the context of protests against the abduction and killing of a Palestinian boy in East Jerusalem, on 2 July, and against the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip between 7 July and 26 August. These events exacerbated pre-existing tensions, including as a result of the continuous settlement expansion and the collapse of the peace negotiations.

In East Jerusalem, where crowd control is handled by the Israeli civil police there were no recorded Palestinian casualties (deaths or injuries) by live ammunition or by rubber-coated metal bullets. Although the intensity of protests and clashes in East Jerusalem was similar to those in West Bank areas, the Israeli civil police adopted regulations prohibiting the use of live ammunition and rubber-coated metal bullets for crowd control, unlike the Israeli army and Border Police.\

Infrastructure of the Jerusalem light train in Shu‘fat and Beit Hanina neighbourhoods was set on fire.

In East Jerusalem municipal areas located on the ‘Jerusalem side’ of the Barrier, where crowd control is handled by the Israeli civil police (also referred as the ‘blue police’), there were no recorded Palestinian casualties (deaths or injuries) by live ammunition or by rubber-coated metal bullets. Although the intensity of protests and clashes in East Jerusalem was similar to those in West Bank areas, the Israeli civil police adopted regulations prohibiting the use of live ammunition and rubber-coated metal bullets for crowd control, unlike the Israeli army and Border Police.
**Concerns over excessive use of force**

The increased number of fatalities and serious injuries highlights longstanding concerns over the use of force by Israeli forces in the West Bank, in cases documented by the UN in past years. According to initial information available, it appeared that the individuals killed or injured posed little or no threat to the soldiers at the time of the incident. This phenomenon is noted as a serious concern by the UN Secretary-General in a forthcoming report.

In the West Bank, Israeli forces act in a law enforcement capacity and are therefore bound by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Under these provisions, the use of firearms is only permitted in limited circumstances, primarily in self-defence or defence of others against imminent threat of death or serious injury. In any event, the intentional lethal use of firearms is only permissible when strictly unavoidable to protect life.

Criminal investigations have been opened by the Israeli military police into most of the fatalities occurring during the reporting period and the conclusions are all pending. While the opening of investigations is in itself positive, human rights organizations are concerned that this type of investigation is frequently not conducted in a thorough and robust manner as required by international law; some cases are subject to serious delays and remain open for years. No similar investigations have been opened into incidents that resulted in serious injuries.

The UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights have recommended a review, possible modification of and compliance with rules of engagement, meaningful accountability procedures, and reparation and remedy for victims.

**LARGE-SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WEST BANK FOLLOWING THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF THREE ISRAELI YOUTHS**

Around 2,200 Palestinians detained between June and August, many under administrative detention orders.

On 12 June, three Israeli youths were abducted and later killed on their way home from a religious school (yeshiva) in two Israeli settlements in the southern West Bank. The Israeli authorities held Hamas responsible and identified three Hamas activists as the perpetrators; one of them was subsequently arrested.
An extensive military campaign conducted throughout the West Bank following this incident included search and arrest operations, broad movement and access restrictions and raids on welfare organizations and universities. These last two measures were largely lifted following the discovery of the bodies of the Israeli youths on 30 June, but intense search operations continued throughout the reporting period to capture the two suspected perpetrators, and also in response to tensions and clashes following the abduction and killing of a Palestinian boy in East Jerusalem and protests against the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip.

The nature and scope of measures implemented by the Israeli authorities have raised concerns about collective punishment: Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes that civilians cannot be punished for an offence they have not personally committed and that all measures of intimidation against civilians are prohibited.

**Search and arrest operations**

The intense military operations launched on 13 June focused initially on the city of Hebron, but later expanded to refugee camps, villages and cities across the West Bank. Between June and August 2014, Israeli forces carried out a total of 1,470 search and arrest operations and detained around 2,200 Palestinians. The number of people detained in June (around 770) was almost double the monthly average of the previous five months and is the highest such figure recorded since OCHA established its Protection of Civilians database in 2005. Many of these operations triggered clashes with Israeli forces and resulted in a record number of casualties (see Casualties section above).

Many of the individuals detained, or whose houses were raided, were alleged Hamas and Islamic Jihad members. Dozens of them had previously been released in the 2011 prisoner exchange (the Shalit deal), and some were members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. While a full breakdown of the status of the detainees over the reporting period is currently unavailable, hundreds were held under administrative detention (i.e. imprisonment without charge or trial); according to Israeli official figures, by the end of August there were 473 administrative detainees, up from less than 200 at the end of May.

The largest number of detentions was recorded in the Jerusalem governorate. According to Israeli police records, around 200 Palestinian children were detained in East Jerusalem during this period, which is equivalent to the total number of children detained in each of 2012 and 2013 as recorded by UNOCHA.
The June operations primarily involved the search of thousands of Palestinian homes and many residents reported damage and theft. Hebron governorate was most affected: approximately 1,400 houses were raided, including at least 280 cases of reported damage to furniture and other belongings. At least 47 houses were occupied by Israeli forces for periods ranging from several hours to a few days.

**Welfare organizations raided**

During these military operations, several welfare organizations, allegedly linked to Hamas, were raided, computers and other equipment were confiscated, and some were shut down under military orders.

Most affected was Hebron’s Islamic Charitable Organization, which employs 680 staff and provides assistance to some 6,000 beneficiaries in the form of education, food, shelter and social safety nets for poor families. On 20 June, Israeli forces raided the organizations headquarters located in the Palestinian-controlled area of Hebron city (H1). They confiscated equipment, sealed the main door and affixed a closure order in force until the end of 2014. Three of the organization’s branches in Hebron governorate (Ash Shyyoukh, Bani Naim and Beit Ula) were also raided.

On 2 July, Israeli forces raided the Ar Rayan dairy factory also owned by the organization, in an Area C part of Hebron city, and confiscated all its equipment worth more than US$100,000. Two month later, the Israeli authorities demolished the factory on the grounds that it had been built without a permit and was subject to a pending demolition order from 2002 (See section below on Demolitions and Displacement).

While overall most of the organization’s educational and charity activities have continued, the closure of the headquarters and the requisition of computers has disrupted activities and hindered access to vital data.

**Tightened restrictions on movement**

Broad restrictions on movement imposed by Israel disrupted access by Palestinians to services, markets and workplaces, and resulted in significant economic losses. The bulk of these restrictions were implemented across Hebron governorate, focusing on Hebron city, and access was disrupted for over 680,000 residents, or around 25 per cent of the West Bank population.15

Three of the main entrances to Hebron city were closed to vehicular traffic, while access through the remaining three routes (Halhul, Nabi Yunis and Al Fahs) was subject to new checkpoints where Israeli soldiers check documentation and search vehicles, resulting in prolonged delays. Additional new checkpoints sprang up on routes in the vicinity of Hebron city, including the main entrances to Halhul, Dura and Idhna towns, and Al Fawwar refugee camp, where vehicles with Palestinian number plates were stopped for inspection. These new checkpoints were gradually lifted in the period after the discovery of the bodies of the three Israeli teens.
In addition, male residents of Hebron governorate aged between 20 and 50 years were subjected to restrictions preventing them from crossing the Wadi An Nar checkpoint, which controls the single route available to most Palestinians between the central and southern West Bank, and preventing travel to Jordan via the Allenby Bridge.

According to the Palestinian District Coordination Liaison Office (DCL), during the reporting period, around 23,000 permits for workers and 3,700 permits for businessmen to enter East Jerusalem and Israel were revoked, resulting in daily economic losses estimated at NIS12 million (approximately US$3.3 million). Other losses were incurred by blocking the export of products manufactured in Hebron to Israel.

**Responding to the emerging psycho-social impact**

Search and arrest operations, especially at night, can have a traumatic effect on family members, and particularly on children detained during such operations or exposed to the detention of others. These experiences have a pervasive impact on children’s self-confidence, family relationships, and future education and work opportunities. Many children suffer from increased levels of fear, insecurity, frustration, lethargy, depression and anger, sometimes developing hostile behaviour.

As part of the child protection response, 11 YMCA psychosocial (PSS) teams across the West Bank, composed of 11 counsellors and 22 volunteers, have been providing swift remedial assistance to children and their families. Between June and August, they conducted 518 interventions, providing support to 2,695 children, a dramatic increase over previous months. The majority of interventions were to support children and families affected by house raids (218), arrest and detention (160) and house demolitions (36).

The teams focused on care givers, providing them with techniques to protect and support children in challenging and traumatizing situations. They also conducted rapid needs assessments for referral to other actors in the community to ensure adequate support in terms of livelihoods, shelter and education. Children participated in therapy sessions and recreational activities to reduce feelings of stress and anxiety, and, where needed, received immediate counselling.

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**SCHOOL EXAMS DISRUPTED BY MILITARY OPERATIONS**

The Israeli military operations occurred during the period of the Tawjihi exams (the final high school exams for students in the oPt) and caused many disruptions to exam schedule. Clashes, restrictions on movement, checkpoints and the military occupation of homes and schools had a detrimental effect on students, both physically and psychologically, across the oPt, most notably in Hebron. Five schools within or next to Taffuh village in Hebron were reportedly occupied by Israeli forces. One of them, the Aesh Al Sayed Al Herbawi school for boys was occupied for four days (14-17 June) with minor damage to school facilities, as well as signs of urination in the kitchen and classrooms. The other four schools were occupied for several hours, and reported little or no damage. Several other schools were reportedly used as interrogation centers, including the Al Madama school (Nablus) on June 22.

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This section was contributed by YMCA and UNICEF

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Psychosocial teams conducted 518 interventions to support 2,695 children and their families affected by house raids, arrest and detention and house demolitions.

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*Information provided by the Education Cluster and its partners*
AREA C DEMOLITIONS DECLINE ALONGSIDE RESUMPTION OF PUNITIVE DEMOLITIONS AND HEIGHTENED RISK OF FORCIBLE TRANSFER

Ongoing impediments to the provision of assistance in Area C

During the reporting period, the Israeli authorities demolished a total of 82 Palestinian-owned structures across the West Bank, displacing nearly 200 people, 60 per cent of them children, and otherwise negatively affecting another 300. Although demolitions were fewer in number than during the beginning of the year and the equivalent period in 2013, the resumption of punitive and ‘military’ demolitions, and the advancement of a plan to ‘relocate’ entire Bedouin communities in Area C, were worrying developments.

Demolitions due to lack of permit

Of the 73 structures demolished or dismantled during this period due to lack of an Israeli construction permit, 60 were located in Area C and 13 were in East Jerusalem. Demolitions fell to their lowest level in July, which coincided with the month of Ramadan, when, as in previous years, the Israeli authorities suspend or significantly reduce demolitions.

Only nine demolitions were recorded in the Jordan Valley (all in the Al ‘Aqaba community), well below the number during the equivalent period in 2013 (102 demolitions). A series of demolitions took place in Hebron governorate following the abduction of the three Israeli youths. Other communities affected by demolitions across the West Bank throughout the reporting period were Bardala (Tubas), Al ‘Eizariya (Jerusalem), East At Tayba Bedouins (Ramallah), Tell Al Khasahbah (Nablus) and Wadi Rahhal (Bethlehem). Nine demolitions were documented in East Jerusalem, of which the most significant was a two-unit residential building in the At Tur neighbourhood, which displaced 16 people, including 11 children.

Demolition and seizure of donor-funded assistance

Despite the decline in demolitions, during the three month period the Israeli authorities continued to target resources provided to vulnerable families in Area C as humanitarian assistance.

Despite the overall decline in demolitions, during the three month period the Israeli authorities continued to target resources provided to vulnerable families in Area C as humanitarian assistance.

Palestinian refugee children from East Tayba Bedouin community, following the demolition of their home, 20 August 2014.

© Photo by: OCHA
intercepted and seized while on their way to the Bedouin community of Al Ganoub in Hebron. The trucks were reportedly returned to the implementing organization several weeks later, but the aid items were not released. On 30 June, 15 water tanks serving 26 families in the Khallet An Nahla area (Bethlehem) were also seized, while another 11 tanks were damaged during the incident.

**Heightened risk of forcible transfer**

Five structures demolished in Area C, one of them donor-funded, were located in the Az Za’yyem Bedouin community. This is one of several communities in the hills to the east of Jerusalem and in the central West Bank who are at risk of forcible transfer in an official ‘relocation plan’ advanced by the Israeli authorities. On 25 August, the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) deposited three of four residential outline plans for the creation of a new town in An Nuwe‘ma (Jericho), which will accommodate the transfer of the Bedouin and herder communities from their current places of residence. Interested parties were given 60 days to lodge objections to the plans with the ICA. The UN Secretary-General has stated previously that the implementation of the proposed ‘relocation’ would amount to individual and mass forcible transfers and forced evictions, prohibited under international humanitarian law and human rights law.

**Punitive demolitions**

The reporting period saw the resumption of the Israeli practice of punitive demolitions/sealing. Four houses were destroyed entirely and another was sealed. At least 27 people, including 13 children, were displaced as a result. The first demolition targeted a house belonging to the family of a Palestinian suspected of killing an Israeli policeman in Hebron in April 2014. The other four houses belonged to the families of three suspects accused of abducting and killing three Israeli youths in Hebron in June (see previous section).
The demolitions were carried out after the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) rejected petitions filed by the Israeli human rights organization, Hamoked, on behalf of the affected families and challenging the legality of the demolitions under international law on the grounds that they violate the prohibition on collective punishment, among other provisions. According to the Israeli authorities, the purpose of this type of demolition is to deter Palestinians from committing acts of violence against Israelis, although the practice was discontinued in 2005 after an Israeli military committee deemed it ineffective for that purpose.

**Demolitions in the course of military operations**

An additional demolition took place during this period in Qabalan village (Nablus - in Area B) during an arrest operation targeting a 24-year-old alleged member of an armed faction. When the man refused to surrender and opened fire, Israeli forces fired a rocket at the house, killing him and injuring six others in adjacent houses. Israeli forces subsequently demolished most of the house with a bulldozer, while two adjacent houses and a stone wall were damaged and a store destroyed. This is the second such incident since the beginning of the year. According to media reports, the demolition of a structure in which a suspect hides and refuses to surrender is the final stage of a procedure referred to by the Israeli military as a ‘pressure cooker’.18

**LARGE AREA IN BETHLEHEM DECLARED ‘STATE LAND’**

Based on past experience, the area is expected to be allocated for settlement development

On 25 August, the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) announced the declaration of 3,799 dunums of land (1 dunum = 1000 m²) in Bethlehem governorate as ‘state land’. This follows a case earlier this year, on 6 April 2014, in which the ICA had declared 1,000 dunums of land in Area C, also in Bethlehem governorate, to be ‘state land’.19 According to the Israeli media, this measure was approved by the Israeli cabinet in response to the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli youths in June.

The affected areas are adjacent to the Green Line and lie within the boundaries of Surif, Nahhalin, Husan, Al Jab’a and Wadi Fukin villages. People claiming private ownership of the land were given 45 days to submit an appeal before a military committee.

Once the process is complete, the area is expected to be officially incorporated within the boundaries of the settlement’s Regional Council of Gush Etzion.

While this procedure served in the past as the main tool for the seizure of land for the establishment of settlements, its use has been largely discontinued since the early 1990s. Hence, the resumption of this practice and the large size of the area affected may indicate a broader policy change.
The UN Secretary-General has called previously on Israel to cease the allocation of state land for the establishment and expansion of settlements. On 1 September, the spokesman for the UN Secretary-General stated that: “The seizure of such large swathes of land risks paving the way for further settlement activity, which- as the United Nations has reiterated on many occasions- is illegal under international law and runs totally counter to the pursuit of a two-state solution.”

Following a landmark ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1979 (the Elon Moreh case) forbidding the allocation of land requisitioned for military purposes for the establishment of settlements, the Israeli authorities developed a new policy based on an interpretation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. Despite many amendments introduced since, the Code has remained in force as the main source of rules regulating land rights in the West Bank.

The new policy builds on a provision in the Code stipulating that the state may take possession of land that is not cultivated for three consecutive years and declare it to be ‘state land’. The policy includes a new and restrictive interpretation of what constitutes ‘cultivation’ for the purposes of the Code, as well as a range of bureaucratic and legal hurdles undermining the ability of Palestinians to effectively challenge such land seizures.

According to Israeli official data, over 99 percent of all state land in Area C has been included within the jurisdictional boundaries of Israeli settlements (local and regional councils) and subsequently allocated for settlement development, military training or nature reserves.
councils) and subsequently allocated for settlement development, military training or nature reserves.23

Under international humanitarian law (IHL), public property in an occupied territory should be administered primarily for the benefit of the local population. The allocation of land for settlement building and future expansion runs contrary to this principle and has resulted in the shrinking of space available for Palestinians to develop adequate housing, basic infrastructure and services, and to sustain their livelihoods.

THE BARRIER: 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE’S ADVISORY OPINION

9 July 2014 marked the 10th anniversary of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Advisory Opinion called on Israel to cease construction of the Barrier ‘including in and around East Jerusalem’; dismantle the sections already completed; and ‘repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto.’ Israel is also under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall. All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.

To mark the occasion, on 8 July, a Humanitarian Country Team event led by UNRWA took place in Al-Walaja village, including a field visit for donors, diplomats and media, presentations by the Humanitarian Coordinator, UNRWA and OCHA, as well as an iftar (Ramadan) meal with community members. On the same day, OCHA released an expanded infographic, ‘In the Spotlight: 10 years since the ICJ Advisory Opinion’ featuring comprehensive information on the Barrier and its humanitarian impact in the West Bank. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_10_years_barrier_report_english.pdf
GAZA STRIP

**HOSTILITIES RESULTED IN THE LARGEST LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE IN THE GAZA STRIP SINCE 1967**

Attacks on residential properties and in the aftermath of the alleged capture of soldiers accounted for a large number of civilian deaths.

The period between 7 July and 26 August 2014 witnessed the deadliest escalation in hostilities to affect the population of Gaza since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. The cumulative death toll among Palestinians was at least 2,189 according to preliminary data collected by the Protection Cluster from various sources.

Of the initially verified cases, 1,486 are believed to be civilians, including 513 children (323 boys and 190 girls) and 269 women. Nearly 70 per cent of child fatalities were below the age of 12. Additionally, 557 have been identified as members of armed groups, and the identity or status of 146 is still being verified. At least 142 Palestinian families lost three or more members in the same incident.

According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH), 11,100 Palestinians, including 3,374 children, 2,088 women and 410 elderly people, were injured. Preliminary estimates by the MoH indicate that up to 1,000 of the children injured will have some form of lifelong disability.

The cumulative Israeli fatality toll was 71: 66 soldiers, one security coordinator, and four civilians, including one child according to various Israeli sources. One foreign national civilian was also killed in Israel. Dozens of Israeli civilians were injured by rockets or shrapnel.

Attacks on residential properties and in the aftermath of the alleged capture of soldiers accounted for a large number of civilian deaths. The information below on specific cases was collected by OCHA from witnesses and survivors, with the purpose of illustrating the dimensions of the human suffering and the difficult circumstances facing civilians. As such, this information it is not intended to provide a comprehensive factual account of specific incidents or policies, nor to present any legal analysis.

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### Israeli fatalities by status

- 66 Soldiers
- 1 Security Coordinator
- 4 Civilians
  - 1 Child

* One additional foreign civilian killed

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### Palestinian fatalities by status

- 2,189 Killed
  - 513 Children
  - 269 Women
  - Unknown 146
  - Members of armed groups 557

**Of the initially verified cases, 1,486 of the dead are believed to be civilians, including 513 children, of whom nearly 70 per cent were below the age of 12.**
Residential buildings targeted or hit

Israeli attacks targeting or hitting residential buildings accounted for a significant number of the civilian casualties in Gaza. The Shelter Cluster estimated that some 20,000 housing units had been destroyed or severely damaged during Israeli attacks. Based on available preliminary information, these structures included the homes of alleged members of Hamas or other armed groups; homes of local authority employees; and homes of civilians with no apparent or alleged affiliation to any armed group. During the final days of the assault, Israeli forces targeted and completely destroyed several high-rise apartment blocks.25

Israeli officials have claimed that residential buildings were used by armed groups for military purposes, including as logistics and command centres, as entrances to tunnels and bunkers, for the launching of rocket attacks and for the storing of weapons. They have also asserted that rocket attacks were often launched from the immediate vicinity of residential areas.

The Israeli authorities have claimed that warnings were delivered to people prior to attacks on residential buildings, including telephone warnings and the so-called ‘roof knocking’ tactic, whereby a non-explosive missile was fired at the targeted building prior to the main strike. In several cases, it appears that people were very confused about the nature of the warning and what to do, sometimes with tragic consequences.

JabalIa, 29 July26

In mid-July, concerned that his home in Jabaliya camp was unsafe, Naim Nasmi Balata, 45 years old, moved his family of eight to the house of his brother, Abdul-Kareem, in the Al Ghasaib area of Jabaliya. On 29 July, at approximately 16:00, the house was struck by a number of missiles. Naim, his wife Saha, 42 years old, and his six daughters, Mariam 22, Du’a 21, Wafa 19, Hanna 18, Alaa 17, and Isra 13 were killed instantly. Yahya, his eight-year-old son died on the way to hospital. Also killed were Abdul-Kareem, the one-year-old son of Wafa, and Hadil, 18, son of Abdul-Kareem: a total of 11 family members. Eighteen year old Alaa, who was outside the house at the time, is the only surviving member of his family.

Because of the impact of the explosion, only body parts remained and these were hurriedly gathered and buried in three graves before nightfall. No warning was delivered to the family and there were no hostilities taking place in the area at the time. According to some residents, missile firing may have taken place from the cemetery behind the house and members of an armed group who were fleeing the scene were targeted by a drone, which missed its target and killed the Balata family.
DEIR AL BALAH, 23 JULY

At approximately 07:00 on 23 July, a woman in the Hay Ibsharah area of Deir Al Balah received a call on the family’s mobile phone. The caller identified himself as an agent of the Israeli intelligence service and warned of an impending air strike on a four-storey building in the neighbourhood ‘with land around it’. Thinking that the call was a hoax, the woman hung up. The call was repeated ten minutes later and was answered by her husband. He promptly fled the house with his disabled daughter without informing his neighbours. He was called a second time and ordered to return and warn his neighbours to evacuate the area.

His sons carried out the instructions. As many buildings in the neighbourhood were four-storey and surrounded by land, up to 200 people took shelter with Ali Abdul-Jawad Muheisan, whose house was judged to be safest because of his perceived non-partisan status. Witnesses said that the caller rang back at 10:00 to enquire why so many people remained in the neighbourhood and was told that the instructions were too vague to enable identification of the intended target. Another warning call came just before 14:00 and the caller said he would initiate ‘roof-knocking’ to identify the target. At 14:00, a small missile struck the roof of the Muheisan house. It caused little damage and most of those inside were unaware that the house in which they were sheltering was the intended target until warned to flee by neighbours.

The house was evacuated and seven minutes after the ‘roof knocking’, several missiles destroyed the building. The strike killed one female tenant, Suheir Abu Medein, 24, who had apparently returned to the house to retrieve some valuables. At the same time, Khalid Hussein Ahmed, who had observed the so-called ‘roof-knocking’, was returning to his house next door to evacuate his wife and eight-year-old twins. The force of the explosion blew the roof off the Muheisan house, killing Khalid’s wife Nisreen, 35, and his son, Hussein. His daughter, Mona, was slightly injured.
On two occasions, the Israeli army launched massive bombardments of built up areas following the alleged capture of an Israeli soldier, reportedly to rescue the soldier or to prevent him from being taken from the area, resulting in extensive Palestinian casualties.

**Attacks in the aftermath of alleged capture of soldiers**

On two occasions, the Israeli army launched massive bombardments of built up areas following the alleged capture of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian armed groups, reportedly to rescue the soldier or to prevent him from being taken from the area. In both cases, in Ash Shuja’iyeh on 26 July and in Rafah on 1 August, this resulted in extensive Palestinian casualties.

In the Rafah incident, a 72-hour ceasefire, the first extended pause in hostilities up to that point, came into effect at 08:00. Many residents left schools designated as emergency shelters and returned to areas previously considered unsafe in eastern Rafah. In circumstances which are disputed, at approximately 09:15, fire was exchanged between Palestinian armed groups and Israeli soldiers, reportedly leading to the deaths of two soldiers and the capture of a third, who was subsequently judged to have died at the scene from his wounds.

Following the incident, Rafah was subjected to intense artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights reported that 123 Palestinians were killed in the following 24 hours, including approximately 40 in the vicinity of Ouroba (also known as Bilbaisi) Street in the Tannour area of Rafah. According to an Israeli media report, an operational debriefing by the Israeli military suggests that the casualty toll during these bombardments was significantly lower.

Dr. Abdullah Shehadeh, Director of An Najar Hospital, reported that casualties began to arrive at his facility within ten minutes of the beginning of the bombardment and the hospital was soon overwhelmed with the number of dead and wounded, in addition to hundreds of IDPs seeking shelter. Attempts were made to evacuate the wounded to Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis and the Kuwaiti Hospital in western Rafah; one of the ambulances en route to Khan Yunis was struck by a missile, killing the driver, two paramedics, two children and their father. Shells struck the vicinity of the hospital itself, causing minor damage to the building.
Dr. Shehadeh said that he received several phone calls from an Israeli official alleging that the captured soldier was in the hospital and that it was not safe for patients or staff to leave. At 16:00 he managed to transfer the wounded and medical staff to the Kuwaiti Hospital by ambulances via a back route. By then, there were 63 fatalities in the hospital refrigerators. The following day, following mediation with the Israeli authorities, passage was arranged to transfer the bodies to the Emirati Hospital in Tel El Sultan, where those that could be identified were subsequently handed over to their families for burial.30

CONCERNS ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES

Effective investigations and accountability are urgently needed

The hostilities that took place between 7 July and 26 August 2014 can be broken down into three phases: a period of air, land and naval strikes between 7 and 17 July; a ground operation by Israeli forces entering the Gaza Strip from 18 July to 5 August, accompanied by continuing airstrikes; and a period of alternating ceasefires and military strikes until an indefinite ceasefire came into effect on 26 August.

During the entire period, 5,830 missiles were used in 4,028 air raids, plus 16,507 artillery and tank projectiles and 3,494 naval shells were fired at targets in the Gaza Strip. During the same period, Palestinian armed groups fired 4,844 rockets and 1,734 mortars at Israel, at least 243 of which were intercepted by the Iron Dome anti-missile defence system.33 At least 31 more fell short and landed in Gaza.

Based on initial information collected on the conduct of hostilities, a number of concerns arise about potential lack of compliance with international law, including humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law, by all parties to the conflict, and which warrants prompt, thorough, effective, impartial, independent and transparent investigations. Accountability must be sought for violations of international law, including justice and remedies for victims.

Issues related to the conduct of hostilities by Israeli forces include the possible lack of adherence to key principles of IHL, such as the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attacks. Concerns include the possible targeting of civilians; attacks on
schools, including those used as IDP shelters, hospitals, ambulances and ambulance staff; possible indiscriminate attacks impacting the civilian population and civilian objects, especially during the ground operation; and allegations of the use of Palestinians as human shields. Of particular concern are instances in which UNRWA schools designated as emergency shelters for displaced Palestinians were hit directly or indirectly in disregard of the inviolability of UN premises stipulated in international law, killing a total of 45 Palestinians, including 17 children.34

Palestinian armed groups fired large numbers of projectiles at Israel, with most attacks appearing to be indiscriminate in nature. There have been reports of Palestinian armed groups locating military objects in populated areas, including the placing of weapons in UNRWA schools in breach of the inviolability of UN premises and international humanitarian law.

Israeli authorities have alleged that armed groups used hospitals and ambulances for military purposes; located tunnels used for military purposes under civilian objects; and that the Palestinian population were used as human shields. In addition, there is evidence of the extrajudicial execution of suspected collaborators with Israel and alleged restrictions on the movement of Fatah members and violations of their physical integrity.

HALF A MILLION PALESTINIANS INTERNALLY DISPLACED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES

Over 100,000 remain displaced, half of them with host families

During the 50 days of hostilities, thousands of Palestinians fled their homes to take refuge with host families, in UNRWA schools, and in government and informal shelters. While the numbers fluctuated during the conflict, at various points approximately half a million Palestinians were internally displaced, constituting 28 per cent of the population. The largest exodus occurred from areas within three kilometres of the Gaza perimeter fence with Israel, declared by Israel as a buffer zone.

Approximately 60 per cent of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were hosted in UNRWA and government schools or informal shelters, and the rest with host families across the Gaza Strip, of whom over 151,000 registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA). UNRWA shelters became increasingly overcrowded and were stretched beyond capacity as UNRWA had anticipated and prepared for the displacement of only 50,000 people, based on previous experiences.

Following the open-ended ceasefire announced on 26 August, the majority of IDPs returned home. However, the destruction of an estimated 20,000 housing units means that approximately 108,000 individuals will be long-term displaced as they do not have homes to return to. As of late September, around 62,000 IDPs were still living in 19 UNRWA schools, 750 in one government school, and about 40,000-50,000 with host families.
Understanding and responding to the needs facing IDPs with host families pose difficult challenges due to the geographical distribution, partial registration, and difficulties in monitoring IDP movements. Between 27 August and 4 September, OCHA carried out ten visits and focus group discussions with IDPs in host families to enhance understanding of their perceptions, needs, challenges and future options.

For all IDP focus group participants, the biggest challenge was their housing situation, followed by access to education. Other challenges included loss of income and livelihoods, lack of food, water and diversified food assistance, lack of NFIs (non-food items), the need for financial assistance and psychosocial support interventions for children to prepare them for the new school year.

**Access to water, food and cooking facilities**

The majority of IDPs with host families reported issues related to access to water. In general, water for drinking and cooking was available, but in limited quantities and not always of good quality. Water for domestic use (showers / toilets) was extremely scarce and often poor quality. The municipal water supply had been damaged and was still not operational in at least three host family households out of ten visited.

IDPs sheltered in UNRWA and government schools did not have access to cooking facilities and therefore received daily, ready to eat food rations from WFP and UNRWA. At the height of the conflict, more than 350,000 displaced people received daily rations. Many IDPs sheltered in host families also encountered difficulties related to cooking. One IDP family consisting of 14 members, two of them disabled, was sharing one small kitchen with their host family of nine people.

During the hostilities, 78,000 displaced people in host families received electronic vouchers provided by WFP, UNICEF and Oxfam GB. The vouchers operate like debit cards, enabling people to purchase locally produced food, safe drinking water and sanitary products at local shops.

“I cook in the staircase for my family on a small stove. Conditions are not good, but what to do? At least my children get food every day.”

Displaced mother, Jabaliya.
**Overcrowding, safety and psychosocial concerns**

Overcrowding and lack of privacy associated with their current living conditions was another common theme for IDPs. One family was living in a building under construction with no doors and windows. The toilet, which they had built themselves from rubble, was situated in close proximity to their cooking and sleeping area. The entire family was sleeping in the same place and electrical wires posed a major risk. The lack of doors and windows meant that children could easily fall and get hurt and rendered the family vulnerable to theft.

Apart from one family, IDP families did not report major concerns related to their physical safety, although females felt safer to leave the house in their own neighbourhoods where they knew the neighbours and community members. In one IDP family, a boy in sixth grade was reportedly staying in or around the destroyed home, away from the host family, to keep an eye on the house and look for organizations to receive or register for assistance.

Many parents reported that their ability to care had been affected during the hostilities and that they were still feeling the repercussions. Bed-wetting, anxiety and clinging to parents were prevalent among children in at least three households.

**Education**

Education was a major issue of concern in all the focus groups. Parents’ worries included children’s inability to concentrate due to psychological distress and overcrowding, insecurity about their future housing situation and proximity to schools, damaged and destroyed schools and schools being used as emergency shelters. Children worried about their living conditions, where they would stay and whether they would have to attend another school far from the familiar faces of teachers and fellow students.
Livelihoods

Another challenge which resonated across the focus groups was access to livelihoods. Most families lost productive assets within or next to their destroyed homes: a grocery shop, a supermarket, trees and livestock. Many had unpaid loans on their homes and two heads of households were former government employees who had not received their salaries in months.

“The school year will start soon. I am afraid they won’t be able to concentrate at home on their homework. One of my daughters had memorized the Quran; I often saw her sit and hold the book in her hands. But since we left our home, I haven’t seen any book in her hand, not the Quran or any other books. Most of my daughters are very academic, so I am worried. Even the recreational, psychosocial support programmes in UNRWA schools will not be so helpful. They are helpful for children who still have their homes to go back to. But those like us who lost their home, even if they do recreational activities every day in school, when they return home from school they will be reminded of the reality. So the effect will be minimal on them as long as they stay with host families and their situation is not relieved.”

Displaced father, Jabaliya
Agricultural livelihoods were greatly affected by the conflict and 23,600 households (14,000 farming, 6,000 herding and 3,600 fishing households) that rely on agriculture for their main source of income were impacted in some way. According to OCHA’s Multi-Sector/Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), 93 percent of the interviewed communities reported that farmers, herders or fishermen had sustained significant damages and losses to their livelihood assets and 71 percent of communities required urgent intervention for food and nutritional requirements.

**Future options**

Eighty per cent of participants living with host families reported that they planned to stay with the host family for the coming weeks, while looking for rented accommodation. Twenty per cent said that they intended to relocate to UNRWA schools used as emergency shelters close to their area of origin to enable their children to attend school and to pursue aid registration and damage assessments at first hand.

All participants stressed their desire to reconstruct their homes as the long-term option, and to rent accommodation for the transitional period. A small number of IDPs mentioned that prefabricated housing units or containers could be an alternative option, but only if rental accommodation were not available, and after ensuring that the unit would be located near to their original home and would be connected to basic services. All interviewees reported the lack of construction materials and financial means (including unpaid salaries) as the main obstacles preventing them from realizing their preferred housing option. Twenty per cent reported that the lack of available and affordable housing for rent was an obstacle.

### ELECTRICITY AND WATER INFRASTRUCTURE SEVERELY DAMAGED DURING HOSTILITIES

Further deterioration in access to basic services and livelihoods

The extensive Israeli aerial bombardment, naval shelling and artillery fire had devastating results on public infrastructure, including water, sanitation and energy. Although infrastructure had been repeatedly hit during previous escalations, the damage on this occasion was unprecedented. Already extremely fragile prior to the hostilities, the damage to the water and energy infrastructure further undermined access to basic services and sources of livelihood.

**Electricity**

Gaza’s sole power plant (GPP), which supplied 30 per cent of the electricity available in Gaza, was hit several times by Israeli fire. The most serious incident was an airstrike on 29 July, forcing the GPP to be shut down; it remains closed as of late September 2014 despite significant progress in repairs. Prior to this, the ground incursion and related shelling, plus Palestinian rocket firing, damaged all ten feeder lines from Israel, from which most electricity in the Gaza Strip is purchased, as well as large sections of the
internal distribution network. While the feeder lines and some parts of the network were repaired to allow the provision of electricity for up to six hours a day, the worst affected areas, such as Beit Hanoun, eastern Gaza city (Ash Shujai’yeh), Khuza’a and eastern Rafah, remain almost completely without a supply.\(^{35}\)

Once repairs are complete and operations resume, the GPP is not expected to function at full capacity due to insufficient funding to purchase the required fuel. Until mid-2013, the main source of fuel was the tunnels with Egypt, smuggling in low-cost Egyptian subsidized fuel. The closure of the tunnels by the Egyptian authorities forced the GPP to shift to more expensive Israeli fuel and rely on external donations. This resulted in scheduled power outages of 12 hours per day, or longer on some occasions when the plant was forced to shut down.

The generating capacity and reliability of the GPP has been significantly impaired over the past eight years by additional factors. These include the destruction of six transformers by an Israeli airstrike in 2006; restrictions on the import of spare parts, equipment and fuel under the Israeli blockade; and the dispute between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the de facto authorities in Gaza over the funding of GPP operations.\(^{36}\)

### Water supply

According to an initial Damage Assessment Report (DAR) by the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU), 12 per cent of Gaza’s wells have been destroyed or damaged during Israeli bombardments, particularly in Gaza City, Beit Hanoun and Deir Al Balah municipalities. Additionally, over 33,000 metres of water and wastewater networks were recorded as damaged: around half located in Khan Yunis, followed by Gaza Municipality. CMWU has been repairing damage and, as of early September 2014, managed to address 80 per cent of the priority repairs. Despite this, current estimates are that 20 to 30 per cent of households, or 450,000 people, remain unable to access municipal water due to damage and/or low pressure. Additionally, many of these repairs are temporary and will require longer-term repairs after emergency works are completed.

Water provision has been severely undermined by the increased power cuts that reduce network pressure. Additionally, households without electricity and/or supplemental...
pumps cannot fill rooftop storage tanks when water is available. Although municipalities and CMWU are making efforts to truck domestic water to neighbourhoods that remain unconnected, they face a shortage of available trucks.

Water and sanitation services in the Gaza Strip were already at a critical level prior to the recent war. The Gaza Strip relies on the underlying Coastal Aquifer as its only water source. Systematic over-extraction during recent decades has resulted in the intrusion of seawater and the emergence of the underlying saline water. As a result, households rely on the purchase of desalinated water from private vendors and tankers for drinking and cooking purposes.37

The operation of many desalination plants was disrupted or shut down during hostilities due to the damages sustained (the scope is still unknown), as well as due to electricity/fuel shortages. It is estimated that plants that resumed operations face increased operational costs from greater reliance on generators and the cost of scarce fuel supplies. Demand also increased for desalinated water as a result of shortages in municipal supplies and use of desalinated water for domestic uses. The rise in prices reduces economic access by already vulnerable families and exacerbates the problems of access to drinking water. It is vital to stabilize the prices of desalinated water and enhance the ability of families to purchase this water.

**Humanitarian impact**

The damage sustained by the electricity and water infrastructure has had a pervasive impact on living conditions. Water scarcity has directly impacted on hygiene and raises public health concerns, particularly in hospitals and among IDPs. According to the MIRA report: “Reduced access to water, limited privacy, and cramped living conditions have led to increases in cases of diarrhea, lice, and skin rashes, most acutely in temporary school shelters. This has had a negative impact on the privacy and dignity of women and girls at IDP and host families in particular.”

The lack of electricity and limited sanitation in health facilities, including hospitals and primary health centers, has been detrimental to the continuity and quality of services during hostilities. Although the major hospitals have more stable direct lines, during power cuts hospitals reserve power for essential medical services by operating standby electric generators. The prolonged power cuts have strained back-up power sources, hindering the operation of medical equipment and resulting in interrupted or postponed medical treatment.

Emergency fuel distributions to ensure critical water and sanitation, health and municipal services have been in place since December 2013, but funding for emergency deliveries is running out faster than anticipated due to the increased needs.

Food and agricultural sectors also suffer from the lack of electricity as bakeries and food producers struggle to meet demand. Lack of refrigeration causes significant damage to crops and increased production costs. Interruptions to crop irrigation delays flowering and prevents fruit from ripening, resulting in a decreased ratio of yield to input.
HEALTH SERVICES CONTINUE DESPITE DAMAGED FACILITIES

40 per cent of hospitals and clinics forced to close

During the 50-day Gaza emergency, 75 health structures (17 hospitals and 58 clinics) were damaged to varying degrees and 44 facilities were closed at one time due to damage or for security reasons, limiting access to health services to almost half of the population. Nevertheless, following the ceasefire, only four of the 32 hospitals monitored by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and WHO remain closed.

At the height of the conflict in early August, 40 per cent of hospitals and clinics were forced to close their doors (10 of 32 hospitals and 34 of 75 clinics), predominantly in the

“OUR LIFE IS ALL RUNNING AND FLIGHT”: A CASE STUDY

Um ‘Ahed Al Ajla sought shelter with her extended family on the top floor of a construction site. Before the start of the hostilities, she and her husband owned a five-storey building where she lived with her extended family. When the area was bombed, all 35 family members had to flee without being able to take any of their personal belongings. The neighbourhood they settled in was also hit in Israeli attacks and her family had to take refuge again in another area, before having to relocate for a third time after their shelter was hit. “Our life is all running and flight,” said Um ‘Ahed Al Ajla.

Um ‘Ahed Al Ajla and her family currently live in a building that lacks the most basic facilities or sanitation and hygiene facilities, relying on makeshift washrooms. The female members of the family lack privacy.

Drinking water (desalinated) is not available in the building and has to be bought from private vendors at distribution points in the neighbourhood. Um ‘Ahed Al Ajla’s family has no choice but to make daily trips to fetch fresh water from 300 metres away in jerry cans. “Sometimes we stay the whole day long without a drop to drink. Water is the basis for everything and we don’t have it,” says Um ‘Ahed Al Ajla.

For most of their domestic needs such as cooking, cleaning and bathing, the family uses saline water from the municipality, which is available sporadically and only for a few hours per day. The dire sanitation and hygiene conditions and the lack of clean water have caused several health problems and the youngest family members suffer from skin problems such as rashes and allergies.

Um ‘Ahed Al Ajla is very worried about her family’s uncertain future. With the winter months approaching, the family needs a decent home with guaranteed basic services like water and electricity.

This section was contributed by the Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group (EWASH), which coordinates the initiatives of local and international NGOs and UN agencies.

The food and agricultural sectors suffer from the lack of electricity and food producers struggle to meet demand. Lack of refrigeration causes significant damage to crops and increased production costs.

This section was contributed by the UN’s World Health Organization.
northern and eastern areas of the Gaza Strip where military activities were intense. At least three hospitals and seven clinics were totally destroyed and have not yet reopened.

The material losses to the health sector have been preliminarily estimated at over $5 million, but a more detailed assessment is currently underway. All health providers were exposed to damage (see table below).

Some of the most serious damage will have a long lasting impact. The closure of two specialized hospitals resulted in the loss of 140 patient beds (six per cent of total bed capacity in Gaza) at a time when hospitals were overwhelmed with casualties:

- The greatest loss has been the total destruction of the only medical rehabilitation centre, Al Wafa Hospital, which had recently installed modern rehabilitation equipment in its seven-floor new building for persons with disabilities.

- Mohammed Al Durra Hospital, one of only three pediatric hospitals in Gaza, has been closed since 25 July due to debris from nearby explosions.

### SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS FOR ENERGY AND WATER

A number of long-term options to address Gaza’s energy and water crisis are currently under consideration, all of which are dependent on progress in the political situation. For the energy crisis, these include the import of an additional 150-300 MW of cost-efficient electricity from Israel; to re-convert the GPP to operate on natural gas, for which it was originally designed, and supply it with natural gas from the gas fields under the Gaza sea; and/or increase imports of electricity from the Arab Regional Grid.

Short to medium-term interventions under consideration for Gaza’s future water quality and supply include an increase in annual water imports from Israel and the building of short-term low-volume (STLB) desalination plants. Proposed long-term interventions include the completion of planned sewage treatment plants to enable about 40 per cent of the recovered water to be reused for irrigation of fodder and fruit trees, while the remainder would recharge and rehabilitate the underlying Aquifer. Another long-term option is to build a large desalination plant, although this alternative faces multiple challenges that reduce its feasibility.

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At the height of the conflict, 40 per cent of hospitals and clinics were forced to close their doors, predominantly in the northern and eastern areas of the Gaza Strip. At least three hospitals and seven clinics were totally destroyed and have not yet reopened.

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<th>Gaza health facilities status, monitored by MoH and WHO, 8 September 2014</th>
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<td><strong>MoH</strong></td>
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*Palestinian Military Medical Services
Health providers have been resourceful in relocating health services. Two damaged hospitals, Al Wafa and Balsam, and at least one clinic (in Khuza’a) have been relocated to other sites, and the Beit Hanoun hospital (MoH) has admitted inpatients to undamaged sections of the hospital. Almost all of the damaged centres reported broken windows and doors, but some also had moderate to serious structural and roof damage, with penetration or collapse of exterior walls.

The current challenge for the health sector is to improve the quality of care for patients who require further surgery, rehabilitation or medical care on an outpatient or referral basis. These objectives are being pursued amid shortages of medical supplies and electricity and mounting debts by the MoH that have prevented salary payments to many health workers.

RESPONDING TO EMERGING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS DURING THE HOSTILITIES

The continuous opening of the crossings with Israel facilitated emergency operations.

The response of national authorities during the hostilities was severely constrained by the long-standing movement and access restrictions imposed on Gaza, as well as internal Palestinian divisions. The rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation since July 2013 had depleted people’s coping mechanisms and weakened the preparedness of the authorities to respond to emergencies. Humanitarian actors also noted gaps in preparedness and stock shortages, mainly due to a lack of funding in certain critical sectors and entry challenges for so-called dual use items.

Generally adequate human resource capacity and skills, plus high levels of awareness within communities, have prevented outbreaks of disease and other associated challenges. Other coping mechanisms further mitigated the impact of the crisis, such as strong community solidarity, individual initiatives to provide shelter and food, or informal credit between households. But chronic shortages and crumbling infrastructure across sectors, combined with the scale of the conflict, left actors struggling to respond.

Service providers were unable to reach communities and carry out repairs and maintenance due to the fighting. The Palestinian Civil Defence’s preparedness for search and rescue operations was inadequate because of shortages of cars and equipment, a lack of training, and the insecure environment. Despite weaknesses and damage sustained as a result of the hostilities, the private sector played an important role in meeting specific needs, for example emergency drinking water.

Despite the challenging conditions generated by the hostilities, the Israeli authorities maintained the Kerem Shalom crossing for goods open almost without interruption, alongside continuous engagement and coordination with a range of humanitarian actors. This proved essential in facilitating the entry of humanitarian consignments, including medical supplies, food assistance and non-food items, and the implementation of humanitarian responses. Similarly, the opening of the Erez and Rafah crossings with Israel...
and Egypt respectively allowed for the evacuation of hundreds of wounded people for treatment outside Gaza. The opening of the former also allowed for the movement of humanitarian staff, despite the restrictions maintained on national staff.

A government Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) for Gaza was established in Ramallah. Relevant line ministries in Gaza itself responded to the best of their capacity, but many faced staffing, salary and running cost issues. Coordination of interventions and financial support remained inconsistent across sectors and in responses and financial monitoring.

An inter-agency EOC, coordinated by OCHA, was also established on the first day of emergency. Comprising representatives from UN agencies, international and national NGOs, ICRC, PRCS and line ministries, its aim was to coordinate and plan responses and assessments, and to identify needs, gaps and priorities.

UN and NGO humanitarian actors in Gaza continued to respond throughout the crisis with existing and increased resources, but were hampered by access limitations. National and local NGOs and CBOs were able, to some extent, to reach affected communities in areas where others did not have access due to the security situation, and numerous partnerships exist or were developed to equip these NGOs and CBOs with resources to enhance their capacity.
Overall, assessments show that most of the affected population received some form of support, although some people could not be reached due to access and security constraints. Many received minimal assistance, sometimes delivered on a one-off basis rather than the continuous intervention required. IDP movement at the end of the hostilities and the identification of their immediate, medium-term and longer-term needs will pose a major challenge.

For a detailed account of response activities carried out during the hostilities see OCHA’s daily Situation Reports and MIRA

**HUMANITARIAN APPEAL FOR $551 MILLION TO ADDRESS THE MOST URGENT NEEDS**

Most organizations remain largely unfunded

In early September the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) launched its Gaza Crisis Appeal outlining the joint strategy of the humanitarian community, including UNRWA, to respond to the current crisis in the Gaza Strip. The appeal requests $551 million to carry out 108 projects, implemented by 54 partners, including 13 UN agencies.

To date, humanitarian partners have mobilized some $233 million, which is 42 per cent of the sum requested. Approximately 85 per cent of these funds have been pledged to UNRWA, leaving the remaining organizations severely underfunded. Moreover, some $10.83 million of funds directed to non-UNRWA partners have come from the Central Emergency Response Fund – a pool of donor funds administered by OCHA – rather than directly from member states.

The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) administered by OCHA is an additional funding mechanism that began to process project applications related to the Gaza emergency from the first week of the crisis. By the end of August, the ERF had approved 13 projects for a total of $3.1 million. Several donors have come forward with pledges for the ERF: Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland and Ireland have pledged a combined sum of $4.45 million.
Many of the unfunded organizations seek to address the basic needs of the most vulnerable people in Gaza, including supporting access to basic social services that are beyond UNRWA’s mandate, alongside support to refugees. Those needs include the clearance of at least 7,000 explosive remnants of war; the repair of water infrastructure supplying some 450,000 people; improving access to public primary health care for the most vulnerable; early detection and treatment of severe cases of stress, anxiety, and child abuse; and support to 27,000 farmers, breeders, herders, fishermen and their families who sustained losses and damage. The inability to address basic needs due to current funding gaps may exacerbate frustrations and social tensions within the population of Gaza.

End notes
2. Unless otherwise stated, all data on casualties are from OCHA’s Protection of Civilians database.
3. On 25 July, in Huwwara village (Nablus), Israeli forces killed a 22-year-old man with live ammunition during clashes that erupted after a settler killed a 19-year-old Palestinian and injured five others in the village.
4. For further details on this incident, see the findings of an investigation carried out by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem at http://www.btselem.org/firearms/20140921_killing_of_khalili_anati
5. Following the recommendations of the Orr Commissions investigation into the conduct of the Israeli police during the events of October 2000, in which police killed 12 Israelis and one Palestinian, the police prohibited the use of rubber-coated bullets within Israel, barring exceptional cases for which the Chief Police Commissioner’s authorization must be obtained. No prohibition was imposed on Israeli forces operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. http://www.btselem.org/download/201212_crowd_control_eng.pdf
7. Ibid.
10. According to the Israeli authorities, the incident also triggered the resumption of punitive demolitions and the declaration of a large area in Bethlehem as ‘state land’ (see separate sections in this report).
11. Collective penalties refer not only to those imposed under penal law, but measures of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of persons for acts that these persons have not committed. For further details on the scope of this provision, see International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary to the IV Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva, 1994, p. 225
12. Information collected by OCHA and recorded in its Protection of Civilians database.
13. Data provided by the Israeli Human Rights Organization, B’Tselem.
15. PCBS, mid-2014 estimate.
16. See the report of the Secretary General on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan, A/69/150.
17. Ibid.
21. See A/68/513, para. 56. Also see A/69/150.
22. For further details see, B’Tselem, Under the Guise of Legality - Declarations on State Land in the West Bank, March 2012,A/68/513, para. 17 to 22.
23. Data provided by the ICA to Bimkom, Planners for Planning Rights, in the context of an information request under the Freedom of Information Act.
24. At least 25 Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel were reportedly killed in Gaza by armed groups and are not included in the fatality toll.
26. Testimony of Jamil Balata, brother of Naim, Jabaliya camp, 8 September 2014.
27. Testimony of Ali Abdul-Jawad Muheisan, Khalid Hussein Ahmed and the recipients of the warning calls who wish to remain anonymous, deir Al Balah 10 September 2014.
28. Although the incident and breakdown of the ceasefire was widely blamed on Hamas at the time, it has subsequently been revealed that this may have resulted from a misunderstanding regarding the details of the truce. ‘Report: US-Israeli misunderstanding led to breakdown of Gaza truce,’ Jerusalem Post, 9 September 2014. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Report-US-Israeli-misunderstanding-led-to-breakdown-of-Gaza-truce-374829.
30. Testimony of Dr. Abdullah Ramadan Shehadeh, Rafah, 10 September 2014. The Rafah incident is one of five criminal investigation cases opened by the IDF’s Investigative Police Unit on Israeli military operations in Gaza during the recent assault.
32. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Resolution S-21/1 on ensuring respect for international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 19 September 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/27/76.
38. For more details, see UN report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), September 2014.