

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

HUMANITARIAN
PROGRAMME CYCLE
2023

ISSUED JANUARY 2023



About

This document is consolidated by OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team and partners. It provides a shared understanding of the crisis, including the most pressing humanitarian need and the estimated number of people who need assistance. It represents a consolidated evidence base and helps inform joint strategic response planning. The designations employed and the presentation of material in the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries

PHOTO ON COVER

Child standing over the rubble of his house, south of Rafah city in Gaza. The destruction occurred on August 2022 as a result of the recent escalations on Gaza.

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Unless otherwise indicated, data in this document is valid as of end October 2022.

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humanitarianaction.info/plan/1109



The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) is the primary provider of continuously updated data on global humanitarian funding, and is a major contributor to strategic decision making by highlighting gaps and priorities, thus contributing to effective, efficient and principled humanitarian assistance.

fts.unocha.org/appeals/1059/summary

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Summary of Humanitarian Needs

Severity of Needs*

TOTAL POPULATION

5.5M

PEOPLE IN NEED

2.1M

SEVERE

24%

EXTREME


13% (0.7m)

CATASTROPHIC

1% (65k)

Source: PCBS, 2023 projection

Among the 2.1 million severely and extremely impacted by the crisis, 64 percent in Gaza and 36% in the West bank.



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
*Severity of needs was calculated based on the Joint Inter-sectoral Analytical Framework (JIAF). For more information see the methodology page 58.

Key Findings




*Households with at least one member with disability. Based on a functional definition of disability as provided by the Disability Working Group.

PEOPLE IN NEED BY GEOGRAPHY AND SEVERITY



According to the Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in July 2022, 58 per cent of Gaza (1.3 million) will require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2023 compared to 25 per cent of the West Bank (0.8 million).

PEOPLE IN NEED AS PERCENT OF POPULATION



BY AGE AND GENDER


AGE AND GENDER	PEOPLE IN NEED	%PiN
MALE 0- <18	532K	%24.8
FEMALE 0- <18	515K	%24.0
MALE 18-65	528K	%24.5
FEMALE 18-65	510K	%23.7
MALE 65+	32K	%1.5
FEMALE 65+	32K	%1.5

BY POPULATION GROUP

POPULATION GROUP	PEOPLE IN NEED
NON-REFUGEES	0.9M
REFUGEES	1.15M
- REFUGEES OUTSIDE CAMPS	687K
- REFUGEES INSIDE CAMPS	466K
FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS	247K
MALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS	1.8M
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES	783K
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE	6 K

*The source of IDPs in Gaza is the Ministry of Social Development, mainly due to the last escalation in August 2022. The source for the IDPs in the West Bank is the demolition system compiled by OCHA oPt.

GAZA STRIP: CROSSINGS AND RESTRICTED AREAS



OCCUPIED WEST BANK: INCREASING FRAGMENTATION



Area C

The over 60% of the West Bank where Israel retains almost exclusive control. Over 370,000* Palestinians and over 465,000 Israeli settlers reside in Area C.

Area A

The 18% of the West Bank where the Palestinian Authority has extensive law enforcement and planning powers.

Area B

The 22% of the West Bank where the Palestinian Authority has planning powers and joint law enforcement authority with Israel. Some 80% of Palestinians live in Areas A and B combined.

Settlements municipal boundaries

Cover around 10% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, where some 150 settlements were established in contravention to int'l law. These areas are largely off limits for Palestinian access. Some 695,000 Israelis live there.

Firing zones

Cover some 18% of the West Bank and are closed for military training. Some 50 herding communities living there are at risk of forcible transfer.

The West Bank Barrier

Built since 2002 following wave of Palestinian attacks in Israel. Most of the route encroaches into the West Bank, in contravention to international law. Palestinians access is subject to a restrictive permit and coordination system.

- Constructed Barrier
- - - - Projected; Under Construction Barrier

East Jerusalem


Covers 70 KM2, unilaterally annexed to Israel in contravention of international law. Over 390,000 Palestinians and more than 230,000 Israeli settlers reside there.

- - - - Green Line
- The 1949 Armistice boundary agreed between Israel and Jordan.

Hebron city: H2

The 20% of Hebron city which remains under direct Israeli control. An estimated 39,000 Palestinians (based on 2017 census of 33,749 and a population growth rate of 2.47%) and a few hundred Israeli settlers live in the area.

*Projection over the 2013 Vulnerability Profile of Palestinian



Part 1

IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS

GAZA STRIP

Destruction/damage in Gaza following the escalation of hostilities 7 August 2022. ©Mohammad Zaanoun



Summary of Humanitarian Needs and Key Findings

The Humanitarian Community estimate that in 2023, approximately 2.1 million Palestinians across the OPT will require some form of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian conditions created by OPT's multi-dimensional crisis continues to impact all parts of the territory and affect every aspect of Palestinian life. Palestinians are in their 55th year of grappling with the safety, security, financial and emotional consequences of occupation.

The resulting political, social, and economic shocks have reverberated across the territory with a further deepening of humanitarian needs and deterioration in the protection situation. The outlook for 2023 remains profoundly uncertain in light of increasing violence, political developments, and an absence of forward movement on sustainable peace solutions. Without political solutions, sustainable development will be hampered and humanitarian assistance will continue to be required.

Deepening Needs

While the overall number of people in need has remained relatively constant, the Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) undertaken in 2022 identified 38 per cent of households as being in 'catastrophic', 'extreme' or 'severe' conditions. In Gaza, the situation is more pronounced, with 29 per cent of households categorized as 'catastrophic' or 'extreme', compared with 10 per cent in 2021.

Lack of livelihoods opportunities driving aid dependency and increasing vulnerability

Although most households are able to meet their basic needs, they do so through heavy reliance on aid and negative coping mechanisms due to barriers to or lack of livelihoods opportunities.

Thirty-one per cent of Palestinians in the West Bank and 81 per cent of those in Gaza have reported challenges in meeting their basic needs, with food, health, and utilities being the top three challenges. Similarly, eight per cent of households in the West Bank and 73 per cent of Gazan households reported receiving humanitarian assistance in the six months prior to the 2022 MSNA data collection.

Chronic shelter, infrastructure, and energy deficits

Recurrent escalation of hostilities in Gaza, the most recent one in early August 2022, caused fatalities, injuries, mental health needs, destruction of homes and structures, and has aggravated Gaza's chronic shelter, infrastructure, and energy deficits. The restrictive and discriminatory planning regime applied by the Israeli authorities in Area C and in East Jerusalem, continues to prevent Palestinians from addressing basic housing, livelihoods, and basic service needs. Israel has steadily increased the amount of Israeli work permits given to Palestinians. There are currently 90,000 Palestinian work permit holders in the West Bank, and 17,000 in Gaza.

The high level of demolitions and seizures of Palestinian structures on the grounds of a lack of Israeli-required building permits continues to represent one element of a coercive environment that leaves many Palestinians throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with little option but to leave their homes and communities.

Imposition of physical and administrative measures including constraints on the delivery of materials needed, and limitations on the implementation of projects that involve building, expanding or

rehabilitating infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, Area C, the H2 area of Hebron and East Jerusalem continue to restrict possibilities for development and the ability to deliver humanitarian programmes.

Physical and Mental Wellbeing

Consistently high levels of the presence of Israeli Forces, including search-and-arrest operations during both the day and night, arrests, detentions, and ill-treatment and violation of the rights of children continue. A steep rise in violence, has further eroded public safety and security, increasing fear among the population with an already high baseline of severity, particularly among children. Access to mental health and psychosocial services remains limited, as does access to critical health services, particularly in Gaza.

Gender-based violence (GBV)

An estimated 1.9 million people across the gender spectrum in OPT are vulnerable to and/or experiencing GBV, 80 per cent of whom are

women, and 65 per cent in Gaza. Violence against women, particularly by intimate partners, remains at an alarmingly high rate. Palestinian women face multiple layers of discrimination within the legal system. According to the 2019 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic (PCBS) survey on violence, which was updated in July 2022, 59 per cent of married or previously married women between the ages of 15 and 64 experienced violence by their husband in the 12 months preceding the survey – 70 per cent in Gaza and 52 per cent in the West Bank.

Restriction on movement of goods and people

Restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza imposed by Israel, citing security concerns, hampers the implementation of infrastructure projects and delays economic recovery recovery.

1.1

Context of the Crisis

Political, social, demographic profile

The occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) is one of the most complex and challenging environments in which the United Nations operates. The OPT remains a protracted political crisis characterized by 55 years of Israeli military occupation. This crisis is exacerbated by a lack of adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law, internal Palestinian divisions and the recurrent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups. The results are chronic protection concerns and humanitarian needs which will continue unabated in the absence of a sustainable political solution and opportunities for further development. The OPT has become more fragmented over time; physically, economically, socially, and politically. At the same time, it has undergone rapid demographic growth and urbanization, trends that will continue for the foreseeable future. The OPT is divided into two physically distinct geographical regions, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with the latter further divided into East Jerusalem and Areas A, B and C.

In Gaza, the Israeli occupation and 15 years of an Israeli-imposed blockade/movement restrictions has contributed to Gaza's dire living conditions. In June 2007, following the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the Israeli authorities implemented a blockade/movement restrictions citing security concerns, virtually isolating the 2.2 million residents in Gaza from the rest of the OPT and the world more broadly. This land, sea and air blockade on the Gaza Strip intensified previous restrictions, imposing strict limits on the number and specified categories of people and goods allowed through the Israeli-controlled crossings.

Restrictions imposed by Egypt on the movement and access of people and goods at the Gaza-Egypt crossing further exacerbates the situation.

In 2022, Israel has gradually eased restrictions on the movement of people and export of commodities in Gaza. Exports of commodities in 2022 through Kerem Shalom, including to the West Bank, were 43 per cent high than in 2021 and 83 per cent higher than in 2020. Imports through Kerem Shalom however decreased by almost eight per cent compared with 2021. Although the exit of people through Erez each month more than doubled between 2021 and 2022 to approximately 35,000, this must be compared to the flow in 2000 when an average of half a million people every month exited Gaza.

The Gaza Strip is one of the most densely populated areas in the world at 5,900 residents/square kilometre, with 41 per cent of the population in Gaza under the age of 15, compared with 36 per cent under the age of 15 in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.¹ The recent escalation of hostilities have heightened risks and exacerbated the vulnerabilities of young people in Gaza, resulting in high rates of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, all of which may increase high-risk behaviour.² At the same time, rapid population growth coinciding with eroding development gains and limited resources results in further deterioration of living standards and development prospects in Gaza.

In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Israel's military occupation continues to impede basic human rights of Palestinians. Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into East

Jerusalem and Areas A, B and C, whereby each area is governed by a different set of administrative and security regulations. The ongoing conflict, including the possible indiscriminate use of force against civilians by Israeli Forces, Hamas, PIJ and/or other armed groups, and Israeli occupation practices including possible excessive use of force, demolitions, evictions, settlement expansion, and settler-related violence all drive insecurity, reverse and prevent socioeconomic progress, breed a climate of mistrust and tension between Palestinians and Israelis, and undermine political solutions.

In 2002, the Israeli authorities initiated the construction of a barrier with the stated aim of preventing violent attacks inside Israel by Palestinians from the West Bank. In 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the route of the barrier to be illegal where it runs inside the OPT. It is now a key component of the range of restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of Palestinians, which include physical obstacles, permit requirements and the designation of areas as “restricted” or “closed”. The Barrier has transformed the geography, economy, and social life of Palestinians living in the West Bank. The geographic and administrative fragmentation in the West Bank isolates families and communities from each other and from needed services, directly affecting the wellbeing, both physical and psychosocial, of Palestinians.

The intra-Palestinian divide between Hamas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) that began in 2007 remains unresolved, deepening territorial fragmentation between Gaza and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and reducing the capacity of local institutions in Gaza to deliver basic services to the population. Political divisions and sense of disenfranchisement in the West Bank are further entrenched given the absence of elections since 2006, the dismissal of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 2018 and the issuance of Presidential decrees.

UNRWA

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. In the absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA's mandate, most recently until June 2026.

UNRWA is unique in terms of its long-standing commitment to one group of refugees and its contributions to the protection, welfare and human development of four generations of Palestine refugees. Originally envisaged as a temporary organization, the Agency has gradually adjusted its programmes to meet the changing needs of the refugees. Today, UNRWA is the main direct provider of basic services - education, health, relief and social services, protection, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance, and emergency assistance to 1.5 million registered Palestine refugees in Gaza. In the West Bank, UNRWA serves 1.1 million Palestine refugees and other registered persons, of whom 890,000 are registered refugees.

Economic Profile

Despite some signs of recovery, the Palestinian economy has not yet rebounded to its pre-pandemic level. The ongoing restrictions on movement and access, the long-term effects of fiscal distress, combined with a rapid increase in prices are contributing to a slower economic recovery. In the first quarter of 2022, the Palestinian economy continued its rebound from the COVID-19 shock, although at a slower rate than 2021. Growth is projected to reach 3.5 per cent in 2022, down from 7.1 per cent in 2021.² Rapid inflation is hitting the poorest Palestinian households hardest, with the cost of some basic food commodities projected to rise by as much as 80 per cent by the end of 2022.³ Estimates based on GDP per capita growth suggest that in 2020 the poverty rate spiked to 30 per cent - an increase of nearly 8 percentage from 2016. As the impact of the pandemic receded, the poverty rate is estimated to have declined to 27 percent in 2021. This represents a poor population of about 1.5 million people.⁴ According to WFP,

one-third of the Palestinian population (1.78 million people) suffer from food insecurity; these include 1.1 million people who are severely food insecure, most of whom (90 per cent) live in Gaza⁵.

During the second quarter of 2022, the unemployment rate was 44 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 14 per cent in the West Bank (21 per cent men and 38 per cent women).⁶ The absence of and barriers to engagement in livelihoods opportunities are subsequently driving a cycle of aid dependency and the reliance on negative coping strategies to meet basic needs. High reported levels of debt, borrowing, and use of savings to meet basic needs further exacerbates the financial precariousness of households and may reduce their resilience to or ability to recover from future shocks.⁷

The continuous cuts and irregularities of salary payment to civil servants of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the de-facto authorities in Gaza adds to the needs for immediate assistance, including food aid. In the West Bank, a coercive environment of settlements, their expansion and settler activities (e.g., violence, pollution, and taking over water resources), has contributed to unstable livelihoods which undermine economic potential. Farmers and herders in Area C of the West Bank are constantly threatened by the enforcement of demolitions, confiscation policies, and Israeli settlers' violent practices targeting Palestinians and their productive assets and equipment. Thus the reliance on humanitarian aid is prevalent in both the Gaza strip (where 68 per cent of aid recipient report that aid is their primary source of income), and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.⁸

As a result, there are significant structural imbalances, namely a resource gap and a labor market imbalance, and high dependance on external sources of income, including aid. These fundamental distortions, along with Israel's control over the collection and disbursement of a large part of the PA's fiscal revenues, perpetuate the high dependency of the Palestinian economy on donor support.

Legal and Policy Issues

Policies and practices that are applied in the OPT, especially by the Israeli authorities, raise significant concerns regarding adherence to their obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Despite its responsibilities as an occupying power and party to the Geneva Conventions, the Government of Israel continues to implement policies in the OPT that elevate the protection risks facing the Palestinian population, exacerbate humanitarian needs, and threaten the humanitarian community's ability to respond effectively. Concerns about Israel's obligations under IHL stem from its practices in both Gaza and the West Bank, including settlement expansion, forced displacement, access restrictions, and destruction of civilian property.

The Israeli authorities continue to maintain and expand settlements throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem in contravention of Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention.⁴ These expansions and accompanying settler violence, as well as inflammatory rhetoric and incitement to violence from Palestinian armed groups, have led to a significant increase in points of friction between Palestinians and Israelis and a related uptick of violence in the West Bank.⁵

Article 49 also prohibits the forcible transfer of civilians from, or within, the OPT. People have already been forced to leave their homes in some areas of the West Bank such as Masafer Yatta, Ras al Tin, and the Jordan Valley.

Increasing civilian casualties, notably among children, have highlighted ongoing questions and concerns about the excessive or disproportionate use of force in Gaza and the West Bank. 6,082 Palestinians were killed between 2008 and 2022 in Gaza alone, and 131 Israelis were killed in Israel and Gaza primarily from rockets fired from armed groups in Gaza. All parties are obliged to respect International Humanitarian Law:

Israel's practices have also raised concerns about respect for other statutes of International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Israel is for example a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which recognizes "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."⁹ Due to Israeli restrictions, the provision of healthcare is a major challenge throughout OPT, particularly for Palestinians in Gaza who are often prohibited or delayed by Israeli authorities from accessing healthcare outside Gaza, even when their lives are at imminent risk. Restrictions on the entry of "dual use items" including machines for oncology treatments, limits access to healthcare inside Gaza.

Demolitions and discriminatory planning regimes

Demolitions represent one element of a coercive environment that leaves many Palestinians throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with little option but to leave their homes and communities. The Israeli authorities' destroy or force the demolition of Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, mostly on grounds of lack of building permits, which are nearly impossible to obtain. According to data obtained by the Israeli organization Peace Now from the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), between 2009 and 2018, only two per cent of all requests submitted by Palestinians for building permits in Area C were granted (98 out of 4,422). A similarly restrictive regime applies in East Jerusalem: according to the same source, in Jerusalem, between 1991 and 2018, only 16.5 per cent of permits were issued for Palestinians, although Palestinians comprise about 38 per cent of the city's residents.¹⁰ The Palestinian Ministry of Local Government has reported that two community-led outline plans have been fully approved by the Israeli authorities in Area C in Hebron and Jenin. COGAT has informed that 13 of 16 projects submitted by the EU have been approved "in principle" and 18 others have been

"promoted" although it is not clear when these plans will receive approval or be implemented.

According to the OCHA OPT demolitions database, there has been a consistent increase in demolished or seized Palestinian-owned structures in recent years. As of 31 October 2022, 84 structures have been demolished or seized on a monthly average in Area C and East Jerusalem, marking an almost 150 per cent increase when compared with 2017, making 2022 the year with the highest number of demolished or seized structures in the last six years. As of 31 October, the Israeli authorities had demolished 695 structures, in 2022, including 110 donor-funded structures, because they lacked Israeli-issued building permits which are nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain. As a result, 744 people, including 371 children, were displaced.

The Israeli authorities continue to punitively demolish the family homes of Palestinians who killed Israelis or are accused of committing serious crimes against Israelis, including in Israel. As of 31 October 2022, 14 Palestinian structures have been demolished on punitive grounds in 2022, compared with three in 2021. Punitive demolitions are a form of collective punishment and as such are illegal under international law as they target the families of a perpetrator, or alleged perpetrator, who are not involved in the alleged act.

Israel's continued restrictive and discriminatory planning regime in Area C and East Jerusalem prevents Palestinians from addressing basic housing, livelihoods, and services. The threat of destruction of homes and sources of livelihood, driven by the discriminatory planning regime, is a key contributor to the generation of a coercive environment pressuring people to leave their areas of residence in Area C, Hebron H2 and East Jerusalem. Public (also called 'state') land is almost exclusively allocated to Israeli settlements or for military training, while most private Palestinian land is zoned as agricultural, where construction is severely restricted. The resulting

housing deficit alongside the risk of demolition, is a significant 'push-factor' for residents of Area C and East Jerusalem to relocate elsewhere in the West Bank.¹¹

As of end of November 2022, 50 schools in Area C and 8 schools in East Jerusalem, serving around 6,550 children and 700 teachers, are at risk of demolition (fully or partially) by Israeli authorities. Israeli authorities have ordered the demolition or stop work order of at least six schools in Area C as of 14 December, impacting over 206 students and 41 teachers.

Security Environment

The security environment in the OPT remains volatile. The use of live ammunition by Israeli forces is on the rise with 30 per cent of all search-and-arrest operations carried out in 2022 seeing the use of live ammunition. 2022 has been the deadliest year for West Bank Palestinians since the United Nations started systematically counting fatalities in 2005. In 2022, 152 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank, including 35 children. This is an 81% increase of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank compared to 2021.

In 2022, according to the UN, 21 Israelis and three foreign nationals were killed by Palestinians from the West Bank in incidents related to the OPT, including one child.¹² Four of those killed were Israeli forces. According to Israeli sources, 31 Israelis have been killed. Armed Palestinians and Israeli forces increasingly engaged in exchanges of fire in certain areas of the West Bank.

In addition to this alarming situation, concerns remain about increasing movement restrictions. In October 2022, following the killing of two Israeli soldiers by armed Palestinians at checkpoints in Nablus and East Jerusalem, Israeli forces imposed extensive movement restrictions in Shu'fat refugee camp in East Jerusalem for five

days affecting about 130,000 Palestinians, and in the city of Nablus for 23 days affecting at least 200,000 Palestinians. The restrictions limited access to health care, education, livelihoods, and impacted economic opportunities, raising further humanitarian concerns.¹³

At the same time, a steep rise in Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank has further eroded safety. The monthly average of settler violence against Palestinians is at its highest since 2005 when OCHA first started recording this data. When compared with 2021, there has been close to a 40 per cent increase in the monthly average of settler violence incidents resulting in either Palestinian casualties or property damage or both, and a 96 per cent increase when compared with 2020. Some settler attacks occur in the presence of or with the active support of Israeli forces, raising concerns of failure by law enforcement to ensure public order and the safety and security of the occupied population as required by IHL.¹⁴

As with demolitions, the prevailing security environment increases the risk of forced displacement for individuals and communities in Area C, East Jerusalem and the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron city (H2), which may amount to individual or mass forcible transfer, also deepen the coercive environment and worrying security conditions unfolding in the West Bank.¹⁵

Escalations

Gaza witnessed a series of escalations of hostilities in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2022, causing fatalities, injuries, mental health needs, destruction of civilian properties, and public basic infrastructure, hindering development and aggravating the already over-stretched infrastructure and energy deficits. On 5 August 2022, hostilities between Gaza and Israel escalated with the killing of a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operative by Israeli forces inside Gaza and armed Palestinian groups firing rockets into Israel. A ceasefire came

into effect two days later. During the escalation, 50 Palestinians, including 17 children, were killed in the Gaza Strip, of whom 36 were civilians and eight were directly participating in the hostilities while the status of six others is undetermined, according to OHCHR. Of the 50 Palestinians killed, 30 were killed by Israeli forces, 16 by Palestinian armed groups with rockets/mortars falling short of their target, and four killed in situations where the victim's identity remains disputed or unknown. 360 others were injured, including 151 children and 58 women, according to the local Ministry of Health. According to the Israeli authorities, a total of 70 Israelis were injured.

Gender Based Violence

Women and girls in the OPT are experiencing various forms of violence due to discriminatory laws that further entrench discriminatory social norms and traditions. The most common types of violence against women observed in the OPT include domestic violence, sexual harassment, child marriage, and femicide or gender-related killings. Access to SGBV reporting channels that lead to assistance continues to be scarce. Data from the MSNA in the context of access to confidential channels to report sensitive information show that knowledge and use of reporting channels is extremely low, 21 per cent in Gaza and 4 per cent in West Bank.

The violence against women only increased during the COVID-19 pandemic for reasons related to increased risk of spending longer time with an abusive husband or immediate relative and lack of operational services due to the lockdowns.¹⁶ One helpline reported an increase of 57 per cent in calls related to violence compared with pre COVID-19 emergency state.¹⁷

The prevalence of patriarchal norms and the economic decline in Palestine, as well as escalations in hostilities and violence, as is the case globally, and the impact of the Israeli occupation are the main drivers of protection needs in relation to GBV. At present, no laws specifically criminalize

GBV such as femicide, domestic violence, and sexual harassment, abuse, and assault.¹⁸ The MICS 2019/2020 found that 16 per cent of women believe husbands are justified in beating their wives, 24 percent in Gaza and 10 percent in the West Bank. Economic struggles reinforce patriarchal discriminatory norms that allow families to strip their daughters of their inheritance rights if they wed outside the extended family. Adolescent girls are particularly vulnerable and face a series of overlapping vulnerabilities linked to poverty, patriarchal social norms, disability, and low access to services, leading to harmful practices, including child marriage. The pressure of early marriage is even higher for girls with disabilities due to the perception that this would ensure their future safety. Across OPT, 52 per cent of parents think it is more difficult for a girl with disability to get married and 50 per cent declared that they would be ready to marry their girl with disability under the age of 16 years old. It is estimated that there are 530,000 adolescent Palestinian girls, projected to rise to 720,000 in 2030.¹⁹

More broadly, children across the OPT experience high levels of violence at home, with 90 per cent of children facing some form of violent discipline at home.²⁰

Natural environment/disaster risk

The OPT is particularly vulnerable to impacts of climate change. Climate projections indicate that by mid-century, the temperature will increase by between 1.2°C and 2.6°C.²¹

In the past, flooding in Gaza has resulted in displacement, loss of assets, disruption of livelihoods and decreased access to services, while exacerbating the risk of waterborne diseases. Women bear the brunt of the hardship of flooded homes as they are expected to continue fulfilling their domestic duties under adverse conditions.

Twelve per cent of households interviewed for the 2022 MSNA reported being affected by floods in the three years prior to data collection. Among these, 41 per cent reported that their shelter or the

area surrounding their shelter had been impacted, and 87 per cent reported that their daily activities had been negatively impacted by the flooding.²²

About 93,000 people in Gaza have been identified as being at risk of flooding due to rainfall and overflow of wastewater from pumping stations and sewage collection network during the 2022-2023 winter season.²³

The precarious state of the infrastructure, which has undergone minimal upgrading or repair over the last decade, and chronic electricity deficit, as a result of the consequences of the blockade/movement restrictions and damage from recurrent escalation of hostilities, have undermined the operational capacity of existing facilities. The ability of service providers to implement infrastructural projects in high-risk flooding areas has also been limited by the lack of funding and import restrictions of essential material imported through Israel, among other reasons.

Natural resource management is challenged in the OPT due to limited financial assets, water scarcity deterioration of the water quality and land and soil contamination, as well as desertification and air pollution. The inability to access and manage natural resources sustainably and to enforce laws and instructions are making the threats of climate change more aggravated, especially with the high population rate, poverty level, and food insecurity. Palestinians are denied access to Area C and areas near settlements, with major implications for farmers and pastoralists.

Impact on systems and services

The Health Care system

The health care system in the OPT continues to struggle to provide adequate essential services due to the consequences of the occupation, persistent fiscal constraints and mismanagement, and sporadic outbreaks of violence. The OPT health sector consists of four main health service providers: the Ministry of Health (MoH), UNRWA,

NGOs, and the private sector. While the MoH is the main primary and secondary health service provider in OPT in the West Bank; in Gaza the main primary health care service provider is UNRWA.

Recurrent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Gaza have resulted in considerable loss of life, injury, permanent disabilities, and psychosocial trauma, while also eroding the capacity of health systems and infrastructure. In the West Bank, the numerous flashpoints especially in Jenin, Nablus, Hebron, and East Jerusalem have led to increased need for trauma and emergency care for those injured in a context where the hospitals are insufficiently prepared to deal with increased influx of injured.

The health system is suffering from major shortages in specialized personnel, specialized facilities, and the availability of drugs. In addition, continued restrictions on patients needing to exit Gaza to obtain essential and often life-saving medical care in Israel or West Bank, as well as the movement of essential medical equipment and supplies into Gaza, remain of grave concern. Challenges include the arbitrary denial or repeated delays by Israel of permits for patients and their companions, and the complicated and lengthy procedures administered by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in obtaining outside medical referrals. According to data collected by the WHO for the Gaza Strip, the approval rate for patient permit applications in 2022 was 67 per cent.

The range of specialized health services in Gaza is limited and there are gaps in capacities to deliver proper services and to cover their cost. This leaves most of the population of Gaza at risk, especially chronic disease patients who need specialized health services and are unable to access quality and timely treatment. With the already high burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) which include oncology, diabetic and cardiac cases, the pressure on the health care system is likely to worsen.

In addition to NCD management issues, the longstanding challenges in the funding and integration of mental health care into essential health services remain, and the MoH struggling to deal with the growing demand, including for more specialized services for mental health disorders. The OPT has one of the highest burdens of mental health issues and psychological disorders in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, with 54 per cent of Palestinian boys and 47 per cent of Palestinian girls aged 6 to 12 years presenting emotional and/or behavioural disorders.²⁴

With a lack of qualified health providers trained to deliver youth-friendly health services, access to sexual and reproductive health care is challenging.

Governance and the rule of law

The political and jurisdictional fragmentation caused by the occupation in the OPT exacerbates a complicated domestic legal framework. The human rights obligations of Israel within the OPT are indivisible from the jurisdiction and effective control exercised by Israel as the occupying power.²⁵ Despite being a key duty bearer to the Palestinian population, the Government of Israel has not acknowledged this in any of its State Party reports to the international treaty bodies.

Although the State of Palestine is a party to most of the core international human rights conventions, and its human rights obligations extend to its jurisdiction, that is, the entirety of the OPT, it lacks control over much of it (for example, East Jerusalem, Area C, H2, and Gaza).²⁶

The *de facto* authorities in Gaza also bear human rights obligations, given their exercise of government-like functions and territorial control.²⁷ Laws enacted during the Ottoman and British Mandate periods remain applicable in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, respectively, as well as personal status laws, including the Egyptian Family Rights Law (1954) and the Jordanian Personal Status Law (1976).

The Israeli occupation, territorial and political fragmentation, and the practical limitations on the control that can be exercised by the PA means that the location where people live also heavily determines the extent to which the State of Palestine can fulfill its human rights obligations including service delivery, access to justice, promotion of the rights of women, and protection of vulnerable groups at risk of being left behind.

The actual transfer of power to the PA under the Oslo Accords was limited, and Israel maintains control over most of the underlying determinants of individual rights for adequate standards of living. For example, Israel collects indirect and direct taxes and transfers them to the PA; these transfers are often subject to periodic political disputes by both parties with Israeli withholding the transfers.

Israel also maintains control over internal boundaries, air space, sea, external security, movement of people and goods, residency, communications, and, in certain areas, infrastructure development and access to resources including energy, land, water, and other natural assets.

While the Israeli occupation is the primary impediment to the exercise of the right to self-determination and effective Palestinian governance, Palestinian political institutions face challenges in administrative capacity, financial sustainability, and popular legitimacy. Along with the lack of progress on the two-state solution and ending the occupation, the failure to hold national elections since 2006, restrictions on human rights, and lack of governance reforms contribute to changing domestic, regional and international support of the PA—leading to reduced financing from donors and declining confidence of citizens in their government.²⁸ The absence of a functioning legislature has resulted in new legislation issued by decree often without transparency and national consultations. Several of the decree-laws appear to have extended the reach of the executive over

the judiciary with serious concerns in relation to the separation of powers.

Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza have shown limited progress and commitment to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of violations linked to incidents of possible excessive use of force or allegations of torture and ill-treatment by PSF.²⁹

Humanitarian and civic space

Space allowing humanitarian, human rights, and civil society organizations (CSOs) to operate within their mandates continues to be under threat across the OPT. Shrinking civic space and attacks on civil society, including human rights defenders (HRDs), continue at a time when there is heightened concern over a range of measures targeting HRDs and civil society groups, introduced by both Israel and the PA. Arbitrary constraints to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and freedom of opinion and expression include threats of harassment, arbitrary arrest and use of force against demonstrators driven both by Israeli forces (IF) and Palestinian Security Forces (PSF).³⁰

Particularly worrying is the ongoing harassment and punitive arrest and other measures by IF against those most active in protests. IF have arrested and detained Palestinian HRDs, imposed restrictions on their freedom of movement, and raided the offices of civil society groups.³¹

The PA has also taken actions that significantly curtail civic space and demands for accountability. The President of the State of Palestine has issued a series of decree laws relating to the freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and expression. PSF routinely repress peaceful dissent through physical assault, arbitrary arrests, and restrictions on demonstrators, journalists, and human rights defenders. OHCHR documented numerous cases of physical attacks against women activists, journalists and by-standers, as well as being

subjected to threats with sexual connotations, and other sexual violence and harassment.³²

In late 2021, the Israeli authorities designated six Palestinian human rights and humanitarian NGOs as 'terror organizations'. To date, the evidence that has been provided to the international community has not been sufficient to substantiate these claims. On 18 August 2022, IF broke into, searched, and sealed the offices of these six NGOs, and one other human rights NGO, in Ramallah. Their property was confiscated and destroyed, and military orders closing the offices were left at the premises. The attempted closures of these organization offices represent the latest in a series of actions by Israel that are further limiting the ability of human rights, humanitarian, and development work in the OPT, which affect all institutions working to promote human rights, development and delivering assistance. These actions constitute a real risk of further undermining the humanitarian community's ability to provide assistance and protection to Palestinians throughout the OPT.

Humanitarian operations in the Gaza Strip are also hampered by the "no contact" policy adopted by certain countries and donors, prohibiting contact with the *de facto* Hamas authorities, even on an operational level. The work of international NGOs is also impeded by the *de facto* authorities due to a wide range of administrative demands. The local authorities in Gaza restrict the movement of humanitarian personnel, which have included questioning and confiscation and searches of equipment belonging to humanitarian organizations and personnel.

Humanitarian access

The imposition of physical and administrative measures continues to restrict humanitarian programmes, including constraints on the delivery of materials needed and limitations on the implementation of projects that involve building, expanding or rehabilitating infrastructure in the

Gaza Strip, Area C, H2 and East Jerusalem.

In Gaza, restrictions on the entry of goods considered by the Israeli authorities as 'dual use' items, which are considered by Israeli authorities to present potential security concerns, continue to undermine the quality of basic services and impede efforts to address housing needs. Limited access to construction materials and critical equipment since 2007 has delayed the construction, repair and upgrade of homes and infrastructure needed to address high population growth and the devastation caused by recurrent escalation of hostilities. This has undermined the quality of health, education, and water and sanitation services available in Gaza, and prolonged the displacement of those who have lost their homes. Although the entry of restricted construction materials has been facilitated by the temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) agreed to by the United Nations, the PA and the GOI following the 2014 hostilities, the entry of other restricted items, particularly those required for water and sanitation projects, remains a major challenge.³³

The UN and partners play an important role in monitoring and reporting violations of IHRL and IHL. Partners that monitor human rights violations have been subjected to physical attacks and have been prevented from accessing vulnerable communities, especially in Hebron H2 and the southern Hebron hills. Similarly, humanitarian partners working in the health sector have been greatly impacted by the closures, as ambulances have often experienced delays and harassment while moving through checkpoints.

Despite increasing humanitarian needs, access restrictions remain a key challenge to reach affected populations. Delays by Israeli authorities in issuing the required permits to travel to and from Gaza are common. As of end November 2022, the Access Coordination Unit reported 278 outstanding permit requests. In addition, the new procedure for "Entry and Residence of Foreigners in the Judea and Samaria Area", announced in February 2022 and entered into force in October 2022, has added further complexity to the legal requirements needed to work in the OPT.³⁴

1.2

Scope of Analysis

Due to the protracted nature of the crisis, the scope of analysis remains largely the same as in past years. This entails a focus on new emerging needs resulting from hostilities as well as vulnerable people with longer-term humanitarian needs.

New for 2023 is the impact of the crisis on services and systems highlighting needs and urgent requirements to maintain basic services and support. This affect both humanitarian and development partners operating in the OPT. As such, this focus can help identify areas where integrated humanitarian action and development cooperation can be achieved to address the emerging needs of basic services and systems in the OPT. In large, the analysis of the 2023 HNO has been informed by the [2022 Multisectoral Needs assessment at the household level in the OPT](#). This public dataset has been developed to ensure evidence-based inter-sectoral analysis of needs to inform a people-centred intersectoral response in both the HNO and Common Country Analysis (CCA).

Key elements of the MSNA were designed to align with the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF), a methodology endorsed by the Global Cluster Coordinators and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). In doing so, this enabled a detailed analysis of the magnitude and severity of humanitarian needs among crisis-affected population groups. In addition, this supported the calculation of sectoral and inter-sectoral 'People in Need' (PIN) and severity figures, as well as the identification of vulnerable population groups and geographic areas at governorate level with the most acute needs.

The methodology of the MSNA, through its sampling and indicator design, was consciously designed to promote and ensure the participation of pre-identified vulnerable groups, information on whose needs is crucial to the broader response. The groups included, among others: Palestine refugees living in refugee camps; Palestine refugees living outside refugee camps; female-headed households; and people with disabilities.

In total, the MSNA sampled 8,331 households across the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza. Data collection was carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and spanned the period of 30 May to 6 July 2022. The majority of respondents (52 per cent) were female. Through consultations with PCBS statisticians and key technical figures across the humanitarian response, the MSNA is statistically representative across 57 strata in the West Bank and Gaza at a 95 per cent confidence level and 9 per cent margin of error. The 57 strata are included below:

West Bank:

- 11 strata in Area C for each governorate (e.g. Nablus Area C)
- 11 strata in Area A and B for each governorate (e.g. Jenin Areas A and B)
- H2 area of Hebron
- East Jerusalem

Gaza Strip:

- 25 localities/municipalities
- 8 refugee camps

Through a participatory process with key humanitarian stakeholders, the MSNA survey developed over 250 needs indicators across all clusters, including Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) and gender indicators, with the risk of SEA addressed as part of AAP and gender. Further, the timing of the assessment and its deliverables were aligned with key milestones of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) to support response planning among and cross humanitarian sectors.

In August 2022, OCHA and cluster coordinators developed the interagency needs analysis and the clusters' needs analysis models. The models included were composed of those indicators considered most representative and critical in assessing household need according to the five-point JIAF severity scale. In support of this process, OCHA shared the validated and clean MSNA data and preliminary analysis with the clusters. Cluster coordinators and information officers used the MSNA data and other datasets to generate the clusters' PIN and severity of needs by strata/area, demographic groups, gender, and age. The results

of these models, along with the MSNA dataset, was used to produce a joint intersectoral analysis to inform the HNO and, subsequently, humanitarian programming/projects.

MSNA indicators were developed jointly with development partners, who will use the data to inform assistance planning and relevant Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) targets. The joint exercise represents a further step towards the integration of a Nexus approach to needs analysis and planning in the OPT.

In 2023, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) estimates that approximately 2.1 million Palestinians across the OPT will require some form of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian conditions created by OPT's multi-dimensional crisis continues to impact all parts of the territory and affect every aspect of Palestinian life. In 2023, Palestinians will be into their 56th year of grappling with the safety, security, financial and emotional consequences of occupation and political turmoil.

1.3




Number and distribution of People in Need

Without continued intervention across the triple nexus and sustainable political solutions, humanitarian assistance will continue to be required for its critical stabilizing effect.

People in Need by Geography and Severity

[The 2023 PIN was calculated based on the 2022 household-level MSNA](#), rather than on a harmonized dataset generated from the various cluster needs assessments, as was the practice before 2022. Of the total, 61 per cent of people in need live in Gaza, and 39 per cent of people in need live in the West Bank. Within Gaza, 58 per cent, or three out of five of residents, needs humanitarian assistance, while in the West Bank 25 per cent, or one-fourth of residents, require humanitarian assistance.

Across OPT, fifty-five per cent or 1.15 million of people in need are refugees. Refugees account for 69 per cent of the people in need in Gaza, and 34 per cent in the West Bank.



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
Humanitarian Conditions and Severity of Needs

Overall needs analysis

While the overall number of people in need has stayed relatively constant, the most recent Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) indicates a deepening of needs with, 38 per cent of households identified as in ‘catastrophic’, ‘extreme’ or ‘severe’ conditions. In Gaza, the situation is more pronounced, with 59 per cent of households categorized as in ‘severe’, ‘extreme’ or ‘catastrophic’ condition.

While overall most households can meet their basic needs, they do so through heavy reliance on aid and negative coping mechanisms due to barriers to or lack of livelihoods opportunities. Thirty-one per cent of Palestinians in the West Bank and 81 per cent of those in Gaza have reported challenges in doing so, with food, health, and utilities being the top three. Similarly, eight per cent of households in the West Bank and 73 per cent of Gazan households reported receiving humanitarian assistance in the six months prior to the 2022 MSNA data collection.

Due to differences in the political and economic situations in the West Bank and Gaza, coupled with the geographical divide and different government and occupation-related policies, we have presented key needs separately for Gaza and the West Bank. The needs of vulnerable groups are presented for the entire territory, except for those groups where the needs differ significantly between the West Bank and Gaza.




Gaza

Gaza suffers from acute financial contraction. With severe restrictions on the import and export of goods – including a denial of entry of resources needed to maintain, repair, and expand existing infrastructure – and restrictions on cross-border movement of people, Gaza exists essentially in a state of isolation. These factors, combined with repeated destruction caused by recurrent escalations of conflict have created a complex and multi-faceted crisis defined by widespread poverty, one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, and limited prospects for genuine development.³⁵

Physical and Mental Wellbeing

The compounding effect of the long-term exposure to violent conflict, financial precarity, and a lack of freedom and opportunity are apparent in the 40 per cent of households in Gaza that reported at least one member of their household experiencing signs of psychosocial distress or trauma in the year prior to the 2022 MSNA data collection. With some of



Gaza Strip: **Intersectoral Needs**

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 1.3M	878K	400K	117K	24%	24%	26%	26%	21%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS




PEOPLE IN NEED AND SEVERITY BY GOVERNORATE



the highest observed rates of psychosocial distress and trauma reported in localities near the access restricted areas (ARAs), these households are particularly vulnerable to human rights concerns and potential displacement, and face restricted access to services.

Figure 1: % of Gaza households with at least one member of the household self-reporting signs of psychosocial distress or trauma, by Gaza locality with the highest reported rates



Children face regular attacks and harassment in going to, from and during school. Approximately 57,000 households reported that at least one child in their household as showing signs of psychosocial distress.³⁶

Beyond MHPSS, access to healthcare remains limited. Children under the age of five in Gaza are one of the most vulnerable groups affected by the deteriorating health system. Up to 10,000 newborn children per year need transfer to neonatal intensive care units for specialized life-saving treatment.³⁷ A total of 324,143 children in Gaza under the age of five also have micronutrient deficiencies. In addition to these challenges the health care system is not prepared to adequately support children with developmental delays and disabilities.

Restrictions on patients needing to exit Gaza to obtain essential and often life-saving medical care in Israel or West Bank, as well as the movement of essential medical equipment and supplies into Gaza, remain of grave concern. Challenges include denial or repeated delays by Israel approving exit

permit for patients and their companions, and the PA and Gaza de facto authorities' complicated and time-consuming procedures for referring patients from Gaza to medical treatment in West Bank and East Jerusalem hospitals. The range of specialized health services in Gaza is limited and with gaps in capacities to deliver proper services and to cover their cost. This leaves most of the population of Gaza at risk, especially chronic disease patients who need specialized health services and are unable to access quality and timely treatment.


Outside major escalations in conflict, farmers and fishers in the ARA and those living close to the fence dividing Gaza and Israel are most often at risk and routinely subjected to Israeli military attacks while carrying out essential livelihood activities. Since the beginning of 2022, the Israeli navy has arrested and injured an increasing number of fishermen along Gaza's coastline.

Concerns about arbitrary arrests, detention and ill-treatment by Israeli authorities persist, including those noted above of fishermen in the ARA who are arrested, transferred to Israel and interrogated before release without conviction, and Palestinian workers with Israeli issued work permits detained while crossing Erez.

Also of concern are the suspected arbitrary arrests, detention, and ill treatment, possibly amounting to torture, of Palestinians by the Gaza *de facto* authorities, who are held sometimes for extended periods of time without charge or. Since the beginning of 2022, courts in Gaza have imposed or upheld 23 death sentences, including eight issued or upheld by military courts, and carried out five executions in September.

Food insecurity in Gaza remains high at 63 per cent. While 93 per cent of food insecure families felt worried about not having enough food to eat, 55 per cent of families had to skip a meal as a coping mechanism.³⁸

Figure 2: % of Gaza households facing challenges obtaining enough money to cover their basic needs, by type of basic need




Living Conditions

The high rates of unemployment in Gaza are well documented. The lack of employment opportunities manifests itself in high reliance on NGO or charity assistance as a primary source of income.

A chronic electricity deficit continues to disrupt the daily lives of Gaza’s residents, further affecting access to health care and economic opportunities. The water crisis in Gaza, due to over-extraction from the coastal aquifer, sea water infiltration and pollution, is particularly severe and an ever-growing population lacks access to clean water supplies. This affects over 90 per cent of households in Gaza, impacting health and general hygiene and causing more than a quarter of all childhood diseases.³⁹

Periodic escalations in conflict and rocket fire between Israel and Gaza, coupled with the slow pace of reconstruction has left many families in Gaza with inadequate shelter. During the 11-day May 2021 escalation, 62,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed, resulting in the displacement of 12,000 people.⁴⁰ Out of 13,000 housing units totally destroyed since 2014, about 2,200 units are yet to be funded for reconstruction and in urgent need for Transitional Shelter support. Additionally, 72,600 out of the partially damaged housing units had not received any repair assistance until now, leaving thousands of households unprotected and living in critical shelter conditions.⁴¹


Figure 3: % of Gaza households by main reported barrier to unemployment



Coping Mechanisms

Under the blockade of the Gaza Strip, livelihood and employment opportunities are extremely limited. More than half of Gaza households reported NGO or charity assistance as one of their primary sources of income in the 30 days prior to MSNA data collection. Taking on debt, primarily to meet basic needs, was a widespread practice, with 83 per cent of households reporting having outstanding debt and 79 per cent of households having taken on recent debt in the 3 months prior to data collection. These factors, combined with the fact that 60 per cent of households reported a member of their household unemployed and unable to find work, further highlight the socioeconomic vulnerability of Gaza households. With 93 per cent of Gaza households having employed at least one type of coping mechanism due to a lack of food or money to buy it⁴², household vulnerability may be further exacerbated and resilience to future shocks may be imperiled. Aid-recipient households reported higher rates of need than their counterparts, indicating that without access to employment or additional means of obtaining financial resources, aid may be insufficient in sustaining household circumstances in the longer term.

Figure 4: % of GZ households facing challenges obtaining enough money to cover at least one type of basic need, by household population group



Refugees

Of the 2.2 million inhabitants living in Gaza⁴³, over two-thirds or 1.48 million, are registered Palestine refugees⁴⁴. This represents over a quarter of the total Palestine refugee population registered with UNRWA across the five fields of operation

of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza. Poverty rates amongst refugees residing inside and outside of the eight refugee camps in Gaza have more than doubled from 39 per cent in 2011 to 82 per cent in 2021.⁴⁵ Conditions have since continued to deteriorate.

As of the second quarter of 2022, the unemployment rate among Palestine refugees in Gaza reached 47 per cent, compared with 39 per cent amongst non-refugees.

In providing access to services, UNRWA remains a lifeline for Palestine refugees in Gaza. As Palestine refugees' vulnerabilities grow, the Agency's role becomes even more relevant and essential to provide a consistent and meaningful response to increased needs. Food security support, safe and continuing access to health care and education services are both humanitarian and strategic priorities: access to rights and dignified living standards is key to stability. UNRWA's emergency food assistance provides a critical lifeline to over one million Palestine refugees who depend on food aid to meet their most basic food needs. UNRWA's ability to deliver essential services will continue to be severely challenged if the growing gap between funding and humanitarian needs is not addressed.

UNRWA

In providing access to services, UNRWA remains a lifeline for Palestine refugees in Gaza while mitigating the worst impact of the chronic crisis after over 15 years of blockade. The Agency's role became even more critical to provide a consistent and meaningful response to the growing vulnerabilities of Palestine refugees. Food security support, safe and continuing access to health care and education services are both humanitarian and strategic priorities: access to rights and dignified living standards is key to stability. UNRWA's emergency food assistance targets 1.2 million Palestine refugees who depend on food aid to meet their most basic food needs. The UNRWA target for food assistance is based on a UNRWA study coordinated with the PCBS,⁹² which highlights that 81.5 per cent of individuals in Gaza, 71 per cent of whom are Palestine refugees, live below the national poverty line. Sixty-four per cent of them are food insecure. UNRWA's ability to deliver essential services will be severely challenged and affect the stability in the region if the gap between funding and humanitarian needs continues to grow.

Explosive Remnants of War

The May 2021 and August 2022 escalation of hostilities have left Gaza contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW). A year after the escalation, 14 out of the 18 deep buried bombs (DBB) that were in Gaza in 2021 have been cleared. These DBB were in the rubble of damaged buildings or in populated areas posing immediate risks to Palestinians, hindering safe movement, humanitarian access and delivery of basic services. Concurrently, due to the cyclical nature of conflict, explosive ordinance risk education (EORE) is a consistent requirement for the civilian population. Specifically, men are more vulnerable to loss of life or injuries due to their larger engagement in the public sphere, including participation in the provision of first response services, construction work and scrap metal collection. Equally, children are particularly vulnerable due to their inquisitive nature and tendency to explore their environments; since the May 2021 escalation, 79 per cent of the reported ERW victims were children.

West Bank

In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, a complex web of long-standing Israeli policies and practices consisting of highly restricted freedom of movement and coercive discriminatory planning regime in Area C and East Jerusalem prevent livelihood development and impede Palestinian households from being able to access essential services. Throughout 2022, growing tensions and

violence have exacerbated protection concerns and led to a marked deterioration in the situation.⁴⁶


Physical and Mental Wellbeing

Protection of civilians in the 2022 MSNA analysis was closely tied to access to services in other forms, particularly for households located in Area C, H2, and East Jerusalem, who were more likely to experience protection concerns related to settler violence or aggression by Israeli forces or authorities.

West Bank-wide, 12 per cent of households reported at least one member had showed signs of psychosocial distress or trauma. Nablus reported the highest rates with 52 per cent of households self-reporting observing signs of psychological distress. Tensions in Nablus have been particularly high throughout 2022, with an increase in raids by Israeli forces, killings of Palestinians, increasing use of live ammunition, and intra-Palestinian clashes.

Palestinian children living in Nablus, East Jerusalem and H2 face a relatively higher risk of being arrested and detained or being placed under house detention compared to their peers in the rest of the West Bank. Among the households in H2 who reported a child had dropped out of school in the 2021-2022 academic year, 89 per cent identified conflict-related protection risks as the primary reason.


West Bank: **Intersectoral Needs**

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.8M	275K	534K	130K	27%	26%	24%	23%	10%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION



PEOPLE IN NEED AND SEVERITY BY GOVERNORATE






Figure 5: Safety concerns driving children feeling unsafe travelling to/from school in Hebron H2



In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, 56 schools, serving around 6,500 children, are currently at risk of demotions by Israeli authorities. The difficulty in accessing schools heightens the risk of children dropping out of school, a trend on the rise in recent years.⁴⁷ It is also considered to be a 'push' factor, driving families such as those in Masafer Yatta, which was designated a military training site by Israel and whose residents are now at imminent risk of eviction and forcible transfer.

Living Conditions


Twenty-one percent of households reported that at least one member of their household was unemployed and unable to find work at the time of the MSNA data collection. Across the West Bank, 35% of households also reported a decrease in income over the course of the year.

The challenge to obtaining sufficient monetary resources to both cover their basic needs and allow adequate access to essential services is observed through the high reported rate of financial barriers to accessing healthcare or other specialized services.

The impact on shelter, infrastructure and livelihoods is particularly evident in Area C and Hebron H2, where the highest rates of eviction from and having a standing demolition order against their shelter were reported. As of October 2022, 692 structures

were reported to have been demolished in the West Bank, leaving 812 displaced.⁴⁸

Figure 6: Per cent of WB households by main reported barrier to unemployment



Coping Mechanisms

Many households in the West Bank can meet basic sectoral needs at acceptable levels. However, to do so, households are reliant on aid or employing negative coping mechanisms at high rates, including taking on debt and spending high proportions of their household expenditure on food, healthcare, and other basic needs, thereby risking to further exacerbate vulnerability, and potentially imperiling their resilience to future ongoing shocks.⁴⁹

A strong relationship is seen between the lack of livelihood opportunities, widespread unemployment, and the reliance of households on negative coping mechanisms to meet basic needs. West Bank-wide 28% of households were categorized as having employed either crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies.

Forty-three per cent of WB households reported having outstanding debt with 37 per cent indicated they had taken on new debt over the past three months. Despite dedicating high proportions of household expenditure to meeting basic needs, in particular food, nearly one third of households reported challenges in obtaining enough money to cover basic needs in the 30 days prior to data collection and 21 per cent reported challenges covering food needs.

Nablus was identified as an area of particular concern with 58 per cent of households in Nablus Area A and B and 66 per cent in Nablus Area C having employed at least one crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategy in the 30 days prior to data collection.⁵⁰


Refugees

Over 890,000 registered Palestine refugees live in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. About 25 per cent of registered Palestine refugees reside in 19 refugee camps across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Palestine refugees both inside and outside refugee camps are considered particularly vulnerable as they continue to face serious protection threats which include exposure to conflict-related violence, settler violence and IF operations in Palestine refugee camps which averaged thirteen operations per week in 2022. These operations often result in live ammunition injuries, excessive tear gas exposure, property damage, severe societal stress and, at times, fatalities. In 2022, there were 3,549 search-and-arrest operations in the West Bank, including 397 in

Figure 7: % of WB households facing challenges obtaining enough money to cover at least one type of basic need, by household population group

Household Population Group	
Household Refugee Status	
Non-refugee households	29%
Refugee households (all)	36%
In-camp refugees	47%
Out of camp refugees	33%
Head of Household Gender	
Male-headed household	30%
Female headed household	31%
Persons with disability	
Households with no person with disability	29%
Households with person with a disability	43%
Age of Head of Household	
Head of Household 18-59 years	32%
Head of Household 60+ years	28%
Household Location	
Areas A and B	34%
Area C	32%
East Jerusalem	5%
H2	35%

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS EMPLOYING CRISIS OR EMERGENCY LIVELIHOOD COPING STRATEGY



refugee camps. According to Israeli authorities, this was in response to an increase in attacks against Israeli citizens, while Palestinian authorities and the United Nations have raised concerns over excessive use of force by Israeli forces in the West Bank. Although there was only an increase of 78 search-and-arrest operations in 2022 when compared with 2021, the number of Palestinians killed in search-and-arrest operations is about three times higher than in 2021. The increase in violence and protection related incidents is impacting refugee livelihoods, children’s education, and the psychosocial wellbeing of the refugee community.

In-camp refugee households were more likely to report safety concerns for girls, boys, children with a disability, and women, compared with out of camp refugee households.

The deepening financial and fiscal crisis within the Palestinian economy, exacerbated by the COVID-19 closures in 2021 and the effects of the Ukraine conflict, have particularly affected the nearly 276,000 Palestine refugees who reside in one of the 19 refugee camps.⁵¹ The poverty rates among refugees in the West Bank are estimated to

have increased from 16 per cent in 2016 to 21 per cent in 2020, marking a 5 per cent increase, with poverty in the camps reaching up to 28 per cent.⁵² At the same time, food insecurity for refugees in the West Bank remains high at 14 per cent, and rose to 16 per cent for refugees inside camps, compared with non-refugees which dropped to 7 per cent in 2020.⁵³

In meeting the increased needs and protection risks, UNRWA plays a key role in the West Bank delivering essential basic services to Palestine refugees, including education, health, sanitation, and relief and social services. In addition to the provision of basic services, UNRWA plays an essential and unique protection and humanitarian role. In the absence of the PA to offer protection for Palestine refugees due to political, security, and financial restrictions, UNRWA’s international protection presence is critical. The Agency’s over 200 installations and operations are embedded within the communities they serve, upholding the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

Bedouin and herder communities

Bedouin and herder communities, of which over 70 per cent are refugees, are among the most vulnerable communities in Area C of the West Bank. The situation of the Bedouin communities, about 27,000 people, remains a major humanitarian

issue. Most at risk are 7,000 Bedouin living in 46 small communities in the Jerusalem periphery, of whom 60 per cent are children. Israeli authorities frequently demolish and confiscate donor-funded humanitarian structures.⁵⁴ Restrictions imposed on them as a result of the occupation and the absence of services deepen their poverty, severely impact their quality of life, and violate their human rights, including rights to freedom of movement, housing, health, education, and employment. By virtue of their location, Bedouin and herder communities are under the constant threat of forced displacement and settler violence. From 2016 to 2021, 1,627 structures in Bedouin and herder communities were demolished, displacing 2,836 people, and affecting over 28,750 people.⁵⁵

Movement restrictions affect these communities more than others because over 90 per cent of them depend on herding as their primary source of income, which requires moving over large areas to enable their livestock to graze. The Israeli planning regime requires Bedouins to stay within limited areas contrary to their nomadic lifestyle. As such, Bedouin and herder communities are among the highest at risk of food insecurity in the OPT. Most Bedouins live in Area C, where vulnerability and protection concerns are very high and access to natural resources is very limited, leading to higher food insecurity.⁵⁶ Israeli military firing ones have been established on land that has traditionally

Figure 8: % of West Bank households reporting safety and security concerns for children and women, by households’ refugee status

	% of HHs reporting a safety concern for girls	% of HHs reporting a safety concern for boys	% of HHs reporting a safety concern for children with disability	% of HHs reporting a safety concern for women
Non-refugee households	42%	43%	42%	25%
Refugee households (all)	47%	51%	47%	35%
In-camp refugees	68%	78%	69%	57%
Out of camp refugees	41%	43%	41%	28%

been inhabited by some 6,200 Palestinians in 38 Bedouin or herding communities. Palestinian residents in Israeli military firing zones face restrictions on grazing livestock inside firing zones and Israeli authorities frequently confiscate Palestinian-owned property and livestock. The use of firing zones and military training areas may expose people to direct and indirect weapons use. The communities are among the most vulnerable in the West Bank in terms of access to an adequate standard of living, primary health services, water, and sanitation.⁵⁷

Risks and Vulnerable Groups

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Discrimination

GBV takes many forms in OPT, including early/forced marriage, intimate partner/family violence, sexual harassment, rape, incest, denial of resources, psychological abuse and sexual exploitation and abuse. According to UN Women's Multi-Sectoral Gender Needs Assessment in the Gaza Strip, exposure to GBV and the threat of GBV is perceived to be on the rise because of war-related violence. Fifty-four per cent households stated that they noticed an increase in GBV against adult females in the community; 45 per cent noticed an increase in GBV against female children in the community.⁵⁸

According to GBV organizations in Gaza, 23 per cent of all registered marriages in 2021 included girls under 18 years old. At the same time, lifesaving GBV services in Gaza are extremely limited and access is further restricted by stigma and discrimination – with the result that those who experience GBV are not able to access quality, timely care, and support to recover. It is recognized that refugee women and girls, as well as other vulnerable groups on the move, are more vulnerable to GBV.

Violence against women, particularly by intimate partners, remains at an alarmingly high rate. Palestinian women face multiple layers of discrimination due to a weak, fragile, and inactive

legal system. According to the 2019 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic (PCBS) survey on violence, which was updated in July 2022, 59 per cent of married or previously married) women between the ages of 15 and 64 experienced violence in the 12 months preceding the survey; 70 per cent in Gaza and 52 per cent in the West Bank. Of those, 57 per cent experienced psychological violence, 19 per cent physical violence, and 9 per cent sexual violence, while 10 per cent experienced the emerging issue of cyber violence.⁵⁹

The stigma around mental health remains “higher for women and threatens their status in society”.⁶⁰ Moreover, the social taboo around speaking about intimate partner violence or other forms of GBV is believed to obstruct recovery and increase mental health challenges for women, who often view suicide as “the only way out of oppression and abusive relationships”.⁶¹

The consequences of GBV for affected women, girls and vulnerable groups include suicide, early marriage, and dropping out of school.⁶²

In addition, it is more difficult for women to find employment compared to men in the OPT because of lack of economic opportunities that are readily available to women. Certainly, the lack of opportunities for women is the most common obstacle behind the feminization of poverty, but other factors also seriously hinder women's access to employment, such as the unavailability or unaffordability of childcare and the lack of consent from the husband and guardian to taking employment. In Gaza, 19 per cent of households reported the lack of consent from husbands being an obstacle to female members of the households finding work, compared with 23 per cent in the West Bank.⁶³

Women and girls in the West Bank face particular disadvantages given their limited share of agricultural holdings, their restricted access to services, and limited economic opportunities

available to generate income. Consequently, this disadvantage restricts women's ability to contribute to household resilience and food security.

In Area C and East Jerusalem, home demolitions have a significant impact on women as traditional gender norms link them to their home and domestic responsibilities. Recent research has highlighted that such destruction can have a devastating psychological and emotional consequence on women, "including the development of psychosocial disorders like anxiety and depression, which can be compounded by a sense of failure to protect one's children from violence".

Female-Headed Households

More than one tenth of all households in Palestine are female-headed: 12 per cent in the West Bank and 9 per cent in Gaza.⁶⁴ The feminization of poverty has been a common phenomenon in the OPT, even before the COVID pandemic. Female-headed households in the OPT experience heightened vulnerability to food insecurity, often experiencing significant declines in their physical conditions and health, including nutrition, due to employing negative coping strategies.⁶⁵

An estimated 68,000 female-headed households suffer from damages and defects at their shelters, 11,000 of whom live in severe and extreme shelter conditions that do not meet minimum standards for protection, privacy, covered living space, resistance to extreme weather conditions, or suffer from unrepaired damage or inadequate WASH facilities.⁶⁶

Sixty percent of female-headed households reported NGO or charity assistance as their primary income source (compared with 50 per cent of male-headed households) and 39 per cent reported community support as a primary income source (compared to 17 per cent of male-headed households). This should be considered alongside the observation that elderly female-headed

households were the least likely to report any member of their household having worked outside of the household in the 30 days prior to the data collection.⁶⁷

Ninety-one per cent of female-headed households reported a member of their household having a healthcare need in the three months prior to data collection, compared with 72 per cent male-headed households.⁶⁸ Particularly vulnerable among female-headed households are those headed by females age 60 and older, of which 89 per cent reported at least one member with a chronic illness, compared with 58 per cent for households headed by females aged 18-59.⁶⁹ In addition, of the eight per cent of female-headed households in Gaza, 27 per cent were assessed to include a member of their household having a disability, compared with 20 per cent of the 92 per cent of male-headed households.⁷⁰ Further, elderly female-headed household (44 per cent) were twice as likely to have at least one member with a disability, as those headed by a female aged 18-59 (18 per cent).⁷¹

Among female headed households, 35 per cent of households identified support from community, family, and friends as one of their primary income sources in the 30 days prior to data collection, compared to 7 per cent of male-headed households. Of all population groups assessed in the West Bank, nearly half of elderly female-headed households reported relying on community support as their primary source of income.⁷² Female-headed households were also more likely to report having received assistance/aid in the previous six months, at 21 per cent as compared to six per cent of male headed households

Persons with Disabilities

Based on the 2022 MSNA, an estimated 21 per cent of households in Gaza have at least one member with a disability,⁷³ and nine per cent include at least one child aged 5 to 17 with a disability.

Barriers are identified in the absence and/or difficult to access health, including MHPSS services, education, livelihood, and protection services. A notable 56 per cent of households indicated access to MHPSS services was lacking and a priority need. Lack of access to healthcare and MHPSS services can increase the risks of onset or progression of disability or can lead to severe complications, depression and increased levels of mortality and morbidity. The primary barriers cited were distance, cost of transportation and facilities not being accessible to persons with disabilities. Schools and other buildings in society, and even homes, are often do not meet accessibility standards and, within it, facilities are often neither accessible nor gender sensitive.⁷⁴


Fourteen per cent of school-aged children with disabilities dropped out of school in the 2021-2022 academic year due to challenges including bullying, adaptability of infrastructure, lack of adapted teaching methodologies, inaccessibility, and availability of transportation⁷⁵. Girls with disabilities face higher possibilities to drop-out schools due to family concerns over their security from harassment and bullying.⁷⁶

CARE Palestine estimates that women with disabilities in the OPT are up to four times more likely to experience intimate partner violence while often having no option but to rely on their abuser for mobility. Women with disabilities have reduced economic opportunities: it is estimated that only 4 per cent of women with disabilities participate in the workforce, increasing dependance to family members.⁷⁷

Elderly people

Based on 2021 figures, the number of elderly people in OPT aged 60 years or older is estimated to be 283,000, representing approximately five per cent of the total population. Of those, 187,000 live in the West Bank and 96,000 live in the Gaza Strip. Elderly people are subject to various intersectional and multidimensional vulnerabilities that leave them among the furthest left behind.⁷⁸ Neglect is the most prevalent type of abuse, reportedly experienced by 24 per cent of elderly women and 19 per cent of elderly men in 2019.⁷⁹ In addition, the elderly suffer disproportionately from non-communicable diseases and disability, such as musculoskeletal disorders, diabetes, and kidney

Figure 9: % of WB and GZ households by main reported barrier to employment faced by female members of the household



diseases, as well as sense organ diseases. In terms of education, a gender gap exists as about 40 per cent of elderly women are illiterate, compared with 10 per cent of elderly men.⁸⁰

According to a PCBS survey in 2019, elderly women were more vulnerable to violence than elderly men.⁸¹ About eight per cent of elderly people reported they were exposed to one form of violence by a family member who resides inside or outside the house. About 22 per cent of elderly people reported that health negligence was the most common form of violence.⁸²

Familial and communal systems serve as the main source of support, upkeep, and care. According to the 2022 MSNA assessment, 29 per cent of elderly-headed households reported community support as their primary income source compared to 3 per cent of households with a head of household aged 18-59 years. Of all population groups assessed in the West Bank, elderly female-headed households were the most likely to report community support as their primary source of income (47 per cent).⁸³ The increasing shift toward nuclear family structures has important implications, eroding critical social support systems which are not replaced by government social safety nets.

One quarter of elderly-headed households also reported a lack of livelihood/employment opportunities for older people.⁸⁴ The lack of strategic or policy direction to stimulate and support the participation of elderly in all aspects of socioeconomic development render them among the groups furthest left behind. This leads to increased marginalization and infringes on their rights to live in dignity and independence, access appropriate care and services, and be protected from violence.⁸⁵

Children

Increasing conflict-related violence, notably between April 2021 to October 2022, has brought a rise in attention to threats to and violations to child rights. In 2021, 2,934 grave violations against 1,208 Palestinian children and 9 Israeli children were verified in Israel and the State of Palestine. The 2,934 grave violations included 88 children (86 Palestinian and two Israeli) killed and 1,128 children (1,121 Palestinian and 7 Israeli) maimed; 134 attacks on schools, hospitals and related protected personnel; and 1,583 incidents of denial of humanitarian access affecting children. In addition, 637 children were arrested and detained for alleged security-related offences; and 156 other interferences with education and health were verified in the same period.⁸⁶ Direct acts and threats of violence, including killing and injuring of children, as well as arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention, impacts of the coercive environment have unique and potentially long-lasting effects on children. Prior to the escalation of hostilities in August 2022, 495,600 children in the Gaza Strip were already in need of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services (MHPSS) and this number is expected to have increased following the latest escalation of hostilities.⁸⁷

Figure 10: Cross-tabulation of GZ and WB households reporting at least one child showing signs of psychosocial distress or trauma, and psychosocial support services (PSS) available in school

PSS available in school	HH reporting at least one child showing signs of distress or trauma	
	No	Yes
No	26% (GZ)	74% (GZ)
	30% (WB)	70% (WB)
Yes	21% (GZ)	79% (GZ)
	16% (WB)	84% (WB)

Across the OPT, children experience high levels of violence at home, with 90 per cent of children facing some form of violent discipline at home (92 per cent boys and 88 per cent girls).⁸⁸

It is estimated that ten per cent of children aged 5-17 are engaged in child labour, including hazardous labour, with boys twice as likely as girls to be engaged in child labour and six times as likely to be working.⁸⁹ In households living in poverty, the pandemic has increased pressure on boys to work and generate income, and exposed girls to additional burdens associated with domestic work, caregiver duties and enhanced risk of child marriage. Almost

6 per cent of school-age children in the Gaza Strip dropped out during the 2022 academic year due to school-related expenses, children having to work, or schools not being inclusive. Dropout rates in the West Bank are estimated at 19 per cent, primarily due to protection risks and school closures.⁹⁰

About 1.3 million children have constrained access to essential services which is overwhelming the capacities of health and child protection service providers. Insufficient water supply to households, poor sanitation, limited public WASH services, and risk of flooding further expose 1.36 million Palestinians to waterborne diseases.⁹¹

Part 2

SITUATION AND NEEDS MONITORING

WEST BANK

The West Bank Barrier. ©Photo by Tanya Habjouqa



A central element to monitoring the situation and needs is engaging directly with communities. Accountability to affected populations (AAP) and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) have been increasingly integrated in the humanitarian response plans since the PSEA Network was established in 2019. For a second consecutive year, the MSNA survey included a number of indicators specifically designed to assess AAP, and results of the MSNA across all sectoral and intersectoral indicators have been disaggregated according to aid-recipient status of the household.

Accountability to Affected Populations

In the West Bank, of the eight per cent of households that received humanitarian aid or assistance, 83 per cent were satisfied with the aid they had received. The main reason provided for dissatisfaction was because “quantity was not enough” (94 per cent of the 17 per cent of households dissatisfied with aid). The main type of assistance provided were food and multi-purpose cash (provided to 65 per cent and 43 per cent of the eight per cent of households receiving aid, respectively) and cash assistance is the preferred type of aid. Compared to non-aid recipient households, aid recipient households tended to score worse on indicators related to ability to meet basic needs. Those households most likely to report that they would like to receive humanitarian aid in the future included aid recipient households (92 per cent), in-camp households (82 per cent), households with a member of the household with a disability (74 per cent) and 72 per cent of female headed households.

In Gaza, the need for basic assistance (cash and in-kind) remains high. With 73 per cent of households in Gaza reporting having received any form of humanitarian aid or assistance (of which 93 per cent received food assistance) in the 6 months prior to the MSNA data collection, the importance

of considering accountability to affected populations is evident. Similar to the West Bank, the main reason for dissatisfaction is that quantity is not enough. Compared to non-aid recipient households, aid recipient households tended to score worse on indicators related to ability to meet basic needs. Data on AAP highlighted the criticality of aid dependency in Gaza to support households in the current circumstances and the risk of harmful and negative coping strategies if aid is to be discontinued.

Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

While the MSNA does not fit into the appropriate methodology to provide a prevalence of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), protection questions delve into proxies related to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment (SEAH). Sexual harassment and sexual violence appear as reasons to avoid certain areas and the school can be often a place where children feel unsafe. Data from existing helplines have highlighted a raise on the number of calls about SGBV, which relates to an increase on SGBV prevalence that include SEAH linked to the worsening of the crisis; and also, a growing trust from communities to report sensitive issues. The PSEA coordinator has also noticed an increase in the disclosure of SEA and safeguarding claims.

In relation to core areas of SEAH prevention the MSNA shows important gaps in efficiently communicating humanitarian workers code of conduct (only four per cent in West Bank and eleven per cent in Gaza report awareness on the CoC) Similarly a very small percentage of the sample (six per cent in West Bank and two per cent in Gaza) were consulted on preferred ways to report sensitive information. Women and men head of households’ differences were not significant, yet household with a member with disability did show worse percentages.

Complaint and Reporting Mechanisms use and awareness

The MSNA highlights that in the West Bank only four per cent of aid recipient households report awareness of existing feedback channels, and among this figure, 53 per cent declare that they would not use existing mechanisms because ‘complaints do not result in any positive change.’ Women head of household reported significantly less awareness than men head of households.

Gaza present slightly better awareness on reporting mechanisms, 21 per cent, and better attitudes toward using available channels (68 per cent); also, differences between women and men head of households were less sharp.

Response Monitoring

Continuous monitoring of situation and needs is conducted through several methods, including direct collection and reporting of demolition data; second-hand collection and triangulation of Protection of Civilians (PoC) data and analysis of that dataset; and receipt of Gaza monitoring indicators and monitoring of access of goods and people in and out of Gaza. Monitoring efforts also focus on addressing information gaps and challenges that were highlighted during the HNO process while maintaining regular engagement in data collection, information management and coordination, and analysis.

Clusters coordinate and undertake monitoring and information analysis through established cluster monitoring mechanisms. Cluster partners also undertake field visits in order to monitor project implementation. Key priorities in monitoring project implementation include ensuring that projects are effectively responding to needs, documenting response gaps, and considering gender mainstreaming, disability inclusion, and AAP.

Protection of Civilians

Information about occupation and conflict-related casualties is regularly collected by OCHA field staff and, following review and verification, entered into OCHA’s Protection of Civilians (PoC) [database](#). As a rule, incidents must be validated by at least three independent and reliable sources to be included in the database. Only casualties that are the result of confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis in the context of the occupation and conflict are included. Incidents resulting in casualties which did not involve direct confrontations, such as access delays, reckless use of weapons, unexploded ordnance, and tunnel collapses, are not included. People who were killed or injured in conflict-related incidents that took place in Israel and did not in any way involve residents of OPT are also excluded. OCHA publishes a qualitative report on the [OCHA OPT website](#) on a bi-weekly basis which summarizes PoC incidents for the previous two weeks.

Access, entries, and exits through Gaza crossings

OCHA regularly monitors access of goods and people into and out of Gaza. OCHA also creates and updates [infographics](#) on entries and exits of people through the Israeli-controlled Erez crossing and the Egyptian-controlled Rafah crossing, entries and exits of commodities through Gaza, and the import of fuel and cooking gas into Gaza. This provides an overview of current and past access trends impacting the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip to decision-makers, humanitarian actors, and the general public.

Demolitions and displacements

OCHA regularly monitors and updates figures on demolitions and displacements in the West Bank. These figures are based on visits that OCHA conducts for an initial assessment of humanitarian needs. They are saved in a database that informs the decisions of multiple agencies on

the humanitarian assistance they provide, thereby allowing timely and targeted responses. Typically, demolitions are reflected in the [OCHA OPT website](#) within 48 hours of the incident.

Electricity in the Gaza Strip

OCHA presents and visualizes [data on electricity in the Gaza Strip](#) in various charts. These charts include data on the availability of electricity (average

hours per day), electricity supply versus demand (average megawatts per day) from Egyptian lines, Israeli lines, and the Gaza Power Plant. The data presented is provided to OCHA daily by the Gaza Electricity Distribution Company (GEDCO), the official body managing electricity supply in the Gaza Strip. The variation in electricity demand per day is estimated based on temperatures recorded on a given day.

Part 3

SECTORAL ANALYSIS

WEST BANK

Sahar, a participant in a training course designed by FAO and WFP, sifts wheat flour to make Maftoul. Photo WFP/Ali Jadallah



Overview of Sectoral Needs

People in need by cluster and governorate


REGION	GOVERNORATE	POPULATION	EDUCATION	FSS	PROTECTION	HEALTH	WASH	SHELTER
West Bank	Jenin	352,875	29,338	20,897	88,219	77,249	67,689	6,424
	Tubas	68,779	2,112	3,474	7,311	6,856	5,687	3,504
	Tulkaram	205,946	10,678	25,701	24,644	46,444	39,144	1,786
	Nablus	431,584	15,611	91,103	112,712	209,465	189,041	4,447
	Qalqiliya	127,025	3,958	13,251	31,756	24,424	25,395	2,383
	Salfit	85,920	4,208	3,254	11,076	9,675	14,300	892
	Ramallah & Al-Bireh	370,030	12,682	23,784	92,508	60,062	128,854	4,440
	Jericho	55,268	2,629	12,608	7,058	6,335	22,475	4,051
	Jerusalem inc. EJ	479,324	74,276	36,382	126,427	61,340	65,959	16,695
	Bethlehem	244,704	13,399	40,595	30,771	50,741	52,337	8,760
Hebron	822,435	46,981	81,768	205,609	69,889	107,204	18,408	
Total		3,243,890	215,872	352,817	738,091	622,480	718,085	71,790
Gaza Strip	North Gaza	444,412	83,655	253,256	222,206	218,264	205,649	189,007
	Gaza	749,100	139,958	390,616	379,082	325,203	153,259	176,201
	Dier al Balah	319,208	48,626	168,111	159,604	121,371	85,294	74,284
	Khan Yunis	438,557	82,501	211,400	221,974	192,179	148,313	91,354
	Rafah	275,267	37,944	165,606	146,237	120,902	56,081	60,467
Total		2,226,544	392,684	1,188,989	1,129,103	977,919	648,596	591,313
Grand Total		5,470,434	608,556	1,541,806	1,867,194	1,600,399	1,366,681	663,103

People in need by governorate and severity


REGION	GOVERNORATE	POPULATION	MINIMAL	STRESS	SEVERE	EXTREME	CATASTROPHIC	PERCENT	PIN
West Bank	Jenin	352,875	31%	57%	11%	1%	0%	12%	42,419
	Tubas	68,779	43%	45%	11%	0%	1%	12%	7,975
	Tulkaram	205,946	15%	61%	19%	5%	1%	25%	50,574
	Nablus	431,584	9%	47%	39%	5%	1%	44%	191,706
	Qalqiliya	127,025	27%	56%	15%	1%	1%	17%	21,180
	Salfit	85,920	35%	52%	12%	0%	1%	13%	10,919
	Ramallah & Al-Bireh	370,030	30%	51%	9%	9%	1%	19%	70,391
	Jericho	55,268	30%	40%	19%	10%	1%	30%	16,431
	Jerusalem inc. EJ	479,324	29%	38%	30%	2%	1%	33%	157,360
	Bethlehem	244,704	22%	53%	16%	8%	1%	25%	61,117
Hebron	822,435	28%	50%	18%	3%	1%	22%	179,325	
Total		3,243,890							809,397
Gaza Strip	North Gaza	444,412	9%	40%	24%	24%	2%	50%	224,053
	Gaza	749,100	13%	35%	28%	23%	1%	52%	389,220
	Dieral Balah	319,208	5%	34%	31%	28%	3%	61%	196,249
	Khan Yunis	438,557	6%	27%	34%	30%	2%	67%	293,182
	Rafah	275,267	5%	32%	30%	32%	2%	64%	175,319
Total		2,226,544							1,278,023
Grand Total		5,470,434	19%	43%	24%	13%	1%	38%	2,087,420

FOOD SECURITY


WEST BANK

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 353K	137K	216K	17.7K	28%	27%	23%	22%	19%



SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*



*Cluster PiN per governorate can overlap with other clusters
 **Including East Jerusalem

- SEVERE
- EXTREME
- CATASTROPHIC

Key Challenges

- Lack of adequate economic access to proper nutritious food
- Lack of stability in food availability and economic access (the inability to always buy nutritious and healthy food).

Vulnerabilities


- The malnutrition situation is driven by poverty, lack of food access, and poor dietary habits. Lack of availability/affordability of macro/micronutrient-rich food and obesity pose significant challenges to health and well-being.
- A coercive environment has led to unstable livelihoods and limited economic access, which is further exacerbated by the volatility of global commodity prices linked to the war in Ukraine.
- The unemployment rate reached 14% during the second quarter of 2022: 11% among males and 22% among females.
- The enforcement of demolitions constantly threatens farmers and herders living in or reliant upon livelihoods from Area C, confiscation policy, and settler violence, which results in Palestinian injuries and casualties and/or damages to Palestinian property, including vandalising trees, crops, and other agricultural properties and assets.
- Up to September 2022, over 220 agriculture structures were demolished in the West Bank, representing more than 34% of the overall structures.

FOOD SECURITY


GAZA STRIP

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 1.19M	798K	390K	111K	24%	24%	26%	26%	21%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE




Key Challenges

- Lack of adequate economic access to proper nutritious food
- Lack of appropriate food utilisation due to improper access to WASH and inadequate diet.
- Lack of stability in food availability and economic access (the inability to always buy nutritious and healthy food).


Vulnerabilities

- Recurrent hostilities have worsened economic conditions, contributing to a reversal in development. All socio-economic indicators and humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate due to the cumulative effects of a 15-year economic blockade by land, sea, and air since 2007.
- The nutrition situation is characterized by relatively high malnutrition rates, driven by poverty, food insecurity, and poor dietary habits. Extremely vulnerable groups are pregnant, lactating women and children.
- 53% of the population living below the poverty line and 34% per cent living below the deep poverty line⁹³, poverty rates will increase further if this situation persists. This is compounding with a very high unemployment rate, which reached 44% in the Gaza Strip, with a significant difference in gender: 39% per cent for males compared to 65% for females during the second quarter of 2022.
- The recurrent hostilities further reduced the profitability and sustainability of agricultural activities for many farmers, driving them to continuous losses and risking their farming practices. The latest escalation of hostilities in August 2022 hit tens of agricultural lands, greenhouses, livestock, and poultry farms, causing damages and losses estimated at US\$1 million.


PROTECTION WEST BANK

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 735K	201K	534K	21.5K	27%	26%	24%	23%	10%



SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*



*Cluster PiN per governorate can overlap with other clusters
**Including East Jerusalem

Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

General protection and human rights concerns

- Killings & injuries resulting from IF use of force
- Settler Violence driven by impunity
- Violence in Refugee Camps (IF operations & Intra-Palestinian violence)
- Restrictions to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and freedom of opinion and expression


Displacement and risk of forcible transfer

- Coercive environment (Evictions, Demolitions, Settler violence, Residency rights, Restrictions on movement and access to land, resources and basic services)


Psychosocial distress and deterioration in mental well-being

- Political situation, insecurity and violence, including threats of home demolitions, arrests, night raids and settler violence
- Escalations of violence / Prolonged periods of high tensions


PROTECTION GAZA STRIP

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 1.13M	0.77M	0.36M	17.7K	24%	24%	26%	26%	21%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE



Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

General protection and human rights concerns

- Killing/injuries and excessive use of force & lack of accountability
- Restrictions on freedom of movement and impediments to access to services, resources, humanitarian assistance, opportunities
- Infringements on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly
- Arbitrary arrests, detention and torture or ill-treatment

Internal displacement

- Active hostilities/ escalations of violence
- Evictions

Psychosocial distress and deterioration in mental health

- Conflict-related violence/ prolonged periods of tension
- Physical assault or abuse
- Psychological or emotional abuse

Explosive remnants of War

Protection Areas of responsibilities West Bank and Gaza Strip


Child Protection

PEOPLE IN NEED	BOYS	GIRLS	WEST BANK	GAZA STRIP
 780K	51% (396K)	49% (384K)	25% (195K)	75%(584K)

Child protection threats and grave violations against children

- Conflict-related violence, and violence against children in the home, school, and community
- Exploitation and neglect
- Negative coping mechanisms including school drop-out, child labour, early marriage, children in conflict with the law

Gender-Based Violence

PEOPLE IN NEED	WEST BANK	GAZA STRIP	GIRLS	BOYS	WOMEN	MEN
 1.5M	53% (800K)	47%(688K)	517K	84K	734K	152K

Specific risks facing GBV survivors:

- Verbal, physical, and sexual harassment
- Domestic and intimate partner violence
- Lack of access to high quality multi-sectoral services (including safe shelter, and adequate clinical management of rape (CMR) services)

Explosive Remnants of War

PEOPLE IN NEED

 0.9M

Explosive Remnants of War Risks


- Increased deaths and injuries of children and men due to ERW contamination
- Lack of resilience-based coping mechanisms of affected communities to prepare and protect themselves during escalations
- Hinderance of safe movement, delivery of UN and humanitarian life-saving and emergency assistance, and access to basic services.

EDUCATION


WEST BANK

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.21M	56K	0.16M	N/A	2%	2%	49%	47%	2%



SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




*Cluster PiN per governorate can overlap with other clusters
 **Including East Jerusalem


Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- General lack of school-based psychosocial support for children in Area C, Hebron H2 and East Jerusalem who face regular attacks and harassment to, from and during school.
- Attacks on students and staff, the destruction of education infrastructure, and restrictions on the right to education contribute to a prevailing coercive educational environment.
- Protection risks on the way to school is a major reason for children dropping out of school. 55% of boys and 36% of girls in the West Bank who dropped out of school was due to conflict-related protection risks on the way to and from schools.
- School dropout rates are higher for boys (20%) than for girls (14%), as adolescent boys are expected to contribute to household income in times of crisis, with this being the main reason for boys to dropout. Girls dropping out of school is often the result of early marriage, family pressure, and/or due to protection concerns.
- Schools in Area C and East Jerusalem are also at continuing risk of stop work or demolition orders, due to lack of building permits which are near impossible to obtain.
- Palestinian children living in Nablus, East Jerusalem and H2 face a relatively higher risk of being arrested and detained or being placed under house detention by Israeli authorities compared to their peers in the rest of the West Bank.
- Sub-standard safe learning environments, particularly for children with disabilities who face numerous challenges to access quality education.
- The prolonged school closures due to COVID 19, escalations, and teachers strikes in West Bank have caused a huge learning loss issue for students. MSNA states that around 70% of children are need of catch-up programs.



EDUCATION GAZA STRIP

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.39M	0.1M	0.29M	N/A	2%	2%	49%	47%	2%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS




PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- General lack of school-based psychosocial support for children in Gaza still dealing with psychosocial distress as a consequence of recurrent hostilities. About 57,000 HHs in Gaza reported at least one child showing signs of psychosocial distress.
- Protection risks on the way to school. Almost 24% of households reported children feeling unsafe or very unsafe when traveling to and from schools, including when studying in schools.
- School dropout rates nearly double for boys than for girls, as adolescent boys are expected to contribute to household income in times of crisis, with this being the main reason for boys to dropout. Girls dropping out of school is often the result of early marriage, family pressure, and/or due to protection concerns.
- Poor physical infrastructure of schools and unsafe learning environments, particularly for children with disabilities who face numerous challenges to access quality education.
- Prolonged school closures due to COVID-19 and escalations of hostilities have caused a huge learning loss for students. 79% of HHs in Gaza reported that their children need to participate in catch-up learning programmes.


HEALTH WEST BANK

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.63M	0.23M	0.40M	18.3K	27%	26%	24%	23%	10%


SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION




PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- A weakened healthcare system due to significant infrastructural and logistic challenges as well as geopolitical barriers.
- Persistent and increased incidences of confrontations in the West Bank, resulting in increased need for trauma and emergency services.
- High burden of non-communicable/ chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, cancers, diabetes, and chronic respiratory diseases.
- A better prepared and resilient healthcare system requiring collaboration between humanitarian and development partners in supporting capacity building and prepositioning supplies.
- Access to essential health services is an urgent priority, particularly in the areas of:
 - » Primary healthcare services for isolated, marginalized communities in Area C, H2, East Jerusalem and the closed area behind the Barrier.
 - » Trauma and emergency care as well as rehabilitation for those injured due to conflict-related violence.
 - » Mental health and psychosocial support to those experiencing various levels of mental distress.
 - » Management of non-communicable diseases with a special focus on cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.
 - » Sexual and reproductive health and rights including services for gender-based violence survivors
 - » Maternal and child health including nutrition.
 - » Monitor and document barriers to accessing health services amongst Palestinians living under occupation and advocate for the removal/ mitigation of these barriers.



HEALTH GAZA STRIP

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.98M	0.9M	81K	14.5K	24%	24%	26%	26%	21%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- Weakened healthcare system due to years of the blockade and political division.
- Limited resources in the Gaza Strip including chronic shortages of drugs and consumables, equipment, and human resources.
- Increased incidences of military conflict in the Gaza Strip, resulting in increased demand for trauma and emergency services.
- High burden of non-communicable/ chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, cancers, diabetes, and chronic respiratory diseases.
- Severe socio-economic environment presents financial barriers to accessing health services thus the need to explore strategies for providing financial support.
- A better prepared and resilient healthcare system requiring collaboration between humanitarian and development partners in supporting capacity building and prepositioning supplies.
- Access to essential health services is an urgent priority, particularly in the areas of:
 - » Primary, secondary, and specialized healthcare.
 - » Trauma and emergency care as well as rehabilitation for those injured due to conflict-related violence.
 - » Management of non-communicable diseases with a special focus on cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.
 - » Mental health and psychosocial support to those experiencing various levels of mental distress.
 - » Sexual and reproductive health and rights including services for gender-based violence survivors
 - » Maternal and child health including nutrition.
 - » Monitor and document barriers to accessing health services amongst Palestinians living under occupation and advocate for the removal/ mitigation of these barriers.


SHELTER WEST BANK

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 71.8K	N/A	N/A	2.3K	27%	26%	24%	23%	1%



SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION




PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- More than 72,000 Palestinians of those in need of shelter assistance live in West Bank including Area C, East Jerusalem and the H2 area of Hebron city, according to the 2022 MSNA.
- In East Jerusalem, some 218 families⁹⁵ are at risk of eviction due to a discriminatory planning regime.
- At least 40,476 individuals in Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities in Area C are living in extreme and severe conditions in basic shelters like tents, metal shacks and caves, as being substandard and in need of urgent rehabilitation and upgrading⁹⁶. Many communities in the West Bank suffer from frequent settler attacks and need shelter protection measures such as external fences or gates and steel protectors for windows.
- To ensure partners' ability to respond to the recurrent small and large-scale escalations and climatic events, preparedness efforts are critical. This includes ensuring appropriate stockpiles of non-food items are prepositioned, community capacity building programmes are developed, and contingency plans are in place.
- In the West Bank, 140 households reported having a standing demolition order against their shelter at the time of the data collection. All but two are in Area C. Additionally, 311 HHs reported being at risk of eviction from their shelter at the time of the data collection. Most of these households (268) are in Area C. Overall, 6.5 per cent of households in Area C report a risk of eviction from their shelter.
- Nearly one quarter of households indicated that they were living with shelter defects.



SHELTER GAZA STRIP

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.59M	N/A	N/A	8.5K	24%	24%	26%	26%	0.3%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS




PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- During the escalation of hostilities in August 2022, about 1,500 housing units were damaged or destroyed, including 97 units severely damaged, and 26 units destroyed, leaving around 600 individuals still internally displaced. This is compounded by the remaining caseload of May 2021 escalation, where 62,000 housing units had been damaged or destroyed out of which 916 housing units were subjected to severe damages and 1,688 housing units destroyed and resulted in the displacement of 12,000 people of which 7,000 remain displaced⁹⁷ in addition to 3,000 people still displaced from previous escalations.
- According to MOPWH reports, 924 of the housing units demolished during the 2021 escalation still lack reconstruction funding, along with 12,300 units requiring repairs of partial damages.
- According to the MSNA, 37.3% of the households reported that their shelters had been damaged by bombardment during the escalation of hostilities in Gaza in May of 2021. 29% have reported that their shelters are still damaged due to the lack of own resources to repair, or the assistance received was insufficient.
- Overall, sixty per cent of assessed households in Gaza reported existing shelter damage, defects, or issues at their shelters.⁹⁸
- 21,500 existing housing units across Gaza which are classified as substandard and do not meet the minimum requirements of living space, weather protection, hygiene facilities, and privacy, require different degrees of rehabilitation⁹⁹.
- 12% of households in Gaza households reported being affected by flooding in the 3 years prior to data collection. Of these households 41% reported their shelter specifically being impacted by flooding.¹⁰⁰


WASH WEST BANK

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.72M	N/A	N/A	21.2K	28%	27%	23%	22%	2%



SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY REGION



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*




*Cluster PiN per governorate can overlap with other clusters
 **Including East Jerusalem


Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- Restrictions on construction of facilities in Area C, coupled with demolition of WASH structures and barriers to accessing existing water sources due to settler violence.
- Impact of climate change, which is exacerbating water scarcity.
- Insufficient governance of the water and sanitation sector.
- Limited technical and financial capacities of the WASH service providers.
- Limited access to natural water resources.
- Priority WASH needs for the most vulnerable are:
 - Facilitating access to water for those communities with insufficient water supply for basic health and consumption needs.
 - Facilitating access to sanitation services at community, institutions, and household levels, notably, communities suffering from continuing wastewater accumulation in residential areas; families without access to household WASH facilities, including latrines and handwashing stations; and schools and healthcare facilities with insufficient access to WASH services.
- Ensuring partners' preparedness and response capacities to maintain WASH services for the most vulnerable communities.



WASH GAZA STRIP

PEOPLE IN NEED	REFUGEES	NON-REFUGEES	FHH	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY
 0.65M	N/A	N/A	9.5K	28%	27%	23%	22%	0.3%

SEVERITY OF NEEDS



PEOPLE IN NEED BY GOVERNORATE*



Key Challenges and Vulnerabilities

- The continued restrictions on entry and exit of people and materials to Gaza over the past 15 years has had negative impacts on the WASH infrastructure in Gaza. At present, 109 WASH items remain on the dual-use list¹⁰¹ and thus restricted.
- Insufficient water resources due to the depletion of the water aquifer.
- Climate change impact on the WASH sector, including flash floods.
- Insufficient governance of the water and sanitation sector.
- Limited technical and financial capacities of the WASH service providers.
- Priority WASH needs for the most vulnerable are:
 - Access to sanitation services at community, institutions, and household levels, notably communities suffering from continuing wastewater accumulation in the residential areas; families with insufficient access to household WASH facilities, including latrines and handwashing stations.; and schools and healthcare facilities with limited access to sufficient WASH services.
 - Access to flood mitigation and prevention measures:
- WASH service providers' insufficient preparedness and response capacities to maintain WASH services for the most vulnerable communities.

Part 4

ANNEXES

GAZA STRIP

Destruction/damage in Gaza following the escalation of hostilities 7 August 2022. ©Mohammad Zaanoun



Annex 1:

Data Sources

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)

The majority of the figures used for the population used in the HNO are based on PCBS population projections for 2023, based on their 2017 census. These include figures for specific vulnerable groups, as well as key geographical areas. PCBS's datasets are [available online](#).

OCHA digital services and platforms

The analysis presented throughout the HNO also makes use of a range of interactive charts, maps, and databases (Protection of Civilian, demolition, Gaza crossing movement, and access, Gaza critical indicators) developed by OCHA to support the humanitarian community's response in the oPt, all of which are [available online](#). In the last decade, OCHA has designed and implemented several online tools and services to monitor occupation violations in the oPt.

Assessments by humanitarian partners

The HNO 2022 analysis and figures are based on a thorough assessment of the humanitarian situation in the form of 61 cluster-specific assessments and four multi-cluster assessments conducted by 46 humanitarian partners during the year across various thematic and geographical areas.


As part of the clusters' needs analysis, clusters utilized secondary data to determine the needs and the Multisectoral Needs Analysis MSNA. The Secondary data were validated through focus group sessions and meetings with community leaders and affected persons. In such sessions and seminars, partners included representatives from vulnerable groups, including women, youth, and persons with disabilities. The majority of these assessments and studies have age and sex-disaggregated data. More information about these assessments and analyses is available in an [online registry](#).

Number of assessments: 61

Partners: 46

	Gaza Strip	oPt	West Bank	Grand Total
Coordination		1		1
Education		6		6
FSS	28	1	2	31
Health	6		1	7
Protection	5	2		7
Shelter	3		1	4
WASH	2	3		5
Grand Total	44	13	4	61

61 assessments by disaggregation of data




Annex 2:

2022 Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA)

All relevant methodological information, raw data, Terms of Reference, factsheets, key findings presentation and MSNA report are available on the [MSNA web page](#). The page includes the following documents and presentations:

- [Terms of Reference](#)
- [Clean Dataset](#)
- [Preliminary Analysis Tables](#)
- [Interactive Dashboard](#)
- [Key Cross-Sectoral Findings Presentation](#)
- [Key Findings Factsheet Booklet West Bank](#)
- [Key Findings Factsheet Booklet Gaza](#)
- [Key Cash and Voucher Assistance Findings Factsheet West Bank](#)
- [Key Cash and Voucher Assistance Findings Factsheet Gaza](#)



Annex 3:

Cluster Needs Analysis Methodology

For alignment between the intersectoral and the sector-specific estimations of PIN and severity, clusters were advised to adopt the 2022 JIAF methodology using “Data scenario A” when possible and to follow two principles:

1. Indicators common to the intersectoral analysis and cluster analysis have the same thresholds. This was done in order to ensure that an indicator was not ‘interpreted’ in two different ways and that analysis remained consistent and comparable.
2. The intersectoral PIN is used as a guiding “ceiling” when calculating cluster PIN. When contextually appropriate, clusters aligned indicators and thresholds with the global indicators references in the JIAF Indicator Reference List. Most clusters calculated people in need and severity of needs using the JIAF methodology.
3. The indicators used by the clusters to calculate severity are listed in Annex 4. Below is a summary of methodological approaches and data sources used.

Cluster	ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY	INDICATORS TO ESTIMATE PIN AND SEVERITY																																															
Food Security Sector	<p>Two indicators have been utilized to calculate the People in Need: proxied Food insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) and Household Economic Capacity to meet Essential Needs (ECMEN).</p> <p>Indicator 1: Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)</p> <p>FIES measure the food insecurity household experiences on monthly recall. This food insecurity can be the result of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of food availability (that is, lack of appropriate quality and quantity of food through domestic production or imports); - Lack of adequate economic access to proper nutritious food. - Lack of appropriate food utilization due to improper access to safe water, sanitation, and inadequate diet. - Lack of stability in food availability and economic access (the inability to always buy nutritious and healthy food). <p>The following variables have been used for the final calculation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Summation of the eight questions related to the FIES module without considering frequencies (often, sometimes and rarely). 2. Following the FAO methodology for categorizing the aggregate¹, a categorical variable has been created reflecting the following categories: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1: Non-food insecure/Minimal (aggregate equal to zero); - 2: Mild food insecure (aggregate within the interval 1/3); - 3: Moderate food insecure (aggregate within the interval 4/6); - 4: Severely food insecure- (aggregate within the interval 7/8). <p>Indicator 2: Household Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN)</p> <p>WFP uses the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI)² to report the population's overall food security status. In the console, a household's economic vulnerability is determined using ECMEN. The ECMEN indicator identifies the percentage of households whose expenditures exceed the minimum expenditure basket (MEB)³.</p> <p>The MEB is defined as what a household requires to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, as well as costs. It covers those needs that households meet fully or partially through the market. The MEB serves as a monetary threshold that can be used to assess a household's economic capacity to meet its needs. To compute the ECMEN, household expenditures are used as a proxy for household economic capacity against the MEB and survival MEB (SMEB) of the same population group. Both economic capacity and MEB are usually calculated on a per capita basis.</p> <p>To calculate the ECMEN indicator,</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create total household expenditure (food expenditure excluding in-kind food received, non-food) 2. Calculate per-capita expenditure (total expenditure divided by household size) 3. Creates the threshold for economic capacity as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. For West Bank: the threshold was set at the 2017 PCBS deep poverty line (national level, 1974 NIS, current prices) and adjusted for inflation (converting to 2022 prices is equivalent to 2,223.3 NIS). The minimum expenditure per capita was calculated based on the national average household size in the West Bank of 5 persons (source PCBS). Finally, the minimum survival threshold of 1,638.8 NIS was calculated, assuming the same survival MEB is equivalent to 73.7 per cent of the MEB. b. For Gaza Strip, the threshold was borrowed from the Cash Working Group through the cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (1743 NIS). The minimum per capita Economic Capacity was calculated using "1743/ national average household size" in Gaza (which is 6, source PCBS) (minimum and essential). The actual per capita economic capacity was calculated based on the value of the survival MEB (SMEB) (1285/national household size). c. Households were classified according to these thresholds as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. If a household is falling above the MEB, categorized as 1; ii. If a household is falling below MEB but above SMEB is classified as 3; iii. If a household is falling below SMEB is classified as 4. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Represents the LEAST VULNERABLE; 3 Represents the VULNERABLE; 4 Represents the EXTREME VULNERABLE. 	<p>Pin calculation</p> <p>To combine the two indicators, the following steps have been taken:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cross-tabulation of the two variables as shown in table (1). 2. The following intervals have been taken, following the JIAF methodology for population classification, that is: <p style="text-align: center;">1 - None/ minimal 2 – Stress 3 – Severe 4 – Extreme 5 – Catastrophic</p> 3. The results of the PIN calculation are based on the combination between proxied FIES and ECMEN, as shown in table 2, it's the sum of the number of people whose JIAF score is 3, 4 or 5. <p>Table 1: The combination matrix between FIES & ECMEN and the transformation to JIAF.</p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2" rowspan="2"></th> <th colspan="4">FIES</th> </tr> <tr> <th>1 (Non-food insecure)</th> <th>2 (Mild food insecure)</th> <th>3 (Moderately food insecure)</th> <th>4 (Severely food insecure)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="4">ECMEN</th> <th>1 (Least vulnerable)</th> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">1</td> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">2</td> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">2</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>3 (Vulnerable)</th> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">2</td> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">3</td> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">3</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>4 (Extreme vulnerable)</th> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">3</td> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">3</td> <td style="background-color: #f28b82;">4</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Table 2: Total People in Need (PiN), in Palestine by region, 2023.</p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Region</th> <th>Population*</th> <th>PiN</th> <th>% PiN</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>West Bank</td> <td>3,256,906</td> <td>352,818</td> <td>10.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Gaza Strip</td> <td>2,226,544</td> <td>1,188,989</td> <td>53.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Palestine</td> <td>5,483,450</td> <td>1,541,807</td> <td>28.1%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>*Estimated Population size in 2023 (PCBS Estimated Population in the Palestine Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997-2026)</p>			FIES				1 (Non-food insecure)	2 (Mild food insecure)	3 (Moderately food insecure)	4 (Severely food insecure)	ECMEN	1 (Least vulnerable)	1	2	2		3 (Vulnerable)	2	3	3		4 (Extreme vulnerable)	3	3	4							Region	Population*	PiN	% PiN	West Bank	3,256,906	352,818	10.8%	Gaza Strip	2,226,544	1,188,989	53.4%	Palestine	5,483,450	1,541,807	28.1%
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1. Page 3:" A suggested set is raw score 1 to 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 8, with raw score 0 as reference (none food insecure). These correspond approximately to some-indication-of food-insecurity/moderate-food-insecurity/severe-food-insecurity" [Modeling Food Insecurity in Bivariate and Regression Analyses \(fao.org\)](#)

2. [New edition of the CARI guidance \(2021\)](#)

3. For more information, please refer to the Minimum Expenditure Basket guidance note <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074198/download/> and [mebcapv4_0.pdf \(fscluster.org\)](#)

<p>Education</p>	<p>Education Cluster used the MSNA dataset and integrated other data sources/assessments (PCBS data, education-related violations data, physical environment and emergency school supplies and preparedness dataset) to reinforce the needs analysis to calculate our PIN. Education Cluster adopted a set of indicators some of them JIAF reference indicators and other Education oPt Contextualized indicators.</p> <p>The learning loss due to COVID-19 outbreak and teacher strike added new burdens on education across oPt, which increased the likelihood of the need for educational humanitarian assistance. This new situation and emerging needs led to an increase in the people in need slightly higher than in 2022. To analyze the needs and calculate the PiN, the Education Cluster conducted one consultation workshops with partners in September 2022. In addition, the Education Cluster compiled new assessments from all partners and at the top of these the results of the education-related incidents system (managed by the cluster).</p> <p>The indicators that were included in the final calculation of PiN were indicators covering the needs based on education-related violations, psychosocial distress, and availability of psychosocial support, schools with poor physical environment and emergency school supplies, children with disabilities reporting challenges to accessing education services and lack of preparedness.</p>	<p>The Education cluster calculated figures for severity based on JIAF methodology and its severity level (five levels). For each indicator, humanitarian consequences and the impact were used to calculate the PIN geographically (Area AB, Area C, H2, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip).</p> <p>The sum of people/students who fall under Stress, Severe and Catastrophic were classified as people in need.</p> <p>The Education cluster gave high consideration to the humanitarian consequences such as education-related violations and need for PSS as well as losing access to education for children due to different factors in a certain area that would have a high risk of drop-out and lead to expose the children to violence and threaten their life.</p>
<p>Protection</p>	<p>The Protection cluster used the Protection Analytical Framework (PAF) methodology to calculate the People in Need (PIN). The data analysts used multiple data sources such as the Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), the Protection of Civilians (POC), and the Demolition databases from OCHA, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) risk assessment, and Mine Action's casualties data. The PAF was designed at the governorate level to match the MSNA stratification.</p>	<p>The MSNA protection indicators at the household level were aggregated to the governorate level. The severity level for the governorates was calibrated by the Area of Responsibilities (AoRs) focal points based on AoRs contextual knowledge. The following AoRs participated in the severity scale determination; Gender Based Violence (GBV), Child Protection (CP), Mine Action, and General Protection.</p> <p>The overarching PIN for each governorate was calculated by multiplying the vulnerability ratio determined by the Protection Cluster for severity levels one to five by the total population.</p>
<p>Health</p>	<p>Using health data gathered from households through the Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), other assessments conducted by partners, health facility-based information on major causes of morbidity and mortality, health resources and services availability information collected through the Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS), reports from MoH and partners.</p> <p>The Health Cluster used the JIAF methodology and the Global Health Cluster PiN Calculator to estimate the number of people in need for each geographical area based on their rating for the following indicators: access to primary, secondary and some specialized healthcare services, prevalence of moderate and severe mental health disorders, prevalence of chronic diseases, and disability.</p>	<p>The critically vulnerable people are identified based on the impact of the lack of health services on morbidity and mortality rates. While the Gaza Strip in its entirety is considered a vulnerable area, in the West Bank those in Area C, Hebron/H2, East Jerusalem and the closed area behind the Barrier are considered most vulnerable.</p> <p>The severity rating was determined by the likelihood of death or severe morbidities, such as disability, or deterioration of physical or mental health, in the absence of health services or lack of timely response.</p>
<p>WASH</p>	<p>The WASH Cluster adopted the JIAF methodology in defining the WASH vulnerability in the West Bank and Gaza. The main WASH vulnerability indicators in Palestine were identified, including indicators about access to water, sanitation, WASH in schools, and flooding.</p> <p>The WASH Cluster adopted the global WASH Cluster severity definitions and adapted them to the Palestinian contextual considering protection, socioeconomic and environmental concerns</p>	<p>The WASH Cluster relied on the MSNA data for measuring the WASH vulnerability/severity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Other community and institutional level assessments were also considered in defining the WASH vulnerability/severity of needs on community and institutional levels such as WASH in schools and WASH in health care facilities.</p>
<p>Shelter</p>	<p>The number of people in need has been estimated through MSNA 2022 assessment and JIAF model in principle, calculating all the people in the JIAF scale from 3 to 5 for each geographical area. The cluster benefited also from the Ministry of Public Work and Housing (MOPWH) damage assessment resulted from August 2022 escalation and the shelter vulnerability assessment in Area C 2022.</p>	<p>The severity identification is based on the JIAF methodology scale by using five indicators (1) percent of people living under critical shelter conditions (2) Average number of household members per room (3) percent of HHs whose shelter has any damage or defects (4) percent of households reporting damage to their current shelter as a result of the recent conflict (5) per cent of households without any capacity to repair and rehabilitate the shelter that has been damaged or destroyed.</p> <p>The team identified the threshold at the JIAF scale for the five indicators included in the shelter cluster needs analysis model.</p> <p>The cluster introduced a separate layer of severity analysis to combine the demographic groups, predominantly People with disabilities and female-headed households.</p>

Annex 4:

Inter-sectoral Framework for Humanitarian Conditions Analysis


JIAF Pillars

- Context** Secondary data review of general characteristics of the political, socio-cultural, attitudinal, economic, legal and policy, technological, demographic, security, public infrastructure, service delivery and environmental profile
- Event/Shock** Secondary data review related to conflict and displacement
- Impact** Secondary data review on the impact of conflict, displacement, systems, and services, and people. Complemented with primary data when available.
- Humanitarian conditions** Indicator-driven used to estimate the severity of need and people in need.

Sector	JIAF Categorization		INDICATORS		Severity Class				
	Subpillar	Critical Problems	oPt 2022 HNO Indicator	JIAF	None/Minimal (1)	Stress (2)	Severe (3)	Extreme (4)	Catastrophic (5)
Cross-sectoral (Disability)	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 1: Humanitarian Consequences related to protection and forced displacement	Percentage of households reporting at least one member of their household having a disability	Yes	All domains are no difficulties	No domain is a lot of difficulties or cannot do at all, 1, 2, or 3 domains are some difficulties	No domain is cannot do at all, 1, 2, or 3 domains are a lot of difficulties OR no domain is a lot of difficulties or cannot do at all; at least 4 domains are some difficulties	1,2,3 domains are cannot do at all or at least 4 domains are a lot of difficulties	At least 4 domains are cannot do all
Cross-sectoral (AAP)	Coping Mechanisms	Critical Problem 3: Humanitarian Consequences related to resilience and recovery	% HH satisfied with aid received % HH with access/knowledge of complaint mechanisms	No	Satisfied with aid and aware of complaint mechanisms	Satisfied with aid and not aware of complaint mechanisms	Unsatisfied with aid, but aware of complaint mechanisms	Unsatisfied with aid and not aware of complaint mechanisms	
Health	Living Standards	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	Percentage households that can access primary healthcare within 30 minutes' walk from dwellings and percentage facing access barriers when trying to access health services	Yes (thresholds adapted)	Less than 30 minutes AND no access barriers	More than and equal 30min AND no access barriers	Less than 30min AND facing access barriers	More than and equal 30min AND facing access barriers	
Health	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	Percentage of households that reported any member of their household having a chronic illness	Yes	No		Yes		
Health/Protection	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 1: Humanitarian Consequences related to protection and forced displacement	% of HH where at least one member (SADD) is reporting signs of distress (self-diagnosed)	Yes	HHs with no adult or child member reported showing signs of psychosocial distress	HHs with 0%-<20% of adult or child members reported showing signs of psychosocial distress	HHs within 20%-<40% of adult or child members reported showing signs of psychosocial distress	HHs with 40-<60% of adult or child members reported showing signs of psychosocial distress	HHs with 60%-100% of adult or child members reported showing signs of psychosocial distress
Protection	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 1: Humanitarian Consequences related to protection and forced displacement	% of girls / women who avoid areas because they feel unsafe	Yes	Women and girls do not avoid any areas	Women and girls avoid one area because they feel unsafe	Women and girls avoid two areas because they feel unsafe	Women and girls avoid three areas because they feel unsafe	Women and girls avoid four or more area because they feel unsafe
Protection	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 1: Humanitarian Consequences related to protection and forced displacement	% of HHs reporting safety or security concerns for women and girls	No	HH: DNK - Prefer not answer	HH: - being threatened with violence, - Being sent abroad to find work - Bullying - Corporal punishment - Begging	HH: - Suffering from physical harassment or violence (not sexual), - Suffering from verbal harassment - Suffering from sexual harassment or violence - Being recruited by armed groups - Being forcibly married - Being exploited - Being robbed - Discrimination or persecution (because of ethnicity, status, etc.) - Being sexually exploited in exchange of humanitarian aid, goods, services, money or preference treatment, Absent or distant medical treatment	HH: - being kidnapped, - Discrimination or persecution, - Being detained, - Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) - Settler violence - Exposure to tear gas - Passing through checkpoints; Difficulty understanding/complying with directives from security forces/police/armed actors	HH: - being killed, - Mine/UXOs, - Being injured/killed by an explosive hazard,
Protection	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 1: Humanitarian Consequences related to protection and forced displacement	% of households reporting the presence of children engaged in child labour outside of the home in the past 30 days	Yes (thresholds adapted)	No child member of the HH engaged in child labour		One child member of the HH engaged in child labour	More than one child member of the HH engaged in child labour	All child members of the HH engaged in child labour

Shelter	Living Standards	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	Average number of household members per room	No	<2 HH member per room	Between 2 and 3 members per room	4 and 5 members per room	more than 6 members per room	
Shelter	Living Standards	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	% of HHs whose shelter has any kind of damage or defects	No	0 points	1-2 points	3-5 points	>5	
WASH	Living Standards	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	% of HHs having access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking, bathing, washing or other domestic use	Yes	Enough water for drinking, cooking, personal hygiene and other domestic purposes		Enough water for drinking AND EITHER cooking OR personal hygiene	Enough water for drinking BUT NOT for cooking AND personal hygiene	Not enough water for drinking
WASH	Coping Mechanisms	Critical Problem 3: Humanitarian Consequences related to resilience and recovery	% of households reporting relying on coping strategies to adapt to a lack of water	No	HH reports having enough water	HH does not have enough water but does not employ any coping strategy	HH reports modifying hygiene practices OR relying on drinking water stored previously OR spending money usually spent on other things to cope with a lack of water	HH reports receiving water on credit or borrowing water to cope with a lack of water	HH reports reducing drinking water consumption OR drinking water usually used for cleaning or purposes other than drinking
WASH	Living Standards	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	# of people with inadequate access to sanitation services	Yes	Connected to a communal lined drainage and to the sewage system	Covered and lined septic tank/cesspool	A hand dug hole in the ground	It drains into an open area outside of the shelter and remains stagnant	
Education	Coping Mechanisms	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	% of school-aged children are out of school (dropped-out)	Yes	HH: No school-aged children in the HH dropped out		HH: Some school-aged children in the HH attend school		HH: All school-aged children in the HH dropped out
Education	Physical and Mental Wellbeing	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	% of households reporting safety concerns in relation to their children's education	Yes	No issues reported from any of these options	One safety issue (for at least one school-child) reported from: 4. Afraid for child's safety when traveling to school, Afraid for child's safety while at school 6. On their way to school	One safety issue (for at least one school-child) reported from: 1. Going to or attending school is not safe for girls, Going to or attending school is not safe for boys 2. Protection risks while commuting to school - political (e.g. soldiers and settler harassment/violence) 3. Attending school is unsafe (e.g. hazards to travel, hazards at school) 5. Very unsafe, Unsafe	More than one safety issue (for at least one school-child) reported from: 1. Going to or attending school is not safe for girls, Going to or attending school is not safe for boys 2. Protection risks while commuting to school - political (e.g. soldiers and settler harassment/violence) 3. Attending school is unsafe (e.g. hazards to travel, hazards at school) 5. Very unsafe, Unsafe	
Education	Impact	Critical Problem 2: Humanitarian Consequences related to the access to essential services	% of households with school-aged children that need catch-up learning programmes and/or satisfaction from education services	No	No catch-up learning needed or very satisfied from education services	Catch-up learning needed and satisfied	Catch up learning needed and Neither satisfied not dissatisfied from education services/ dissatisfied	Catch-up learning needed /very dissatisfied from education services	
FSS	Coping Mechanisms	Critical Problem 3: Humanitarian Consequences related to resilience and recovery	Combined two indicators: Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) and Household Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN)		1	2	3	4	5

Figure 1. **Visual representation of the JIAF conceptual framework.**



JIAF Severity Scale

SEVERITY PHASE	KEY REFERENCE OUTCOME	POTENTIAL RESPONSE OBJECTIVES
1 None / Minimal	<p>Living Standards are acceptable (taking into account the context): possibility of having some signs of deterioration and/or inadequate social basic services, possible needs for strengthening the legal framework.</p> <p>Ability to afford/meet all essential basic needs without adopting unsustainable Coping Mechanisms (such as erosion/depletion of assets).</p> <p>No or minimal/low risk of impact on Physical and Mental Wellbeing.</p>	<p>Building Resilience</p> <p>Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction</p>
2 Stress	<p>Living Standards under stress, leading to adoption of coping strategies (that reduce ability to protect or invest in livelihoods).</p> <p>Inability to afford/meet some basic needs without adopting stressed, unsustainable and/or short-term reversible Coping Mechanisms.</p> <p>Minimal impact on Physical and Mental Wellbeing (stressed Physical and Mental Wellbeing) overall.</p> <p>Possibility of having some localized/targeted incidents of violence (including human rights violations).</p>	<p>Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction</p> <p>Protecting Livelihoods</p>
3 Severe	<p>Degrading Living Standards (from usual/typical), leading to adoption of negative Coping Mechanisms with threat of irreversible harm (such as accelerated erosion/depletion of assets). Reduced access/availability of social/basic goods and services</p> <p>Inability to meet some basic needs without adopting crisis/emergency - short/medium term irreversible - Coping Mechanisms.</p> <p>Degrading Physical and Mental Wellbeing. Physical and mental harm resulting in a loss of dignity.</p>	<p>Protecting Livelihoods</p> <p>Preventing & Mitigating Risk of extreme deterioration of Humanitarian conditions</p>
4 Extreme	<p>Collapse of Living Standards, with survival based on humanitarian assistance and/or long term irreversible extreme coping strategies.</p> <p>Extreme loss/liquidation of livelihood assets that will lead to large gaps/needs in the short term.</p> <p>Widespread grave violations of human rights. Presence of irreversible harm and heightened mortality</p>	<p>Saving Lives and Livelihoods</p>
5 Catastrophic	<p>Total collapse of Living Standards</p> <p>Near/Full exhaustion of coping options.</p> <p>Last resort Coping Mechanisms/exhausted.</p> <p>Widespread mortality (CDR, U5DR) and/or irreversible harm.</p> <p>Widespread physical and mental irreversible harm leading to excess mortality.</p> <p>Widespread grave violations of human rights.</p>	<p>Reverting/Preventing Widespread death and/or Total collapse of livelihoods</p>

Acronyms

4W	Four W's (Who is Where, When, doing What)	OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
AOR	Area of Responsibility	OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ARA	Access Restricted Areas	OPT	occupied Palestinian territory
AIMWG	Assessment and Information Management Working Group	PA	Palestinian Authority
AWD	Acute Watery Diarrhea	PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund	PMR	Periodic Mid-Year Monitoring Report
CWD	Children with Disabilities	PiN	People in Need
DES	Designated Emergency Shelter	PNA	Palestinian National Authority
EiE	Education in Emergencies	PNGO	Palestinian NGO network
EJ	East Jerusalem	PoC	Protection of Civilians
ER	Early Recovery	PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	PRCS	Palestine Red Crescent Society
EU	European Union	PRDP	Palestinian Reconstruction and Development Plan
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	PSEA	Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
FHH	Female Heading Households	PSS	Psychosocial Support
GAM	Gender and Age Marker	PWD	Persons with Disability
GBV	Gender-based violence	RPM	Response Planning Module
GEDCO	Gaza Electricity Distribution Company	SC Res.	Security Council Resolution
GMR	Great March of Return	SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
H2	Hebron City	SEFSec	Socio-economic and Food Security Monitoring System
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team	SSN	Social Safety Net
HeRAMS	Health Resources Availability Monitoring System	TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
HH	Households	UN	United Nations
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
HRC	Human Rights Council	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	UNDAF	United Nations Development Analysis Framework
HF	Humanitarian Fund for the oPt	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group	UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced People	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
IHL	International humanitarian law	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
IHL	International human rights law	UN-HABITAT	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
INGO	International non-governmental Organisation	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ISF	Israel Security Forces	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
JMP	Joint Monitoring Programme	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
MCNA	Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
MHPSS	Mental health and psychosocial services	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
MoE	Ministry of Education	UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator's Office
MoEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	VPP	Visual Plugin Pack
MoH	Ministry of Health	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government	WASH MP	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project
MoP	Ministry of Planning	WB	West Bank
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs	WBWD	West Bank Water Department
MoPAD	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development	WFP	World Food Programme
MoPWH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing	WHO	World Health Organization
MOSD	Ministry of Social Development		
NCD	Non-communicable disease		
NFI	Non-Food Item		
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation		
NIS	New Israeli Shekel		
NM	Nautical Miles		
NNGO	National NGO		
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council		
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		

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